This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

3 9015 00391 294 9
University of Michigan - BUHR

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
1817
LIBRARIES

Sculp. 46 46.

Engraved by Isaac Taylor



PHILOSOPHICAL

ARRANGEMENTS

BY

IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

LONDON

PRINTED FOR IOHN NOVRSE
BOOKSELLER TO HIS MAJESTY.

MDCC LXXV

ADVERTISEMENT

ADVERTISEMENT.

MOST of the Speculations, contained in the following Work, are not the Author's own, but the Speculations of ancient *and* reſpectable Philoſophers. *His employ has been no more, than to exhibit what they taught, which he has endeavoured to do after the beſt manner he was able. The peruſal of old Doctrines may afford perhaps amuſement, if it be true (as he has obſerved in another place* *), *that,* what from it's Antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumſtance the recommendation of Novelty.

* See the Preface to *Hermes.*

If he might aſk a favour from his Readers, the favour ſhould be this——that, they would not reject his Work upon a curſory inſpection, *ſhould it appear in ſome parts too* abſtruſe, *and perhaps in others too* obvious. *He could not well avoid either the one or the other, without impairing an* Arrangement, *which had been eſtabliſhed for Ages.*

THE

CONTENTS.

Chapter I. *Introduction—Scope or End of the Inquiry—begins from the* ARRANGEMENT *of ſimple, or ſingle Terms—Character of theſe Terms—Nature and Multitude of the Objects, which they repreſent.* Page 1.

Chap. II. *A Method of* ARRANGEMENT *propoſed—rejected, and why—another Method propoſed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole.* p. 24.

Chap. III. *Concerning* SUBSTANCE *natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increaſed to three—reduced again to two—theſe laſt two, Form and a Subject, or rather, Form and Matter.* p. 38.

Chap. IV. *Concerning* MATTER—*an imperfect Deſcription of it—it's Nature, and the Neceſſity of it's exiſtence, traced out and proved—firſt by Abſtraction—then by Analogy—Illuſtrations from Mythology.* p. 63.

Chap. V. *Concerning* FORM—*An imperfect Deſcription of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Phyſical—how they differ—Eſſential Forms—Tranſition to Forms of a Character ſuperior to the paſſive and elementary.* p. 84.

Chap. VI. *Concerning* FORM, *conſidered as an* EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE—*Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeleſs—Ovid, a philoſophical Poet—Farther Deſcription*

ſcription of the Animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, und Effects —Virgil—The Active Principle and the Paſſive Principle run thro' the Univerſe —Mind, Region of Forms— Corporeal Connections, where neceſſary, where obſtructive— Means and Ends—their different Precedence according to different Syſtems—Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Ariſtotle, &c.— Providence. p. 95.

hap. VII. *Concerning the Properties of Subſtance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic.* p. 132.

hap. VIII. *Concerning* QUALITIES—*corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of Capacity, and Completion— Tranſitions immediate, and thro' a medium—Diſpoſitions,*

Habits — Genius — Primary and imperfect Capacity — Secondary and perfect — where it is, that no Capacities exist — Qualities, penetrating and superficial — Essential Form — Figure, an important Quality — Figures intellectual, natural, artificial, phantastic — Colour, Roughness, Smoothness, &c. — Persons of Quality — PROPERTIES *of Quality — Some rejected, one admitted, and why.* p. 142.

Chap. IX. *Concerning* QUANTITY — *it's two Species — their Characters — Time and Place — their Characters* — PROPERTY *of Quantity, what — Quantities relative — Figure and Number, their Effect upon Quantity — Importance of this Effect — Sciences Mathematical appertain to it — their Use, according*

according to Plato — How other Beings partake of Quantity — Analogy, found in Mind — Common Senſe and Genius, how diſtinguiſhed — Amazing efficacy of this Genus in and thro' the World — Illuſtrations. p. 180.

Chap. X. *Concerning* RELATIVES — *their Source — Relatives apparent — real — their Properties, reciprocal — Inference, and Coexiſtence — Force of Relation in Ethics — in matters Dramatic — in Nature, and the Order of Being — Relations, amicable and hoſtile — Evil — Want — Friendſhip — Strife — Relation of all to the Supreme Cauſe — Extent and Uſe of this Predicament, or Arrangement.* p. 212

Chap. XI. *Concerning* ACTION *and* PASSION — *Action, it's five Species*

cies—those of Passion reciprocate—Mind Divine, Human—latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Passivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Re-action, where they exist, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence, and what—requisite both in Action and in Passion—Power, tho' like Non-Entity, yet widely different—Double in the reasoning Faculty—Power, not first in existence, but Energy, which never has ceased, or will cease, or can cease. p. 254.

Chap. XII. *Concerning* WHEN *and* WHERE *—Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how distinguished from Time and Place, how connected with them—Descriptions*

ſcriptions of When and Where —their Utility and Importance in human Life—various Terms, denoting theſe two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extenſive influence—plauſible Topics—concurring Cauſes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Cauſes—Supreme Intelligence. p. 290.

Chap. XIII. *Concerning* POSITION *or* SITUATION—*What it is, and how deduced—how it exiſts in Beings inanimate—in Vegetables—in Man—animal Progreſſion—Works of Art—Attitudes—Illuſtrations of Attitude—from Poets—from Actors—from Orators—it's Efficacy, whence—Poſition, among*

among the Elements of Democritus—it's Influence and Importance in the natural World—in the intellectual. p. 315.

Chap. XIV. *Concerning* HABIT, *or rather* THE BEING HABITED—*It's Deſcription—it's principal Species deduced and illuſtrated—it's Privation—Concluſion of the ſecond or middle Part of the Treatiſe.* p. 347.

Chap. XV. *Concerning the* APPENDAGES *to the Univerſal Genera or Arrangements; that is to ſay concerning* OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER, *or* AT ONCE, *and* MOTION, *uſually called Poſt-Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all theſe (Motion excepted) deduced and illuſtrated—Preparation for the Theory*

Theory of Motion. p. 360.

Chap. XVI. *Concerning* MOTION PHYSICAL—*It's various Species deduced and illuſtrated—blend themſelves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Oppoſition, Reſt—Motion Phyſical—an Object of all the Senſes—Common Objects of Senſation, how many—*MOTION, *a thing not ſimple, but complicated with many other things—it's Definition or Deſcription taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Ariſtotle, and why.* p. 381.

Chap. XVII. *Concerning* MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL—*This means* METAPHYSICAL, *and why ſo called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Conſciouſneſs, Anticipation, Preconception*

Appetite

*—Appetite, Reſentment, Reaſon — Motion Phyſical and Metaphyſical, how united— Diſcord and Harmony of the internal Principles—Powers vegetative, animal, rational —Immortality—*REST, *it's ſeveral Species—*MOTION, *to what perceptive Beings it appertains; to what not—and whence the Difference.* p. 406.

Chap. XVIII. *Concluſion—Utilities deducible from the Theory of theſe Arrangements—Recapitulation.* p. 452.

PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS

ADDRESS'T TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS LORD HYDE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUTCHY OF LANCASTER &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—Scope, or end of the Inquiry—Begins from the ARRANGEMENT *of ſimple, or ſingle Terms—Character of theſe Terms—Nature and Multitude of the Objects, which they repreſent.*

PHILOSOPHY, taking its name from the *Love of Wiſdom*, and having for its *End* the Inveſtigation of Truth, has an equal regard both to Practice and Speculation, in as much as *Truth of every kind* is *ſimilar* and *congenial.* Ch. I.

Ch. I.

nial. Hence we find that ſome of the moſt illuſtrious *Actors* upon the great Theatre of the World have been engaged at times in Philoſophical Speculation. *Pericles,* who governed *Athens,* was the Diſciple of *Anaxagoras*; *Epaminondas* ſpent his youth in the *Pythagorean* School; *Alexander* the Great had *Ariſtotle* for his Preceptor; and *Scipio* made *Polybius* his Companion and Friend. Why need I mention *Cicero,* or *Cato,* or *Brutus?* The Orations, the Epiſtles, and the Philoſophical Works of the firſt, ſhew him ſufficiently converſant both in Action and Contemplation. So eager was *Cato* for Knowledge, even when ſurrounded with Buſineſs, that he uſed to read Philoſophy in the Senate houſe, while the Senate was aſſembling: and as for the Patriot *Brutus,* though his life was a continual Scene of the moſt important Action, he found time not only to ſtudy, but to compoſe *a Treatiſe upon Virtue.*

Ch. I.

When theſe were gone, and the worſt of times ſucceeded, *Thraſea Pætus*, and *Helvidius Priſcus* were at the ſame period both Senators, and Philoſophers; and appear to have ſupported the ſevereſt trials of *Tyrannic* Oppreſſion by the manly ſyſtem of the *Stoic* Moral *. The beſt Emperor, whom the *Romans*, or perhaps any Nation, ever knew, *Marcus Antoninus*, was involved during his whole life in buſineſs of the laſt conſequence; ſometimes Conſpiracies forming, which he was obliged to diſſipate; formidable Wars ariſing at other times, when he was obliged to take the field. Yet during none of theſe periods did he forſake *Philoſophy*, but ſtill perſiſted in *Meditation* †, and in committing his thoughts to

* See *Arr. Epictet. lib.* i. *c.* 1. *and* 2. and the Notes of my late worthy Friend, the learned Editor, *Upton*. See alſo Mrs. *Carter's* excellent Tranſlation.

† See the Original, particularly in *Gataker's* Edition. See alſo the learned and accurate Tranſlation of *Meric Caſaubon*.

Ch. I. writing, during moments gained by ſtealth from the hurry of courts and campaigns.

If we deſcend to later ages, and ſearch *our own* Country, we ſhall find *Sir Thomas More*, *Sir Philip Sidney*, *Sir Walter Raleigh*, *Lord Herbert* of *Cherbury*, *Milton*, *Algernon Sidney*, *Sir William Temple*, and many others, to have been all of them eminent in *public* Life, and yet at the ſame time conſpicuous for their *Speculations* and *Literature*. If we look *abroad*, examples of like character will occur in other Countries. *Grotius*, the Poet, the Critic, the Philoſopher, and the Divine, was employed by the court of *Sweden* as *Ambaſſador to France*: and *De Witt*, that acute but unfortunate Stateſman, that Pattern of parcimony and political accompliſhments, was an able mathematician, wrote upon the *Elements of Curves*, and applied his Algebra with accuracy to the Trade and Commerce of his Country.

AND ſo much in DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHY againſt thoſe, who may poſſibly *undervalue* her, becauſe they have *ſucceeded without* her; thoſe I mean (and it muſt be confeſt they are many) who, having ſpent their whole lives in what *Milton* calls the *buſy hum of Men*, have acquired to themſelves Habits of amazing efficacy, *unaſſiſted* by the helps of *Science* and *Erudition*. To ſuch the *retired* Student may appear an aukward Being, becauſe they want a juſt ſtandard to meaſure his merit. But let them recur to the bright examples before alledged; let them remember that theſe were eminent in their own way; were men of action and buſineſs; men of the world; and yet did they not diſdain to cultivate *Philoſophy*, nay, were many of them perhaps indebted to her for the ſplendor of their *active* Character.

THIS reaſoning has a farther end. It juſtifies me in the addreſs of theſe *Philo-*

Ch. I. *ſophical Arrangements*, as your Lordſhip has been diſtinguiſhed in *either* character, I mean in your *public* one, as well as in your *private*. Thoſe, who know the Hiſtory of our *foreign* tranſactions, know the reputation that you acquired both in *Poland* and in *Germany* * : and thoſe, who are honoured with your *nearer* friendſhip, know that you can *ſpeculate* as well as *act*, and can employ your pen both with Elegance and Inſtruction.

It may not perhaps be unentertaining to your Lordſhip to ſee, in what manner the *Preceptor of Alexander the Great* arranged his *Pupil's* Ideas, *ſo that they might not cauſe confuſion for want of accurate diſpoſition*. It may be thought alſo a fact worthy of your notice, that he be-

* The Treaty of *Warſaw*, negotiated and ſigned by Lord *Hyde*, was made in *January*, 1745; that of *Dreſden*, made under Lord *Hyde's* Mediation, was ſigned the *December* following. By this laſt Treaty, not only the Peace of *Germany* was reſtored, but the *Auſtrian Netherlands*, and the King of *Sardinia's* Territories were in conſequence of it preſerved.

came

came acquainted with this method from the venerable *Pythagoras*, who, unleſs he drew it from *remoter* ſources, to us unknown, was, perhaps, himſelf its inventor and original teacher (*a*). Ch. I.

POETS relate that VENUS was wedded to VULCAN, the Goddeſs of Beauty to the God of Deformity. The Tale, as ſome explain it, gives a *double* repreſentation of *Art*; *Vulcan* ſhewing us the *Progreſſions* of Art, and *Venus* the *Completions*. The *Progreſſions*, ſuch as the hew-

(*a*) From *Pythagoras* it paſt to his Diſciples, and among others to *Archytas*, who wrote upon the Subject in the *Doric* Dialect, the Dialect generally uſed by *Pythagoras*, and his Followers. This Treatiſe of *Archytas*, is in part ſtill extant, tho' but little known, large Quotations out of it being inſerted by *Simplicius* into that valuable, but rare Book, his *Commentaries on the Predicaments*, from which many of them are transferred into the Notes upon the different Chapters of this Work.

Fabricius, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, T. i. p. 394, mentions a Tract upon this Subject, publiſhed at *Venice* an. 1571, under the name of *Archytas*, but he informs us withal, that its Authenticity is doubted, becauſe the above-mentioned Quotations from *Archytas*, made by *Simplicius*, are not to be found there. This Tract I have never ſeen.

Ch. I. ing of Stone, the grinding of Colours, the fuſion of Metals, theſe all of them are laborious, and many times diſguſtful: the *Completions*, ſuch as the Temple, the Palace, the Picture, the Statue, theſe all of them are Beauties, and juſtly call for admiration.

Now if Logic be one of thoſe Arts, which help to improve Human Reaſon, it muſt neceſſarily be an Art of the *progreſſive* Character; an Art which, not ending with itſelf, has a view to ſomething *farther*. If then in the following Speculations it ſhould appear dry rather than elegant, ſevere rather than pleaſing, let it plead by way of defence that, tho' its importance may be great, it partakes from its very nature (which cannot be changed) more of the *deformed God*, than of the *beautiful Goddeſs*.

The ſubject commences in the manner following,

The

THE VULGAR can give reaſons to a certain degree *(d)*, and can examine after a manner, the reaſons given them by others.—And what is this, but NATURAL LOGIC? If therefore theſe Efforts of theirs have an Effect, and nothing happen without a Cauſe, this Effect muſt of neceſſity be derived from certain Principles. Ch. I.

THE Queſtion then is, *What theſe Principles are*; for if theſe can be once inveſtigated, and then knowingly applied, we ſhall be enabled to do by *Rule*, what others do by *Hazard*; and in what we do, as much to excell the uninſtruct-

(d) Πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς κ᾽ ἐξετάζειν κ᾽ ὑπέχειν λόγον, κ᾽ ἀπολογεῖσθαι κ᾽ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. Τῶν μὲν ὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῆ κ. τ. λ. *Omnes enim quadam tenus et exquirere et ſuſtinere rationem, et defendere, et accuſare aggrediuntur. At ex imperitâ quidem multitudine alii temerè*, &c. *Ariſt. Rhetor. lib.* i. *cap.* 1. See alſo Vol. the firſt of theſe Works, *Treatiſe the third, in the Notes*, p. 286.

ed

Ch. I. ed Reaſoner, as a diſciplined Boxer ſurpaſſes an untaught Ruſtic.

Now in the inveſtigation of theſe Principles we are firſt taught to obſerve, that every *Science* (as Arithmetic, Geometry, Muſic, Aſtronomy) may be reſolved into it's *Theorems*; every *Theorem* into it's *Syllogiſms*; every *Syllogiſm* into it's *Propoſitions*; and every *Propoſition* into certain *ſimple*, or *ſingle Terms*.

If this be admitted, it is not difficult to ſee, that, in order to know Science, a man muſt know firſt what makes a Theorem; in order to know Theorems, he muſt know firſt what makes a Syllogiſm; in order to know Syllogiſms, he muſt know firſt what makes Propoſitions; and to acquire a general Knowledge of theſe, he muſt firſt know ſimple or ſingle Terms, ſince it is out of theſe that Propoſitions are all of them compounded.

AND thus we may perceive, that where these ſeveral Reſolutions *end*, 'tis hence preciſely the diſquiſition is to *begin* (*e*). Ch. I.

It

(*e*) There is an elegant Simile, taken from Architecture, to illuſtrate this Speculation. The Quotation from the original Author (*Ammonius*) may be found in the firſt Volume of theſe Treatiſes, p. 271. to which a Tranſlation is there ſubjoined.

Ammonius, after he has produced his Similitude, applies it as follows.

Οὕτως ἂν καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ποιεῖ· βουλόμενος γὰρ ποιῆσαι ἀπόδειξιν, φησὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, βέλομαι περὶ Ἀποδείξεως εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἐπιστημονικὸς, ἀδύναλον εἰπεῖν περὶ τούτου τὸν μὴ πρότερον εἴποντα, τί ἐστι συλλογισμός· τὸν δὲ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμὸν οὐκ ἂν μαθοῖμεν, ἐ μαθόντες, τί ἐστι πρότασις· λόγοι μὲν γάρ τινές εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις· τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογὴ ἐστιν ὁ συλλογισμός· ὥσε ἄνευ τοῦ γνῶναι τὰς προτάσεις, ἀδύνατον μαθεῖν τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων σύγκειται· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὴν πρότασιν, ἄνευ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε πᾶς λόγος. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, καὶ ῥήματα ἄνευ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων φωνή ἐστι σημαντική. Δεῖ οὖν πρότερον περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν εἰπεῖν. Ἐνταῦθα οὖν ἡ θεωρία κατέληξε, καὶ γίγνεται τοῦτο τῆς πράξεως ἀρχή.

Ch. I. It muſt begin, where they end, that is to ſay, from ſimple Terms; becauſe, if it

---

ἀρχή. Πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις. Εἶθ' ὕτω περὶ ὀνομάτων, καὶ ῥημάτων, καὶ προτάσεως, ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἑρμηνείας· εἶτα περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ, ἐν τοῖς προτέροις Ἀναλυτικοῖς· εἶθ' ὕτω περὶ ἀποδείξεως, ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις Ἀναλυτικοῖς. Ἐνταῦθα ἦν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας——*And thus alſo the Philoſopher does: being willing to form a Demonſtration, he ſays to himſelf, I am willing to ſpeak concerning Demonſtration. But, in as much as Demonſtration is a Scientific Syllogiſm, it is impoſſible to ſay any thing concerning it, without firſt ſaying what is a Syllogiſm; nor can we learn what is ſimply a Syllogiſm, without having firſt learnt what is a Propoſition; for Propoſitions are certain Sentences; and it is a Collection of ſuch Sentences that forms a Syllogiſm: ſo that without knowing Propoſitions, it is impoſſible to learn what is a Syllogiſm, becauſe it is out of theſe that a Syllogiſm is compounded. Farther than this, it is impoſſible to know a Propoſition, without knowing Nouns and Verbs, out of which is compoſed every Species of Sentence; or to know Nouns and Verbs without knowing Sounds articulate, or ſimple Words, in as much as each of theſe is a Sound articulate, having a Meaning. It is neceſſary therefore in the firſt place to ſay ſomething concerning ſimple Words.*

Here then ends the Theory, and it is this, which becomes the Beginning of the Practice, (that is, from this laſt part the Theory is to be carried into execution.)

Firſt

it were to begin ſooner, it would begin in the middle; and becauſe if the Reſolutions did not ſtop ſomewhere, there could be no beginning at all. Ch. I.

Now as to the Subject, whence the Diſquiſition is to begin (I mean *the Contemplation of Simple Terms*) 'tis obvious it muſt be widely different from the ſeveral Subjects that precede it. The preceding Subjects, ſuch as Theorems, Syllogiſms, Propoſitions, may all of them

---

Firſt therefore (with a view to the practical Part) *he diſſerts concerning ſimple articulate Sounds in his* PREDICAMENTS: *after that, concerning Nouns and Verbs, and Propoſitions, in his Treatiſe concerning* INTERPRETATION: *then, concerning Syllogiſm, ſimply ſo called, in his* FIRST ANALYTICS: *and finally, concerning Demonſtration, in his* LATTER ANALYTICS. *And here is the End of the Practice, which End* (as we have ſhewn above) *was the Beginning of the Theory. Ammon. in Prædic.* p. 16. ed. 8vo.

We have made this large Extract from *Ammonius*, not only as it fully explains the Subject of *this* Treatiſe, but as it gives a conciſe, and yet an elegant View of that celebrated Work of *Ariſtotle*, his ORGANON, and of that juſt and accurate *Order* in which its ſeveral Parts ſtand arranged.

be

Ch. I. be *reſolved*, becauſe they are all of them *compound*: But *Terms cannot be reſolved*, becauſe they are *ſimple* or *ſingle*. The moſt we can do, as their Multitude is large, is to ſeek after ſome Method, by which they may be claſſed or arranged; and if *different* Methods of *Arrangement* occur, then to adopt out of the ſeveral that, which appears to be *the beſt*.

IT being therefore adjuſted, *from what Subject* we are to begin (namely, from *ſimple* or *ſingle Terms*) and *after what Manner* we are to begin (namely, by *claſſing* or *arranging* them) a farther Queſtion occurs before we proceed, and that is, *What is it, that theſe Terms repreſent?*

THERE ſeem but *three* Claſſes poſſible, and theſe three are either WORDS—or IDEAS—or THINGS, that is to ſay, *Individuals*.

Now

Now they cannot repreſent merely *Words*, for then the Treatiſe would be *Grammatical*—nor yet merely *Ideas*, for then the Treatiſe would be *Metaphyſical*—nor yet merely *Things* or *Individuals*, for then the Treatiſe would be *Phyſical*. Ch. I.

How then ſhall we decide?—Shall we deny that *ſimple Terms* repreſent any one of theſe? Or ſhall we rather aſſume the contrary, and ſay they repreſent them *all*?—If ſo, and this be, as it will appear, *the more plauſible* Hypotheſis, we may affirm of *ſimple Terms* (the Subject of this Inquiry) that they are WORDS *repreſenting* THINGS, *through the Medium of our* IDEAS *(f)*.

THAT

(f) Ammonius, in his excellent Commentary upon theſe Predicaments of *Ariſtotle*, informs us there were different Sentiments of different Philoſophers as to the Subject, concerning which theſe *Predicaments* were converſant. Some, as *Alexander of Aphrodiſeum*, confined them wholly to *Words*: others, as *Euſtathius*,

Ch. I. THAT *this* in fact is their Character, may appear from the many *Logical*, *Metaphyſical*, and *Phyſical* Theorems, and to theſe (as *Man* is a Part of Nature) we may add alſo *Ethical* Speculations, which are occaſionally interſperſed in the courſe of this Inquiry *(g)*.

BUT

---

thius, wholly *to Things:* a third ſet, of which was *Porphyry*, wholly *to our Thoughts or Ideas*. *Ammonius* appears to have ſuppoſed that they all erred, and that, not ſo much in the reſpective Subjects they adopted, as in the reſtriction or limitation to one Subject *only*. For this reaſon he immediately ſubjoins——

Οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστεροι λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστι καὶ Ἰαμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς ὅτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος, ὅτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων, ὅτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα, διὰ μέσων νοημάτων——*But thoſe, who ſpeak more accurately, of which number Iamblichus is one, ſay that Ariſtotle diſcourſes not upon Ideas alone, nor upon Words alone, nor upon Things alone; but that the* SCOPE *or* END *of his Categorics, is,* CONCERNING WORDS, SIGNIFYING THINGS, THRO' THE MEDIUM OF OUR THOUGHTS OR IDEAS. *Ammon.* in *Prædicam.* p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo.

(g) Thus *Boethius*——*Hæc quoque nobis de decem Prædicamentis inſpectio, et in Phyſicâ Ariſtotelis Doctrinâ,*

et

But to return to our ſubject, the *Contemplation of Simple Terms.* Ch. I.

As they appear to be *Words*, and not only Words, but *Words* which repreſent *Things* through the medium of our *Ideas*, it may not be improper to obſerve ſomething upon the ſeveral Objects

---

et in Moralis Philoſophiæ Cognitione perutilis eſt; quod per ſingula current ibus magis liquebit. Boeth. in Cat. p. 113. *Edit. fol. Baſil.*

Ammonius ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe in fuller and more general terms——Ὅτι δὲ χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὸ βιβλίον εἴς τε τὸ θεωρητικὸν φιλοσοφίας μέρος, καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν ἐδείξαμεν, ἄνευ τῶν ἁπλῶν φωνῶν οὐκ ἔστι γνῶναι, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τῶν κοινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἃ τὰ ὄντα πάντα διαιρεῖται——*that the Book is uſeful both to the ſpeculative Part of Philoſophy, and the Practical, is evident from what has been ſaid, if it be true both that Demonſtration, as we have ſhewn, cannot be known without ſimple Words, and that* THE BOOK ALSO TREATS CONCERNING THOSE COMMON CHARACTERS OR ATTRIBUTES, INTO WHICH ALL BEINGS ARE DIVIDED. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 16. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo.

Ch. I. thus repreſented, and that with reſpect both to their *Nature*, and to their *Multitude*.

As to their Nature (without being too philoſophically minute), 'tis enough to obſerve, that ſome of them are *ſenſible* Objects, and ſome of them are *intelligible*—that *the ſenſible* are perceived by our ſeveral Senſes, and make up *the Tribe of external Individuals*—that the *intelligible* are more immediately *our own*, and ariſe within us, when the Mind, by marking what is *common to many Individuals*, forms to itſelf *a Species*; or, when by marking *what is common to many Species*, it forms to itſelf *a Genus*.

Nor are theſe mental Productions the mere efforts of Art, the ingenious inventions of Human Sagacity, but, under the *original* guidance of pure Nature, even Children in their early days *ſpontaneouſly faſhion* them, and *ſpontaneouſly*

neously refer them to Individuals, as they occur, ſaying of this Individual, 'tis a Horſe; of another, 'tis a Dog; of a third, 'tis a Sparrow *(h)*. Ch. I.

If from the *Nature* of theſe Objects (which we have now ſuppoſed to be either ſenſible or intelligible) we paſs to their *Multitude*, we ſhall find the Genera to be fewer than the Species, and that from this plain reaſon, becauſe *many* Species are included within *one* Genus. We ſhall find alſo the Species to be fewer than the Individuals, and that by parity of reaſon, becauſe *many* Individuals are included within *one* Species. But as for Individuals themſelves,

(h) See *Hermes*, B. III. c. iv. where the Doctrine of *general* or *univerſal Ideas* is diſcuſt more largely.

See alſo the Εισαγωγη, or Introduction of *Porphyry*, where the Subject of *Genus* and *Species* is treated in a perſpicuous and eaſy method. This Tract is uſually prefixt to *Ariſtotle's* Logic.

Ch. I. theſe we ſhall find to be truly *infinite*; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are inceſſantly periſhing, the new inceſſantly ariſing.

YET 'tis *theſe* that compoſe that *Univerſe*, in which we exiſt; and without knowing ſomething of *theſe*, we may be conſidered as living, like the *Cimmerians*, in *Homer*,

Ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι—— *

Cover'd with miſt and cloud.

IF, therefore, *all Science* be ſomething *definite* and *ſteady* (for without this character it would not merit the name), how can it poſſibly bear relation to *ſuch a Multitude* as this, a multitude in character ſo truly contrary to it's own, a multitude every where *fleeting*, every where *infinite* and *vague?* How indeed

* Οδυσσ. Λ. 15.

ſhould

ſhould the *fleeting* be known *ſteadily*; or how ſhould the *vague* and *infinite* (*i*) be known *definitely*? Ch. I.

(*i*) INFINITORUM NULLA COGNITIO EST; *infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non poteſt, nullius Scientiæ fine concluditur: quare* INFINITORUM SCIENTIA NULLA EST. *Boeth. in Præd.* p. 113. *Edit. Baſ.*

Such was the doctrine of *Boethius*, who, according to the practice of the age, in which he lived, united the *Platonic* and the *Peripatetic* Philoſophies. But *Ariſtotle* himſelf taught the ſame doctrine many centuries before.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ᾗ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωϛον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωϛον ποσόν τι· τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωϛον ποιόν τι· τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων ὄντων ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ὅτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων ἢ πόσων ἐϛίν. *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. p. . *Edit. Sylb. If therefore* INFINITE, *conſidered as infinite, be* UNKNOWABLE, *then that which is infinite in Multitude or Magnitude is unknowable as to* QUANTITY, *and that which is infinite in Form is unknowable as to* QUALITY. *But the Principles being infinite both in Multitude and in Quality, 'tis impoſſible to know the Beings derived out of them. For then 'tis we conceive that* WE KNOW ANY BEING COMPOSITE, *when we know out of* WHAT *Things, and* HOW MANY *Things it is compounded.*

Ch. I. As this can hardly be ſuppoſed, 'tis for this reaſon that LOGIC, which is juſtly called THE ORGAN (*k*), or INSTRUMENT *of the Sciences*, has for it's *firſt* Employment *to reduce Infinitude*; and this it does *by eſtabliſhing certain definitive* ARRANGEMENTS, or CLASSES, to

---

(*k*) The *Stoics* held Logic to be a *Part* of Philoſophy; the *Peripatetics* held it no more than an ORGAN, or INSTRUMENT; *Plato* held it to be both, as well a Part as an Organ. His Reaſoning, according to *Ammonius* was, as follows. Καθάπερ γάρ φησιν ὁ Ξέρξης δίτοὺς, ὁ μὲν μετρῶν, ὁ δὲ μετρούμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν μετρῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, ὁ δὲ μετρούμενος μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ὑγροῦ· ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ Λογικὴ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἑστα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς Φιλοσοφίας, συμβιβαζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς Φιλοσοφίας. *As the Quart, ſays he, is twofold, one that which meaſures, the other that which is meaſured; and as that, which meaſures, is the Organ of Menſuration; that, which is meaſured, the Part of ſome whole or intire fluid: in like Manner alſo Logic, when taken apart from things, is an Organ of Philoſophy; when connected with them, is a Part of Philoſophy.*

Thus *Ammonius* on the *Categorics*, p. 8. where we may find alſo the reaſonings both of the *Stoics* and the *Peripatetics*.

ſome

ſome of which *all Particulars may be referred*, however numerous, however diverſified, the paſt, the preſent, the future, all alike. Ch. I.

And thus we return to *Claſſing* and *Arranging*, the Proceſs already ſuggeſted to be the proper one.

It remains to inquire, whether there are more Methods of Arrangement than one; and, if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

But this will be the Subject of the following Chapter.

CHAP. II.

A Method of Arrangement propoſed—rejected, and why—another Method propoſed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole.

Ch. II.

ONE Method of Arrangement is as follows.

THE Multitude of *Ideas* treaſured up in the human Mind, and which, bearing reference to *Things*, are expreſſed by *Words*, may be arranged and circumſcribed under the following characters. They all denote either SUBSTANCE or ATTRIBUTE—and *Subſtance* and *Attribute* may be each of them modified under the different characters of UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR, as beſt befits the Purpoſes of Reaſoning and Science. Thus *Man is an univerſal Subſtance*; *Alexander*,

ander, a particular One: Valour, an universal Attribute; the Valour of Alexander, a particular One. Ch. II.

AND hence there ariſes a QUADRUPLE ARRANGEMENT OF TERMS; an Arrangement of them into SUBSTANCE UNIVERSAL, and SUBSTANCE PARTICULAR; into ATTRIBUTE UNIVERSAL, and ATTRIBUTE PARTICULAR, to ſome one of which FOUR not only our *Words* and our *Ideas*, but the innumerable Tribe of *Individuals* may all of them be reduced (*a*).

A LARGE

(*a*) This method may be found in the beginning of *Ariſtotle's Predicaments*, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the *Predicaments* themſelves.

See *Ariſtot. Prædic.* p. 23. *Edit. Sylb.* Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑποκειμένου κ. τ. λ.

The *Stagirite*, in giving this *quadruple* Arrangement, explains himſelf not by *Names*, but by *Deſcriptions*. *Subſtance univerſal* he deſcribes, as follows——καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ' οὐδενί ἐστι—*Attribute particular*, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου

Ch. II.

A LARGE *Reduction* this, yet a Reduction which may poſſibly lead us into another Extreme, by rendering that Multitude, which we would confine, *too limited, too abridged.* Suppoſe, therefore, we were to inquire whether this Reduction might not be *enlarged*, and a ſecond and *more perfect Method* than the laſt be eſtabliſhed.

THE World, as we ſee, is filled with various SUBSTANCES. Each of theſe poſſeſſes it's proper *Attributes*, and is at the ſame time encompaſſed with certain

---

κειμένε δὲ ὑδενὸς λέγεται—*Attribute general*, καθ' ὑποκειμένε τε λέγεται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐςίν—*Subſtances particular*, ἔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐςὶν, ἔτε καθ' ὑποκειμένε τινὸς λέγεται.

Thoſe, who would ſee an explanation of thoſe ſeveral *Deſcriptions*, and why *Ariſtotle* prefers them to their peculiar *Names*, may conſult his *Greek* Commentator, *Ammonius*, and his Latin one, *Boethius*, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the ſubject.

Circum-

Circumſtantials. Not to ſpeak of *intelligible* Subſtances (which belong rather to *Metaphyſics*), *natural* Subſtances appear all to be *extended*; nor that ſimply, but under a certain *external Figure*, and *internal Organization*. A Lion and an Oak *agree*, as they are both *extended*; yet have they each a Figure, and Organization *peculiar*. A *living* Lion and a *brazen* Lion may have the *ſame* external Figure, but *within* there is a wide *Difference* from the *poſſeſſion* of *Organization* on one ſide, and the *want* of it on the other. If then we call the Attribute of *Extenſion* QUANTITY, that of *Figure* and *Organization* QUALITY, we may ſet down theſe two (I mean *Quantity* and *Quality*) as the two great *eſſential Attributes* belonging to every Subſtance, whether natural or artificial. Ch. II.

AGAIN, every *Subſtance*, whether natural or artificial, either from *Will* or from *Appetite*, or, where theſe are wanting,

Ch. II. ing, from ſuch *lower* Cauſes as it's *Figure* or mere *Quantity*, has (in an enlarged uſe of the Words) a *Power to act*. Thus 'tis through *Will*, that Men ſtudy; through *Appetite*, that Brutes eat; through its *Figure*, that the Clock goes; and through its *Quantity*, that the Stone deſcends. Nor are they only thus capable of *acting*, but alſo of *being acted upon*, and that too each of them, according to its reſpective Character. The Mind is acted upon by *Truth*, the Appetite by *Pleaſure*, the Clock by a *Spring*, and the Stone by *Gravitation*. Thus then, beſides *Quantity* and *Quality*, we have found two other Attributes, common to all *Subſtances*, and theſe are ACTION and PASSION.

AGAIN, it often happens when Subſtances are not *preſent* to us, that we are deſirous to know, *when* and *where* they exiſted. *When*, we aſk, lived *Homer*? *Where*, we aſk, ſtood the antient *Memphis*?

phis ?—In the anſwer to theſe Queſtions we learn the *Time* and *Place*, which *circumſcribed* the exiſtence of theſe Beings. Now as all ſenſible Subſtances are circumſcribed after theſe manners, hence we may conſider the WHEN, and the WHERE, as two *Circumſtantials*, that inſeparably attend them. And thus have we added two more Attributes to the number already eſtabliſhed. Ch. II.

FARTHER ſtill, in contemplating *where* things exiſt, we are often led to conſider their *Poſition*, and that more eſpecially in *living* Subſtances poſſeſſing the Power of Self-Motion. There is a manifeſt difference between *reclining* and *ſitting*; between *ſitting* and *ſtanding*; and there are other Circumſtances of *Poſition*, which extend to all Subſtances whatever. And thus muſt POSITION or SITUATION be ſubjoined as another different Attribute.

ADD

Ch. II. ADD to this, when *Subſtances are ſuperinduced upon Subſtances*, we conſider them under the character of *Cloathing* or HABIT. Thus in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word, the Glove, covering our hand, the Shoe our foot, the Coat our Body, are ſo many Species of *Habit*. By a more *diſtant* Analogy the Corn may be ſaid to *cloath* the fields, the Woods to *cloath* the Mountains; and by an Analogy ſtill more remote than that, the Sciences and Virtues to be *Habits, that cloath the Mind.*

LAST of all, in the variety of *co-exiſting* Subſtances and Attributes, there are many *whoſe very Exiſtence* infers *the Exiſtence of ſome other*. Thus in *Subſtances*, the Exiſtence of *Son* infers that of *Father*; of *Servant*, that of *Maſter*: in *Quantity*, the Exiſtence of *greater* infers that of *leſs*; in *Poſition*, *above* infers *below*; and in the time *When*, *ſubſequent* has

has a neceſſary reſpect to *prior*. 'Tis when we view things in theſe *mutual Dependencies*, in theſe *reciprocal Inferences*, that we diſcover another Attribute, the *Attribute* of RELATION. Ch. II.

AND thus inſtead of confining ourſelves to the ſimple Diviſion of SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE, we have divided ATTRIBUTE itſelf into NINE diſtinct ſorts; ſome of which we have conſidered as *eſſential*, others as *circumſtantial*, and thus made upon the whole *(by ſetting Subſtance at their Head)* TEN COMPREHENSIVE AND UNIVERSAL GENERA, called, with reference to their *Greek* name, CATEGORICS; with reference to their *Latin* name, PREDICAMENTS; and ſtyled in the Title of this Work, PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS (*b*). When enume-

(*b*) The Antients gave to theſe ARRANGEMENTS different Names, and made alſo the Number of them different. Some, as *Archytas*, called them καθόλου λόγοι,

Ch. II. enumerated (c) in their several Names and in order, as they follow.

λοῖοι, *universal Denominations*; others, as *Quintilian*, Elementa, *Elements*; others, as *Aristotle*, σχήματα κατηγορίας, *Figures, or Forms of Predication*; κατηγορίαι, *Prædicaments*; γένη γενικώτατα, *the most general or comprehensive Genera*; τὰ πρῶτα γένη, *the primary Genera*. They differed also as to their Number. Some made them *two*, *Subject* and *Accident* (or, which is the same) *Substance* and *Attribute*; others made them *three*, dividing *Accidents* into the *inherent* and *circumstantial*; *the Stoics* held them to be *four*, ὑποκείμενα, ποιὰ, πῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχοντες, *Subjects, things distinguished by Qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else*; *Plato* said they were *five*, οὐσία, ταυτότης, ἑτερότης, κίνησις καὶ στάσις, *Substance, Identity, Diversity, Motion, Rest*; others made *seven*; lastly, the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, maintained the Number usually adopted, that is to say, those *ten*, which make the Subject of this Treatise.

See *Aristot. Prædic.* p. 24, *et Metaphys.* p. 79, 104, &c. *Edit. Sylburg. Quintil. l* iii. *c.* 6. *Ammon. in Prædicam.* p. 16, 17, &c. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo. 1545. *Simplic. in Prædicam.* p. 16. *V. Edit. Basil. Fol.* 1551.

As *Words*, by signifying *Things*, through the Medium of our *Ideas*, are essential to *Logic*, and are the

Mate-

QUALITY, QUANTITY, RELATION, ACTION, PASSION, WHEN, WHERE, POSITION, and HABIT. Ch. II.

As each of theſe ten Predicaments has it's ſubordinate diſtinctions, the Baſis of our Knowlege will be now ſo amply *widened*, that we ſhall find Space ſufficient, on which to build, be our Plan diverſified, and extenſive, as it may.

WE cannot conclude this Chapter without obſerving; that the doctrine of theſe CATEGORIES, theſe PREDICAMENTS, theſe PRIMARY GENERA, or

---

Materials of every Propoſition, the preſent Work may be called *Logical*. But as the Speculations extend to *Phyſics*, to *Ethics*, and even to the *Firſt Philoſophy*, they become for that reaſon ſomething *more than Logical*, and have been called, with a view to this their *comprehenſive* Character, *not Logical*, but PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

(*c*) Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων, ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ἢ ποσόν, ἢ ποιόν, ἢ πρός τι, ἢ ποῦ, ἢ ποτὲ, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν, ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν. *Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 24. *Edit. Sylb.* The paſſage needs no other tranſlation, than what appears in the Text.

Ch. II. PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, is a valuable, a copious, and a ſublime *Theory*; a *Theory*, which, when well underſtood, leads by *Analogy* from things *ſenſible* to things *intelligible*; from *Effect* to *Cauſe*; from that which is *paſſive*, *unintelligent*, and *ſubordinate*, to that which is *active*, *intelligent*, and *ſupreme*; a *Theory*, which prepares us not only to ſtudy every thing *elſe* with advantage, but makes us knowing withal in one reſpect, where *particular* ſtudies are ſure to fail; knowing in the *relative* value of things, when *compared* one to another; and modeſt, of courſe, in the eſtimate of our own accompliſhments *.

THIS is in fact the *neceſſary* conſequence of being ſhewn *to what Portion of Being every Art or Science belongs*, and how *limited that Portion*, when *compared* to what *remains*. The want of this *ge-*

* See the laſt Chapter of this Treatiſe, p. 462, 463.

neral

neral knowlege leads to an effect the very reverse; ſo that men, who poſſeſs it not, though profoundly knowing in a *ſingle* Art or a *ſingle* Science, are too often carried by ſuch *partial* Knowlege to a blameable *Arrogance*, as if *the reſt* of mankind were buſied *in purſuits of no value*, and *themſelves* the *monopolizers of Wiſdom and of Truth*.—But this by the way.

THE *diſtinct* diſcuſſion of each one of theſe *Categories*, *Predicaments*, *Arrangements*, or *Genera*, will become the buſineſs of the following Chapters; which diſcuſſion, joined to what has been *already* premiſed, as well as to ſuch *future* inquiries, as ſhall naturally ariſe in conſequence, will include all we have to offer upon this *intereſting ſubject* (*d*).

As

(*d*) The *Greek* Logicians divided their ſpeculations on this ſubject into three τμήματα, or Sections, calling the firſt Section, τὸ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν;

Ch. II. As for PROPOSITIONS, which have for their materials *the ſimple Terms*, here enumerated; and for SYLLOGISMS, which have for their materials *the ſeveral Species of Propoſitions*; both theſe naturally make *ſubſequent* and *diſtinct* Parts of LOGIC, and muſt therefore be conſigned to ſome future Speculation.

IF we go back farther, and recur to *Theorems of Science*, or to *Sciences* them-

---

the ſecond, τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριῶν; the third, τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας. *Ammon. in Prædic.* p. 146.

The *Latins*, adhering to the ſame Diviſion, coined new names, *Anti-prædicamenta*, or *Præ-prædicamenta*; *Prædicamenta*; and *Poſt-prædicamenta*. *Sanderſon*, p. 22, 51, 55. *Edit. Oxon.* 1672.

In the preſent Work, the firſt Section begins from Chapter the firſt; the ſecond Section, from Chapter the third; the third Section, from Chapter the fifteenth. Of theſe Sections, the ſecond (which diſcuſſes the Predicaments, or Philoſophical Arrangements) makes the *real* and *eſſential* part of the Speculation: the firſt and third Sections are only *ſubſervient* to it; the firſt to prepare, the third to explain.

ſelves,

ſelves, theſe will be found *not properly* Ch. II.
Parts of Logic, but works of a *different* and *higher* character; works, where Logic ſerves the Philoſopher for an *Inſtrument* or *Organ*, as the Chizzel ſerves the Statuary, the Pencil ſerves the Painter.

AT preſent we are to proceed to the Speculation concerning SUBSTANCE.

CHAP. III.

Concerning SUBSTANCE *natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increaſed to three—reduced again to two—theſe laſt two, Form and a Subject, or rather Form and Matter.*

Ch. III. TO explain how natural SUBSTANCES *originally* began, is a taſk too arduous for unaſſiſted Philoſophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been *continued*, is a work better ſuited to *Human* abilities; becauſe to a portion of this Continuity we are *perſonally preſent*, nay within it we ourſelves are all included, as ſo many *parts*.

Now as to the manner, in which ſubſiſts the *Continuity* of natural Subſtances,

ſtances, and as to the Cauſes (*a*) by which that Continuity is maintained; there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every Birth, every recent Production, that daily happens in the Univerſe, to be an abſolutely freſh Creation; a realizing of Non-entity; an Evocation (if it may be ſo deſcribed) of ſomething

Ch. III.

(*a*) The Doctrine of *Cauſes*, and their different Species, is treated at large in the firſt volume of theſe Miſcellanies, through the whole Treatiſe upon *Art*, and in the Notes ſubjoined to the ſame, particularly page 280.

The Author deſires to inform his Readers, that in the ſubſequent diſquiſitions he hath not confined himſelf merely to *Logic*, but has interſperſed many Speculations of different kinds; acting in this view differently from the Model ſet him by the *Stagirite*. The *Stagirite* left no Part of Philoſophy unexplored, and of courſe had *ſeparate* and *diſtinct* Treatiſes for Logic, Phyſics, and the many other Branches of Science, as well the practical, as the ſpeculative. Not ſo the Author of this Treatiſe: he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehenſive variety of that ſublime and acute Genius, whoſe writings made him for more than two thouſand years the admiration of *Grecians*, *Romans*, *Arabians* *Jews*, and *Chriſtians*. Such eſteem could not have been the effect either of Faſhion, or of Chance.

Ch. III. out of nothing.—What then is it?—'Tis a *Change* or *Mutation* out of Something, which was *before*. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural Subſtances are *continued*, is to inquire what are the Principles of *Mutation* or *Change*.

FIRST, then, let us obſerve, what is in fact moſt obvious, that there can be no Mutation or Change, were every thing to remain preciſely *one* and the *ſame*; hot and cold, preciſely as they are, one hot, the other cold; ſo likewiſe crooked and ſtrait; black and white, &c. On the contrary, Mutation or Change is from one thing into another (*b*), from

(*b*) Thus *Ariſtotle*—Πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐξιν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι. He then ſubjoins the *Etymology* of the word μεταβολὴ, to confirm his doctrine—δηλοῖ γὰρ καὶ τὄνομα. ΜΕΤ' ΑΛΛΟ γάρ τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ, τὸ δ' ὕστερον. *Even the Name* (ſays he) *ſhews it; for 'tis* SOMETHING AFTER SOMETHING ELSE; *and one of theſe things denotes prior, the other denotes ſubſequent. Phyſic.* lib. v. c. 1. p. 95. *Edit. Sylb.*

hot

hot into cold, or from cold into hot; from ſtrait into crooked, or from crooked into ſtrait; and ſo in other inſtances. It follows hence, that the *Principles* of Mutation or Change are neceſſarily Two; one, a Principle, OUT OF which; the other, a Principle INTO which. Ch. III.

AGAIN, theſe two Principles are not merely caſual and temerarious (*c*). Hot changes not into Crooked, but into Cold; Crooked not into Cold, but into Strait; White not into Moiſt, but into

---

(*c*) Thus the ſame Author—Ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐνδέχεται ἢ ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν——ἀλλὰ λευκὸν μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἐξ οὐ λευκοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς, ἀλλ' ἐκ μέλανος ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ, καὶ μουσικὸν κ. τ. λ. *Univerſally with regard to all Beings whatever, no one Being is formed by Nature either to act upon any other indifferently, or to be acted upon indifferently; nor is any thing produced or generated* [indiſcriminately] *out of any thing —but white is generated or produced out of ſomething Not white; and this, not every thing that may be ſo called, but either out of Black, or ſome of the intermediate Colours. The ſame holds as to the production of what is Muſical,* &c. *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 5. p. 14. *Edit. Sylb.*

Black;

CH. III. Black; Moiſt not into Black, but into Dry. The ſame holds in other inſtances more (*d*) complicated. The becoming a Statue is a Change from *indefinite* Configuration into *definite*; the becoming a Palace, a Change from Diſperſion into Combination, from Diſorder into Order. Already the Principles, which we inveſtigate, have appeared to be *Two*; and now it further appears that they muſt be CONTRARIES (*e*) or OPPOSITES.

(*d*) Καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ σύνθετα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον—ἥτε γὰρ οἰκία γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διηρῆσθαι ταδὶ ὠδί· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρίας καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχηματοσύνης, καὶ ἕκαστον τέτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσίς τίς ἐστιν. *Beings too, which are not ſimple, but compoſite, admit the ſame reaſoning—for the Houſe is formed from certain Materials, which are not previouſly ſo compounded* [as to make a Houſe], *but which lie ſeparate; and the Statue, and every one of thoſe things, which have Figure given them, are formed out of ſomething, which wants that Figure; and each Production has a different Name, ſometimes 'tis* ORDER, *ſometimes 'tis* COMPOSITION. *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 5. p. 14, 15.

(*e*) See the ſame Author in the ſame Treatiſe, p. 11, 12, &c. See alſo the Quotation in the Text from

AUTHORITY is not wanting to countenance this laſt poſition. The Scripture (*f*) tells us, that *the Earth* in the beginning *was without form, and void, and darkneſs was upon the face of the deep.* After this it became *enlightened*, as well as *repleniſhed*; repleniſhed with various *Forms* both Vegetable and Animal; *enlightened* by the ſublime Command of, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT. In the whole of this Progreſs we may remark CONTRARIETY; *Formleſs* oppoſed to *Form*; *Void* to *Repleniſhed*; and *Darkneſs* to *Light*. Ch. III.

AMONG the ancient Philoſophers, ſome held the Principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moiſt and dry; others, to be denſe and rare; others, in a

---

from Scripture, which immediately follows, as well as the ſubſequent Notes.

(*f*) *Geneſis*, chap. i.

more

Ch. III. more abſtracted way, to be Exceſs and Defect; Even and Odd; Friendſhip and Strife. Among the moderns, we know the ſtreſs laid on Action and Re-action; Attraction and Repulſion; Expanſion and Condenſation; Centripetal and Centrifugal: to which may be added thoſe two Principles held by many Ancients as well as Moderns, the Principles of Atoms and a Void (*g*), which two ſtand oppoſed nearly as *Being* and *Non-being*.

We ſhall ſubjoin the following paſſage from a Treatiſe of ancient date, becauſe in it the Force of Contraries is exemplified with elegance.

(*g*) *Democritus*, ſays *Ariſtotle*, holds THE SOLID and the VOID, τὸ στερεὸν καὶ κενὸν, to be PRINCIPLES, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ὂν, τὸ δ' ὡς οὐκ ὂν εἶναι φησι, *of which he ſays the one is the ſame as* BEING, *the other the ſame as* NON-BEING. See *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 5. p. 13. See alſo c. 4. p. 11. where the other Contraries are explained at large.

" *Some*

" *Some* (ſays an ancient Author) (*h*) Ch. III.
" *have wondered how the World, if it be*
" *compoſed, as it appears, out of* CON-
" TRARY PRINCIPLES *(the Dry, the*
" *Moiſt, the Cold, and the Hot) has not*
" *for ages ago been ruined and deſtroyed.*
" *As if indeed men ſhould wonder how a*
" *City could ſubſiſt, compoſed (as it is) out*

(*h*) See the Treatiſe Περὶ κόσμου — It is given to *Ariſtotle*, and always makes a part of his Works; but although it be of genuine antiquity, and truly ſublime, both in language and ſentiment, yet ſome have thought it of a later period, and not written in the cloſe manner and ſtyle of *Ariſtotle*. A Tranſlation of it is extant, as old as by the Philoſopher *Apuleius*, beſides other Tranſlations more modern. The Tract itſelf ſtands the fifth in the volume of *Ariſtotle's Phyſical* Pieces, according to *Sylburgius's* edition, and the paſſage here tranſlated may be found, *cap.* 5. *page* 12. of that edition, beginning at the Words, Καί τοι γέ τις ἐθαύμασε πῶς ποτε εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων κ. τ. λ. In *Apuleius* the words are, *Et quibuſdam mirum videri ſolet, quod, cum ex diverſis*, &c. p. 731. *Edit. in Uſum Delphini.* Quarto.

See *Fabricius's Biblioth. Græc.* T. ii. p. 127, where the learned Author, with his uſual labour and accuracy, has collected all the ſentiments both of Antients and Moderns on this valuable work.

" *af*

Ch. III.

" of contrary Tribes (I mean the Poor
" and the Opulent, the Young and the
" Aged, the Weak and the Strong, the
" Good and the Bad), and be ignorant that
" this of all things is moſt admirable in
" Political Concord; I mean, that by ad-
" mitting every Nature and every Fortune,
" it forms out of MANY *diſpoſitions* ONE
" diſpoſition; and out of Diſſimilar ones, a
" Similar. Perhaps alſo NATURE *herſelf*
" has an affection for CONTRARIES, *and*
" chooſes out of theſe to form the Conſo-
" nant, and not out of things ſimilar; ſo
" that in the ſame manner as ſhe aſſociated
" the Male to the Female, and not each to
" it's own Sex, did ſhe eſtabliſh through
" Contraries, and not Similars, the firſt
" and original Concord. ART *too, in imi-*
" tation of Nature, appears to do the ſame.
" Thus Painting, by blending the Natures
" of things white and black, pale and red,
" produces Repreſentations conſonant to
" their originals. Thus Muſic, by mixing
" together Sounds that are ſharp and flat,

" that

" *that are long and ſhort, out of different*
" *voices produces one Harmony. Thus*
" *Grammar, by forming a mixture out of*
" *Vowels and Mutes, through theſe hath*
" *eſtabliſhed the whole of it's Art. And*
" *this is what appears to have been the*
" *meaning of that obſcure Philoſopher* He-
" raclitus. *You are, ſays he, to connect the*
" *Perfect and the Imperfect, the Agree-*
" *ing and the Diſagreeing, the Conſonant*
" *and the Diſſonant; and* OUT OF ALL
" THINGS, ONE; AND OUT OF ONE,
" ALL THINGS."

THUS far this ingenious Author, with regard to whoſe doctrine, as well as that of the many others already mentioned, we cannot but remark, that whatever may have cauſed ſuch an *Unanimity* of opinion, whether it were that men adopted it from one another by a ſort of Tradition, or were inſenſibly led to it by the latent force of Truth; *all* Philoſophers, of *all* ages, appear to have favoured

Ch. III. voured CONTRARIETY, and given their ſanction to the Hypotheſis, that PRINCIPLES ARE CONTRARIES (*i*).

BUT farther ſtill—*'Tis impoſſible for Contrarieties to co-exiſt, in the ſame place, at the ſame inſtant.* 'Tis impoſſible, for example, that in the ſame place and inſtant ſhould co-exiſt Cold and Hot; Crooked and Strait; Diſperſion and Combination; Diſorder and Order. As therefore the Principles of Change are *Contraries*, and Contraries cannot *co-exiſt*, it follows that *one Principle* muſt neceſſarily *depart*, as the *other accedes*. Thus in the Mutation out of Diſorder into Order, when *the Principle* INTO WHICH,

(*i*) Πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. *For* ALL *Philoſophers hold the Elements and thoſe other Cauſes, which they call* PRINCIPLES *(though they ſuppoſe them without giving a reaſon) to be* CONTRARIES, *compelled as it were to do ſo by Truth itſelf.* *Ariſtot. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 5. p. 15.

that

that is *Order*, accedes, *the Principle* OUT OF WHICH, that is *Diſorder*, departs. The ſame happens in all other inſtances. Ch. III.

A QUESTION then ariſes. If one of them neceſſarily depart, as ſoon as the other accedes, how can Nature poſſibly maintain *the Continuity* of her Productions? To *depart*, is to be no more, a ſort of Annihilation, or *Death*; to *accede*, is *to paſs into Being*, a ſort of Production or *Birth*. They cannot co-exiſt, becauſe they are abſolutely incompatible *(k)*; ſo that upon this Hypotheſis *there*

(*k*) Τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον, ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, πῶς ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ αὐτὴ τὴν πυκνότητα· ὁμοίως δὲ κ) ἄλλη ὁποιανῶν ἐναντιότης. *That we ſhould not make* TWO PRINCIPLES *only, has ſome appearance of reaſon: for a man may well doubt, how Denſity ſhould be formed by nature to make Rarity, or this laſt, Denſity; and ſo in like manner with reſpect to any other Contrariety whatever. Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 6. p. 16.

Simplicius well obſerves—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν εἰς ὑπομένον τι ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ἐχ ὑπομένει τὸ ἐναντίον

Ch. III. *there can be no Continuity* at all, but every *new* Production muſt be a realizing of Non-entity, a freſh and genuine Evocation of ſomething out of nothing.

IF this in the *Continuity* of Beings appear a difficulty, let us try, whether we can remove it by any aid not yet ſuggeſted. Crooked, we are told, is changed into Strait, *a Contrary into a Contrary*; one of which neceſſarily *departs*, and the other *accedes*. We admit it.—But is there not *Something*, which during the Change, *neither* departs *nor* accedes? Something which REMAINS, and is all along ſtill ONE and the SAME *(l)*.

THE

—*That, which acts, acts upon ſomething which remains*; but CONTRARY DOES NOT REMAIN *and wait for Contrary*. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 43. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

(l) Καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἦν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἄπαυλα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι

THE Stick, for example, changes from Crooked into Strait; and if there was not a *Stick*, or *ſomething analogous*, no

---

πάλιν· ὁ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν—*And this is rightly ſaid by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of* ONE *things it would not be poſſible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another; for example, that, what is hot, ſhould become cold; or reciprocally, that this ſhould become hot; for 'tis not the Heat or the Coldneſs, which change into one another, but 'tis that evidently changes, which is the* SUBJECT *of theſe Affections: whence it follows that in thoſe things, where there is acting, and being acted upon, 'tis neceſſary there ſhould belong to them ſome* ONE *Nature, their* COMMON SUBJECT. *Ariſt. de Gener. et Cor.* lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ariſtotle, who gives this quotation, well remarks, that it was too much to affirm this of *all* things, but that it ſhould be confined to ſuch things only as *reciprocally act, and are acted upon*; and ſo in his Comment we may perceive he reſtrains them.

See more of this ONE Being, the *common Subject*, or *Subſtratum*, in the following Chapter.

The *Diogenes* here mentioned was a contemporary of *Anaxagoras*, and lived many years before the *Cynic* of the ſame name. See *Diog. Laert.* ix. 57.

Ch. III. *ſuch Change could be effected.* Yet is it *leſs a Stick* for becoming Strait; or was *it more ſo,* when Crooked? Does it not *remain (m),* conſidered as a Stick, *preciſely,*

(*m*) Ὅτι δεῖ ἀεί τι ὑποικεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἕν, ἀλλ' εἴδει γε οὐχ ἕν· (τὸ γὰρ εἴδει λέγω, καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν.) ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' οὐχ ὑπομένει· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὑπομένει· (ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἄμουσον οὐχ ὑπομένει. *'Tis neceſſary that in every Production there ſhould be a Subject* [or a Subſtratum], *and this, though One numerically, yet not One in Form (I mean, by one in Form, the ſame as One in Reaſon, in Detail, or Definition). Thus 'tis not the ſame thing to be a Man, and to be a Being Immuſical, or Void of muſical Art.* [In the formation of a Muſician] *the one remains, the other remains not; the Subject or Subſtratum remains (for Man remains); the being Immuſical, or Void of muſical Art, remains not* [for that is loſt, as ſoon as he becomes an Artiſt.] *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 7. p. 18. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Production,* or *Formation* here ſpoken of, means the becoming a Muſician by the acquiſition of the muſical Art. The ſame reaſoning may be applied to any *other* Art or Science, which Man, *as Man,* is capable of acquiring.

Again, the ſame Philoſopher—Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ

ταῦτα

ciſely, in either caſe, *one* and *the ſame*? As therefore the Stick is to Crooked and Strait, ſo is the Bar of Iron to Hot and Cold; the Braſs of the Statue to Figure and Deformity; the Stones of the Palace to Order and Confuſion; and *ſomething, analogous* in other Changes, *to other Contraries, not enumerated.* Ch. III.

IF therefore we were right in what we aſſerted before, and are ſo in what we aſſert now; it ſhould ſeem that THE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE or MUTATION WERE THREE (*n*); ONE, *that which departs*;

ρὰ τὰ ἐναντία. *Add to this* (ſays he) *there is* SOMETHING [in productions of all kinds] WHICH REMAINS; *but the Contrary does not remain; there is therefore ſome* THIRD *thing over and above the Contraries. Metaph.* A. p. 196. *Edit. Sylb.*

If there appear a difficulty in the firſt quotation of this note, concerning a Subject being One *numerically*, but not ſo in *Form*, or *Character*, ſee Note on the word *Privation*, in the firſt part of the following Chapter.

(*n*) Διόπερ, εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον· ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφο-

Ch. III. *parts*; ANOTHER, that *which accedes*; and a THIRD, *that which remains*. Take an example or two from Man. *The healthful* departs; *the morbid* accedes; *the Body* remains. *The morbid* departs; *the healthful* accedes; *the Body* remains. 'Tis thus we change reciprocally as well to better, as to worſe.

ἀμφοτέρως αὐτὰς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον—*If any one therefore think the former Reaſoning, and the preſent Reaſoning, to be each of them true; 'tis neceſſary, in order to preſerve both of them intire and unimpeached, to lay down and eſtabliſh ſome* THIRD PRINCIPLE.

He ſoon after adds—τὸ μὲν ἓν τρία φάναι τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ἔκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοπῶσι δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. *To ſay therefore that the* ELEMENTS [or Principles of Things] *are* THREE, *may appear to have ſome foundation to thoſe, who ſpeculate from theſe and other Reaſonings of like ſort. Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 6. p. 16, 17. *Edit. Sylb.*

And again more explicitly in his *Metaphyſics*—Τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια, καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί· δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις (ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγῳ καὶ εἴδει, τὸ δὲ στέρησις·) τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.—*Wherefore the Cauſes of Things are* THREE, *and the Principles are* THREE; *two, the* CONTRARIETY (*of which Contrariety one part is the* DEFINITION *and* FORM; *the other part, the* PRIVATION); *and the third Principle, the* MATTER. *Metaph.* A. p. 197. *Edit. Sylb.*

It

IT may be obſerved of theſe *three* Principles, that *two* of them, being Contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare: Ch. I

Haud bene conveniunt, nec in unâ ſede morantur——

the *third*, like a neutral Power, preſerves an intercourſe with both, and ſometimes aſſociates with one, and ſometimes with the other. It may be obſerved alſo of the two *hoſtile* or *contrary* Principles, that one of them appertains *for the moſt part* to the *better Co-arrangement* (*o*) of things, and one to

(*o*) CO-ARRANGEMENT.—So I here ventured to tranſlate the word Συστοιχία, or Συστοιχεία, for it is written both ways in *Ariſtotle*. See *Metaph.* l. i. c. 5. p. 13. l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb.*

The *Pythagoreans*, obſerving through the world a difference in things as to *better* and *worſe*, and that this difference often led to a ſort of *Contrariety* or *Oppoſition*, arranged them into two *Claſſes*, a *better* Claſs and a *worſe*; and, placing the two Claſſes by the ſide of each other, called them συστοιχίαι, or *Co-arrangements*. In the better Claſs they

Ch. III. to the *baſer*; to the *better* appertains Figure; to the *baſer*, Deformity; to the *better*, Order; to the *baſer*, Confuſion; to the *better*, Health; to the *baſer*, Diſeaſe. Now if we call thoſe of the better Tribe by the common name of FORM, and thoſe of the other Tribe by the common name of PRIVATION (*p*), diſtinguiſh-

---

they put *Unity*, *Bound*, *Friendſhip*, *Good*, &c.; in the other they put *Multitude*, *Boundleſs*, *Strife*, *Evil*, &c. Some of this ſchool limited the Number, others left it indefinite, conſidering all things *as double*, *one againſt another*, according to the Language of *Eccleſiaſticus*, chap. xxxiii. v. 14, 15. and chap. xlii. v. 24.

See (beſides the quotations mentioned already) *Ethic. Nicom.* l. i. c. 6. p. 15. *Edit. Oxon.* 1716. and *Euſtratii Com. in Ethic. Nic.* p. 13. *B.*

(*p*) Τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συζοιχία, στέρησις— *The* OTHER CO-ARRANGEMENT *of Contraries is* PRIVATION. *Ariſtot. Metaph.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb.*

By the word *other*, he means the *baſer* and ſubordinate Claſs, to which Claſs he gives the *common* name of PRIVATION, as including all the Genera therein enumerated, *Strife*, *Evil*, &c. And hence it

is,

tinguiſhing the neutral Principle withal by the name of SUBJECT, we ſhall then find *the three Principles of Mutation*, or *Change*, to be FORM, PRIVATION, and a SUBJECT. Ch.III.

OF theſe *three*, if we compare FORM to PRIVATION, we ſhall find FORM to be *definite* and *ſimple*; PRIVATION to be *infinite* and *vague*. Thus *there* are *infinite* ways of being *diſeaſed*, though but one of being healthy; *infinite* ways of being *vicious*, though but one of being virtuous (*q*).

SHOULD it be aſked, how PRIVATION is ONE, having this *infinite* and *vague* Character; we may anſwer, becauſe *as Privation*,

---

is, that Privation is in this Treatiſe ſoon after called *infinite and vague*; for τὸ Ἄπειρον, *Infinite*, made one in this baſer Arrangement. See *Blemmidæ Epitom. Phyſic.* p. 60. *Philop. in Ariſt. Phyſ.* lib. i. *ſub fin.*

(*q*) Ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, πανῳδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. *Theognis.*

it

Ch. III. it is nothing more than the ſimple *Abſence* of that *Form, to which it is oppoſed.* Thus to be *diſeaſed* (though the ways are *infinite*) is nothing more than the *Abſence of Health*; to be *vicious*, (though the ways are *infinite*) nothing more than the *Abſence of Virtue.*

AND hence, perhaps, it may be poſſible *to reject* PRIVATION *for a Principle*, and *ſupply it's place*, when wanted, by *it's Oppoſite*, that is to ſay FORM; not however by the ſpecific *Form* then actually *tending* to exiſtence, but *by every other congenial Form, of which this Specific Form is the Privation.* Thus in the producing of the Sphere, it's *Privation* may be found in the *Preſence* of the Pyramid, or of any Figure, *beſides the Sphere*, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that Harmony called the *Diapaſon*, it's *Privation* may be found in the *Preſence* of the *Diapente*, or of *any other* Tenſions, beſides

ſides thoſe of the Octave, *be they conſonant* or *diſſonant*. 'Tis certain that by ſuch a *reciprocal acceding and receding of* [redacted]*poſſible Forms*, by ſuch an *Abſence* and *Preſence* (*r*), by ſuch a continued Revolution Ch. III.

(*r*) —Ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἔσαι τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ παρουσίᾳ τὴν μεταβολήν· — *One of the two Contraries* (that is to ſay FORM) *will be ſufficiently able, by it's* ABSENCE *and it's* PRESENCE, *to effect Mutation. Ariſtot. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 7. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.*

On this paſſage, *Themiſtius* thus comments.—Having inſerted the words above quoted, he ſubjoins—ὥσε τὸ Εἶδος τὴν χώραν ἀποπληροῖ καὶ τῆς Στερήσεως· ἡ γὰρ Στέρησις ὐ φύσις τις καὶ Εἶδος ἐσὶν, ἀλλ' ἀπουσία τοῦ Εἴδους. *So that the* FORM *ſupplies alſo the place of the* PRIVATION; *for the* PRIVATION *is itſelf no particular Nature or Form, but rather* THE ABSENCE OF THE FORM [which is then paſſing into exiſtence]. *Themiſt. in Ariſt. Phyſ.* p. 21. *B. Edit. Ald.*

Simplicius on this occaſion explains himſelf as follows—ὐ μέντοι ἠξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεῖναι τὴν Στέρησιν καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν μὴ ὂν, διότι ἀπουσία μόνον ἐσὶ τοῦ πεφυκότος, ὐδὲν ἄλλο ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα· ἠρκίσθη δὲ τῷ Εἴδει μόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς, τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ δυναμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀποδιδόναι.—*Ariſtotle has not deigned to place among the Elements*

Ch.III. lution and periodical Succeſſion, ſuppoſing *a proper* SUBJECT *withal to receive and*

Elements [of Natural Productions] PRIVATION, *and that Mode of Non-being, which is conſonant to it; becauſe Privation is no more than the Abſence of the thing produced, introducing along with itſelf no other particular Attribute. He himſelf alſo has been ſatisfied with the* FORM *alone, as being able by it's* PRESENCE *and it's* ABSENCE *to effect both Generation and Diſſolution. Simplic. in Ariſtot. Phyſ.* lib. i. p. 54. *Edit. Ald. Fol.* 1526.

Perhaps *Simplicius* alludes to what *Ariſtotle* ſays in the following paſſage.—Ἡ δέ γε μόρφη καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πως ἐστίν. *The Terms* FORM *and* NATURE *have a double meaning: for in one Senſe even* PRIVATION *is* FORM. *Phyſic. Ariſtot.* l. ii. c. 1.

Philoponus gives a pertinent inſtance to explain, how PRIVATION may be FORM. He tells us—ἡ γὰρ Λύδιος ἁρμονία γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμοστίας τῆς Λυδίου· ἀλλ' ἡ Λύδιος ἀναρμοστία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγιος ἁρμονία, ἢ ἑτέρα τις· δύναται δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀναρμοστία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὑπωσοῦν ἐχουσῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπιτεταμένων μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνειμένων.—*The Lydian Mode or Harmony is made out of Lydian Diſſonance* [that is, before the ſtrings of a Lyre were tuned to that Mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, *Lydian Diſſonance*]. *New Lydian Diſſonance may*

and give them up, we may conceive how *Changes* may be performed, and *new Subſtances* produced, though (as we have ſaid already) the Principle of *Privation* were to be *withdrawn*. No harm accrues to the Doctrine from a ſuppoſition like this; only, if we admit it, we again reduce the PRINCIPLES from THREE to TWO; not however the *former two*, thoſe that exiſt in CONTRARIETY, for now we adopt the more *amicable* ones, thoſe of a FORM and a SUBJECT (*t*), or (if Ch. III.

may be the Phrygian Mode or Harmony, or it may be any other of the Modes [Doric, Ionic, &c.]; *it may alſo be ſimply the Diſſonance of the Strings under any caſual tenſion, and that in various and different ways, either as they are more ſtretched, or more relaxed* [that is, either ſharper or flatter.] *Philop. in Phyſic.* l. i. p. 45.

This ſhews that the *Phrygian* Mode in this example, though clearly a *Form* of Harmony, is nevertheleſs, when referred to the *Lydian* Mode, as much a *Privation*, as any *caſual* Tenſion of the Strings, totally *void of all Concord*.

(*t*) This is implied in the words—Ὅτι γίγνεται ἅπαν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς. *That every thing*

Ch.III. (if we take *Matter* in it's proper meaning) thoſe of FORM and MATTER.

'TIS in theſe we behold the *Elements* of thoſe *compoſite* Beings, NATURAL SUBSTANCES. The Diſquiſition makes it expedient to conſider each of the two apart, and this we ſhall therefore do by beginning with MATTER.

---

thing is made or produced out of a SUBJECT *and a* FIGURE. *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. c. 7. p. 19.

FIGURE, Μορφὴ, means the ſame with Εἶδος, FORM; Ὑποκείμενον, SUBJECT, means the ſame with Ὕλη, MATTER. See the Treatiſe juſt quoted, particularly towards the concluſion of the firſt Book.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning MATTER—*An imperfect Deſcription of it—it's Nature, and the Neceſſity of it's exiſtence, traced out and proved—firſt by Abſtraction—then by Analogy—Illuſtrations from Mythology.*

MATTER *is that Elementary Conſtituent in compoſite Subſtances, which appertains in* COMMON (*a*) *to them all, without diſtinguiſhing them from one another.* Ch. IV.

(*a*) If we compare the beginning of this Chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though MATTER and FORM are the ELEMENTS, or *inherent Parts* of every *compoſite* Subſtance, yet they eſſentially differ, in as much as *Matter* being COMMON, *Form* PECULIAR, *Form* gives every ſuch Subſtance it's *Character*, while *Matter* gives it *none*.

Thus *Philoponus*—κατ' αὐτὸ γὰρ [τὸ Εἶδος *ſcil.*] χαρακτηρίζονται τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ὕλην οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι.—*By* FORM *things are characteriſed; by* MATTER *they differ not one from another.*

Com-

Ch. IV. *another*.—But 'tis fitting to be more explicit.

EVERY thing generated or made, whether by Nature or Art, is generated or made out of *ſomething elſe*; and this *ſomething elſe* is called it's SUBJECT or MATTER. Such is Iron to the Saw; ſuch is Timber to the Boat.

Now this *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing, being *neceſſarily previous* to that thing's exiſtence, is *neceſſarily different* from it, and *not the ſame*. Thus Iron, as Iron, *is not* a Saw; and Timber, as Timber,

---

Com. in Phyſ. Ariſt. p. 55. d.——And ſoon after —διότι αὐτὸ χαρακτηριστικόν ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας· ἡ γὰρ Ὕλη, κοινή.—*This* [that is, the FORM] *is* CHARACTERISTIC *of every Being's Eſſence; for as to the* MATTER, *it is* COMMON [and runs through all.]

Ammonius ſays expreſly—ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ὕλη κοινωνίας ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δὲ Εἶδος διαφορᾶς.—MATTER *with regard to things is the Cauſe of their general* COMMUNITY, or COMMON NATURE; FORM, *the Cauſe of their peculiar* DIFFERENCE. *Ammon. in Cat.* p. 25. *B.*

is

is not a Boat. Hence then one character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, that is, the Character of NEGATION or PRIVATION. Ch. IV.

AGAIN, though the *Subject* or *Matter* of a thing be not that thing, *yet* were it incapable of becoming ſo, it could not be called it's Subject or Matter. Thus Iron is the *Subject* or *Matter* of a Saw, becauſe, though *not* a Saw, it may ſtill *become* a Saw. On the contrary, Timber *is not* the Subject or Matter of a Saw, becauſe it not only (as Timber) is *no* Saw, but can never be made one, from it's very nature and properties. Hence then, beſides *Privation*, another Character of every *Subject* or *Matter*, and that is the Character of APTITUDE or CAPACITY.

AGAIN, when *one* thing is the *Subject* or *Matter* of *many* things, it implies a *Privation* of them *all*, and a *Capacity* to

Ch. IV. them *all* (*b*). Thus Iron, being the Subject or Matter of the Saw, the Axe,

(*b*) PRIVATION and CAPACITY are essential to every thing, which bears the name of MATTER; and this is the meaning of the following passage—Ἐστι δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο—*The* SUBJECT *or* MATTER *is* ONE *numerically, but in character it is* TWO, that is to say, TWO, as it has a *Capacity* to become a thing, and yet is under a *Privation*, till it *actually become so*. *Arist. Physic.* l. i. p. 17.——And soon after, he says—ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἀσχηματίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ. *'Tis a different thing to be a Man, and to be Void of the musical Art; 'tis a different thing to be Void of Figure, and to be Brass.*—As much as if he had said, that the *Man*, before he became a *musical Artist*, had both a *Capacity* for that character, and a *Privation* of it; the *Brass* a similar *Capacity* and *Privation*, before it was cast into a *Statue*.

Thus too *Themistius*—Καί τοι λέγομεν τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ δυνάμει· ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ στερήσεως· εἰδὲ γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις εἴη, μὴ σὺν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως νοουμένης—*We say the Essence of* MATTER *is in* CAPACITY; *and* CAPACITY *is evidently connected with* PRIVATION; *since it would no longer be Capacity, could Privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it. Themist. in Arist. Physic.* p. 21. *Edit. Ald.*

See before, Note p. 52, and Note p. 71.

and

and the Chiſſel, implies *Privation* and *Capacity* with reſpect to *all* three. Ch. IV.

AGAIN, we can change a Saw into a Chiſſel, but not into a Boat; we can change a Boat into a Box, but not into a Saw. The reaſon is, there can be no Change or Mutation of one thing into another, where the *two changing* Beings do not participate the *ſame Matter* (*c*). But

(*c*) This reaſoning has reference to what the Ancients called Ὕλη πρόσεχὴς, THE IMMEDIATE MATTER, in oppoſition to Ὕλη πρώτη, THE REMOTE OR PRIMARY MATTER, of which more will be ſaid in the courſe of this Speculation.

'Tis of the *immediate* Matter we muſt underſtand the following Paſſage—Ἐνδέχεται δὲ, μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης ὔσης, ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν· οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλινή· ἐνίων δὲ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀναγκαίας, ἑτέρων ὄντων· οἷον περίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο.—*'Tis poſſible, that, the* MATTER *being one and the ſame, different things by the Efficient Cauſe ſhould be formed out of it; as, for example, that out of Wood ſhould be formed a Box and a Bed. But then with regard to ſome things, which are different, the Matter is of neceſſity different alſo. 'Tis thus, for example,*

Ch. IV. But even here, were the Boat to moulder and turn to Earth, and that Earth by natural proceſs to metallize and become Iron, through ſuch progreſſion as this, we might ſuppoſe even the Boat to become a Saw. Hence therefore it is, that ALL CHANGE *is by immediate or mediate participation of* THE SAME MATTER.

HAVING advanced thus far, we muſt be careful to remember—firſt, that every SUBJECT or MATTER implies, as ſuch, PRIVATION and CAPACITY—and next, that *all* CHANGE or *Mutation* of Beings into one another, is *by means of their participating the ſame common Matter.* This we have choſen to illuſtrate from Works of Art, as falling more eaſily under human cognizance and obſervation. 'Tis however no leſs certain as to the

---

example, that a Saw cannot be made out of Wood; nor is this a work in the power of the Efficient Cauſe. Ariſt. Metaph. H. κιφ. δ. p. 138. *Edit. Sylb.*

Pro-

Productions of Nature, though the ſuperior Subtlety in theſe renders examples more difficult. Ch. IV.

The Queſtion then is, whether in the World which we inhabit, it be not admitted from Experience, as well as from the Confeſſion of all Philoſophers, that Subſtances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately paſs one into another; that we ſuppoſe at preſent no Realizings of Non entity, but that reciprocal Deaths, Diſſolutions, and Digeſtions, ſupport by turns all Subſtances out of each other, ſo that, as *Hamlet* ſays, from the Idea of this rotation,

Imperial Cæſar, dead and turn'd to clay,
May ſtop a hole, to keep the winds away.

The Queſtion in ſhort is, *whether in this World which we inhabit, there be not an*

Ch. IV. *univerſal Mutation of all things into all* (*d*). If there be, then muſt there be ſome ONE PRI-

(*d*) The *Peripatetics*, according to the erroneous Aſtronomy by them adopted, ſuppoſed the fixt Stars, the Planets, the Sun, and the Moon, to move all of them round the Earth, attached to different Spheres, which moved and carried them round, the Earth itſelf being immoveable, and placed in the Centre of the Univerſe. This Motion, purely and ſimply *local*, was the only one they allowed to theſe *Celeſtial* Bodies, which in *Eſſence* they held to be perfectly *unchangeable*. Things on the ſurface of this Earth (ſuch as Plants and Animals), and things between that ſurface and the Moon (ſuch as Clouds, Meteors, Winds, &c.) theſe they ſuppoſed obnoxious to *Motions of a more various and complicated character*; Motions, which changed them in their *Qualities* and *Quantities*, and which even led to their *Generation* and *Diſſolution*, to Life and to Death. Hence the whole Tribe of theſe mutable and periſhable Beings were called SUBLUNARY, becauſe the Region of their exiſtence was *beneath the Sphere of the Moon*. 'Twas here exiſted thoſe Elements, which, as *Milton* tells us,

——————— *in quaternion run*
Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix
And nouriſh all things——— Par. Loſt.

'Twas here that *Ariſtotle* held—ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι πέφυκε, *that every thing was naturally formed to ariſe*

PRIMARY MATTER, *common to all things*; I ſay, ſome ONE PRIMARY MATTER, and that COMMON TO ALL THINGS, ſince, without ſome *ſuch* Matter, *ſuch* Mutation would be wholly impoſſible. Ch. IV.

BUT if there be ſome *one Primary Matter*, and that *common to all things*; this *Matter* muſt imply, not (as particular and ſubordinate Matters do) a *particular* Privation, and a *particular* Capacity, but, on the contrary, UNIVERSAL PRI-

---

ariſe out of every thing. Lib. de Ortu et Int. p. 39. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from *Archytas*, *Timæus*, and the other *Pythagoreans*, both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* borrowed much of their Philoſophy) elegantly calls this imaginary Sphere of the Moon's orbit, ἰσθμὸς ἀθανασίας καὶ γενήσεως, *the Iſthmus of Immortality and Generation*, that is, the Boundary, which lies between things *immortal*, and things *tranſitory*. *Gale's Opuſc. Mythog.* p. 516.

The *Stoics* went farther than this *Iſthmus*.—They did not confine theſe Changes to a *Part* only of the Univerſe; they ſuppoſed them to paſs through the

Ch.IV. PRIVATION, *and* UNIVERSAL CAPACITY *(e)*.

IF the notion of ſuch a Being appear ſtrange and incomprehenſible, we may farther prove the *neceſſity* of it's exiſtence from the following conſiderations.

---

whole; and to continue without ceaſing, till all was at length loſt in their Ἐκπύρωσις, or general *Conflagration*, after which came *a new World*, and then *a new Conflagration*, and ſo on periodically. *Diog. Laert.* vii. 135, 141, 142.

(e) Τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, δυνάμενον ἁπάσας δέχεσθαι τὰς μορφὰς, ἐν στερήσει μέν ἐστιν ἁπασῶν— *The* PRIMARY SUBJECT *or* MATTER, *having a* CAPACITY *to admit all Forms, exiſts in a* PRIVATION *of them all. Themiſt. in Ariſt. Phyſ.* p. 21.

Themiſtius well diſtinguiſhes between two words, expreſſing the ſame Being, I mean ὑποκείμενον and ὕλη. *The firſt* he makes the *Subject* or *Subſtratum* of *Something* ACTUALLY *exiſting*; *the other*, that *Matter* which has a CAPACITY of becoming *many* things, before it *actually* becomes any one of them.

This is that ONE Being, mentioned by *Diogenes*, whoſe words we have quoted in the preceding Chapter, p. 51, in the Note.

EITHER

EITHER there is no ſuch general Change, as here ſpoken of, which is contrary to fact, and would deſtroy the Sympathy and Congeniality of things; or if there be, there muſt be a *Matter* of the character *here* eſtabliſhed, becauſe without it (as we have ſaid) ſuch Change would be *impoſſible*. Ch. IV.

ADD to this, however hard *univerſal* Privation may appear, yet had the *Primary Matter* in it's proper nature any one *particular* Attribute, ſo as to prevent it's *Privation* from being unlimited and univerſal, ſuch *Attribute would run thro' all things*, and be conſpicuous in all. If it were white, all things would be white; if circular, they would be circular; and ſo as to other Attributes, which is contrary to fact (*f*). Add to this, that the *Oppoſite*

(*f*) This Argument is taken from *Plato*.—Speaking of the *primary Matter*, he ſays—ὅμοιον γὰρ ὂν τῶν ἐπει-

Ch. IV. *Oppoſite* to ſuch Attribute could *never* have exiſtence, unleſs it were poſſible for the *ſame thing* to be *at once* and in the ſame inſtance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. ſince this *inſeparable* Attribute would neceſſarily be *every where*, becauſe the *Matter*, which implies it, is *itſelf every where*, at leaſt

---

ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τά τε τῆς παράπαν ἄλλης φύσεως, ὁπότ' ἔλθοι, δεχόμενον, κακῶς ἂν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὑτῇ παρεμφαίνων ὄψιν—*Were it like any of thoſe things that enter into it, in ſuch caſe, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itſelf, it would exhibit them ill, by ſhewing* IT'S OWN NATURE ALONG WITH THEM *at the ſame time.* *Plat. Tim.* p. 50.

Thus *Chalcidius*, in commenting the Paſſage here quoted—*Si ſit aliquid candidum, ut* ψιμμύθιον, *deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, vel diverſum, ut ruborem ſivi pallorem, vel contrarium, ut atrum; tunc candor non patietur introeuntes colores ſynceros perſeverare, ſed permixtione ſui faciet interpolatos.* *Chalcid. in Tim. Com.* p. 434.

Hence we ſee the propriety of thoſe deſcriptions, which make the primary Matter, to be *void of Body, of Quality, of Bulk, of Figure*, &c. ἀσώματον, ἄποιον, ἀμεγέθης, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἄμορφον, κ. τ. λ.

may

may be found in all things, that are generated and periſhable. Ch. IV.

HERE then we have an Idea (ſuch as it is) of that ſingular Being, ΥΛΗ ΠΡΩΤΗ, the PRIMARY MATTER; a Being, which thoſe Philoſophers, who are immerged in ſenſible Objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it (*g*); a Being, which flies the Percep-

(*g*) So ſtrange a Being is it, and ſo little comprehenſible to common Ideas, that the *Greeks* had no name for it in their language, 'till ΥΛΗ came to be adopted as the *proper* word, which was at firſt only aſſumed by way of *Metaphor*, from ſignifying *Timber* or *Wood*, the common materials in many works of Art. Hence it was that *Ocellus*, *Timæus*, and *Plato*, employ various words, and all of them after the ſame metaphorical manner, when they would expreſs the nature of this myſterious Being. *Ocellus* calls it Παυδεχὲς καὶ Ἐκμαγεῖον τῆς γενέσεως, *the univerſal Recipient, and Impreſſion of things generated*, as Wax receives Impreſſions from various Seals. *Timæus* uſes the word ΥΛΑ in the *Doric* Dialect, and explains it (like *Ocellus*) by Ἐκμαγεῖον, to which he adds the Appellations of Ματέρα καὶ Τιθάνην, *Mother* and *Nurſe*.

Ch. IV. Perception of every *ſenſe*, and which is at beſt even to the *Intellect* but a *negative* object, no otherwiſe *comprehenſible* than either by ANALOGY or ABSTRACTION.

WE gain a glimpſe of it by ABSTRACTION, when we ſay that *the firſt Matter* is *not* the Lineaments and Complexion, which make the beautiful Face; *nor yet* the Fleſh and Blood, which make thoſe Lineaments, and that Complexion; *nor yet* the liquid and ſolid Aliments, which

---

Nurſe. *Plato* calls it firſt πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν, οἷον τιθήνην, *the Receptacle of all Generation, as it's Nurſe*—then παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν—*the Mother and Receptacle of every ſenſible Object*. *Gale's Opuſc. Mythолog.* p. 516. 544. *Platon. Tim.* p. 47. 51. *Edit. Serr.* See *Hermes*, p. 308, &c.

Ariſtotle alſo obſerves, conſiſtently with one of the above expreſſions—ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα, συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γινομένων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ—*that the* MATTER, *by remaining, is in concurrence with the Form, a Cauſe of things generated, under the character of a* MOTHER. *Phyſ.* l. i. c. 9. p. 22. *Edit. Sylb.*

make

make that Fleſh and Blood; *nor yet* the ſimple Bodies of Earth and Water, which make thoſe various Aliments; but *Something*, which being *below* all theſe, and *ſupporting* them all, is yet *different* from them all, and *eſſential* to their exiſtence (*h*). Ch. IV.

WE obtain a ſight of it by ANALOGY, when we ſay, that as is the Braſs

---

(*h*) ABSTRACTION appears to have been uſed by *Plato*—Διὸ τὴν τῦ γεἰονότ@ ὁρατῆ κ᾽ πανὸς αἰσθητῆ μητέρα κ᾽ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν, μήτε ἀέρα, μήτε πῦρ, μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τύτων, μήτε ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα γέγονεν· ἀλλ᾽ ἀόρἀλον εἰδός τι κ᾽ ἄμορφον, πανδεχὲς· μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτἀλά πη τῆ νοητῆ, κ᾽ δυσαλωτότἀλον αὐτὸ λέγονῖες, ὐ ψευσόμεθα.—*Let us therefore ſay that* THE MOTHER *and* RECEPTACLE *of every viſible, nay of every ſenſible Production, is neither Earth, nor Air, nor Fire, nor Water, nor any of the things which ariſe out of theſe, nor out of which theſe ariſe, but a certain* INVISIBLE AND FORMLESS BEING, THE UNIVERSAL RECIPIENT; *concerning which Being, if we ſay it is in a very dubious way intelligible, and ſomething moſt hard to be apprehended, we ſhall not ſpeak a falſhood. Plat. Tim.* p. 51. *Edit. Serr.*

Thus *Chalcidius*—*Sublatis quæ ſunt ſingulis,* QUOD SOLUM REMANET, IPSUM ESSE, QUOD QUÆRITUR. *In Tim. Com.* p. 371.

to

Ch. IV. to the Statue, the Marble to the Pillar; the Timber to the Ship, or any one *ſecondary Matter* to any one *peculiar* Form; ſo is the FIRST and ORIGINAL MATTER *to all Forms in general (i).*

AND

(i) The Method of reaſoning on this Subject by ANALOGY was uſed by *Ariſtotle.*—ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη Φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει, πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν· ἅτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, καὶ τὸ ὄν. *Phyſ.* l. i. c. 7. p. 20. *Edit. Sylb.* —*The Subject*—*Nature*, (that is, the PRIMARY MATTER) *is knowable in the way of* ANALOGY: *for as is the Braſs to the Statue; the Timber to the Bed; or the immediate and formleſs Material to any of thoſe things which have Form, before it aſſumes that Form; ſo is* THIS [general and primary] MATTER *to* SUBSTANCE, *and to each particular Thing, and to each particular Being.*

Not that *Ariſtotle* rejected the Argument from ABSTRACTION.—Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τι, μήτε ποσὸν, μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεσθαι οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν· ἔστι γάρ τι, καθ' ὃ καθηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον, καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστη—*I mean by* MATTER, *that which of itſelf is not denominated either this particular Subſtance, or that particular Quantity, or any other of thoſe Attributes, by which Being is characteriſed.*

It

AND here, if a Digreſſion may be permitted, let us reflect for a moment on the character of old PROTEUS. Ch. IV.

Omnia

It is indeed that, of which each one of theſe is predicated, and which has an Eſſence different from every one of the Predicaments. Metaph. Z. p. 106. *Edit. Sylb.*

And here we may obſerve, that as ABSTRACTION and ANALOGY are the two Methods, by which this *ſtrange* Being (as it has been called) was inveſtigated by the ancient Philoſophers, ſo for that reaſon *Timæus* tells us, that it was made known to us λογισμῷ νόθῳ, *by a ſpurious kind of Reaſoning*, p. 545.—*Plato* ſays the ſame, only he is more full.—Matter, according to him, was μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν, λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ μόγις πιστόν—*Something tangible without Senſation, ſomething hard to be believed, and that by means of a ſpurious kind of reaſoning. Tim. Plat.* p. 52. *Edit. Serr.*

This *ſpurious Reaſoning* is explained by *Timæus*, who ſays that MATTER is ſo comprehended τῷ μήκω κατ' εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, *by it's not being underſtood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication. Opuſc. Myth. Gale*, p. 545.

As to the *being tangible without Senſation*, this means, that though it be an eſſential to *Body*, which appears to make it tangible, yet the *Abſtraction* makes it ſtand under the ſame character to the Touch, as Darkneſs ſtands to the Sight, Silence to the Hearing; we cannot be ſaid to ſee the one, nor to hear the other; and yet *without the help of thoſe two Senſes we could have no*

Compre-

Ch. IV.

Omnia transformat ſeſe in miracula rerum,
Ignemque, horribilemque feram, fluviumque liquentem. Georg. IV.

Thus VIRGIL — thus, before him, HOMER:

Πάντα δὲ γιγνόμενος πειρήσεται, ὅσσ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
Ἕρπετὰ γίνονται, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ θησπιδαὶς πῦρ.
Οδυσ. Δ. 417.

Made into all things, all he'll try; become
Each living thing, that creeps on earth; will glide
A liquid Stream, or blaze a flaming Fire (k).

Comprehenſion of thoſe two Negations, or perhaps more properly, thoſe two *ſenſible Privations*.

Both *Timæus* and *Plato* drop expreſſions, as if they conſidered MATTER to be PLACE. *Timæus* calls it τόπος and χώρα; *Plato* calls it χώρα and ἕδρα. *Opuſc. Myth.* p. 544. *Plat. Tim.* p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly ſhews, how in this negative manner it attends all the Predicaments, and ſerves for a ſupport to each. *Eſſentia eſt, ut opinor, cum eam Species*, &c. See *Com. in Tim.* p. 438.

(k) To the Poets here quoted may be added *Horace Sat.* lib. ii. S. 3. v. 73. *Ovid. Metam.* viii. 730.

WHAT

WHAT wonder, if this *ſingular Deity* ſuggeſt to us that *ſingular Being*, which we have been juſt attempting to deſcribe? The Allegory was too obvious to eſcape the Writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted (*l*).

That great Parent of *Mythology* as well as *Poetry*, *Homer*, not only informs us concerning PROTEUS, but concerning his daughter EIDOTHEA, who diſcovered her father's abode.

We ſhall perceive in the Explanations which follow, how this Fable applies itſelf to the Subject of the preſent Chapter.

(*l*) Some, ſays *Euſtathius*, when he comments the paſſage above cited from *Homer*, hold "PROTEUS *to* "*be that original* MATTER, *which is the Receptacle of* "*Forms*; *that, which being* IN ACTUALITY NO ONE "*of theſe Forms, is yet* IN CAPACITY *all of them*— "WHICH PROTEUS (they add) EIDOTHEA *his* "*Daughter is elegantly ſaid to diſcover, by leading him* "*forth out of Capacity into Actuality*; *that is, ſhe is that* "PRINCIPLE OF MOTION, *which contrives to make* "*him* RUSH INTO FORM, *and be moved and actuated.*

Heraclides Ponticus having adopted the ſame Method of explaining, ſubjoins—"*that hence it was with* "*good reaſon, that the* FORMLESS MATTER *was called* "PROTEUS; *and that* PROVIDENCE, *which modified*

 each

Ch.IV. "*each Being with it's peculiar Form and Character, was* "*called* EIDOTHEA."

The words of EUSTATHIUS in the original are—ΠΡΩΤΕΑ τὴν πρωτόγονον εἶναι ὕλην, τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν δεχάδα, τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ὖσαν μηδὲν τῶν εἰδῶν, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ πάντα——ὃν δὴ Πρωτέα καλῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑ ἐκφαίνειν, διὰ τῆς ἐκ τῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν προαγωγῆς· ἦγεν ἡ κίνησις, ἡ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΟΣ ΘΕΕΙΝ αὐτὸν, ᾗ κινεῖσθαι μηχανωμένη. *Euſtath. in Hom.* Odyſſ. p. 177. *Edit. Baſil.*

We ſhall only remark, as we proceed, that the Etymology here given of EIDOTHEA, εἰς εἶδος θεῖν, *to ruſh into Form*, is invented, like many other ancient Etymologies, more to explain the word *philoſophically*, than to give us it's *real* origin. 'Tis perhaps more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and ſuch appears to have been the common practice of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoics*.

The words of *Heraclides* are—ὥσε εὔλογον, τὴν μὲν ἄμορφον ὕλην ΠΡΩΤΕΑ καλεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' εἰδωλοπλαςήσασαν ἕκαςα Ἱρόνοιαν ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑΝ. *Heraclid. Pontic.* p. 490. *Gale's Opuſc. Mythog.* 8vo.

To theſe *Greeks* may be ſubjoined a reſpectable Countryman of our own.

Lord *Verulam* tells us of PROTEUS, *that he had his Herd of Seals, or Sea-calves; that theſe 'twas his Cuſtom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a Cavern, and repoſe himſelf.* Of this we read the following Explanation—"*that under the Perſon of* PROTEUS "*is ſignified* MATTER, *the moſt ancient of all Things,*

"*next*

" *next to the Deity—that the Herd of Proteus was no-*
" *thing elſe, than the ordinary* SPECIES *of Animals,*
" *Plants, and Metals, into which* MATTER *appears to*
" *diffuſe, and as it were to conſume itſelf; ſo that after*
" *it has formed and finiſhed thoſe ſeveral Species (it's taſk*
" *being in a manner complete) it appears to ſleep and be*
" *at reſt, nor to labour at, attempt, or prepare any Spe-*
" *cies farther.*" *De Sapientiâ Vet.* c. 13.

The Author's own words are—*ſub* PROTEI *enim perſonâ* MATERIA *ſignificatur, omnium rerum poſt Deum antiquiſſima.*——PECUS *autem, ſive* GREX *Protei. non aliud videtur eſſe, quam* SPECIES *ordinariæ Animalium, Plantarum, Metallorum, in quibus Materia videtur ſe diffundere, et quaſi conſumere; adeo ut, poſtquam iſtas Species effinxerit, et abſolverit, (tanquam penſo completo) dormire et quieſcere videatur, nec alias ampliùs Species moliri, tentare, aut parare.*

CHAP. V.

Concerning FORM—*An imperfect Deſcription of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Phyſical—how they differ—Eſſential Forms—Tranſition to Forms of a Character ſuperior to the paſſive and elementary.*

Ch. V. FORM *is that elementary Conſtituent in every compoſite Subſtance, by which it is* DISTINGUISHED *and* CHARACTERIZED, *and known from every other (a).* But to be more explicit.

THE *firſt* and moſt ſimple of all *Extenſions* is a *Line.* This, when it exiſts united with a *ſecond* Extenſion, makes a *Superficies*; and theſe two, exiſting to-

(a) See the firſt Note in the preceding Chapter, and page 91.

gether

gether with a *third*, make a *Solid*. Now this *laſt* and *complete* EXTENSION we call the *firſt* and *ſimpleſt* FORM; and when this *firſt* and *ſimpleſt Form* accedes to the *firſt* and *ſimpleſt Matter*, the Union of the two produces BODY, which is for that reaſon defined to be *Matter triply extended*. And thus we behold the riſe of *pure* and original BODY (*b*). Ch. V.

IT

(*b*) Original Body, when we look *downwards*, has reference to the *primary Matter*, it's Subſtratum; when we look *upwards*, becomes itſelf a ὕλη, or *Matter to other things*; to the *Elements* as commonly called, Air, Earth, Water, &c. and in conſequence, to all the variety of *natural Productions*.

Hence it is, that *Ammonius*, ſpeaking of the firſt Matter, ſays—αὕτη ἔν, ἐξοικωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαςάσεις, ὥσιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ἄποιον σῶμα—*This* [that is, THE FIRST MATTER] *being embulked with three extenſions, makes* THE SECOND MATTER OR SUBJECT, that is to ſay, BODY VOID OF QUALITY.

After having ſhewn how *natural Qualities* and *Attributes* ſtood in need of ſuch a Subject for their exiſtence, he adds (which is worth remarking)—ὐχ ὅτι ἦν ποτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἢ σῶμα ἄποιον, ἀλλὰ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ὄντων γένεσιν θεωρῦντες φαμὲν,

Ch. V.

IT muſt be remembered however, that *Body* under this character is ſomething *indefinite* and *vague*, and ſcarcely to be made an *Object of ſcientific Contemplation*. 'Tis neceſſary to this end, that it's Extenſion ſhould be *bounded*; for as yet we have treated it without ſuch regard. Now the *Bound* or *Limit of Simple Body* is *Figure*; and thus it is that FIGURE, with regard to Body, becomes the next *Form* after *Extenſion*.

IN *Body* thus bounded *by Figure*, every other of it's *Attributes* being *abſtracted* and *withdrawn*, we behold that Species of Body, called BODY MATHEMATICAL; a name ſo given it, becauſe the *Mathematician*, as ſuch, conſiders no other *At-*

τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ διαιροῦντες ταῦτα, τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀχώριστα— *not that there ever was* IN ACTUALITY *either Matter without Body, or Body without Quality; but we ſay ſo, as we contemplate the well-ordered Generation of things, dividing thoſe things in Imagination, which are by Nature inſeparable. Ammon. in Præd.* p. 62. See below, p. 90, 91.

tributes

tributes of Body, except it be theſe two *Primary*, it's *Extenſion* and it's *Figure* (*c*). Ch. V.

BUT though the *bounding* of Body by *Figure* is one ſtep towards rendering it more *definite* and *knowable*, yet is not this ſufficient for the purpoſes of *Nature*. 'Tis neceſſary *here*, that not only it's *External* ſhould be duly bounded, but that a ſuitable regard ſhould be likewiſe had to it's *Internal*. This *internal Adjuſtment*, *Diſpoſition*, or *Arrangement*

(*c*) In *Body Mathematical* all Qualities being abſtracted but *Figure* and *Extenſion*, we may hence perceive the reaſon why the Contemplation of *ſuch* Body (*which Contemplation makes ſo large a part of the Mathematical Sciences*) is more accurate and certain, than that of any *other* Body. It is, becauſe of all Bodies, Mathematical Body has the *feweſt*, the *moſt obvious*, and the *moſt preciſe* Attributes.

Hence too we may perceive the difference between a *Mathematician*, and a *natural Philoſopher*. They differ, as their Subjects differ; as the Subject of the firſt is ſimple; of the laſt is complicated; as the Attributes of *Mathematical* Body are *few* and *known*; of *Phyſical* Body are *unknown* and *infinite*. *Vid. Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. ii. c. 2.

Ch. V. (denominate it as you pleaſe) is called ORGANIZATION, and may be conſidered as the *third* Form, which appertains to Body. By it's acceſſion we behold the riſe of BODY PHYSICAL or NATURAL, for every *ſuch* Body is ſome way or other *organized*.

AND thus may we affirm that theſe *three*, that is to ſay, EXTENSION, FIGURE, and ORGANIZATION, are the three ORIGINAL FORMS to BODY PHYSICAL or NATURAL, *Figure* having reſpect to it's *External*; *Organization* to it's *Internal*; and *Extenſion being common* both to one and to the other. 'Tis more than probable that from the Variation in theſe *univerſal*, and, as I may ſay, *Primary Forms*, ariſe moſt of thoſe *ſecondary* Forms uſually called QUALITIES SENSIBLE, becauſe they are the *proper* Objects of our ſeveral Senſations. Such are Roughneſs and Smoothneſs, Hardneſs and Softneſs, the tribes of Colours,

lours, Savours and Odours, not to mention thoſe Powers of Character more *ſubtle*, the Powers Electric, Magnetic, Medicinal, &c. Ch. V.

HERE therefore we may anſwer the Queſtion, how *natural* Bodies are *diſtinguiſhed*. Not a ſingle one among them conſiſts of *Materials in Chaos*, but of Materials wrought up after the moſt exquiſite manner, and that conſpicuous in their *Organization* (*d*), or in their *Figure*, or in *both*.

As therefore every *natural Body* is diſtinguiſhed by the *Differences* juſt deſcribed; and as theſe *Differences* have nothing to do with the *original Matter*, which being every where ſimilar, can afford no diſtinctions at all: may we not

(*d*) No where perhaps is the force of *Organization* more conſpicuous, than when we perceive different Grafts, upon the ſame Tree, to produce different Species of Fruit.

hence

Ch. V.

hence infer the expediency of ESSENTIAL FORMS, that *every natural Subſtance may be eſſentially characterized?* 'Tis with deference to my Contemporaries, that I ſurmiſe this aſſertion. I ſpeak perhaps of Spectres, as ſhocking to ſome Philoſophers, as thoſe were to *Eneas*, which he met in his way to Hell:

Terribiles viſu Formæ.

Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think theſe *Forms* SELF-EXISTENT; things, *which Matter may ſlip off*, and fairly leave to themſelves,

Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æſtate cicadæ (*e*.)

They rather mean ſomething, which, though differing from Matter, can yet *never ſubſiſt without it* (*f*); ſomething,

(*e*) *Lucr.* iv. 56.

(*f*) See Note the ſecond of this Chapter. 'Tis a uniform Poſition in the Phyſics of the old Peripatetics,

which, *united* with it, helps to produce every *compoſite* Being, that is to ſay in other words, every *natural Subſtance* in the viſible world. Ch. V.

It muſt be remembered however (as we have ſaid before) that it is the Form in this Union, which is the *Source of all Diſtinction* *. 'Tis by *this*, that the Ox is diſtinguiſhed from the Horſe, not by that Graſs, on which they ſubſiſt, *the common Matter* to both. To which alſo may be added, that as Figures and ſenſible Qualities are *the only objects of our Senſations*, and theſe all are *Parts of natural Form*; ſo therefore (contrary to the

---

tetics, ὅτι ἀχώρισα τὰ πάθη, that *the Affections* [of Body] *are inſeparable from it.* See *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. i. 'Tis *one* thing to be a Cube, *another* thing to be Iron, or Silver, or Wood, or Ivory. The Cube is moſt evidently and certainly *no one* of theſe, yet is it abſurd and impoſſible to ſuppoſe the Cube ſhould ever exiſt without one of theſe, or ſomething ſimilar to ſupport it. See before, pages 77, 78.

* P. 63. 84.

ſentiment

Ch. V. ſentiment of the Vulgar, who dream of nothing but of *Matter*) *'tis Form which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, ſee, or feel*; nor is *mere Matter* any thing better, than an *obſcure imperfect Being*, knowable only to the *reaſoning Faculty* by the two methods already explained, I mean that of *Analogy*, and that of *Abſtraction* (*g*).

HERE therefore we conclude with reſpect to SENSIBLE FORMS, that is to ſay, FORMS IMMERGED *in Matter*, and *ever inſeparable* from it. In *theſe* and *Matter* we place THE ELEMENTS OF (*h*) NATURAL

(*g*) See before p. 76, 77, 78.

(*h*) ELEMENTS are τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, *the inherent*, or (if I may uſe the expreſſion) *the in-exiſting Cauſes*, ſuch as MATTER and FORM, of which we have been treating. There are other Cauſes, ſuch as the Tribe of EFFICIENT CAUSES, which cannot be called Elements, becauſe *they make no part* of the Subſtances, which they generate, or produce. Thus the Statuary is no part of his Statue; the Painter, of his Picture.

TURAL SUBSTANCE, and thus finiſh the first part of the Inquiry we propoſed. Ch. V.

WE are now to engage in Speculations of another kind, and from the *Elements* of Natural Subſtance to inquire after it's EFFICIENT CAUSE (*i*), that is to ſay, that

---

Picture. Hence it appears that ALL ELEMENTS are *Cauſes*; but not ALL CAUSES, *Elements*.

(*i*) *Ariſtotle* having reduced his three Principles of natural Productions to *two*, which two we have treated in this, and the preceding Chapter, adheres not ſo ſtrictly to this Reduction, but that he ſtill admits the *Three*.—Thus in his *Metaphyſics*, he tells us—ὅτι ἀρχαί εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη—that *the Form, the Privation, and the Matter, are three* PRINCIPLES. He calls them ELEMENTS, becauſe they have no Exiſtence, but in the Subſtance to which they belong. To theſe he adds the EFFICIENT CAUSE, which as it exiſts *externally*, that is, *without* the Subject, he will not for that reaſon allow to be *an Element*.—Hence he obſerves, ὥστε Στοιχεῖα μὲν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες—*that the* ELEMENTS *were* THREE; *the* CAUSES *and* PRINCIPLES *were* FOUR. His inſtances are—Health, *the Form*; Diſeaſe, *the Privation*; the human Body, *the Subject*. In theſe *three Cauſes* we have *the* ELEMENTS: Add to theſe Cauſes *the fourth*, that

Ch. V. that Cauſe, which *aſſociates* thoſe Elements, and which *employs* them, when aſſociated, according to their various and peculiar Characters.

---

that is, *the Efficient*, the Art of Medicine; and then we have THE FOUR CAUSES required.—Again—call the Plan of the Houſe, the *Form*; the previous want of Order, the *Privation*; the Bricks, the *Materials*; add to theſe the *fourth Cauſe*, the Architect's *Art*, and again we have THE FOUR CAUSES required. *Metaph.* A. p. 198, 199. *Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis this *Efficient* Cauſe, that will make the Subject of the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning FORM, *conſidered as an* EFFICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE—*Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeleſs—Ovid, a philoſophical Poet—Farther Deſcription of the animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, and Effects—Virgil—The Active and the Paſſive Principle run thro' the Univerſe—Mind, Region of Forms—Corporeal Connections, where neceſſary, where obſtructive—Means and Ends—their different Precedence according to different Syſtems—Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Ariſtotle, &c.—Providence.*

LET us ſuppoſe an artificial Subſtance, for example a muſical Pipe, and let us ſuppoſe to this Pipe *the Art* of the Piper to be united, not ſeparated Ch. VI.

as

Ch.VI. as now, but *vitally* united, ſo that the Pipe by it's *own* Election might play, whenever it pleaſed.—Would not this Union render it a kind of *living* Being, where the Art would be an *active* Principle, the Pipe a *paſſive*, both *reciprocally* fitted for the purpoſes of each other? —And what, if inſtead of the Piper's Art, we were to ſubſtitute that of the Harper?—Would this *new* Union alſo be *natural* like the former? Or would not rather the *Inaptitude* of the Conſtituents prevent any *Union* at all? It certainly would prevent it, and all *Melody* conſequent; ſo that we could now by no analogy conſider the Pipe as *animated*.

'Tis in theſe and other Arts, conſidered as *efficient* Habits, we gain a glimpſe of thoſe Forms, which characteriſe not by *viſible* Qualities, but by their reſpective *Powers*, their Operations and their Energies. As is the Piper's *Art* to the Pipe, the Harper's to the Harp,

ſo

ſo is the *Soul* of the Lion to the *Body* Leonine, the *Soul* of Man to the *Body* Human; becauſe in neither caſe 'tis poſſible to commute or make an exchange, without ſubverting the very End and Conſtitution of the Animal *(a)*. Ch. VI.

AND thus are we arrived at a *new order of Forms*, the tribe of animating Principles *(b)*; for there is nothing which diſtin-

(a) See *Ariſt. de An.* l. i. c. 3. p. 13. *Edit. Sylb.*

The Stagirite uſes upon this occaſion the following Similitude—παραπλήσιον γὰρ λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλὸς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τεχνὴν χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι—*They* [who adopt the Notion of placing *any* Soul in *any* Body] *talk the ſame, as if a Perſon was to ſay the Carpenter's Art might enter into a Muſician's Pipe: now 'tis neceſſary that every Art ſhould uſe it's proper Inſtruments, and every Soul it's proper Body.*

(b) Alexander Aphrodiſienſis has an expreſs Diſſertation to prove, ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ψυχὴ, *that the Soul is a Form. Alex.* p. 124. *Bi Edit. Ald. Ven.* 1534. It was ſo called, not with the leaſt view to it's having a

Ch. VI. *diſtinguiſhes* ſo eminently as theſe; and 'tis on the power of *Diſtinction*, that we reſt the very *Eſſence* of FORM.

'Tis here we view *Form* in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a *paſſive elementary* Conſtituent, a mere inactive and ſenſible Attribute. 'Tis here it aſſumes the dignity of a *living motive Power*, of a Power deſtined by it's nature to uſe, and not be uſed. 'Tis to the Diverſity of *Powers* in theſe animating *Forms*, that the *Diverſity* of the *Organizations* in the corporeal World has reference. That ſtrong and nervous Leg, ſo well armed with tearing

---

Figure, as if, for example, it were a Spherical Body, but becauſe it was able not only by it's *perceptive* Powers to *ſecrete* Forms, but by it's *productive* Powers to *impart* them; whence, being conſidered as full of them, it was elegantly deſcribed to be τόπος Εἰδῶν, *the Region of Forms*. *Ariſt. de Anim.* l. iii. c. 4. —See alſo l. ii. c. 1.

See *Hermes*, p. 310, 311, 312, &c.

Fangs,

Fangs, how perfectly is it correſpondent to the fierce Inſtincts of the Lion? Had it been adorned, like the Human Arm, with Fingers inſtead of Fangs, *the natural Energies of a Lion* had been all of them defeated. That more delicate ſtructure of an Arm, terminating in *Fingers* ſo nicely diverſified, how perfectly does it correſpond to the pregnant Invention of the *human* Soul? Had theſe Fingers been Fangs, what had become of poor *Art*, that by her Operations procures us ſo many Elegancies and Utilities? 'Tis here we behold the *Harmony* between the Viſible World and the Inviſible; between the Paſſive and the Active; between the Lifeleſs and the Living. The whole Variety in *Bodies* as well natural as artificial, is ſolely referable to the *previous* Variety in theſe their *animating* Forms. 'Tis for the ſake of theſe they *exiſt*; 'tis by theſe they are *employed*; and without them they would Ch. VI.

Ch. VI. be as uſeleſs, as the Shoe without the Foot.

'Twas perhaps owing to this uſe of the word Form, in order to denote *an animating Principle*, that the Poet Ovid (who appears by his works not unacquainted with Philoſophy) opens his *Metamorphoſis* with thoſe lines, ſo perplexing to his Commentators.

In Nova *fert* Animus *mutatas dicere* Formas
Corpora——

"*My Mind* (ſays he) *carries me to tell of* "Forms *changed into* new Bodies;" not of *Bodies* changed into *new Forms*, but of *Forms*, that is to ſay, Souls, transferred into new Bodies. The *Bodies* it ſeems were new, but the *Souls* or *Forms* remained *the ſame*, of which throughout his Work we have perpetual teſtimony. Thus, when he ſpeaks of *Calliſto*,

MENS ANTIQUA *tamen factâ quoque manſit in urſâ.* Metam. ii. 485.

Of *Arachne*,

—— ANTIQUAS *exercet Aranea* TELAS. Ibid. vi. 145.

Of the *Ants*, that became *Men*,

—— MORES, QUOS ANTE GEREBANT,
NUNC *quoque habent; parcumque genus, patienſque laborum.* Ibid. vii. 656.

And ſo in many other places (*c*), which thoſe who favour this Conjecture, may eaſily diſcover.

(*c*) *Ovid* appears by theſe quotations to have uſed the word FORMA, when he opens his Poem, in a ſenſe *truly* Philoſophical. His Doctrine, that this *Form* or *Soul* might be *transferred from one Body into another* was PYTHAGOREAN, but which the PERIPATETICS rejected from the reaſons above alleged, in the firſt Note of this Chapter.

Ch. VI. As nothing can become known by that, which it has not, ſo it would be abſurd to attempt deſcribing theſe animating Forms by any *viſible* or other Qualities, *the proper Objects of our Senſations*. The Sculptor's *Art* is *not Figure*, but 'tis that, through which Figure is imparted to *ſomething elſe*. The Harper's *Art* is *not Sound*, but 'tis that, through which Sounds are called forth from *ſomething elſe*. They are of themſelves no objects either of the Ear or of the Eye; but their nature or character is underſtood in this, that were they never to exert their *proper Energies* on their *proper Subjects*, the Marble would remain for ever ſhapeleſs, the Harp would remain for ever ſilent (*d*).

'Tis

(*d*) See *Maximus Tyrius*, Diſſ. I. who eloquently applies this Reaſoning to the SUPREME BEING, the Divine Artiſt of the Univerſe—Εἰ δὲ μὴ νῦν ἤδη μαθεῖν ἐρᾷς τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, πῶς τίς αὐτὴν διηγήσηται; καλὸν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, μὴ τῶν καλῶν τὸ φανώτατον·

'Tis the ſame in *natural* Beings (*e*). The ANIMATING FORM *of a natural Body* is neither it's Organization, nor it's Figure, nor any other of thoſe inferior *Forms*, which make up the Syſtem of Ch. VI

τατον· ἀλλ' ὁ σῶμα καλὸν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ᾗ τῷ σώματι ἐπιῤῥεῖ τὸ κάλλος· ὁδὲ λειμῶν καλὸς, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ᾗ ὁ λειμὼν καλός· ᾗ πόλαμις κάλλος, ᾗ θαλάττης, ᾗ ὁρανὸς, ᾗ τῶν ἐν ὁρανῷ θεῶν, πᾶν τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ, οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς ἀενάου, ᾗ ἀκηράτου· καθόσον αὐτῆς μετέχεν ἕκαστα, καλὰ, ᾗ ἑδραῖα, ᾗ σωζόμενα· ᾗ καθόσον αὐτῆς ἀπολείπεται, αἰσχρὰ, ᾗ διαλυόμενα, ᾗ φθειρόμενα.—*But if even now you wiſh to learn the nature of this* SOVEREIGN BEING, *after what manner ſhall any one be able to explain it?* DIVINITY *itſelf is ſurely beauteous, and of all Beauties*, &c. &c.

Thoſe, who chuſe to ſee the remaining part of this elegant original, elegantly tranſlated, may find it *in the ſecond Volume of Lord Shafteſbury's Characteriſtics*, p. 295.

(*e*) Here an attempt is made to explain the *three* great Principles of the SOUL, anciently called τὸ νοητικὸν, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, τὸ θρεπτικὸν, *the Intellective*, *the Senſitive*, and *the Nutritive*. The *Nutritive* is treated firſt, then the *Senſitive*, then the *Intellective*.

See below, note on the word *Intellective*, p. 106.

Ch. VI. it's visible Qualities; but 'tis the Power, which, *not being* that Organization, nor that Figure, nor those Qualities, *is yet able* to produce, to preserve, and to employ them. 'Tis therefore *the Power*, which *first* moves, and then conducts that latent Process, by which the Acorn becomes an Oak, the Embryo becomes a Man. 'Tis *the Power*, by which the Aliment of Plants and Animals is *digested*, and by such digestion *transformed* into a part of themselves. 'Tis *the Power*, as oft as the Body is either mutilated or sick, that co-operates with the Medicine in effecting the Cure. 'Tis *the Power*, which departing, the Body *ceases to live*, and the Members soon pass into putrefaction and decay.

FARTHER still, as putrefaction and decay will *necessarily* come, and Nature would be at an end, were she not maintained by a supply; it is therefore *the Power*, that enables every Being *to produce*

duce another like itſelf, the Lion to pro- Ch. VI.
duce a Lion, the Oak to produce an Oak; ſo that, while Individuals periſh, the Species ſtill remains, and THE CORRUPTIBLE, *as far as may be*, PARTAKES OF THE ETERNAL AND DIVINE (*f*).

IN

(*f*) *This* ETERNAL *and* DIVINE *is what*, as *Ariſtotle* ſays, *all Beings deſire, and for the ſake of which they act whatever they act agreeably to Nature.* Πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (*ſcil.* τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον) ὀρέγεται, χάριν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει. *De Anim.* l. ii. c. 4. p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.*

Immediately afterwards he ſubjoins the following remarkable paſſage, by which he appears to refer the whole Syſtem of *natural* Production or Generation to that *one great Principle.*—ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατεῖ τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ μετέχειν δύναται ἕκαστον, ταύτῃ κοινωνεῖ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἧττον· καὶ διαμένει ἐκ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό· ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δὲ ἕν.—*In as much therefore as theſe Beings* (meaning the ſubordinate and inferior) *cannot participate of the* ETERNAL *and the* DIVINE *in uninterrupted Continuity, from it's being impoſſible that any thing periſhable and tranſient ſhould remain the ſame and one numerically; hence it follows that as far as each is capable of ſharing it, ſo far it participates, one thing*

in

Ch. VI. IN *all the Energies here enumerated* it extends through *Vegetables* as well as *Animals*. But with Animals, taken apart, it is that *higher Active Faculty*, which, by employing the Organs of *Senſe*, *peculiar to them as Animals*, diſtinguiſhes them as *Beings ſenſitive* from Vegetables and Plants. Farther than this, with *Man alone* above the reſt it is that ſtill *ſuperior and more noble* FACULTY, which *by it's own* divine Vigour, *unaſſiſted perhaps with Organs*, makes and denominates him a BEING INTELLECTIVE and RATIONAL *(g)*.

AND

---

in a greater degree, and another in a leſs; and that each thing remains not preciſely the ſame, but as it were the ſame, not NUMERICALLY ONE, *but* ONE IN SPECIES.

To this *Virgil* alludes,

At GENUS IMMORTALE *manet*——

Georg. iv.

See *Plat. Conviv.* p. 1197. C. *Ed. Fic.*

(g) Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λειχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς

AND ſo much for the deſcription of thoſe Forms, which, being *purely invi-* Ch. VI.

νὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη.—*As to the Powers of the Soul here deſcribed, they exiſt* ALL *of them in ſome Beings*; SOME *of them only in other Beings*; *and in ſome Beings* ONLY ONE *of them. Ariſt. de An.* l. ii. c. 3. p. 26. *Edit. Sylb.* That is to ſay, *Man* poſſeſſes *all*; *Brutes* poſſeſs *ſome*; *Plants*, *one only*—*Man* has the Vegetative, the Senſitive, and the Intellective Faculty; *Brutes* only the Vegetative and the Senſitive; *Plants*, the Vegetative alone.

See ſoon after, p. 28—ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῦ θρεπτικῦ κ. τ. λ.

Ideoque ob conſortium corporis eſt inter homines, beſtiaſque, et cetæra vitâ carentia, Societas communioque corporeorum proventuum. Siquidem NASCI, NUTRIRI, CRESCERE *commune eſt hominibus cum cæteris*; SENTIRE *vero* ET APPETERE, *commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum, et ratione carentibus animalibus.* CUPIDITAS *porro atque* IRACUNDIA *vel agreſtium vel manſuetorum,* APPETITUS IRRATIONABILIS *eſt: Hominis vero, cujus eſt proprium rationi mentem applicare,* RATIONABILIS: RATIOCINANDI *enim atque* INTELLIGENDI, SCIENDIQUE VERUM APPETITUS *proprius eſt Hominis, quia a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum diſtat. Illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus, et multo quidem acriora, cernuntur:* RATIONIS *autem* PERFECTIO *et* INTELLECTUS, *propria* DEI *et* HOMINIS *tantum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim.* p. 345. *Edit. Fabric.*

ſibly,

Ch. VI. *ſible*, and (it may be ſaid) *totally inſenſible*, are no otherwiſe to be known, *Conſciouſneſs* alone excepted, than by *ſenſible Operations* and *Energies (h)*, *perceived in things corporeal*. As

(h) See the Paſſage juſt before quoted from *Maximus Tyrius*. Nothing can be of greater importance, than a due attention to this Diſtinction; I mean *the Diſtinction between Effects and Cauſes*; between *Effects* which are viſible, and *Cauſes* which are inviſible; between *Effects*, the natural Objects of *all* our Senſations; and *Cauſes*, which are Objects of *no Senſation at all*.

'Tis with reference to this Diſtinction that *Cyrus* is made to reaſon in his laſt moments by *Xenophon*, his philoſophical Hiſtorian, who thus deſcribes him addreſſing his Children.

Οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοῦτό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἰδέναι, ὡς ἐμὲ ἔσομαι ἐγὼ ἔτι, ἐπειδὰν τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ τελευτήσω· οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τὴν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οἷς διεπράττετο, τούτοις αὐτὴν ὡς ἔσαν κατεφωρᾶτε— Thus excellently tranſlated by my honourable Relation, Mr. *Aſhley*.—*You ought not to imagine you certainly know, that, after I have cloſed the period of Human Life, I ſhall no longer exiſt. For neither do you* NOW *ſee my Soul; but you conclude* FROM IT'S OPERATIONS, *that it* DOES EXIST. *Cyropædia*, l. viii.

Cicero has tranſlated the ſame paſſage with great elegance, but in a manner leſs ſtrict, leſs confined to the original.

As in their very Eſſence they imply *Activity*, as much as *Matter*, upon which they operate, implies *Paſſivity*; hence in every natural Compoſite, we may diſcern the influence of *two ſuch Principles*, while, under different Proportions, and in different Degrees, THE ACTIVE *enlivens* the Paſſive, *and* THE PASSIVE *depreſſes* the Active. Ch. VI.

'Tis to this that VIRGIL nobly alludes, when he tells us, that to every *enlivened* ſubſtance, every *animated* Being, there was ſomething appertaining of *etherial*

Nolite arbitrari O! mihi cariſſimi filii, me, cum a vobis diſceſſerim, nuſquam aut nullum fere; nec enim, dum eram vobiſcum, animum meum videbatis, ſed cum eſſet in hoc corpore, EX IIS REBUS, QUAS GEREBAM, *intelligebatis: eundem igitur eſſe creditote, etiamſi nullum videbitis. De Senect.* c. 22.

Nothing is more certain than that many things, which have *no ſenſible* Qualities, may be deſcribed accurately, and comprehended adequately, by *their Energies and Operations upon ſenſible Objects.*

Vigour,

Ch.VI. Vigour, and *heavenly* Origin, as far forth as not retarded by it's *mortal* and *earthly* Members.

IGNEUS *eſt ollis* VIGOR, *et* CÆLESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus, quantum nox NOXIA CORPORA TARDANT,
TERRENIQUE *hebetant* ARTUS, *moribundaque membra.* Æn. VI.

COULD we penetrate that Miſt, which hides ſo much from human Eyes, and follow theſe *Compoſites* to their different and original Principles, we might gain perhaps a glimpſe of *two* objects worth contemplating; of that which is FIRST, and that which is LAST, in the general Order of Being; of *pure Energy* in the SUPREME MIND, the *firſt* Mover of all Efficients; of *pure Paſſivity* in the LOWEST MATTER, the *ultimate* Baſis of all ſubjects (*i*).

(*i*) Thus the *Stoics*—δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον

But leſt theſe ſhould be eſteemed Speculations rather foreign, 'tis ſufficient to Ch. VI.

χον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν θεόν.—*Their opinion is, that the Principles of all things are two,* THE ACTIVE *Principle and* THE PASSIVE; *that the Paſſive Principle is that Subſtance void of all Quality,* MATTER; *the Active Principle, that Reaſon, which exiſts within it,* GOD. *Diog. Laert.* vii. 134.

The following Paſſage from *Ammonius* is remarkable, and well applies to the preſent Subject.—Διὸ φασὶ τὴν ὕλην τῷ θείῳ ἀνομοίως ὡμοιῶσθαι· ὡμοιῶσθαι μὲν, ὅτι δι' ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἄλλων σημαίνεται ἑκάτερον, ἀνομοίως δὲ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν, χρεῖττον ὄντος, ἡ κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀποφάσκομεν πάντα, τῆς δὲ ὕλης, χείρους ἔσης ἢ κατὰ πάντα, ταῦτα ἀποφάσκομεν.—*For this reaſon they ſay that* MATTER *is* DISSIMILARLY SIMILAR *to the* DIVINITY; *is* SIMILAR, *becauſe each of them is explained by a Negation of all other things;* DISSIMILARLY *ſo, in as much as we deny all things of the Divinity, by it's being better than all things; we deny them of Matter, by it's being worſe. Ammon. in Prædic.* p. 50. *B.*

Archytas thus expreſſes himſelf in his *Doric* Dialect.

Τὸ μὲν ἐντὶ ποιέον, τὸ δὲ πάχον· οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ποιέον μὲν ὁ θεὸς, πάχον δὲ ἁ ὕλα, καὶ ποιέον

καὶ

Ch. VI. to mark the *Analogy* between things *Natural* and *Artificial*; how, that as there are no FORMS of *Art*, which did not *pre-exiſt* in the *Mind of Man*, ſo are there no FORMS *of Nature*, which did not *pre-exiſt in the Mind of* GOD. 'Tis through this we comprehend, how MIND or INTELLECT IS THE REGION OF

ἡ πάσχον, τὰ στοιχεῖα.—*There is ſomething, which is* AGENT; *and ſomething, which is* PATIENT; *that among natural Beings* GOD *is the* AGENT; MATTER *the* PATIENT; *but the* ELEMENTS *are both Agent and Patient united.*

Upon this *Simplicius* obſerves—Σαφῶς δὲ ὄντος τῶν λεγομένων, παραδείγματα ἀρχικώτατα παρέθετο, ποιοῦν μὲν τὸν θεὸν εἰπών, ᾧ ἡ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ποιητικὰ αἴτια συνέπεται, πάσχειν δὲ τὴν ὑλην, δι' ἣν ἡ τὰ ἄλλα μετέχει τοῦ πάσχειν, ἡ ποιεῖν δὲ ἡ πάσχειν τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἅτε δὴ μετέχοντα ἥ τε ὕλης ἡ εἴδους.—*Tho' what has been ſaid is evident, he has adduced* (to explain himſelf) *the two higheſt and moſt leading Inſtances, ſaying, that* GOD *is* AGENT, *whom all other Active Cauſes follow; and* MATTER PATIENT, *thro' which other Beings partake of Paſſion; and that the* ELEMENTS *are both* AGENTS *and* PATIENTS, *in as much as they participate both of Matter and of Form. Simpl. in Prad.* p. 84. *Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

FORMS,

FORMS (*k*), in a far more noble and exalted ſenſe, than by being their *paſſive* Receptacle through Impreſſions from Objects without. It is their *Region*, not by being the Spot into which they migrate as *ſtrangers*, but in which they dwell as *αὐτοχθόνες*, the *original Natives* of the Country. 'Tis in *Mind* they firſt exiſt, before *Matter* can receive Ch. VI.

(*k*) See *Ariſtotle* already quoted, p. 98, in his Tract *De Animâ* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* In the eighth Chapter of the ſame Book, p. 62, he calls the Soul ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, and that not only from it's being that *ſupreme characteriſing Power*, which *gives* to ſubordinate Beings their *peculiar Form or Character*, but as it *uſes* them, when made, agreeably to their reſpective Natures. In this laſt acceptation it is the *Form of Forms*, as *the Hand* appears to be *the Organ of Organs*; to be that ſuperior Inſtrument, which *uſes* the reſt, the Chiſſel, the Pencil, the Lyre, &c. all which inferior Organs or Inſtruments, *without this previous and ſuperior one to employ them*, would be inefficacious, and dead, and incapable of produeing any ſingle Effect.—ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων. *Ariſt in loc.*

Ch. VI.

them (*l*); 'tis *from Mind*, when they adorn *Matter*, that they *primarily* proceed: ſo that, whether we contemplate the works of Art, or the more excellent Works of Nature, all that we look at, as *beautiful*, or liſten to, as *harmonious*, is the genuine EFFLUENCE OR EMANATION OF MIND (*m*).

AND

(*l*) In the *Scriptural* account of Creation, *Light*, previouſly to it's exiſtence, is commanded to exiſt — *And God ſaid*, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT. So alſo *Vegetables* and *Animals*, *previouſly* to their exiſting, are *commanded* to exiſt. Now, whether by theſe Commands we ſuppoſe certain *verbal Orders*, or (what ſeems far more probable) only a *Divine Volition*, reſpect muſt needs have been had to certain PRE-EXISTING FORMS, elſe *ſuch Words* or *ſuch Volitions* muſt have been *devoid of all Meaning*.

(*m*) A proof, that theſe tranſcendent Objects are of an Origin truly *mental*, is, that nothing but MIND or INTELLECT *can recognize or comprehend them*. And hence it follows that, if this *intellective* Faculty be wanting, as it is to inferior Animals, or be unhappily debaſed, as too often happens to our own Species; tho' their *ſenſitive* Organs may be *exquiſite* to a degree, yet are ſuch Beings to ſuch Objects, as if they had no Organs at all. *Eyes have they, and ſee not*, &c.

And

AND now to recapitulate what we have ſaid concerning FORM. We have traced it's Variety from the *Lifeleſs* and *Inanimate* up to the *Living* and *Animating*; from Figures, Colours, and ſenſible Qualities, up to the *Powers only knowable through their Energies and Operations*; in other words, from thoſe *Forms*, which are but *paſſive Elements*, up to thoſe, which are *Efficient Cauſes*. Ch. VI.

EVEN in theſe active, animating, and efficient *Forms*, beſides the Differences which we have remarked, there is ſtill another worth regarding. Some of them

---

And hence the meaning of that fine Trochaic Verſe in the *Sicilian* Poet and Philoſopher, *Epicharmus*;

Νῶς ὁρᾷ κ᾽ νῶς ἀκέει· τ᾽ ἄλλα κωφὰ κ᾽ τυφλά.

'Tis MIND ALONE, *that ſees, that hears; all things beſide are deaf and blind.*

Clem. Alex. t. i. p. 442. *Edit. Pott. Max. Tyr. Edit.* 8vo p. 12. *Edit.* 4to. p. 203.

Ch. VI. cannot act without *corporeal* Connections, while to others such Connections appear to be no way requisite. What for example is the *vegetative* Power in Plants, without *a natural Body* for it to nourish and enliven? What the *sensitive* Powers of hearing or of seeing, without the corporeal Organs of an Ear, or an Eye? These are *animating Forms*, which though themselves not Body, are yet so far inseparable from it, that were their Connection dissolved, they would be as unable to exert themselves, as the Painter, deprived of his Pencil, or the Harper of his Harp. 'Tis not so with that *perceptive Power*, UNMIXED AND PURE INTELLIGENCE, the Objects of which being purely intelligible, are all congenial with itself. *Corporeal* Connections appear so little wanted here, that perhaps 'tis then in it's *highest* Vigour, when it is wholly *separated* and *detached*. 'Tis in *this* part of our animating Form, that we must look for THE IMMORTAL AND DIVINE;

VINE *(n)*; 'tis *this* indeed is all of it, that a rational Man would wiſh to preſerve, Ch. VI.

(*n*) Ὁ δὲ Νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι, οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι—MIND *ſeems to be implanted* [into the Body] *being* A PECULIAR SUBSTANCE OF ITSELF, *and not to be corrupted or to periſh* (as the Body does). *Ariſt. de An.* l. i. c. 4. p. 15—And ſoon after, when he has told us that the *Paſſions* periſh with *the Body*, to which they are inſeparably united, he adds—Ὁ δὲ Νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές. *But the* MIND *perhaps is ſomething* MORE DIVINE, *and free from Paſſion, or being acted upon.*

In another part of the ſame Work he diſtinguiſhes between the original *Capacity* of the *ſenſitive* Part, and that of the *Intellective* Part: *Senſation* (he tells us) is *impaired* by the *Violence of ſenſible* Objects: Exceſſive Sounds, exceſſive Light, exceſſive Smells, prevent us from hearing, from ſeeing, or from ſmelling.—Ἀλλ' ὁ Νοῦς, ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητὸν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ Νοῦς χωριστός.—*But* MIND, *when it contemplates any thing clearly and ſtrongly intelligible, does not for that reaſon* LESS *comprehend inferior Objects of Intellection, but even* MORE; *the Cauſe is, the* SENSITIVE *Principle exiſts not* WITHOUT A BODY (it's Organs being all Bodily); *but* MIND *on the contrary is* SEPARABLE AND DETACHED. *Ibid.* l. iii. c. 4.

Ch. VI. ſerve, when he would be rather thankful to find his Paſſions and his Appetites extinct.

AND

Cyrus, in the Speech attributed to him by *Xenophon*, and quoted before, p. 108, ſpeaks as follows.

Οὕτοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, ἀεὶ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπεισθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ· ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. Ὁρῶ γὰρ, ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ᾖ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζῶντα παρέχεται. Οὐδέ γε, ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφρονος σώματος δίχα γένηται, ἀεὶ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἰκὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένου δὲ ἀνθρώπου, δῆλά ἐστιν ἕκαστα ἀπιόντα πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, πλὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη οὔτε παροῦσα οὔτε ἀπιοῦσα ὁρᾶται. Ξενοφ. Κύρου Παιδ. H. p. 655. *Edit. Hutchinſon.* 4to. *Oxon.* 1727.

Thus tranſlated by the abovementioned excellent Tranſlator.

No! Children! I can never be perſuaded, that the Soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal Body, and that it dies on Separation. For I ſee that the Soul communicates Vigour and Motion to mortal Bodies, during it's continuance in them. Neither can I be perſuaded, that the Soul is diveſted of Intelligence, on it's Separation from this groſs ſenſeleſs Body; but it is probable, that WHEN THE SOUL IS SEPARATED, *it becomes pure and intire,*

AND thus having traced the various order of FORMS from the loweſt and baſeſt Ch. VI

intire, and is then MORE INTELLIGENT. *It is evident, that, on Man's diſſolution, every part of him returns to what is of the ſame nature with itſelf, except the Soul:* THAT ALONE IS INVISIBLE, BOTH DURING IT'S PRESENCE HERE, AND AT IT'S DEPARTURE. *Cyropæd.* p. 326, 327.

Thus tranſlated by *Cicero*—*Mihi quidem nunquam perſuaderi poteſt animos, dum in corporibus eſſent mortalibus, vivere; cum exiſſent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum eſſe inſipientem, cum ex inſipienti corpore evaſiſſet; ſed, cum,* OMNI ADMIXTIONE CORPORIS LIBERATUS, *purus et integer eſſe cœpiſſet, tum eſſe* SAPIENTEM. *Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte diſſolvitur, cæterarum rerum perſpicuum eſt quo quæque diſcedant; abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta ſunt:* ANIMUS AUTEM SOLUS, NEC CUM ADEST, NEC CUM DISCEDIT, APPARET. *De Senectute,* cap. 22.

Theſe Speculations of *Cyrus* may more properly be called the Speculations of *Xenophon*, who derived them without doubt (as he did the reſt of his Philoſophy) from his great Maſter, *Socrates*. They paſſed alſo into other Syſtems of Philoſophy, derived from the ſame Original; ſuch for example as the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle*, who was a hearer and a diſciple as well of *Socrates* as of *Plato*.

Ch. VI. baſeſt up to the higheſt and beſt, and conſidered how, though differing, they *all agree* in this, that *they give to every Being it's peculiar and diſtinctive Character*, we ſhall here conclude our Speculations concerning FORM, the ſecond Species of Subſtance, and which appears *in*

Beſides what has been offered in the beginning of this Note, the following Remark and Quotation may perhaps inform us farther in the Sentiments of the *Stagirite*, and his School.

The HUMAN INTELLECT was ſuppoſed by the *Peripatetics* to be *pure and abſolute* CAPACITY; to be *no particular thing*, till it began *to comprehend* things; *nor to be blended with Body*, becauſe, if it were, it would have *ſome Quality of Body* adhere to it (ſuch as hot, cold, and the like), which *Quality* would of courſe obſtruct it's operations. On the contrary they held it to receive it's impreſſions, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, *as impreſſions are made in* A WRITING TABLET, WHERE NOTHING AS YET IS IN ACTUALITY WRITTEN. *Ariſtot. de Animâ*, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 58. *Edit. Sylb.*

But this in the way of digreſſion—'Tis only the ſhort Specimen of an ancient Speculation, which gives us reaſons, why the *human* Intellect can have no *Innate Ideas*.

part

part to be an ELEMENT, *in part* an EFFICIENT CAUSE (*o*). Ch. VI.

AND yet we cannot quit theſe Speculations, the latter part of them at leaſt, without a few obſervations on their dignity and importance.

THEIR principal object has been to ſhew, that in the great *intellectual* Syſtem of the Univerſe, MEANS do not lead to ENDS, but ENDS lead to MEANS; that it was not the Organization of the Sheep's Body, which produced the *gentle* inſtincts of the Sheep; nor that of the Lion's Body, which produced the *ferocious* Inſtincts of the Lion (*p*); but, becauſe in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole, ſuch reſpective *animating* and *active Principles* were wanting, it was

(*o*) See the two laſt Notes of the preceding Chapter.

(*p*) See before, in the beginning of this Chapter, page 99.

therefore

Ch. VI. therefore neceſſary that they ſhould be furniſhed with ſuch peculiarly *organized Bodies*, that they *might* be enabled *to act*, and to perform their part, agreeably to their reſpective natures, and their proper buſineſs in the World.

THE ancient Syſtem of Atheiſm ſuppoſed the Organs to come *firſt* * before any thing *farther* was thought of; which Organs, being all of them formed *fortuitouſly*, ſome of them *luckily* anſwered an end, and others anſwered none: thoſe that anſwered, *for a while ſubſiſted*; thoſe that failed, *immediately periſhed*.

EMPEDOCLES (which is ſomewhat ſurpriſing, if we conſider ſome of his better and more rational Doctrines) appears to have favoured this opinion: καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώων ἀπὸ τύχης γενέσθαι τὰ πλεῖσα φησίν. *He ſays*, (as *Ariſtotle* tells us) *that the Limbs of Animals were the*

* See *Hermes*, p. 392.

greater

greater part of them MADE BY CHANCE. Soon after this *Ariſtotle* proceeds in explaining this ſtrange Syſtem—*ὅπῃ μὲν ἂν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ὥσπερ καὶν εἰ ἕνεκά τε ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτομάτης συςάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἅτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα*—*When therefore theſe Limbs all co-incided, as if they had been made for the purpoſe, they were then ſaved and preſerved, having been thus aptly put together by the Operation of* CHANCE; *but ſuch as co-incided not, theſe were loſt, and ſtill* [as faſt as they ariſe] *are loſt; according to what Empedocles ſays concerning* [thoſe monſtrous Productions] *the Bull Species with Human Heads. Ariſt. Phyſic.* l. ii. c. 4. 8. Ch. VI.

LUCRETIUS advances the ſame Doctrine, which was indeed ſuitable to *his* Ideas of the World's production. *The Earth*, he tells us in *his* account of Creation, *aimed at the time to create many*

Ch. VI. *many portentous Beings, ſome with ſtrange Faces and Members; others deficient, without either Feet or Hands; but the endeavours were fruitleſs, for Nature could not ſupport, and carry them on to Maturity.*

Multaque tum Tellus etiam portenta creare
Conata eſt, mirâ facie, membriſque coorta;
Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata viciſſim:

— — — — —

Nequicquam, quoniam Natura abſterruit auctum,
Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
Nec reperire cibum, &c.

LUCRET. V. 835, &c.

'Tis more expreſly in contradiction to the Doctrines inculcated through this whole Tract, *that he denies* FINAL CAUSES; that he holds Eyes were not made for ſeeing, nor Feet for walking, &c.

&c. that he calls ſuch explanations a *prepoſterous* and inverted order, the exiſtence of the USE (according to him) not leading to the production of the THING, but the CASUAL PRODUCTION of the THING leading to the exiſtence of the USE. Ch. VI.

LUMINA *ne facias oculorum clara creata,*
Proſpicere ut poſſimus, et, ut proferre viai
Proceros paſſus, ideo, &c.

Cætera de genere hoc inter quæcunque pretantur,
Omnia perverſâ PRÆPOSTERA *ſunt ratione:*
Nil adeo quoniam natum'ſt in Corpore, UT UTI
Poſſimus; ſed quod NATUM'ST, ID *procreat* USUS.

LUCRET. IV. 822, 30.

AN elegant Poet of our own ſtates this doctrine with his uſual humour.

Note

Ch. VI.

Note here, Lucretius dares to teach
(As all our Youth may learn from CREECH*)*
That Eyes were made, but could not view,
Nor Hands embrace, nor Feet purſue;
But HEEDLESS *Nature did produce*
The Members FIRST, *and* THEN *the uſe:*
What each muſt act, was yet unknown,
Till all was moved by CHANCE *alone.*

A Man firſt builds a Country ſeat,
Then finds the Walls not fit to eat;
Another plants, and wond'ring ſees
Nor Books, nor Medals on his Trees.
Yet Poet and Philoſopher
Was He, who durſt ſuch whims aver.
Bleſt, for his Sake, be Human Reaſon,
Which came at laſt, tho' late, in ſeaſon.
PRIOR's *Alma, Canto I.*

THE Poet had cauſe to be thankful, that a time came, when Men of Senſe oppoſed Reaſon to ſuch Sophiſtry; but the Oppoſition was not ſo late, nor ſo long

long in coming, as he imagined. *Galen*, many Centuries ago, in his excellent Treatiſe *De Uſu Partium*; *Cicero*, in the beſt and moſt concluſive part of his Treatiſe *De Naturâ Deorum*; and before them both, as well as before *Lucretius*, *Ariſtotle*, through every part of his Works, and above all in thoſe reſpecting the Hiſtory of the *Members*, and the *Progreſſion* of *Animals*, had inculcated with irreſiſtible ſtrength of Argument the great Doctrine of FINAL CAUSES; which if we allow with regard to *ourſelves*, but deny to *Nature*, we totally annihilate through the Univerſe any DIVINE or INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE. For nothing can be *Divine*, which is not *Intelligent*; nor any thing *Intelligent*, which has not a *Meaning*; nor any Being have a *Meaning*, which has no *Scope*, or *Final Cauſe*, to govern and direct it's Energies and Operations. Ch. VI.

A PAINTER

Ch. VI. A PAINTER, painting a hundred Portraits, ſucceeds in ninety-nine, and fails in one. We may poſſibly impute *the ſingle Failure* to CHANCE; but can we poſſibly impute to CHANCE his ſucceſs in the *ninety-nine?* How then can we dream of CHANCE in the Operations of NATURE; Operations ſo much more *accurate*, tho' withal ſo much *greater*, and more *numerous*, than thoſe of the Painter? CHANCE is never thought of in that which happens *always*; nor in that which happens *for the moſt part*; but, if any where, in that which happens *unexpectedly* and *rarely* (*q*).

AND

(*q*) See Vol. i. p. 267, 8, 9, where the Doctrine of CHANCE and FORTUNE is diſcuſſed at large upon the *Peripatetic Principles*, and where an attempt is made to explain that moſt ſubtle and ingenious Argument of the *Stagirite*, by which he proves that CHANCE and FORTUNE are ſo far from ſupplanting MIND, or AN INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, that the Exiſtence of *the two former* neceſſarily infers the Exiſtence of *the latter*.

'Twas

AND ſo much for thoſe Philoſophers, recorded for having hardily *denied* a Providence. Ch. VI.

THERE are others, who, tho' they have not denied one, have yet made *Syſtems, that would do without one*; ſeeming to think concerning the trouble of governing a World, as Queen *Dido* did of old,

Scilicet is ſuperis labor eſt; ea cura quietos
Sollicitat?—— (*r*).

A THIRD ſort, with more decency, have neither denied a Providence, nor

---

'Twas conſonant to the Reaſoning there held, that PLATO, long before, is ſaid to have called FORTUNE σύμπλωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, *a* SYMPTOM, *or* THING CO-INCIDENT *either with Nature, or the Human Will.* See *Suidas* in the Word, Εἱμαρμένη. *Plato's* Account will be better underſtood perhaps, by recurring to the Quotation in the former part of this note.

(*r*) *Virg. Æn.* iv.

Ch. VI. omitted one; yet have ſeldom recurred to it, but upon preſſing occaſions, when difficulties aroſe, which they either happened to find, or had happened to make. They appear to have conducted themſelves by *Horace's* advice;

Nec Deus interſit, niſi dignus vindice nodus (s).

A FOURTH Philoſopher remains, and a reſpectable one he is, who ſuppoſes *Providential Wiſdom never to ceaſe for a ſingle moment*, and who ſays to it with reverence, what *Ulyſſes* did to *Minerva*,

——— ἀλλέ σε λήθω
Κινύμενος. (t)

(s) *Hor. Art. Poet.*

(t) *Hom. Iliad.* 10. v. 279. See *Arrian's Epictetus*, lib. i. c. 12, both in the *Original*, and in Mrs. *Carter's* excellent Tranſlation. See alſo the Comment of my worthy and learned Friend *Upton*, on this Chapter, in his valuable Edition of that Author, tom. ii. p. 40; 41. See alſo *Pſalm* cxxxix.

—*Nor*

—Nor can I move, and 'ſcape
Thy Notice—

But to quit Philoſophers and Poets, and return from a Digreſſion, to which we have been led inſenſibly by the latent connection of many different ideas.

THERE remains nothing further, in the treating of SUBSTANCE, than to ſay ſomething of thoſe characters, which are uſually aſcribed to it by *Ariſtotle* and his followers, when they conſider it not in a *phyſical*, but in a *logical* view.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning the Properties of Subſtance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic.

C.VII. THE ancient Logicians, or rather ARISTOTLE and his School, have given us of SUBSTANCE the following Characters.

They inform us that, as SUBSTANCE, *it is not ſuſceptible of more and leſs (a).* Thus a Lion is not more or leſs a Lion, by being more or leſs bulky; a Triangle is not more or leſs a Triangle, by being more or leſs acute-angled. The Intenſions and Remiſſions are to be found in their *Accidents*; the *Eſſences* remain *ſimply* and immutably the ſame, and either abſolutely *are*, or abſolutely *are not*.

(a) Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.—*Ariſt. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.* See *Hermes*, p. 201.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, SUBSTANCE, they tell us, *admits of no Contraries* (*b*). 'Tis to this that *Milton* alludes, when, after having perſonified *Subſtance*, he tells us, C. VII.

TO FIND A FOE IT SHALL NOT BE HIS HAP,
And Peace ſhall lull him in her flow'ry lap (*c*).

THE Aſſertion is evident in *compound Beings*, that is to ſay, in ſubſtances *natural*; for what is there contrary to Man conſidered as Man, or to Lion conſidered as Lion? This is true alſo in the Relation borne by MATTER to FORM; for while Contraries by their co-incidence deſtroy each other, theſe two, *Matter*

(*b*) Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*c*) *Milt. Poems*, No. II.

C. VII. and *Form, coaleſce ſo kindly*, that no Change to either ariſes from their Union. Thus the Marble, when adorned with the *Form* of a Statue, is as preciſely Marble, as it was before; and the Oak, when faſhioned into the *Form* of a Ship, is as truly Oak, as when it flouriſhed in the Foreſt. If there be any Contrariety in Subſtance it is that of FORM to PRIVATION, where *Privation* nevertheleſs is nearly allied to *Non-entity*.

LASTLY, SUBSTANCE they tell us is Something, which, though it have no Contrary, yet *is by nature ſuſceptible of all Contraries, itſelf ſtill remaining one and the ſame* (*d*).

WE cannot forget that deſcription, given by VIRGIL, of the *Cumean* Propheteſs.

(*d*) Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ οὗ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 29. *Edit. Sylb.*

Subito

——*Subito non vultus, non color unus,* C. VII.
Non comptæ manſere comæ; ſed pectus anhelum,
Et rabie fera corda tument (e).

Here we ſee her countenance and complexion perpetually *changing*, her hair diſhevelled, her breaſt panting, and a tranſition too in her manners from *ſobriety* to *diſtraction*. How different is all this from the appearance of that *Sibyl*, who firſt ſo courteouſly received *Eneas* at *Cumæ*, and afterwards ſo prudently attended him to the Shades? Yet, *amidſt all theſe Contrarieties*, was ſhe ſtill *the ſame* Sibyl; *ſhe was ſuſceptible of them all*, without becoming *another woman*.

This laſt Character of Subſtance appears to be the moſt *eſſential*: for what is the *Support of Contraries*, or indeed of every Attribute, but *Subſtance?* Motion

(e) *Æn.* VI.

C. VII.

and Reſt, Heat and Cold, Health and Sickneſs, Vigour and Decay, are all to be found at times in each Individual of the human race. Moſt of the ſame Contraries are to be found among Brutes, and ſome of them deſcend even to the race of Vegetables.

If we deſcend from theſe minuter *Subſtances* to our terraqueous Globe, here Tempeſt and Calm, Froſt and Thaw, Rain and Drought, Light and Darkneſs, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their ſeeming Conteſt, *the ſame* individual Globe, and not another. Thus the *Poet*, we have already quoted, ſtill conſidering *Subſtance*, as a *Perſon*—

Yet he ſhall live in ſtrife, and at his door
Devouring War ſhall never ceaſe to roar:
Yea, it ſhall be his nat'ral property,
To HARBOUR THOSE THAT ARE AT ENMITY (*f*).

(*f*) *Milt. Poems*, No. II.

If

C. VII.

If we extend our views beyond the Spot which we inhabit, what is the whole viſible Univerſe, but the comprehenſive Receptacle of every Contrary conceivable? Within this immenſe Whole they all diſtributively exiſt, while each of them by ſucceſſion fulfils it's allotted period, without diſturbing the general Order, or impairing the general Beauty.

But if we aſcend from *paſſive* and *material Subſtances* up to ſuch as are *active* and *immaterial*, here we ſhall find no Diſtribution, no ſucceſſion of Contraries; but Motion and Reſt, Equality and Inequality, Similarity and Diſſimilarity, Identity and Diverſity, will appear, each pair co-exiſting within *the ſame* Being in *the ſame* inſtant, and that by an amazing Connection *of both together under One.*

'Tis by virtue only of this combining, this *unifying* Comprehenſion (and which for

C. VII. for that reaſon can only belong to a Being *unextended* and *indiviſible*) that the Mind or Intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were ſuch Propoſitions, inſtead of being comprehended *at once* by ſomething *Indiviſible* and *One*, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of ſomething *Diviſible*; or were they to be comprehended by a Power indiviſible, yet *not at once*, but *in a Succeſſion*; 'twould be as impoſſible either way to comprehend the real Propoſitions, as it would, if they were to be recognized in part by a Man in *England*, in part by one in *China*; or elſe in part by a Man in the *preſent* Century, in part by one of the *ſucceeding*. It may be aſked in ſuch inſtances, *who is it that comprehends* THE WHOLE (*g*)?

(*g*) See *Hermes*, l. iii. c. 4. *Note* (*f*). See alſo *Ariſtot. de Animâ*, l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. *Edit. Sylb. Themiſt. Paraph.* p. 85. *a. b.*

LASTLY,

LASTLY, much more in the SUPREME MIND may we find ſuch *Coincidence*, ſince here not only Contraries, but all things whatever *co-exiſt*, and that too after a manner peculiarly tranſcendent; not by a Knowlege which is partial, but by one which is univerſal; not with *occaſional* remiſſions, but in one uniform unremitting Energy (*h*); not by ſubſequent Impreſſions from things already *pre-exiſting*, but by that *original Cauſality*, through which it makes all things to exiſt. C. VII.

A NOBLE field for ſpeculating opens upon this occaſion; which, tho' ariſing out of our Subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we ſhall omit, and return to our *Logical* Inquiries, concluding here what we have to ad-

(*h*) See the Chapter on *Quality*, where the Verſes of *Empedocles* are quoted.

vance

C. VII. vance in our Theory concerning SUBSTANCE (*i*).

WE are now to conſider the remaining GENERA, PREDICAMENTS, or ARRANGEMENTS, that is to ſay *Quality*, *Quantity*, *Relation*, *Site*, &c.

SOME of theſe are *at all times* no higher than *Accidents*; ſuch for example as *Site* or *Poſition*, the Time *When*, and the Place *Where*. Others upon occaſion *characterize*, and *eſſentiate*; ſuch for example as *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Colour*, and many *Qualities*. Thus a *triply extended Magnitude* is *eſſential* to Body; *Angu-*

(*i*) The Author, in the repreſenting of ancient Opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his Treatiſes *conſiſtent*, and *explanatory* one of another. Thoſe, who would ſee what he has already written on the *two great Elements of Subſtance*, diſcuſſed in this and the three preceding Chapters, may ſearch the Index of *Hermes* for the Words, MATTER and FORM; and the Index of his firſt Volume, for the Word CAUSE.

larity

larity to a Cube; *Heat* to *Fire*; and *Colour* to every Superficies not tranſparent. In all ſuch Inſtances, they make a part of the *Characteriſtic Form*, and in that Senſe are to be conſidered rather as *Subſtances* than as *Accidents*. However as this holds not always, and that they are *ſometimes* as merely and as ſtrictly Accidents, as any of thoſe which are ſo *always*, we chooſe under that *common* Denomination to ſpeculate upon them all, beginning according to Order firſt from the firſt. C. VII.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning QUALITIES—*corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of Capacity, and Completion—Tranſitions immediate, and through a medium—Diſpoſitions, Habits—Genius—Primary and imperfect Capacity—Secondary and perfect—where it is, that no Capacities exiſt—Qualities, penetrating, and ſuperficial—Eſſential Form—Figure, an important Quality—Figures intellectual, natural, artificial, phantaſtic—Colour, Roughneſs, Smoothneſs, &c.—Perſons of Quality—Properties of Quality—Some rejected, one admitted, and why.*

C.VIII. AS SUBSTANCE juſtly holds the *firſt* rank among theſe *Predicaments*, or *univerſal Arrangements*, by being the ſingle one among them that exiſts *of itſelf*,

ſelf, ſo the next in order, as ſome have afferted (*a*), is QUALITY, becauſe *Quality* is ſaid to be an Attribute, from which no Subſtance is exempt. C. VIII.

THERE may be *Subſtances*, they tell us, *devoid of Quantity*; ſuch, for example, if we admit them, as the *intellective*, or *immaterial*. But that there ſhould be Subſtances *devoid of Quality*, is a

(*a*) This was the Opinion of *Archytas*—Πρῶτα μὲν τέτταλαι ὐσία—δευτέρα δὲ ἀ ποιότης—*the firſt in Order is* SUBSTANCE; *the ſecond*, QUALITY. *Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat.* p. 31. *Edit. Baſil. Simplicius* adds—ὥσπερ ἡ Οὐσία τῆ Ποσῦ πρυπάρχει, διότι τὸ εἶναι τῷ ποσῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ὐσίας ἐνέδοται· ὅτως ϗ μᾶλλον τὸ Ποιὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ Ποσὸν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτοῦ, ϗ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἔχει—*As* SUBSTANCE PRECEDES *Quantity, becauſe Being is imparted to Quantity from Subſtance, ſo alſo muſt Quantity ſucceed and* COME AFTER QUALITY, *in as much as it derives from Quality its very Character, and diſtinctive Peculiarity.*—*Ibid.*—Τὸ ποιὸν λέγεσθαι ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς ὐσίας—*The* DIFFERENCE, *which attends each Subſtance, is called* QUALITY. *Ariſt. Metaph.* Δ. c. 14. He explains it immediately—*Man is a Biped Animal; Horſe, a Quadruped.*

thing

C. VIII. thing hardly credible, becauſe they could not *then* be *characterized*, and diſtinguiſhed one from another.

On this reaſoning it is maintained, that, altho' we have no Idea of *Quantity* ſuggeſted to us in that *animating* Principle, THE SOUL, yet can we diſcern that this Principle has many different *Qualities*, and that Animals from theſe *Qualities* derive their diſtinct and ſpecific Characters. There is for example a *ſocial* Sympathy in the Soul of Man, which prompts the individuals of our Species to congregate, and form themſelves into Tribes.

Homo ſum, humani nihil a me alienum puto (*b*).

We can trace the ſame congregating Quality in the Bee, in the Beaver, and

(*b*) *Terent. Heauton.* Act. I.

even

even in the ferocious Wolf. It is however leſs frequent in thoſe of ferocious character; the greater part of whom, if we except thoſe ſeaſons while they breed and nurture their young, ſeem to feel no other inſtincts, but ſuch as lead them to be *ſolitary*. 'Twas under this unfeeling and gloomy character that *Homer* deſcribes *Polypheme*, and his giant-brethren— C.VIII.

——Θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
Παίδων, ἠδ' ἀλόχων· οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.

——*Each lords it o'er*
His children and his wives; NOR CARE THEY OUGHT
ONE FOR ANOTHER (*c*).

It is no leſs obvious on the other hand, that there are QUALITIES which may be conſidered as peculiar to BODY.

(*c*) *Odyſſ.* l. ix. v. 114.

C. VIII. If we admit Figures, Colours, and Odours for *Qualities*, and ſuch undoubtedly they are; we muſt admit of courſe, that among *Animal Bodies* there is one Figure to the Serpent, another to the Horſe; one Colour to the Swan, another to the Parrot. Even in the *vegetable* Race, the Roſe has one Odour, the Jeſſamine another; there is one Figure to the Orange, another to the Fig.

IT follows, therefore, that as QUALITIES help to *diſtinguiſh* not only one *Soul* from another Soul, and one *Body* from another Body, but (in a more general view) every *Soul* from every *Body*; it follows (I ſay) that QUALITIES, by having this common reference to *both*, are naturally divided into CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL.

'TWAS the judgment of *Shakeſpear* to unite them in the character of *Richard* the third, when he makes *Buckingham*

ham relate, in what manner he recommended him to the Citizens of *London*: C.VIII.

Withal I did infer your lineaments,
Being the right Idea of your Father,
Both in your FORM, *and* NOBLENESS OF MIND (*d*).

Virgil does the ſame with reſpect to *Eneas*, when he makes his *heroic Virtue* and his *graceful Perſon* have ſo powerful an effect upon the unfortunate *Dido*.

Quis novus hic noſtris ſucceſſit ſedibus hoſpes?
Quàm ſeſe ORE *ferens, quàm* FORTI PECTORE *et armis?* (*e*)

THE *Qualities* abovementioned admit of *another* diviſion, and that is into NATURAL and ACQUIRED. Thus in the

(*d*) *Shakeſ. Rich.* III.

(*e*) *Æn.* iv. 10, 11.

C. VIII. *Mind*, *Docility* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Science*, an *acquired* one: in the human *Body*, *Beauty* may be called a *natural Quality*; *Gentility*, an *acquired one*. This diſtinction deſcends even to Bodies *inanimate*. To tranſmit Objects of Viſion is a *Quality natural* to Cryſtal; but to enlarge them, while tranſmitted, is a character *adventitious*. Even *the ſame Quality* may be *natural* in one Subſtance, as Attraction in the Magnet; and *acquired* in another, as the ſame Attraction in the Magnetic Bar.

ALL the above *Qualities* have not only their *Completion*, but their *Capacity* (*f*). Thus not only the Grape, when com-

(*f*) Thus we tranſlate the Words Ἐντελέχεια and Δύναμις. Sometimes we read τὰ μὲν Δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ Ἐνεργείᾳ. Δύναμις, POWER, is ſeen in Ὕλη, MATTER; Ἐντελέχεια, COMPLETION, in Εἶδος, FORM.

The Diviſion abovementioned into *Corporeal* and *Incorporeal*, is taken from *Plotinus*, as we learn from *Simplicius in Præd.* p. 69. *B.*

plete

plete (that is to ſay, when mature) poſ- C. VIII.
ſeſſes a delicious Flavour; but there is a *Capacity* alſo to produce it, reſiding in a ſimple Grape-ſtone. Even in *artificial* Subſtances, there are in like manner *Capacities*. A Grain of Gun-powder has the *Capacity* of exploſion; a muſical Inſtrument, that of rendering Harmony. If, leaving theſe *artificial* and *vegetative* Subſtances, we go ſtill higher; we ſhall in *Animals* find *Capacities*, commonly known by the name of *Inſtincts*, to which the frame of every Species is peculiarly accommodated, and which Frame ſuch *Inſtincts* internally actuate.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde niſi
INTUS
Monſtratum?— (g)

In Man there is a *Capacity to Science and Virtue*; and well would it be for

(g) *Horat. Sat.* ii. 1. 52.

C. VIII. him, if not alſo to their *Contraries*. Yet ſuch is our Nature, ſuch the peculiar character of the *Reaſoning* Faculty, belonging to us as *Men*; it is capable of *either* Direction (*h*), and may be employed, like the ſame Weapon, as well to Evil as to Good.

NOR are there ſuch *Qualities* only as *Capacities*, but there is a *contrary and ne-*

(*h*) Ἐπαμφοτερίζει πᾶσα ἡ λογοειδὴς [δύναμις]—*Every* POWER *of the* RATIONAL *kind* has a *Capacity either way*, that is, *a double Capacity*. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 127. Αἱ μὲν ἓν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων—*The* POWERS, *that are connected with the* REASONING *Faculty, are* THE SAME *with reſpect to various and* CONTRARY *Operations*. *Ariſt. de Interpr.* p. 75. *Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis thus Medicine, as an Art, can cauſe Sickneſs, as well as Health; Muſic, as an Art, can cauſe Diſcord, as well as Harmony.—And why this?—Becauſe they are *both founded in Reaſon*; and 'tis *the ſame Reaſon*, in all inſtances, which ſhews us *the Thing*, and ſhews us alſo it's *Privation*.—Ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. *Ariſt. Metaph.* ix. 2. p. 143. *Edit. Sylb.* See alſo pages 147, 153, of the ſame Work.

gative

gative Sort, which may be called INCAPACITIES (*i*); and theſe alſo of different Kinds, ſome for *better*, ſome for *worſe*; ſo that where the *Capacities* do honour, there the *Incapacities* debaſe; where the Capacities debaſe, there their Oppoſites do honour. Thus to the Power of being taught, an *honourable* Capacity, is oppoſed the Incapacity of being taught, a *debaſing* one; and hence is *Man* diſtinguiſhed from an Inſect, and the one called *docil*, the other *indocil*. Again, to the Power of *dying*, a *debaſing* Capacity, is oppoſed the *Inability* of dying, a *ſuperior* one; and thus are ſuperior Beings called *immortal* (*k*) in the way of excellence, C.VII

(*i*) Δυνάμεις, Ἀδυναμίαι. *Ariſt. Prad.* p. 41. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*k*) *Sappho*, the celebrated Poeteſs, has a ſingular Sentiment upon this Subject.—Τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ ὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀποθνήσκον γὰρ ἄν— *To die, is an Evil; the Gods have ſo determined it, or elſe they would die themſelves. Ariſt. Rhet.* l. ii. c. 22. *S.* 27.

C. VIII. whilſt Man is called *mortal*, with a view to ſubordination.

THE Tranſition from *Qualities* of *Capacity* to thoſe of *Completion*, is ſometimes *immediate*, ſometimes *through a Medium*. Thus in a Grain of Gunpowder, the Tranſition from the *power* of exploding, to *actual* exploſion, is *immediate*; ſo from the *power* of hearing, to *actual* hearing; from the *power* of ſeeing, to *actual* ſight; and the ſame in the other *Senſes (l)*, *all which we ſeem to poſſeſs.*

(*l*) The *Peripatetics* made *two Sorts of Capacity*, both of which have a foundation in Nature, and yet are evidently diſtinguiſhed the one from the other. Man, as a rational Being, is capable of Geometry.—This is the *firſt Capacity*.—After he has acquired the Science of Geometry, he poſſeſſes it, even when he *does not* geometrize.—This is the *ſecond Capacity*; a Capacity acquired indeed by Labour, but when once acquired, *called forth in an inſtant*; a Capacity founded on the *original* one, but yet in every view of it far *ſuperior* and more valuable.

All this holds with regard to the INTELLECT or MIND, but by no means with regard to the SENSES, for

poſſeſs in a ſort of *perfection from the beginning*. But there are *other* Capacities, and thoſe none of the meaneſt, where C.VIII.

for theſe are *perfect, or nearly ſo, from the beginning*, and *require neither Time, nor Teaching, for their Maturity*.

Ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην ἡ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὁμοίως λεγέται τῷ θεωρεῖν—*As ſoon as any one is born, he immediately poſſeſſes Senſe, as he would actual Science; and the Energy of Senſation has a ſimilar meaning with that of actual ſcientific Speculating*. *Ariſt. de An.* ii. 5. He means by this, that every Man *originally ſees* with the ſame eaſe, as an able Geometrician goes thro' a Theorem. There is none of the fatigue and labour and delay of a Learner: Seeing and Hearing have no need to be taught us.

Animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, ut Corpus: Sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nihil aut non multum adjumento ullo ad ſuam conformationem indigeret. Quod autem in homine præſtantiſſimum et optimum eſt, id, &c. *Cic. de Fin.* l. v. c. 21.

And here, by the way, we may perceive *a capital Diſtinction* between thoſe two Powers or Faculties of the *Soul*, SENSE and INTELLECT, which Faculties in vulgar Speculations are too often confounded. In INTELLECT there is an *Advance to better* and *more complete*; a *Progreſſion* wholly unknown to the Powers of SENSE, which is *complete* from the very beginning, through all it's Operations.

the

C.VIII. the Tranſition to Completion is neceſſarily *through a Medium.*

Qui ſtudet optatam curſu contingere metam,
Multa tulit, fecitque puer——— (*m*)

If an *Art* be our End, there are many Energies to be practiſed; if a *Science*, many Theorems to be underſtood; if *Moral Virtue*, many Appetites to be curbed, many Opinions to be eradicated, before we can attain the wiſhed for Goal. The *Qualities*, which diſtinguiſh any Being, during this *changeable* period, may be called TENDENCIES, DISPOSITIONS, or PROGRESSIVE QUALITIES. They are too, as well as *Capacities*, of a different colour, ſome *good*, ſome *bad*. There is a kind of laudable Progreſſion, before we arrive at perfect Virtue; as there is a kind of degenerating Interval, before we ſink into perfect Vice.

(*m*) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.

OUR

OUR *Tendencies* during theſe intervals are eaſy to be *interrupted*. As the Wiles of Pleaſure, and an ill-directed Shame, are often fatal Checks to a young Proficient in Virtue; ſo are Conſcience and a better Shame to young Beginners in Vice. And hence we may perceive the *true* character of theſe Tendencies; which is, that of all *Qualities* they are the *leaſt ſteady* and *permanent*. *Horace* well deſcribes this ſtate of fluctuation: C. VIII.

——— *Si toga diſſidet impar,*
Rides: Quid, mea cùm pugnat ſententia ſecum;
Quod petiit, ſpernit; repetit, quod nuper omiſit;
ÆSTUAT, ET VITÆ DISCONVENIT ORDINE TOTO (*n*).

'Tis to the ſame *mutable* Condition that *Epictetus* alludes, where, having *ſpoken*

(*n*) *Horat. Epiſt.* l. i. 96.

upon

C. VIII. upon Proficiency, he ſubjoins the following advice—" That after a certain time " his young Philoſopher ſhould exhibit " himſelf, to ſee how far the Fancies " overpowered him, as they did before; " and how far he was now able to reſiſt " their influence. He adviſes him, how- " ever, to fly at firſt ſuch Conflicts, as " would put his Virtue to a trial too " ſevere; and quotes the proverb on the " occaſion, that the Metal Pot and the " Stone Pot do not with ſafety ac- " cord (*o*)".

SUCH *therefore* is the character of theſe *Tendencies*, or *Diſpoſitions* (*p*). But different is the caſe, when their courſe is finiſhed, and when they may be ſaid to have attained their *Maturity* and *Completion*. The Man *compiletely virtuous*

(*o*) *Arrian. Epictet.* l. iii. c. 12.

(*p*) Διάθεσις, *Diſpoſition*; Ἕξις, *Habit. Ariſt. Cat.* p. 40. *Edit. Sylb.*

dreads

dreads no allurements; the Man *completely vicious* feels no compunctions. Like ſturdy Oaks, they defy that force, which could eaſily have bent them, while they were but ſaplings. C. VIII.

AND hence, as we are not ſaid to *have* an Eſtate, becauſe we are walking upon it, or to *have* a Picture, becauſe we are holding it; but to *have* them, implies a ſuperior, a more *permanent poſſeſſion*, ſuch as either cannot be defeated, or at leaſt not eaſily; hence I ſay theſe *Completions*, whether virtuous or vicious, are called, from their *ſteadineſs* and *permanence*, HABITS (*q*). They are *Poſſeſſions*, which their

(*q*) Διαφέρει Ἕξις Διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον, καὶ δυσκινητότερον. HABIT *differs from* DISPOSITION, *as the latter is eaſily moveable, the former is of longer duration, and more difficult to be moved. Ariſt. Præd.* p. 40. *Edit. Sylb.*

And juſt after, having ſpoken of Warmth and Cold, of Health and Sickneſs, and ſhewn how far theſe, when

C. VIII. their owner may properly be ſaid TO HAVE, and by which we call him *habitually good*, or *habitually bad*. The Profeſſors of Medicine find this Diſtinction in human Bodies. 'Tis not *any* Health, (ſuch as health juſt recovered, or with difficulty preſerved) but 'tis *confirmed* and *ſteady* Health, which they call a GOOD HABIT OF BODY. They have reference in Diſeaſes to the ſame *Permanence*, when they talk of HECTIC Coughs, and HECTIC Fevers, Complaints not caſual, but which *make a part* (as it were) of the Conſtitution.

---

when they are *mutable* and ſhift eaſily, may be called *Diſpoſitions*, he ſubjoins, that ſo it is—ἢν μή τις ϗ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνει διὰ χρόνου πληθος ἤδη συμπεφυσιωμένη ϗ ἀνίατος (*legitur* ἀκίνητος), ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος ἴσα, ἢν ἄντις ἴσως ΕΞΙΝ ἤδη προσαγορεύοι—*Unleſs any one of theſe very affections ſhould by length of time become naturalized, and grow either immoveable, or only to be removed with difficulty; which perfection then perhaps we may call a* HABIT. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 41. *Edit. Sylb.*

AND

C. VIII.

AND thus beſides the Diſtinctions of CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL, of NATURAL and ACQUIRED, may all QUALITIES be conſidered as CAPACITIES, as TENDENCIES, and as HABITS; as *Capacities* only and *Habits*, where the *tranſition* is *immediate*; as *all three ſucceſſively*, where the tranſition is *through a Medium*.

IT is worth while to obſerve in the human Mind the *ſucceſſive* appearance of *theſe Qualities*, where during the Tranſition there exiſts a *Medium* or *Interval*. The *original* Power, which the Mind poſſeſſes of being taught, we call NATURAL CAPACITY; and this in ſome degree is common to *all* Men. The *ſuperior Facility* of being taught, which *ſome* poſſeſs above the reſt, we call GENIUS. The *firſt* tranſitions or advances from *natural* Power, we call PROFICIENCY; and the

C. VIII. the End or *Completion* of *Proficiency* we call HABIT.

IF ſuch *Habit* be converſant about Matter purely *Speculative*, it is then called *Science*; if it deſcend from Speculation to *Practice*, it is then called *Art*; and if ſuch *Practice* be converſant in regulating the *Paſſions* and *Affections*, it is then called *Moral* Virtue.

EVEN all theſe *Habits*, after having been thus acquired, can *return at times* into Capacity, and there lie dormant and for a time unperceived.

——— *Alfenus vafer, omnî*
Abjecto inſtrumento artis, clauſâque tabernâ,
Sutor erat——— (r)

WIDE however is the difference between this *habitual*, *ſecondary* Capa-

(r) *Horat. Sat.* i. 3. 130.

city,

city (*s*), and that which is *natural* and *original*. The *habitual* can pass AT ONCE, when it pleases, into *perfect Energy*; the *natural*, only thro' the Medium of *Institution* and REPEATED PRACTICE. C.VIII.

THE several *Qualities* thus variously distinguished are to be found only in Beings of *subordinate* Nature. But if there be a BEING, whose Existence is *all-perfect* and *complete*, and such must that Being *necessarily* be, the Source of Perfection to all others; with the nature of *such* Being *this Variety* will be incompatible. In Him are no *Powers* or *dormant* Capacities, no *Proficiencies* or Transitions from worse to better, and still

(*s*) See before Note, p. 152—οὐχ ἁπλῶς οὕτω τὸ δυνάμει λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴπομεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα —CAPACITY *or* POWER *is not a simple Term of one Meaning only, but there is one Sort, when we say of a Child, he has a Capacity to be a military Leader; another, when we say so of a Man, who is in complete Maturity. Arist. de An.* l. ii. c. 5. p. 33. *Edit. Sylb.*

C.VIII. much leſs from better to worſe; *but a full and immutable Energie thro' every part of Space.* 'Twas concerning this divine Principle that *Empedocles* ſung of old.

Οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κίκασαι,
Οὐ μὲν ἀπαὶ νώτων γε δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσουσιν,
Οὐ πόδες, ἠ θόα γοῦνα, ἠ μήδεα λαχνήεντα,
Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ, καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἵπλετο μοῦνος,
Φροντίσι κόσμου ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσι.

No Limbs hath he, with human head adorned;
Nor from his Shoulders branch two ſprouting Arms;
To him belong nor feet, nor pliant knees;
But MIND ALONE *he was; ineffable,*
And HOLY MIND; *that rapidly pervades*
With providential cares the mighty World (*t*).

(*t*) See *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 199. *B.* and *Poeſ. Philoſoph. Hen. Step.* p. 30, where, inſtead of ἔτι γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ, we read ἠ μὲν γὰρ βροτέῃ.

And here it may be obſerved by way of digreſſion, that in this part of *Ammonius*, a part truly valuable, and

THE Speculations of this *Genus*, or *Arrangement*, having now carried us to the ſublimeſt of all Objects, ought here to end. But as there ſtill remain a few obſervations, and beſides theſe a diſquiſition into the *Properties of the Genus*, C.VIII.

---

and deeply philoſophical, we meet in the printed text two Chaſms, which much impair the meaning. The firſt occurs p. 199. *B.* line 19, between the words τῶν——ϗ τῶν. Here a MS. Collation ſupplies the word ἀφανῶν. The ſecond occurs p. 200, line 2, after the word συνιέντων. Here the ſame MS. ſupplies the following valuable Reading, which lies far beyond the reach of the moſt acute Conjecture. The words are—ὃ συνιέντων [ὅτι περιττάσματα τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσι.]

There is a third Reading from the ſame Authority, in the fourth line of the ſame page, which is ἀπ' ἐκείνων, inſtead of ἐπ' ἐκείνων, a Reading manifeſtly better, though not ſo important as the former.

The Edition of *Ammonius*, here referred to, is that of *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1545. The ſame places may be found in the Edition of *Aldus* at *Venice*, in 12mo. in the year 1546, page 172, *B.* p. 173, and in the *Fol. Edition* of the ſame *Aldus*, in the year 1503, where the pages are not marked, but where the above Chaſms eaſily ſhew themſelves to the Reader's eye.

C.VIII. and that the apparent, as well as the real; we cannot quit the ſubject, till theſe inquiries have been firſt ſatisfied. Thus then the Treatiſe proceeds.

WITH reſpect to QUALITIES PURELY CORPOREAL, they may be conſidered either as *penetrating* Body, ſuch as Gravitation, Heat, Flavour, and the like; or elſe as *confined to the Surface*, ſuch as Figure, Colour, Smoothneſs, Roughneſs, &c. Thoſe *internal Qualities* which pervade the *whole*, (whether they ariſe merely from Organization, or include that, and ſomething more) conſtitute what we call *eſſential Form* or *natural Eſſence*. And hence the juſt Idea of *natural Eſſence*, or *eſſential Form (u)*, which conſiſts *in giving a Character* to the ſubject, which it pervades. 'Tis thro' this *internally pervading Character*, that Subſtances are what they are; that they become not

(u) See before, p. 89, 90, 91.

only

only diſtinguiſhed from one *another*, but from the niceſt Mimicries of *Art*; the *real* Orange from the Orange of Wax, the *living* Lion from the Lion painted. C. VIII.

INDEED one of the capital Diſtinctions between Operations *Natural* and *Artificial*, is, that *Nature penetrates*, while *Art* ſtops *at the ſurface*. 'Tis the Surface of the Canvas, which the Painter covers; the Surface of the Gem, which the Jeweller poliſhes; the Surface of the Steel, to which the Smith gives a Figure; and the Surface of the String, to which the Muſician applies his Bow. There is hardly *any* deviation from this rule with reſpect to *Arts*, if we except *thoſe only*, (ſuch as Cookery and Medicine) the buſineſs of which conſiſts principally in *compounding* natural Materials. Here indeed the Proportions paſs *thro' the whole* Compoſition, and the more accurate theſe Proportions, the greater of courſe the merit of each Artiſt.

C.VIII. IT muſt be remembered however, that tho' *artificial Qualities* are moſtly *ſuperficial*, yet are not *all natural Qualities* to be conſidered as *internal*. The FORM or ESSENCE of every *natural Subſtance* (that is to ſay, in other words, *it's Syſtem of internal Qualities*) extends itſelf *outwardly* (*x*) every way from *within*; and, as it muſt neceſſarily *ſtop ſomewhere*, (every individual being finite) ſo according to the *different points*, at which it ſtops in it's *Evolution*, it communicates to each Subſtance a *different* and *peculiar* Figure. And hence the

(*x*) Ὥσπερ δὲ τῆς διαςάσεως τὸ τέλος ἐςι τὸ Σχῆμα, ὕτως ἡ τῆ ὅλη εἴδυς ἀποτελεύτησις ἄχρι τῆς ἐπιφανείας τὴν Μορφὴν ἀπεγέννησεν, ὅσαν αὐτὴν τὸ φαινόμενον ἴχνος τῆ Εἴδυς, καὶ τελευταίαν ἔκτασιν τῆς τῆ λόγυ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς προόδυ—*Simplic. in Præd.* p. 69. *B. Edit. Baſil.*—*For as the End or Extremity of any Extenſion is the* FIGURE, *ſo the Ending of a complete Form, at it's Surface, produces* SHAPE; *Shape being itſelf the apparent Veſtige of that Form, and the ultimate Extent of that Progreſſion, which the internal Ratio makes outwards.*

true

true character of every NATURAL and SPECIFIC FIGURE, which ought not to be conſidered merely as a *Surface*, but as a *Bound*; the Bound, *to which* the *internal* Eſſence or Form every way *extends* itſelf, and *at which*, when it is arrived, it finally *terminates*. C. VIII.

FOR this reaſon it is, that of all *the external Qualities* there is none ſo capital, ſo characteriſtic, as FIGURE. 'Tis a kind of *univerſal* Signature, by which Nature makes known to us the ſeveral Species of her Productions; the primary and obvious teſt, by which we pronounce this a Vegetable, and that an Animal; this an Oak, and that a Lion: ſo that if we neither ſuſpect fraud, nor the fallibility of our own Organs, we commonly reſt here, and inquire no farther.

IF we paſs from theſe *natural* Subjects to contemplate FIGURE in works of *Art*, we ſhall diſcover it to be *almoſt* all, that

C.VIII. *Art* is able to communicate. 'Tis to this that the Painter arrives by *Addition*; the Sculptor by *Detraction*; the Founder by *Fuſion*; and the Stucco-Artiſt by *Moulding*. Even when we contemplate the Tools of Art, it will appear that as 'tis by virtue of their *Figure* alone the Saw divides, the Hammer drives, and the Pincers extract; ſo is it from theſe ſeveral *Figures*, that they derive their Character and their Name, not from their *Matter*, which Matter is often the *ſame*, when the Tools are totally different, and diſtinct one from another *.

Nor are theſe *artificial* the only *Figures*, with which Man is found converſant. Among the various *poſſibilities*, which the Mind ſuggeſts, there is a *more accurate* tribe of *Figures*, which it recognizes and defines, and *which*, it may be juſtly queſtioned, *whether Matter*

* See before, Chap. IV.

ever

ever poſſeſſed; for example, the *perfect* Triangle, the *perfect* Circle, the *perfect* Pyramid, the *perfect* Sphere, with the reſt of thoſe FIGURES commonly called MATHEMATICAL *. *Theſe* are not ſought out by *Experiments*, nor are the *Truths* dependent on them derived from Experiments, being in fact the reſult of a *more authentic* Knowledge, that is to ſay in other words, of the pureſt *Demonſtration*. On theſe Figures, and their dependent Truths, reſts the whole of *Mechanics*, ſo highly uſeful to human life; reſt *Aſtronomy* and *Optics*, and a large part of *Phyſics*, ſome of the nobleſt ſubjects among the *corporeal* for contemplation. C. VIII.

THE induſtry of Man ſtops not even here, but prompts him to ſearch for *Figures*, not only in his *Intellect*, but in a *lower* faculty.

* See the third Treatiſe of Vol. firſt, p. 220, 370, 371.

The

C. VIII. *The Poet's Eye in a fine Phrenzy rolling*
Doth glance from Heav'n to Earth, from Earth to Heav'n,
And as IMAGINATION *bodies forth*
THE FORMS OF THINGS UNKNOWN, *the Poet's Pen*
Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy nothings
A local Habitation and a Name (z).

And hence that tribe of FIGURES, which are neither *natural*, nor *artificial*, nor *intellectual*, but which make a *fourth* ſort, that may be called PHANTASTIC, or IMAGINARY; ſuch as Centaurs, Satyrs, Sphinxes, Hydras, &c.

AND ſo much for FIGURE, that moſt *capital Quality* of all the *ſuperficial*.

THE next *Quality* of this ſort after *Figure* is COLOUR, the Source, like *Fi-*

(z) *Shakeſ. Midſ. Night's Dream*, Act V. Sc. I.

gure,

gure, of many Varieties and Diſtinctions. Yet that it is inferior to *Figure*, is obvious from this: in the Sketches of a Painter, we know things by their *Figures alone*, without their Colours; but not by their *Colours alone*, when diveſted of their Figures. C. VIII.

As for Roughneſs, Smoothneſs, Hardneſs, Softneſs, tho' they may be ſaid perhaps to penetrate farther than the Surface, yet are they, to *Man's* Senſation at leaſt, ſo many *Qualities ſuperficial*.

And now with reſpect to *all* kinds of Qualities whether corporeal or incorporeal, there is one thing to be obſerved, that *ſome* degree of *Permanence* is always requiſite; elſe they are not ſo properly *Qualities*, as *incidental Affections* (*a*). Thus

(*a*) Theſe *Ariſtotle* calls Πάθη.—Οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὰ αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, ἔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ὠχρίας· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ ὔ.

—*Neither*

C. VIII. we call not a man *paſſionate*, becauſe he has occaſionally been angered, but becauſe he is *prone to frequent anger*; nor do we ſay a man is of a *pallid* or a *ruddy* Complexion, becauſe he is *red* by immediate *exerciſe*, or *pale* by ſudden *fear*, but when that Paleneſs or Redneſs may be called *conſtitutional*.

WE have ſaid already, that it was *the Eſſence of all Qualities to* CHARACTERIZE *and* DISTINGUISH. And hence the Origin of that Phraſe, *a Perſon of Quality*; that is to ſay a Perſon *diſtinguiſhed from the Vulgar* by his Valour, his Wiſdom, or ſome other *capital* Accompliſhment. As theſe were the *primary* Sources of thoſe *external* Honours, paid to eminent

---

—*Neither is the Man, who bluſhes from being aſhamed, called of a Reddiſh Complexion; nor is he, who turns pale from being frightened, called of a Paliſh Complexion, but they are rather ſaid to have been particularly affected; for which reaſon ſuch Events are called incidental* AFFECTIONS, *and not* QUALITIES. *Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 43. *Edit. Sylb.*

Men

Men in Precedencies, Titles, and various other Privileges; it followed that these *Honours* by degrees grew to represent the *things honoured*; so that as *Virtue* led originally to *Rank*, *Rank* in after days came *to infer Virtue*; particular Ranks, particular Virtues; that of a Prince, *Serenity*; of an Ambassador, *Excellence*; of a Duke, *Grace*; of a Pope, *Holiness*; of a Justice or Mayor, *Worship*, &c. &c. C. VIII.

As to the GENERAL PROPERTIES of QUALITY, they may be found among the following.

CONTRARIETY appertains to it (*b*). Thus in the *corporeal Qualities*, Hot is contrary to Cold, and Black to White. So too in *mental Qualities*, Wisdom is contrary to Folly, and Virtue to Vice: subordinate Virtues to subordinate Vices; Liberality to Avarice, Courage to Cowardice. Even *Vices* themselves are con-

(*b*) Ὑπάρχει δὲ Ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν, κ. τ. λ. *Arist. Præd.* p. 44. *Edit. Sylb.*

trary

C. VIII. trary *one to another*; Cowardice to Temerity; Avarice to Profuſion. It may be doubted, however, whether this character of Quality be *univerſal*; for what among *Figures* is there *Contrary* in one *Figure* to another, either in the Square to the Circle, or in the Circle to the Square?

ANOTHER *Property* of *Qualities* is TO ADMIT OF INTENSION AND REMISSION (*c*). Thus of *two* Perſons handſome, there may be one *the handſomer*; and among *many* handſome, one the *handſomeſt*.

Πασάων δ' ὔπερ ἥγε κάρη ἔχει, ἠδὲ μέτωπα,
Ῥεῖα δ' ἀριγνώτη πέλεται, καλαὶ δέ τε πᾶσαι (*d*).

Far above all ſhe bears her tow'ring head,
With eaſe diſtinguiſh'd, tho' they all are fair.

So Sir *John Falſtaff*, ſpeaking to his Companion, the young Prince—*I am*

(*c*) Ἐπιδέχεσθαι δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά· κ. τ. λ. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*d*) *Hom. Odyſ.* Z. 107.

not

not John a Gaunt, your Grandfather; and yet I am no Coward (*e*). C. VIII.

It appears, however, that the abovementioned Species of *Quality* called *Figure* no more *admits this* Property, than it did *Contrariety*. The Figures, which are Triangles, are not *more ſo* one than another; no more are the Circles, Circles; the Squares, Squares, &c. which ſeems indeed to ariſe from their *definitude* and *preciſion* *.

But there is a *Property* to be found, which may juſtly deſerve the name, by being *common at leaſt to the whole Genus*, if not *peculiar to that only*: and this Property is, that BY VIRTUE OF THEIR QUALITIES THINGS ARE DENOMINATED LIKE and UNLIKE (*f*). 'Tis thus that

(*e*) *Shakeſ.* Hen. IV.

* See *Hermes*, p. 200.

(*f*) Ὅμοια δὲ ἢ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεσθαι· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄλλο εἶδος, ἢ καθ' ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

C.VIII. the Swan by his *Quality* of Whiteneſs *reſembles* the Snow; that *Achilles* by his *Quality* of fierceneſs *reſembles* a Maſtiff; and that the *Earth* by her *Quality* of Figure is *like* to a Bowl.

FROM *this Property* we ſee the reaſon, why there is no *Arrangement*, to which *the Poets* are ſo much indebted, as to *this*; ſince hence they derive thoſe innumerable Images, which ſo ſtrongly diſtinguiſh Poetry from every other Species of Writing. For example: let us ſuppoſe a young Hero juſt ſlain; let us ſuppoſe him lying, with a drooping head, a face diveſted of life and bloom, yet ſtill retaining traces both of beauty and of youth. The Poet would illuſtrate this pathetic Image by finding ſomething that *reſembles* it. And where is he to ſearch, but where he can diſcover *ſimilar Qualities?* He finds at length an *aſſemblage* of them in a flower juſt gathered: the ſame drooping head, the ſame lifeleſs fade,

fade, the ſame relicts of a form that was *once* fair and flouriſhing. C.VIII.

THUS then *Virgil*, ſpeaking of young *Pallas*—

Qualem virgineo demeſſum pollice florem
Seu mollis violæ, ſeu languentis hyacinthi,
Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum ſua forma receſſit;
Non jam mater alit tellus, viresque miniſtrat (g).

AGAIN, what would *Milton* have us conceive, when he deſcribes *the tremendous Shield of Satan*?—Thoſe *conſpicuous* Characters of *Brightneſs*, *Vaſtneſs*, and *Rotundity*. To what ſubject then ought he to refer, that we may comprehend what he would deſcribe? It muſt be to one, that eminently poſſeſſes an *aſſemblage of the ſame Qualities*. Let the Poet in his own Words inform us *what* this Subject is:

(g) *Æn.* xi. 68.

C. VIII. ——— *The broad Circumference*
Hung on his Shoulders, LIKE THE MOON (*h*).

THE reaſon of this *Property* may be perhaps as follows. *To be like* is ſomething *leſs* than to be perfectly *the ſame*, and ſomething *more* than to be perfectly *different*. And hence it is, that when two things are called *like*, there is implied in their nature ſomething of *Sameneſs*, and ſomething of *Diverſity*. If it be aſked what the *Sameneſs* is, we anſwer, it muſt be ſomething *more definitive* than thoſe *tranſcendental* Sameneſſes, *which run thro' all things*. We ſay not that a piece of Ebony is *like* a Swan, becauſe they both *are*; or that a Crow *reſembles* a Snow-ball, becauſe each of them is *One*, and not two. The *Identity* muſt be ſought from among the number of thoſe Qualities, the nature of which is leſs

(*h*) *Par. Loſt*, l. i. 286.

exten-

extenſive, and *more* confined to particular Species. Let Blackneſs, for example, be *a Quality* of *this character* in that union of *Qualities*, which conſtitutes Ebony; and let *the ſame Quality* be one alſo in *that union*, which conſtitutes a Crow. So far then the Ebony and the Crow are the ſame; thro' every other Quality perhaps they are different; and *thro' Sameneſs, thus temper'd by Diverſity, they become, and are called* LIKE (*i*). C.VIII.

THE ſame happens to the Earth and a Bowl, from their *common Rotundity*; to the Hero and the Maſtiff, from their *common Ferocity*.

AND ſo much for the *ſecond univerſal Genus, Arrangement*, or *Predicament*, the Genus of QUALITY, it's various SPECIES, and it's different PROPERTIES.

(*i*) See Note, p. 90. and Note, p. 190.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning QUANTITY—*it's two Species*—*their characters*—*Time, and Place*—*their characters*—PROPERTY *of Quantity, what*—*Quantities relative*—*Figure and Number, their Effect upon Quantity*—*Importance of this Effect*—*Sciences Mathematical appertain to it*—*their uſe, according to Plato*—*how other Beings partake of Quantity*—*Analogy, found in Mind*—*Common Senſe and Genius, how diſtinguiſhed*—*Amazing Efficacy of this Genus in and thro' the World*—*Illuſtrations.*

Ch. IX. THE Attribute of *Subſtance*, ſtanding in Arrangement next to *Quality*, is QUANTITY; the *former* having precedence, as being ſuppoſed *more univerſal*; while the latter, at leaſt in appearance,

pearance, ſeems not to extend beyond *Body*. Ch. IX.

OUT of *natural Bodies* is the viſible *World* compoſed, and we may contemplate them in different manners; either *one Body* taken by *itſelf* and *alone*; or *many Bodies* taken *collectively*, and at once. When *Virgil* ſays of the Oak,

——— QUANTUM *vertice ad auras Ætherias*, TANTUM *radice ad Tartara tendit*——— *(a)*

or when *Milton* informs us, that

Behemoth, biggeſt born of Earth, upheaved HIS VASTNESS——— *(b)*.

in theſe inſtances we have *only one Body*, taken *by itſelf* and *alone*, and this naturally ſuggeſts the Idea of MAGNITUDE. But when in *Virgil* we read,

---

(a) Geor. ii. 291.

(b) Par. Loſt. vii. 471.

Ch. IX. *Quàm* MULTA *in ſylvis autumni frigore primo*
Lapſa cadunt folia—— (*c*).

or when in *Milton*,

THICK *as autumnal leaves, that ſtrew the brooks*
In Vallombroſa—— (*d*).

in theſe inſtances we have *many Bodies taken collectively* and *at once*, and this naturally ſuggeſts the Idea of MULTITUDE.

HORACE gives the two Species together in his fine addreſs to *Auguſtus*:

Cum TOT *ſuſtineas et* TANTA *negotia*—(*e*).

Now in MAGNITUDE and MULTITUDE we behold theſe two primary,

(*c*) *Æn.* vi. 309.
(*d*) *Par. Loſt*, i. 302.
(*e*) *Horat. Epiſt.* l. ii. 1.

theſe

theſe *two* grand and comprehenſive *Species, into which the Genus of Quantity is divided*; MAGNITUDE, from it's Union, being called QUANTITY CONTINUOUS; MULTITUDE, from it's Separation, QUANTITY DISCRETE (*f*). Ch. IX

OF the *Continuous* kind is every *Solid*; alſo the *bound* of every Solid, that is, a *Superficies*; and the bound of every Superficies, that is, *a Line*; to which may be added thoſe two *concomitants* of every Body, namely *Time* and *Place*. Of the *Diſcrete* kind are Fleets, Armies, Herds, Flocks, the Syllables of Sounds articulate, &c.

WE have mentioned formerly (*g*), when we treated of *Time*, that every *Now*

(*f*) Τῶν δὲ Ποσῶν τὸ μὲν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές. *Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 30. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*g*) See *Hermes*, lib. i. c. 7. p. 103, 104.

Ch. IX. or preſent Inſtant was a Boundary or Term, at which the Paſt ended, and the Future began; and that 'twas in the *Perpetuity of this Connection, that Time became continuous.* In like manner *within every Line* may be aſſumed infinite *ſuch Connectives*, under the character of *Points*; and within every Superficies, under the character of *Lines*; and within every Solid, under the character of *Superficies*; to which *Connectives* theſe Quantities owe their *Continuity.* And hence a *Specific Diſtinction, attending all Quantities continuous*, that their ſeveral *Parts every where coincide in a common Boundary or Connective* (*h*).

It is not ſo with *Quantities diſcrete*: for *here* ſuch *Co-incidence is plainly impoſſible.* Let us ſuppoſe, for example, a

(*h*) See *Ariſt. Prædic.* p. 31. *Edit. Sylb.*—ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχής ἐστιν, κ. τ. λ. This Character is deſcribed to be—πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτειν.—*Ibid.*

Multi-

Multitude of Squares; *x*, *y*, *z*, &c: C.VIII.



Here if the Line AB, where the Square *x* ends, were the ſame with the Line CD, where the Square *y* begins, and EF in like manner the ſame with GH; they would no longer be a *Multitude* of Squares, but one continuous Parallelogram, ſuch as  the figure KMNL.

ANOTHER *Specific* Character belonging to the Solid Body, the Superficies, and the Line, (*all of which* are *Quantities Continuous*) is, that *their Parts have a definite Poſition within ſome definite Whole* (*i*); while in *Quantities diſcrete*,

(*i*) Ἔτι, τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε· οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, κ. τ. λ. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 31. *Edit. Sylb.*

that

Ch. IX. that is in *Multitudes*, ſuch Poſition is *no way* requiſite. In the moſt *perfect continuous Quantities*, ſuch as Beams of Timber, Blocks of Marble, &c. 'tis with difficulty the Parts *can change Poſition*, without deſtruction to the *Quantity*, taken as *continuous*. But a herd of Cattle, or an Army af Soldiers, *may change Poſition* as often as they pleaſe, and no damage ariſe to the *Multitude*, conſidered as a *Multitude*.

It muſt be remembered however, that *this Character of Poſition extends not to* TIME, tho' *Time* be a *Continuous* Subject. How indeed ſhould the Parts of *Time* have *Poſition*, which are ſo far from being *permanent*, that *they fly* as faſt as they arrive? Here therefore we are rather to look for a *Sequel in juſt Order* (*k*); for a

(*k*) Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐϛιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου, τὸ δὲ ὕϛερον. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 32. *Edit. Sylb.*

Continuity

Continuity not by *Position*, as in the Limbs of an Animal, but *for a Continuity by Succession*; Ch. IX.

——— *velut unda supervenit undam* (*l*).

And thus are the two Species of *Quantity*, the Continuous and the Discrete *distinguished* from each other.

Besides this, among the *Continuous themselves* there is a farther *Distinction*. Body and it's Attributes, the Superficies and the Line, are continuous Quantities, capable all of them of being *divided*; and by being divided, of becoming a *Multitude*; and by becoming *a Multitude*, of passing into *Quantity Discrete*. But those *continuous* Quantities, Time and Place, admit not, like the others, even *the possibility* of being divided. For grant *Place* to be divided,

(*l*) *Horat. Epist.* ii. 2. 176.

Ch. IX. as *Germany* is divided from *Spain*: what *interval* can we ſuppoſe, except it be *other* Place?—Again, ſuppoſe *Time* to be divided, as the Age of *Sophocles* from that of *Shakeſpeare*: what *Interval* are we to ſubſtitute, except it be *other* Time? PLACE therefore and TIME, tho' *continuous* like the reſt, are incapable of being divided, *becauſe they admit not*, like the reſt, *to have their Continuity broken* (*m*).

(*m*) They cannot be divided ACTUALLY, from the reaſons here given;—but they may be divided IN POWER, elſe they could not be CONTINUOUS; nor could there exiſt ſuch Terms, as a Month, a Year, a Cubit, a Furlong, &c.

In this Senſe of *potential* Diviſion, they may be divided *infinitely*, as appears from the following Theorem.



Let A and B be two Spheres, that are moving, and let A be the *quicker* moving Sphere; B, the *ſlower*; and

Ch. IX.

But to proceed. Let us imagine, as we are walking, that at a diſtance we view a Mountain, and at our feet a Mole-hill. The Mountain we call *Great*, the Mole-hill *Little*; and thus we have two *oppoſite* Attributes in *Quantity Con-*

---

and let the ſlower have moved thro' the Space γδ in the Time ζη. 'Tis evident that the quicker will have moved thro' the ſame Space in a leſs Time. Let it have moved thro' it in the Time ζθ. 'Tis thus *the Sphere* A divides *the Time*. Again, in as much as the quicker A has in the Time ζθ paſt thro' the whole Space γδ, the ſlower B in the ſame Time will have paſt thro' a ſmaller Space. Let this be γκ. 'Tis thus *the Sphere* B divides *the Space*. Again, in as much as the ſlower Sphere B in the Time ζθ has paſt thro' the Space γκ, the quicker Sphere A will have paſt thro' it in a leſs Time; ſo that the *Time* ζθ will be again divided by the quicker Body. But this being ſo divided, the *Space* γκ will be divided alſo by the ſlower Body, according to the ſame Ratio. And thus it will always be, as often as we repeat ſucceſſively what has been already demonſtrated: for the *quicker Body* will after this manner divide *the Time*; and *the ſlower Body* will divide *the Space*; and that, in either caſe, *to Infinite*, becauſe their *Continuity is infinitely diviſible in power*. See the Original of this Theorem in *Ariſtotle's Phyſics*, lib. vi. cap. 2. p. 111. *Edit. Sylb.* Ἔστω τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ᾧ α, κ. τ. λ.

tinuous.

Ch. IX. *tinuous*. Again, in a meadow we view a Herd of Oxen grazing; in a field, we ſee a Yoke of them ploughing the land. The Herd we call *Many*, the Yoke we call *Few*; and thus have we two *ſimilar Oppoſites* in *Quantity Diſcrete*.

Of theſe four Attributes, *Great* and *Many* fall under the common name of *Exceſs*; *Little* and *Few* under the common name of *Defect*. Again, *Exceſs* and *Defect*, tho' they include theſe four, are themſelves included under the common name of *Inequality*. Farther ſtill, even *Inequality* itſelf is but a Species of *Diverſity*; as it's *Oppoſite*, *Equality*, is but a Species of *Identity*. They are ſubordinate Species confined always to *Quantity*, while IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY (their *Genera*) may be found *to paſs thro' all things* (*n*).

Now

(*n*) The following *Characters* of the *three firſt* great *Arrangements*, or *univerſal Genera*, are thus deſcribed by

Now 'tis here, namely in theſe two, *Equality* and *Inequality*, that we are to look for that PROPERTY, by which *this Genus is diſtinguiſhed.* It is *from* QUANTITY ONLY that things are denominated EQUAL or UNEQUAL (*o*). Ch. IX.

FARTHER ſtill—Whatever is *Equal*, is equal to *ſomething elſe*; and thus is *Equality* a RELATIVE Term. Again, if we reſolve *Inequality* into it's ſeveral *Exceſſes* and *Defects*, it will be apparent that each of theſe is a *Relative* Term alſo. 'Tis with reference to *Little* that *Great* is called *Great*; with *reference* to *Few*, that

---

by *Ariſtotle.*—Ταυτὰ μὲν γὰρ, ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία· ὅμοια δ', ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία· ἴσα δὲ, ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἕν.—*Things are the* SAME, *of which the* SUBSTANCE *is one*; SIMILAR, *of which the* QUALITY *is one*; EQUAL, *of which the* QUANTITY *is one. Metaph.* Δ. κεφ. ιέ. p. 88. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*o*) —ἴδιον δὲ μάλιϛα τῦ ποσῦ, τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνιϛον λέγεϛθαι—*Ariſt. Præd.* p. 34.

Many

Ch. IX. *Many* are called *Many*; and 'tis by the ſame habitudes inverted exiſt *Little* and *Few*. And thus is it that, thro' the Property here mentioned, the Attribute of QUANTITY paſſes inſenſibly into that of RELATION (*p*); a fact not unuſual in *other* Attributes as well as theſe, from the univerſal Sympathy and Congeniality of Nature.

NAY ſo merely *relative* are many of theſe Exceſſes and Defects, that the *ſame* ſubject, from it's different *Relations*, may be found ſuſceptible of *both at once*. The Mountain, which by it's Relation to the Mole-hill, was *great*; by it's Relation to the Earth, is *little*: and the Herd, which were *many* by their Relation to

(*p*) *Ariſtotle* ſays expreſly of the Things here mentioned, that no one of them is *Quantity*, but exiſts rather among the Tribe of *Relatives*, in as much as nothing is *Great* or *Little* of *itſelf*, but merely *with reference* to ſomething elſe.—Τάτων δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστι ποσὸν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό. κ. τ. λ. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 33. *Edit. Sylb.*

the

the ſingle Yoke, are *few* by their Relation to the Sands of the Sea-ſhoar (*q*). And hence it appears that the Exceſſes and Defects, which belong to *Quantity*, are not of a *relative* Nature only, but of an *indefinite* one likewiſe. The truth of this will become ſtill more evident, when it is remembered, that every Magnitude is *infinitely diviſible*; and that every Multitude is *infinitely augmentable*. Ch. IX.

WHAT then is to be done? How is it poſſible that *ſuch* Attributes ſhould become the Objects of *Science*? 'Tis then only we are ſaid to *know*, when our Per-

(*q*) *Ariſtotle's* Inſtance goes farther, and ſhews how a *ſmaller* Number may be called *Many*; a *larger* Number be called *Few*.—ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαμὲν εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους, πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους, πολλῷ πλείους αὐτῶν ὄντας—*We ſay there are* MANY *Men in a Village; and but* FEW *in Athens, tho' the Number in this laſt be many times larger; ſo too we ſay there are* MANY *Perſons in a Houſe, and but* FEW *in the Theatre, tho' the Number in this laſt may be many times more. Ibid.*

Ch. IX. ception is *definite* (*r*); ſince whatever falls ſhort of this, is not *Knowlege*, but *Opinion*. Can then the Knowlege be *definite*, when it's Object is *indefinite*? Is not this the ſame, as if we were to behold an Object as ſtrait, which was in itſelf crooked; or an Object as quieſcent, which was in itſelf moving? We may repeat therefore the queſtion, and demand, what is to be done?—It may be anſwered as follows: *Quantity Continuous* is circumſcribed by FIGURE, which, being the natural boundary both of the Superficies and the Solid, gives them the diſtinguiſhing Names of Triangle, Square, or Circle; of Pyramid, Cube, or Sphere, &c. By theſe FIGURES not only the *Infinity* of *Magnitude* is limited, but the means alſo are furniſhed for its moſt exact Menſuration. Again, *the Infinity of Quantity Diſcrete* is aſcertained by NUMBER, the very Definition of which is Πλῆ-

(*r*) See before, page 19, 20, 21, and *Hermes*, p. 368, 369.

θος

Θος ὡρισμένον, that is, *Multitude circumſcribed* or *defined*. Thus, if, in deſcribing a Battle, we are told that *many* of the Enemy were ſlain, and but *few* ſaved; our Knowlege (if it deſerve the name) is perfectly vague and *indefinite*. But if theſe indefinite *Multitudes* are *defined by Number*, and we are told that the ſlain were a *thouſand*, the ſaved a *hundred*; in ſuch Caſe our Knowlege becomes adequate and *complete*. Ch. IX.

'Tis in the contemplation of theſe two *Quantities* thus defined, the Continuous by *Figure*, the Diſcrete by *Number*, that we behold them rendered ſubjects for the two *nobleſt* of Sciences, the firſt of them for GEOMETRY, the ſecond for ARITHMETIC (*s*); from which two (and not from mere Experiments, as ſome have haſtily aſſerted) both the Knowlege of

(*s*) See *Hermes*, page 351, 352. 367.

Ch.IX. Nature, and the Utilities of common Life, are in the greateſt part derived.

'Tis here we ſee the riſe of thoſe *Mathematical* Sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Muſic, &c. which the Ancients eſteemed ſo eſſential to a liberal Education. Nor can we believe there is any one now, but muſt acknowlege, that a Mind properly tinged with ſuch noble Speculations (ſuppoſing there be no want of Genius, or of Courage) is qualified to excel in every ſuperior Scene of Life. Far more honourable they ſurely are, than the Arts of riding a Horſe, or of wielding a Sword, thoſe Accompliſhments uſually aſſigned to our Youth of Diſtinction, and for the ſake of which alone they are often ſent into diſtant Countries, as if there were nothing to be taught them *at home*, nor any thing in a Gentleman worth cultivating, but his Body. We would not undervalue theſe *bodily* Ac-

com-

compliſhments (for Perfection of every ſort is certainly worth aiming at); but we would wiſh them to be rated as much below the *mental*, as the *Body* itſelf is inferior to the *Mind*. Ch. IX.

THERE is an elegant account of the Sciences abovementioned in the Republic of *Plato*. *Glaucus* (one of the Perſons in the Dialogue) takes pains to recommend them from their Uſefulneſs in human life: Arithmetic for accounts and diſtributions; Geometry for incampments and menſurations; Muſic for ſolemn feſtivals in honour of the Gods; and Aſtronomy for agriculture, for navigation, and the like. *Socrates*, on his part, denies not the truth of all this, but ſtill inſinuates, that they were capable of anſwering an end more ſublime. "*You* "*are pleaſant, ſays he, in your ſeeming to* "*fear the multitude, leſt you ſhould be* "*thought to enjoin certain Sciences, that* "*are uſeleſs. 'Tis indeed no contemptible*

Ch. IX. " *matter, tho' a difficult one, to believe, that*
" *thro' theſe particular Sciences the Soul*
" *has an Organ purified and enlightened,*
" *which is deſtroyed and blinded by Studies*
" *of other kind; an Organ better worth*
" *ſaving than a thouſand Eyes; in as much*
" *as* TRUTH *becomes viſible thro'* THIS
" ALONE (*t*).

THESE, that we have here mentioned, appear to be the *only* Species of *Quantity*; in as much as other things are called *Quantities*, not from *themſelves*, but with reference to *theſe*. Thus we ſay that there is *much* White, becauſe the Superficies,

(*t*) The above is an attempt to tranſlate the following elegant Paſſage of *Plato*.—Ἡδὺς εἶ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τὰς πολλὰς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάτειν· Τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ὃ πάνυ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστοις ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται, καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. *Plat. de Repub.* lib. vii. p. 527. *Edit. Serran. Hermes*, 294, 5.

which

which it covers, is *much*; and that an Action was *long*, becauſe *the Time* was long, during which it was tranſacted. And hence it is, that, if any one is to explain the *Quantity of an Action*, as for example the length of the *Trojan* War, he explains it by the *Time*, ſaying it was a War of ten *Years*. So when we give the *Quantity* of any thing White, we define it by the *Superficies*, becauſe, as that is in *Quantity*, ſo alſo is the *White (u)*. Ch. IX.

We farther obſerve that *Quantity Continuous* and *Diſcrete* may be ſaid to *blend* themſelves with all things. Thus in *Subſtances*, let Mount *Athos* repreſent the former; the Army of *Xerxes*, the latter.

(u) Κυρίως δὲ Ποσὰ ταῦτα λέγεται μόνα τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποβλέποντες, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα Ποσὰ λέγομεν· οἷον πολὺ τὸ λεῦκον λέγεται, τῷ γε τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι· καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ, τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. *Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 32. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ch. IX. In *Colours*, let us view the former in the uniform Blueneſs of a clear ſky; the latter, in the many and diverſified Tints of a Rainbow. In *Sounds* we find *Quantity Diſcrete* belonging to *Speech* or Language, it being the Eſſence of Articulation, that every Syllable ſhould be diſtinct. *The Continuous*, on the contrary, naturally ſuggeſts itſelf to our Ears, when we hear Yellings, Howlings, and heavy Pſalmody. In *Motions*, when a Graſhopper moves *by leaps*, we behold *Quantity diſcrete*; when a Ship ſails *ſmoothly*, we behold *Quantity Continuous*. The motion of all Animals, that have feet, (whether they leap or not) by being *alternate*, is of the *diſcrete* kind: but 'tis fabled of the Gods, that, when they moved as Gods, 'twas under *one continued progreſſion* of their whole frame together; to which *Virgil* they ſay alludes in ſpeaking of *Venus*,

Et vera INCESSU *patuit* DEA— (x) Ch.IX.

THE MIND, tho' devoid of *Corporeal* Extenſion, admits what is *analogous* to theſe two Species of *Quantity*, and recognizes their force even within the ſacred receſſes of itſelf. For what can be more truly united in *perfect Continuity*, than the Terms which compoſe *a Self-evident* Truth? And how is this *Continuity* ſtill *farther* extended, when by the Union of two ſuch Truths there is produced a third, under the indiſſoluble Connection of a *Demonſtrative Syllogiſm*? If there was not this *Syllogiſtic Continuity*, there might indeed be other Continuities, but it would never be in our power to prove any thing concerning them. Again, when we conſider either *many* Propoſitions, without reference to a *Syllogiſm*; or *many* independent Terms,

(x) *Æn.* I. 411.

without

Ch. IX. without reference to a *Propoſition*; what have we then but *Quantity diſcrete?* PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS? Treaſures, as capable of being *number'd*, eſtimated, and recorded, as thoſe which the Miſer commits to his coffers.

'TIS indeed by the help of an *innate* power of *Diſtinction*, that we recognize the *Differences* of things, as 'tis by a *contrary* power of *Compoſition*, that we recognize their *Identities* (*y*). Theſe powers, in ſome degree, are *common to all Minds*; and as they are the Baſis of our whole Knowlege (which is of neceſſity either *affirmative* or *negative*) they may be ſaid to conſtitute what we call COMMON SENSE (*z*). On the contrary, to poſſeſs theſe Powers in *a more eminent* degree, ſo as to be able to perceive

---

(*y*) See *Hermes*, p. 362, Note (*f*).

(*z*) See Vol. I. *Treatiſe the third, in the Notes*, p. 287.

Identity

Identity in things *widely* different, and *Diverſity* in things *nearly* the ſame; this 'tis that conſtitutes what we call GENIUS, that Power divine, which thro' every ſort of diſcipline renders the difference ſo conſpicuous between one learner and another. Ch. IX.

IT was from Speculations of this kind, that ſome of the Ancients were induced to conſider QUANTITY in a far higher rank than is uſual in common Speculations. "They conſidered *both* Species "under *the common* character of a BOUND "or MEASURE, and as ſuch to be con- "ſpicuous throughout the whole Uni- "verſe; the nature of the *Continuous*, "called MAGNITUDE, being ſeen in "UNION and CONNECTION; that of the "*Diſcrete*, called MULTITUDE, in AC- "CUMULATION and JUXTAPOSITION;— "that by virtue of *Magnitude* the WORLD "or Univerſe was ONE; was extended "and connected every where thro' its "moſt

Ch.IX.

" moſt *diſtant* Parts ;—that by virtue of
" *Multitude* it was DIVERSIFIED WITH
" THAT ORDER AND FAIR ARRANGE-
" MENT, ſeen in the amazing variety of
" Stars, of Elements, of Plants, of Ani-
" mals ; of *Contrarieties* on one ſide, and
" of *Similarities* on the other ;—that if
" theſe *Quantities* were thus diſtinguiſh-
" able in the *Copy* or *Image*, (for ſuch
" was this *World*, when compared to it's
" *Archetype*) *much more* ſo were they in
" thoſe PURE and IMMATERIAL FORMS,
" the invariable and immediate Objects
" of the SUPREME INTELLECT. The
" whole Production of *Quantity* (as of
" every thing elſe) they referred with
" reaſon to this *Primary Intelligent Cauſe* ;
" —whoſe *virtual* Efficacy, as far as it
" paſſes thro' all things *without dividing*
" itſelf or ſtopping, they ſuppoſed to
" generate CONTINUITY and UNION ;—
" as far as it *ſtops in it's progreſs* at every
" particular, and communicates to each
" a peculiar Form of its own, they held

" to

" to generate DISTINCTION and MUL- Ch.IX.
" TITUDE;—and as far as it perpetually
" exerts *at once* theſe two *diſtinct* and
" *oppoſite Energies, they conſidered as for*
" *ever rendering* THE UNIVERSE *both*
" MANY *and* ONE; MANY, thro' it's
" *Order* and fair Variety; *One*, thro' it's
" *Connection* and general Sympathy." (*a*)

AND

(*a*) The Authors, from whom the preceding Sentiments are taken, are *Plotinus* and *Jamblichus*, in the Commentary of *Simplicius* upon this Predicament of *Quantity*.

Ἔτι δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνος—ἰδία γὰρ καὶ φύσις ἑκάστῳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖται, τὸ μὲν συνεχὲς ἡ φύσις, ἥτις καλεῖται μέγεθος, κατὰ ἕνωσιν καὶ ἀλληλεχίαν· τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον, ἥτις καλεῖται πλῆθος, κατὰ διάρειαν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τὸ μεγέθος οὐσίαν, εἷς ὁ κόσμος ἐστί τε καὶ νοεῖται, σφαιρικὸς καὶ συμπεφυκὼς ἑαυτῷ, διατεταμένος τε καὶ ἀλληλεχόμενος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἥτε σύνταξις καὶ ἡ διακόσμησις, ἡ ἐκ τοσῶνδε φέρε εἰπεῖν στοιχείων, καὶ ζώων ἢ φυτῶν θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐναντιοτήτων ἢ ὁμοιοτήτων τόσων καὶ τόσως· εἰ ἓν ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἕτω ταῦτα κεχώρισαι, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς νοουμένοις γένεσι· καὶ πρὸ τέτων,

ἐν

Ch.IX. AND ſo much for the *third* UNIVERSAL GENUS, or PREDICAMENT, that of QUANTITY, it's various *Species*, and it's peculiar *Properties* (*b*).

ἐν τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ ἀΰλοις εἴδεσι διέῃκε, κοινὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ πέρας. *Simplic. in Prædic.* p. 32. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος——ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἑνὸς δύναμις, ἀφ' ἧς πᾶν τὸ ποσὸν ἀπογεννᾶται, διατείνεται δι' ὅλων ἡ αὐτὴ, καὶ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον προϊοῦσα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἡ μὲν δι' ὅλων διήκει παντάπασιν ἀδιαιρέτως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑφίστησι, καὶ ἡ τὴν πρόσοδον ποιεῖται μίαν, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄνευ διωρισμῶν· ἡ καὶ προϊοῦσα ἵσταται καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ποιεῖ, ταυτὴ τὸ διωρισμένον παράγει.——ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννᾷ. περιέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἅμα ἀμφότερα τὰ μένοντα καὶ προϊόντα ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. *Simplic. in Prædic.* p. 34. *Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

As the above Sentiments are expreſſed in the Text, a verbal Tranſlation of them is omitted. It may however be acceptable to the curious to ſee them in their Originals, and for that reaſon they have been ſubjoined.

(*b*) See before Note (*o*) of this Chapter, p. 190.

WE

WE cannot however quit this and the preceding *Predicament* (I mean the *Predicaments* of *Quality* and *Quantity*) without obſerving that, as they are diffuſed in a conſpicuous manner throughout the Univerſe, ſo Writers both ſacred and profane, both poetic and proſaic, appear to have expreſſed their force, and that often *at the ſame time*, as the *Predicaments themſelves often exiſt ſo in nature*.

O! Lord, how MANIFOLD *are thy Works?* IN WISDOM *haſt thou made them all* (*c*).

HERE [*manifold*] denotes the *Quantity* of the Divine Works; [*made in Wiſdom*] denotes their *Quality*.

Quinctilian——*Nam et* QUALIS *in cujuſque rei naturâ, et quæ forma, quæritur:*

(*c*) *Pſalm* civ. v. 24.

an

Ch.IX. *an immortalis anima, an humanâ Specie Deus: et de* MAGNITUDINE *et* NUMERO: *quantus, Sol; an unus, Mundus* (*d*).

WHERE the Critic not only delineates the two great *Predicaments* here mentioned, but divides alſo *Quantity* into it's two capital Species, I mean *Magnitude* and *Number*.

CICERO goes farther in his *Tuſculan Diſputations*, not only producing QUALITY and QUANTITY, but SUBSTANCE alſo, their ſupport; which he places firſt, according to it's proper order. *Si* QUID *ſit hoc, non vides; at* QUALE *ſit, vides: ſi ne id quidem; at* QUANTUM *ſit, profectò vides* (*e*).

EVEN comic writers have expreſſed the force of *theſe two* Predicaments.

(*d*) *Inſtit. Orat.* l. vii. c. 4.

(*e*) *Tuſc. Diſp.* l. i. 25.

QUANTUM

QUANTAM *et quam* VERAM *laudem capiet* Ch. IX.
Parmeno (*f*) ?

How GREAT, *and* HOW TRUE *praiſe will*
Parmeno acquire ?

Great indicates QUANTITY ; *True* indicates QUALITY ; for what QUALITY in praiſe is more valuable, than *Truth ?*

THE Poets, who dealt in Subjects more exalted than Comedy, appear many of them to have employed the ſame Language.

THUS *Tibullus*, ſpeaking of *Bacchus*—

—QUALIS QUANTUSQUE *minetur* (*g*).

OVID, of *Jupiter*——

(*f*) *Terent. Eunuch.* v. 4. 3.

(*g*) *Tibul.* l. iii. *Eleg.* vi. v. 23.

Ch. IX. —QUANTUSQUE *et* QUALIS *ab altâ Junone excipitur*——— (*h*)

VIRGIL, *of Venus*——

——QUALISQUE *videri Cælicolis, et* QUANTA *ſolet*—— (*i*)

THE ſame, of POLYPHEME——

— QUALIS, QUANTUSQUE *cavo Polyphemus in antro* (*k*).

HOMER (whom 'tis probable the reſt all copied) ſpeaking of *Achilles*—

Ἦτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμαζ' Ἀχιλῆα,
ΟΣΣΟΣ ἴην, ΟΙΟΣ τε· θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄντα ἐώικει (*l*).

Nor leſs the royal Gueſt the Hero eyes,
His godlike *aſpect, and* majeſtic *fize* (*m*).

(*h*) *Metam.* iii. 204.
(*i*) *Æn.* ii. 589.
(*k*) *Æn.* v. 641.
(*l*) *Iliad.* xxiv. 629.

(*m*) *Pope's Homer*, B. xxiv. v. 798. The Tranſlation we ſee renders the words ὅσσος and οἷος by a *Peri-*

THESE Attributes, given by Poets to Gods and Heroes, have been found by *Euclid* in Figures *Geometrical*. He has a Problem, to teach us *how to deſcribe a rectilineal Figure, which to one given rectilineal Figure ſhall be* SIMILAR, *to another ſhall be* EQUAL (*n*). Ch. IX.

SIMILAR is *a Property* of QUALITY; EQUAL, of QUANTITY (*o*).

BUT 'tis time to finiſh, and proceed to the Arrangement next in order.

Periphraſis, and it ſhould ſeem with ſome propriety, as *the God-like aſpect* of *Achilles* is clearly among his *Qualities*, and *his Majeſtic Size* evidently reſpects his *Magnitude*, that is to ſay, his *Quantity*. It muſt be confeſſed however, that much of the force of the Original will neceſſarily be loſt in the Tranſlation, where *ſingle* words in one Language cannot be found correſponding to *ſingle* words in the other.

(*n*) *Euclid* vi. 25.

(*o*) See before page 175, and page 191.

CHAP. X.

Concerning RELATIVES (*a*) *—their Source —Relatives apparent—real—their Properties, reciprocal—Inference, and Coexiſtence—Force of Relation in Ethics— —in matters Dramatic—in Nature, and the Order of Being—Relations, amicable and hoſtile—Evil—Want—Friendſhip— Strife—Relation of all to the Supreme Cauſe—extent and uſe of this Predicament, or Arrangement.*

Ch. X. THRO' the *three univerſal Genera, Predicaments*, or *Arrangements* already deſcribed, ſubordinate Beings may be ſaid to attain their *Completion*; thro' *Subſtance*

(*a*) The Title of this ARRANGEMENT is expreſſed by a *Plural*, and not a ſingular (like *Quality* and *Quantity*) becauſe *all Relation is neceſſarily between* Two.

Subſtance they exiſt; thro' *Quality* they are *diſtinguiſhed*; and thro' *Quantity* they acquire a *Magnitude*, and become a certain *Multitude*. Ch. X.

YET when Beings are thus produced, we muſt not imagine them to exiſt, like Pebbles upon the Shoar, diſperſed and ſcattered, without *Dependence* or mutual *Sympathy*. 'Twould be difficult out of *ſuch* to compoſe a Univerſe or *perfect Whole*, becauſe every perfect Whole has a reſpect to it's Parts, as well as the Parts a reſpect both to ſuch Whole, and to each other. Hence then the riſe of that *Genus* called RELATION, a Genus which *runs thro' all things*, *holding all of*

TWO.—ἡ δὲ Σχέσις τουλάχιστον ἐν δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖται. *Ammon. in Cat.* p. 94. *B.*—ἴδιον γὰρ τῆς σχέσεως μόνης, τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ὑφεσάναι μόνως, ὅπερ ἀδεμιᾷ πρόσεισι τῶν ἄλλων καθηγοριῶν.—'Tis *a Peculiarity of Relation only*, to *have it's exiſtence in* MANY, *which is the caſe with no one elſe of the Predicaments. Simpl. in Præd.* p. 41. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

Ch. X. *them together*, in as much as there is no Member of the Univerſe either ſo great or ſo minute, that it can be called *independent*, and *detached* from the reſt.

Now in all RELATION there muſt be a Subject *whence* it commences, for example Snow; another, *where* it terminates, for example a Swan; the *Relation itſelf*, for example Similitude; and laſtly *the Source* of that Relation, for example Whiteneſs (*b*); *the Swan* is *related* to *Snow*, by being both of them *White*.

THE

(*b*) This Source may be ſought for among the Differential Characters of Being, in whatever *Predicament* or *Arrangement* they happen to exiſt, be it in *Quality*, as the Character of *Whiter*; in *Quantity*, as that of *Greater*, that of *more Numerous*; in *Time*, as that of *Older*; in *Place*, as that of *Upper*, &c.

This is what *Simplicius* means, when he ſays—ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν (*ſcil.* τὴν χίσιν) ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν χαρακτῆρι ὑυπάρχειν. *Simpl. in Cat.*

Hence too we may ſee why RELATION ſtands next to *Quantity*; for in ſtrictneſs the *Predicaments* which follow are but different *Modes of Relation*, marked by ſome

THE Requiſites to *Relation* being in this manner explained, it will appear that *thoſe only* are the *true Relatives*, which expreſs *in their very Structure* the *relative* Source, and *whoſe very Eſſence may be found in this their reciprocal Habitude (c)*. But this perhaps will be better underſtood by a few examples. Ch. X.

THE

ſome *peculiar* Character of their own, over and above the relative Character, which is *common* to them all.

Even in the two *Predicaments* that precede this of Relatives, I mean QUALITY and QUANTITY, tho' they have an exiſtence *void of Relation*, we cannot ſay ſo of their *characteriſtic Peculiarities*; for LIKE is a *Relative* Term, and ſo is EQUAL. Hence *Simplicius*—ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἴσον παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ὅμοιον παρὰ τὸ ποιόν—EQUAL *is ſomething elſe beſide* QUANTITY; LIKE, *ſomething elſe beſide* QUALITY. *Simpl. in Præd.* By ſomething elſe he means they are *Relatives*.

(c) Πρός τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται· ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. —*Such things as theſe are ſaid to be* RELATIVES, *namely as many as are ſaid* TO BE, WHAT THEY ARE,

Ch. X. THE Swan ('twas ſaid before) was in Whiteneſs *like* Snow. Here the Swan and the Snow were produced, as *Relatives*. We produce others of like kind, when we aſſert that *London* is larger than *York*, a Lemon equal to an Orange, &c.

BUT the truth is, theſe Subjects are none of them *properly Relatives of themſelves*, but then *only* become ſuch (as indeed may every thing elſe) when a *Relation* is raiſed between them through the Medium of a *Relative* Attribute. *London*, we ſay, is larger than *York*. The Relation ſubſiſts in *Larger*, which being attributed to *London*, makes it a Relative to *York*, which is in fact ſomething *leſs*. The ſame holds in the Lemon and Orange, and in all poſſible inſtances. To whatever Subject we aſſo-

---

by being THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER THINGS, *or which in any other ſenſe have reference to ſomething elſe. Ariſt. Præd.* p. 34. *Edit. Sylb.*

ciate

ciate any of the *Relative* Attributes, we immediately render the Subject by ſuch *Aſſociation* a *Relative*. Such a Subject therefore is only a Relative *incidentally*. Ch. X.

BUT the *true* and *real* Relatives are thoſe Attributes *themſelves*, the Terms *Larger*, *Equal*, *Like*, &c. for theſe *in their very Structure* expreſs the *relative* Source, and only exiſt in a *joint* and *reciprocal Habitude* one to another.

THERE are alſo *relative Subſtances*, as well as *relative Attributes*; that is to ſay, Terms *which indicate at once both a Subſtance and a Relative*. Such are Maſter and Servant, Preceptor and Diſciple: *Maſter* implies *a Man*; and not only that, but *a Man having Dominion*: *Servant* implies *a Man*, and not only that, but a Man rendering Service; and the ſame may be ſaid of the other example alleged.

Now

Ch. X. Now a diſtinguiſhing PROPERTY of theſe *real Relatives*, is, that they *reciprocate in their Predication* (*d*). Every Maſter is the Maſter of a Servant, and every Servant the Servant of a Maſter: every Preceptor the Preceptor of a Diſciple; and every Diſciple, the Diſciple of a Preceptor. The ſame holds in the *relative Attributes* as well as in the *Subſtances*, Greater being always Greater than Leſs, and Leſs being always Leſs than Greater. That this is a *Property, which never fails*, will better appear, if from any *relative Subſtance* we ſubtract the *relative Attribute*, and ſubſtitute in it's room the Subſtance *alone*. For example, from the relative Subſtance, Maſter, let us ſubtract the relative Attribute, Dominion, ſo that *Man only* ſhall remain, diveſted of that Attribute. We

(*d*) Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 35.

cannot

cannot affirm of every Man, as we can of every Maſter, that *merely as a Man*, he is the Maſter of a Servant (*e*). Ch. X.

FROM this neceſſity of *reciprocal* Predication, another *Property* of Relation follows, that *we cannot underſtand one Relative, without underſtanding it's companion*; and that *in proportion as our Knowlege of one Relative is more preciſe, ſo is that likewiſe of the other* (*f*). I cannot know

(*e*) *Ariſtotle* finds an inſtance in the ſame Term, *Servant*.—οἷον ὁ δοῦλος, ἐὰν μὴ διστότε ἀποδοθῇ δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ἥμεροῦ, ἢ ὁτουῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἡ ἀποδοσίς ἐστιν—*For example, the Term Servant, if he be not deſcribed as the Servant of a Maſter, but of a Man, or of a Biped, or of any other ſuch thing, does not reciprocate, becauſe the Deſcription returned is not neceſſary and eſſential*—that is, we cannot ſay, the *Man* of a Servant, or the *Biped* of a Servant, as we ſay the *Maſter* of a Servant. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 37, where much more is ſubjoined, worth reading.

(*f*) *Relata ſunt ſimul* COGNITIONE. *Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoſcitur alterum*; (*idque* EODEM *plane* MODO

Ch. X. know for example that A is greater than B, without knowing that B is leſs than A; and if with more preciſion I know that A is double, I neceſſarily know withal that B is half; and if with ſtill farther preciſion I know the meaſure of A to be eight, I know with equal preciſion the meaſure of B to be four (*g*).

AND

MODO, *et* MENSURA COGNITIONIS) *et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. Compend. Saunderſon*, p. 41. *Edit. Oxon.* 1672.

I have quoted *Saunderſon*, as he was an accurate Logician, but *Ariſtotle's* own words are, as follows—ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, καὶ κεῖνο, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ὡρισμένως εἴσεται—*If any one know with preciſion any one of two Relatives, he will know alſo the other Relative which it refers to, with equal preciſion. Ariſt. Prædic.* p. 39. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*g*) And here by the way it is worth obſerving, that as *all Relatives* are recognized in *combination*, while *every Object of Senſe* is perceived *diſtinct* and independent; it follows that *all Relatives are properly Objects of the Intellect*, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we ſhould know nothing concerning them. Let A for example be ſuppoſed the maſter of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. Theſe laſt

AND this naturally leads to that fundamental *Property* of Relation, on which the reſt all depend, namely, *the neceſſary and univerſal Co-exiſtence of Relatives* (*h*), which always commence *together*, ſubſiſt *together*, and ceaſe *together*. *Ulyſſes*, in his Speech to *Therſites*, ſays in anger, Ch. X.

---

laſt characters only are viſible to the Eye, nor does the Eye ſee *more*, while the Relation *ſubſiſts*, or *leſs*, when the Servant *dies*, and the Relation *is at an end*. Were there a change in the Maſter's perſon, were he to become deformed from being well-ſhaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the Eye be able to recognize what had happened. But 'tis a ſingular property of this Genus, that a Relative may change, or loſe it's Relations, without change or loſs within itſelf. Let the correſponding Relative but vary, or ceaſe to exiſt; let the Maſter loſe his Servant, or the Preceptor his Diſciple; let thoſe, who ſtood on my right remove themſelves to my left, or thoſe, who ſtood above me, place themſelves below; and 'tis eaſy to conceive a Subject, after having loſt or varied *every one* of theſe Relations, ſtill to remain itſelf invariably the ſame.

(*h*.) Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 37.

May

Ch. X. *May I loſe my ſon Telemachus, if I do not ſeize,* &c: And how does he expreſs this ſentiment?

Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἶην.

May I no longer be called THE FATHER OF TELEMACHUS (*i*).

He well knew he could only loſe that *Relative Denomination,* by loſing his Son, with whoſe birth and duration it was indiſſolubly connected. It was not that *Ulyſſes* might not have ſurvived *Telemachus,* or *Telemachus, Ulyſſes;* the *Co-exiſtence* being only attached to the *Relative* Characters, thoſe of Father and Son.

AND hence we may collect that the *Co-exiſtence* here mentioned is not like that of *Subſtance* and it's *eſſential* Pro-

(*i*) *Iliad,* B. v. 260.

perties

perties (as *Rationality* for example *co-exiſts* with Man, or *Senſation* with Animal); *but a Co-exiſtence leſs intimate* by far than that is, becauſe it ſubſiſts between Beings actually *diſtinct* one from another. Ch. X.

AND hence it has followed, that ſome Logicians have treated it as poſſeſſing leſs of the *real*, than any one of the other Genera. They tell us, *Relatio eſt Ens minimæ Entitatis* (*k*).

YET we muſt be careful how we undervalue it (*l*), in conſequence of ſuch a notion;

(*k*) *Fell's Logic*, p. 92.

(*l*) Thus *Simplicius* in his Comment on this Categoric—Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ὡς παραφυομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις, τὴν τῦ πρός τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσι· καὶ τοι προηγυμένην ὖσαν, κὴ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκείαν διωρισμένην. Αὕτη γὰρ κοινότης ἐςὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, τῶντε ἐναντίων, κὴ τῶν ὁποσῦν διαφερόντων, κὴ τῶν ὅλων γενῶν, κὴ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ τεταγμένων· ἥτις εἰ μὴ παρῆν,

Ch. X. notion; ſince with thoſe, who well attend to it's amazing efficacy, it is more likely

---

παρὴν, διεσπάσθη ἂν πάντη (*l.* πάντα) ἀπὸ πάντων. —*And hence ſome conceive the Predicament of* RELATION, *by it's growing on as it were to the reſt, to be ſomething epiſodic and adventitious, altho' it be in fact truly* PRINCIPAL, *and an Object of Contemplation from it's own diſtinctive Character. 'Tis this indeed is that Band of* COMMUNITY WHICH PASSES THRO' ALL THINGS; *thro' Contraries, thro' things in any way diſferent, thro' whole Genera, and thro' the ſeveral Beings arranged beneath them—that Principle, which, were we to ſuppoſe away, all things in that inſtant would be diſſipated and torn from all things. Simplic. in Prædic.* p. 44. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

See alſo the ſame Author in the ſame Comment.

Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, ἅτε τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄντα, κοινωνίαν ἔχει τινὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μή τις σχέσεως ἢ λόγου ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν. Ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀναιρεῖν, ἢ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀσίαις καὶ δυνάμεσι πάσαις καὶ ἐνεργείαις, ἥτις ἐγγινομένη τοῖς ἔσι, συνήγαγεν εἰς ταυτὸν, καὶ σχέσιν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργάσατο· ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἐπισητὸν, καὶ ἐπισήμη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ μουσικὴ περὶ σχέσεις ἔχουσιν, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αὐταί· καταγέλαστοι ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ-

vai

likely to acquire a rank perhaps above it's real merit. Ch. X.

WHAT ought we to think, ſhould it appear the Baſis of Morality?—"MORAL "DUTIES (ſays *Epictetus*) *are in general*

ναι περὶ τὰ ἀνυπόϛαλα καλατριβόμεναι. Πῶς δὲ ϗ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ Θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία ϗχέσις ἐϛὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ.—*For neither the Univerſal Genera, nor the things included under them, can have any Connection one with another, if there exiſt not in things the Ratio of* HABITUDE *or* RELATION. *But 'tis abſurd to take away the Connection of things that differ one from another: abſurd alſo to take away Harmony, not that only which exiſts in Sounds, nor that which exiſts in Numbers, but that alſo which exiſts in Subſtances; and in all the variety of Capacities and Energies; that, which having been implanted in Beings, has brought them together, and effected, that they ſhould have the Relation here ſpoken of to each other.* [Farther than this, by taking away Relation] *there will be taken away the Proportionate, the Equal, the Knowable, and Knowlege. If Geometry and Muſic are employed about Relations, and theſe laſt have no Exiſtence; then will thoſe Sciences be ridiculous, in being employed about Non-entities. How alſo can* GOD *himſelf be called* AN OBJECT OF DESIRE TO ALL BEINGS, *if there be no Relation between the Thing deſired, and that which deſires? Simplic. in Præd.* p. 43. *B.*

Ch. X. "*meaſured by* RELATIONS. *Is he a Fa-*
"*ther?—The Relation ordains, that he*
"*muſt be taken care of; that thou yield to*
"*him in all things, bear with him, when*
"*he reproaches, when he ſtrikes,* &c.—
"*But he is a bad Father—And wert thou*
"*then by nature connected with a good*
"*Father?—No, but with a Father—*
"*Thus therefore out of Neighbour, out of*
"*Citizen, out of Magiſtrate wilt thou*
"TRACE THE MORAL DUTY, *if thou*
"*make it a Cuſtom to* CONTEMPLATE
"THE RELATIONS (*m*)."

THE Stoic Emperor *Antoninus* inculcates the ſame doctrine. *There are* (ſays he) *three* RELATIONS; *one to the proximate Cauſe, which immediately ſurrounds us; one to the divine Cauſe, from which all things happen to all; and one to thoſe, along with whom we live* (*n*). So import-

(*m*) *Epict. Ench.* cap. xxx.

(*n*) *M. Ant.* viii. 27.

ant

ant is the Knowlege of *Relations* (ac- Ch. X.
cording to theſe Philoſophers) in a ſub-
ject, which ſo much concerns us, I mean
an upright and a virtuous conduct.

'Tis to a ſubordinate end, that *Horace* applies this Knowlege, when he makes it an eſſential to *Dramatic Poets*; and as a Philoſophical Critic, teaches them, that 'tis thro' *this* Knowlege only they can *truly* delineate Characters. The verſes are well known;

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

'Tis thus too that *Shakeſpeare*, either by Knowlege acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate ſuperior Genius (*o*), makes *Macbeth* ſhudder

(*o*) The Author has in this place conſidered *Shakeſpeare*, as *Ariſtotle* did *Homer*, and has left it uncertain, to what Cauſe his tranſcendent merit ſhould be aſcribed. *Ariſtotle*, ſpeaking of *Homer's* ſuperiority,

Ch. X.

der at the thoughts of murdering *Duncan*, when he reflects on the many *Duties* he owed him, *arising from the many Relations* he stood in, all of which Duties he was then basely going to violate.

——— *He's here in double trust;*
First, as I am his KINSMAN, *and his* SUBJECT,
Strong both against the deed: then, as his HOST,
Who should against his Murtherer shut the door,
Not bear the Knife myself———

AND here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent Tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a *Poem*, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most *moral* pieces existing. It teaches

---

says in like manner, that it was, ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην, ἢ διὰ φύσιν, *either thro' Art, or thro' Nature. Vid. Arist. Poet.* c. viii.

us the danger of venturing, tho' but for *once*, upon a capital offence, by ſhewing us that 'tis impoſſible *to be wicked by halves*; that we cannot ſtop; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, *be the ſucceſs as it may*, we are ſure in the event to become *wretched* and *unhappy (p)*. Ch. X.

But to return to our Subject, I mean that of *Relation*.

If we quit Mankind, and view it's more general extent, we ſhall find, that, where *Continuity* fails, there Relation *ſupplies it's office*, connecting as it were all things the moſt *remote* and *heterogeneous*. Were they indeed combined under an Union more intimate, were it the ſame with that *Continuity*, ſeen in a *living* Body and it's Limbs, *the whole Uni-*

(p) See the Remarks on this Tragedy in that elegant Book, the *Eſſay on the Writings and Genius of Shakeſpeare*.

Ch. X. *verſe* would be no more than one immenſe Animal. But 'tis not ſo: and thoſe, who have explained it's Nature, have rather called it *one City*, or *one Commonwealth* (*q*); a very different Species of Monad from one Animal, or living Being. 'Tis here then (as we have ſaid) *Relation* intervenes, and under a thouſand different ties *connects all things together*.

THE ties indeed are many, tho' the Sources are few. Every *ſubordinate* Being, as it is by nature *ſubject to wants*, (indigence and imperfection being *eſſential* to it's conſtitution) has a connection with thoſe *Beings, thro' whom ſuch wants may be ſupplied*. Hence then one Source of *Relation*. Again, every Being whatever, *that has power to ſupply ſuch wants*, has a Connection with thoſe *Beings, to whom it can thus become ſubſervient*. Hence

(*q*) See *Vol. Firſt, Treatiſe the third*, p. 225, 341.

then

then another Source of *Relation*. Now in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole it is ſo admirably contrived, that every Being in different degrees poſſeſſes this *double* character, and not only *needs* aſſiſtance, but is able in it's turn to *afford* it. Nothing is ſo mighty, as to ſubſiſt without help; nothing ſo minute, as not at times to have it's uſe. Thus as *Connections reciprocate*, and are every where blended, the *Concatenation of Relations* grows in fact *univerſal*, and the *world* becomes (as above deſcribed) one *City* or *Commonwealth*. Ch. X.

INSTANCES of this *double Relation* occur (as we have ſaid) in every particular Being. The Ewe is related to the Graſs, as to the Being which *ſupplies* her wants; to her Lamb, as to the Being whoſe wants *ſhe herſelf ſupplies*. The Graſs again is *related* to the Earth, as to the Being, which affords it aliment; while it is *related* to the Ewe, by becoming

Ch. X. coming itſelf aliment to her. The Earth is *related* to Vegetables, as ſhe is both their parent and their nurſe; while ſhe is *related* to the Sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The *Relations* of the Sun are finely repreſented by *Epictetus*, who makes THE SOVEREIGN OF THE UNIVERSE thus addreſs that noble Luminary. "*Thou* (ſaith he) *art* SUN: "*Thou art able by going round, to form* "*the year and the Seaſons; to enlarge and* "*nouriſh the fruits; to raiſe and ſtill the* "*Winds; to warm in due degree the bo-* "*dies of men: Ariſe, go round, and be-* "*ginning from the greateſt, extend after* "*this manner thy influence to the moſt mi-* "*nute* (*r*)."

NOR when we mention *the Earth* ought we to forget that equitable diſcharge of her *Relations*, for which *Virgil* well diſtinguiſhes her by the character of *moſt Juſt*;

(*r*) *Arrian. Epict.* l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 444. *Edit. Upton.* Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ.

Fundit

Fundit humo facilem victum JUSTISSIMA TELLUS (*s*). Ch. X.

THE *Attic Hiſtorian* and *Philoſopher* will be found the beſt Commentator on this elegant paſſage of the *Roman* Poet. "THE EARTH *too* (ſays *Xenophon*) be- "ing a *Divinity*, *teacheth thoſe that can* "*learn it of her*, JUSTICE: *for ſuch as* "*cultivate her beſt*, *ſhe requiteth with moſt* "*goods* (*t*)".

WHEN we view the *Relation* of the Male to the Female, and of the Female to the Male, and add to this the *Common Relation* extending from both to their Offſpring, we view the riſe of *Families* thro' the whole animal race. Among

(*s*) *Virg. Georg.* ii. 460.

(*t*) Ἔτι δὲ ἡ ΓΗ, θεὸς ἔσα, τὺς δυναμένυς καταμανθάνειν, καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ διδάσκει· τὺς γὰρ ἄριστα θεραπεύονλας αὐτὴν, πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ἀντιποιεῖ· *Xenoph. Oeconom.* p. 35. *Edit. Oxon.*

the

Ch. X. the more ſocial, ſuch as Sheep and Cattle, theſe Families by freſh *Relations* are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of *Flocks* and *Herds*. Among thoſe of higher order ſtill (ſuch as the Bee (*u*), the Ant, the Beaver, and above all the ſocial and rational Being, Man) theſe herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into *civil Polities*, where there is a general Intereſt or *common Good*, a Good to which either willingly or unwillingly (*x*) every individual co-operates.

(*u*) *Virgil* ſpeaks of the *Bee*, as he would of *Man*; *Mores et ſtudia et populos et prælia dicam.* Georg. iv. *Ariſtotle*, diſtinguiſhing theſe Animals from thoſe, which do no more than barely *herd* together, elegantly calls them ζῶα πολιτικὰ, *Political* or *Civil* Animals, Animals formed for a Life of *Civil aſſociation*, *where the Buſineſs is* ONE, *and that* COMMON *to the whole Tribe*; ὧν ἕν τι, κ. τ. λ. *Hiſtor. Anim.* p. 5. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*x*) ——— ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.
Epict. Enchirid. c. lii.

See *Vol. I. Treatiſe the third*, p. 235, 349.

Ch. X.

If we deſcend below Animals down to Vegetables, we ſhall diſcover in the Vine, the Ivy, the Woodbind, and all the Plants of ſlender Stalk, a manifeſt relation to thoſe of a trunk more ſolid, ſuch as the Oak, the Elm, and the ſeveral trees of the Foreſt. 'Tis with a Power, which appears *almoſt a conſcious one*, that the former of theſe tribes, *recognizing their Relation*, apply to the latter for a ſupport, and *ſpontaneouſly* twine their bodies, or at leaſt their tendrils, around them (*y*).

When

(*y*) Τὰ τέλη, ἐφ' ἃ τῶν Φύσει γιϛνομένων ΕΚΑΣΤΑ ἥκει, ἃ κὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς Φυομένοις πάρεϛιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὕϛατα ὀπίϖ παραγίγνεται. Σκοπῶμεν δ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶνδε· τῇ ἀμπέλῳ ἕλικι τέλος ἐϛὶ, τὸ ἑτέρῳ Φυτῷ πλοκῇ περιελιχθεῖϛαν, ἐκείνῳ τὴν ἄμπελον ἀναδῆσαι τῷ Φυτῷ, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς Φυτοῖς τὴν Φύσιν εἰληχυίαν, ἱπαλλόκαυλον εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἑτέρῳ Φυτῷ πλοκὴν τὴν ἕλικα περιελιχθεῖϛαν ἀναδῆσαι τὴν ἄμπελον, ἥτε τῇ ἀμπέλῳ Φυομένῃ, ἥτε τῇ ἕλικι εὐθὺς πάρεϛιν, ἀλλ' ὕϛατόν γε παραγίγνεϛαι· ὀφὴν μέντοι ἦτλον τὰ Φύεϛθαι

Ch. X. WHEN therefore we contemplate the various *Relations* already hinted, and mark in

---

εσθαι ὅλως ἕλικα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ αἴτιον τελικὸν ἡ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσις αὐτῆς ἐστιν. Ἀμήχανον δὲ τὸ μηδέπω ὂν, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τεταγμένον, ὄντος τε ἤδη αἴτιον γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τῷ γινομένῳ, ἐχὶ μὴ εἶναι. Προειλῆφθαι ἄρα δεῖ ἔν τινι νῷ τὴν τῆς ἀμπέλου ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ φυτῷ ἀνάδεσιν, ὡς αὐτῇ ἐπισατῶν, ὥσπερ δημιουργὸς ἀνὴρ σκευασοῖς, καὶ τὴν ἕλικα αὐτῇ τῆς τοιαύτης ἕνεκα ἀναδέσεως φύσει· ἢ καὶ θαυμασίως, ἐὰν μὲν μηδέν τι αὐτῇ τοιοῦτον παρακεῖσθαι οἷον περιελιχθῆναι, ἐπ' εὐθύ πως φαίνεσθαι φερομένη· ἐὰν δὲ ὀρθός τις παρῇ, εὐθὺς περιελιχθῇ. Οὐτ' ἂν τὴν ἕλικα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ μὴ ἕνεκα τούτου φύεσθαι, ὅπως ἑτέρῳ αὐτὴν φυτῷ ἀναδήσῃ, νῦν ἔχει μὴ ἀξίαν· ἅτε τὸ μὴ νῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐφισάναι ἔχοι ἂν καὶ ὁντινοῦν λόγον.

The ENDS, *to which the ſeveral vegetable Productions tend, are* not inſtantly preſent *to them, as ſoon as they begin to grow, but ſome way or other accrue to them* ſubſequently. *We may perceive this in a ſingle inſtance. The End to the Vine's Tendril, is, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, to bind the Vine to that Vegetable; which Vine, among the vegetable Tribe, poſſeſſes this natural Character,* that it ſhould reſt upon another for it's ſupport. *Now that the Tendril, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, ſhould bind the Vine on, neither belongs to the Vine, when it firſt begins*

to

in how *friendly* a manner they bring the moſt diſtant Beings together, we may be Ch. X

to grow, nor yet to it's Tendril; but is ſomething which accrues ſubſequently: *and yet nevertheleſs, the binding of it to another Vegetable is the* FINAL CAUSE *why the Tendril ſhould grow at all, and belong to the Vine. But it is impoſſible that what* AS YET IS NOT, *and has no Arrangement in the order of things,* (I mean the binding) SHOULD BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING WHICH NOW IS, (I mean the Tendril of the Vine; when it firſt appears). *The Cauſe of any thing produced muſt have an actual Exiſtence, and* not be a non-entity. *This Binding therefore of the Vine to ſome other Vegetable muſt have been* PRECONCEIVED IN SOME MIND OR INTELLECT, *who preſiding over it (as any Man, being an Artiſt, preſides over his Works) makes the Tendril grow to it for the ſake of ſuch Binding: which Tendril alſo wonderfully, if there be nothing adjoining of a nature for it to twine round, appears in ſome ſort to ſhoot upwards; but if any Branch be near, inſtantly deviates and twines round it. It is therefore irrational to ſuppoſe that the Tendril did not grow to the Vine,* that it might hereafter bind it to another Vegetable; *nor can there be any degree of Reaſon for aſſerting, that ſome* MIND *or* INTELLIGENCE *did not preſide over ſuch Operations.*

The force of this Argument is, as follows—— THINGS exiſt before their ENDS; that is, before that the Ends of their Exiſtence take place. The Tendril exiſts, before it binds the Vine; the Minute-hand exiſts,

Ch. X. be tempted to ſay with the Philoſopher, *that "all things are full of* FRIENDLY "PRIN-

exiſts, before it indicates the Minutes. And yet is this Binding, and this Indicating ſo neceſſary, that the Things themſelves would never have exiſted, but for the ſake of *theſe only*. Where then were theſe *Ends*, when the *Things* themſelves firſt appeared?—In external and viſible nature?—This from the Hypotheſis is *impoſſible*, for the Hypotheſis makes them *ſubſequent*.—No other place then remains, but either the SOVEREIGN MIND, or a *Mind ſubordinate*, according as the Work itſelf is a Work of *Nature* or of *Art*. See before, p. 112, 113.

I have taken the preceding Extract from a Manuſcript of that able Scholar and Philoſopher *George Gemiſtus*, otherwiſe called *Pletho*, who flouriſhed in the fifteenth Century, both before and after the taking of *Conſtantinople*. If it apply not immediately to the Subject, it has at leaſt the merit of being ſomething rare and ingenious. It is a morſel of that Controverſy among the learned *Greeks* of this Period, whether the Preference in Philoſophy was due to *Plato* or to *Ariſtotle*. *Scholarius*, among others, was for *Ariſtotle*; *Pletho* for *Plato*; from whoſe Work on this Subject (which was an Anſwer to *Scholarius*) this Extract is taken. There is another ſmall Work of *Pletho's* upon the ſame Subject, intitled, Περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαφέρεται, printed at *Paris*, 1541; and *Beſſario* (a learned *Greek* of that age, who went over to the Latin Church, and became a Cardinal)

"PRINCIPLES *(z)*". But we must not suffer this sentiment to carry us too far. Things are not only full of FRIENDLY PRINCIPLES, but of HOSTILE likewise. Ch. X.

Cardinal) wrote a large Tract to defend the *Platonic* Doctrine, intitled *Contra Calumniatorem Platonis*. The printed Edition is in Latin, but the whole Work is extant in *Greek* among the Manuscripts of St. *Marc's* Library at *Venice*, to which Library *Bessario* bequeathed his own. There is too a fine Letter remaining of the same *Bessario*, addressed to *Michael Apostolius*, who, tho' he took *Bessario's* side, and defended *Plato*, yet appears to have done it, according to *Bessario's* Letter, with a zeal and bitterness not becoming him; a zeal and bitterness too frequent in Controversy, and (unfortunately for the Cause of Letters) no where more, than among learned men, and those in particular, whom we call *Professors of Humanity*.

The Epistle above mentioned may be found in *Greek* and *Latin*, published by the learned *Boivinus*, in the second Tome of L'Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Inscriptions, &c. p. 455; and it is well worth perusal, for it's Temper and Elegance.

See also *Cicero de Senectute*, c. xv. *Vitis quidem*, &c.

(z) Πάντα δὲ φίλων μετά. *Arrian Epict.* l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 486. *Edit. Upt.*

THE

Ch. X. THE Fangs of the Lion are as much the work of Nature, as the tendrils of the Vine, or the nurturing Teats of the Ewe. To what then have theſe formidable weapons *Relation*; for *Nature*, we are aſſured, *makes nothing in vain* (*a*)? If to *Offence*, then is the Lion himſelf a ſource of *hoſtile* relation; if to *Defence*, then is he the object of injury from ſome other; ſo that *hoſtility* in either

(*a*) This was an axiom, inculcated every where by *Ariſtotle*; and more eſpecially, when he is ſpeaking of *Final* Cauſes, which, tho' now they make a ſmall part of Philoſophy, were never omitted by the *Stagirite*, as often as they could be introduced. His own words deſerve attention—ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζώου τὸ ἄριστον—NATURE MAKES NOTHING IN VAIN, *but with reſpect to each animal Genus, out of the ſeveral ways practicable ſhe always makes that which is beſt. De Animal. Ingreſſu*, p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.*—And again, in the ſame Tract—ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν δημιουργεῖ μάτην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων—NATURE CREATES NOTHING IN VAIN, *but* (as has been ſaid already) *all things for the beſt, out of the ſeveral ways that are practicable. Ibid.* p. 141. *Edit. Sylb.*

caſe

caſe is neceſſarily implied. Were it poſ- Ch. X.
ſible to doubt as to the *offenſive* here, we could never doubt as to the Structure of the Spider's Web; a Structure clearly taught her by Nature for *offence alone*. Theſe and the like Preparations, ſuch as the Boar's Tuſk, the Eagle's Talons, the Viper's Venom, &c. are all founded on ſuch wants, as can never be ſatisfied *amicably*. The Wants therefore of this character naturally rouſe up *ſimilar* Inſtincts, and thus the World becomes filled as well with HOSTILE RELATIONS, AS FRIENDLY.

Torva leæna lupum ſequitur, lupus ipſe capellam (*b*).

IT appears to have been *theſe Relations of Hoſtility*, that firſt gave riſe to the phænomena of NATURAL and MORAL EVIL. Now whether REAL EVIL exiſt

(*b*) *Virg. Ecl.* ii.

Ch. X.

at all, or whether we ſhould confine it with the STOICS to *Evil* purely *moral*, are Queſtions beyond the Scope of this Treatiſe to examine. It will be ſufficient to ſay, that *much Evil* is imaginary, and founded merely on *falſe opinion*: that of the EVILS MORE REAL, there are many, which have their END, and ſo may be ſaid to partake *ultimately* the nature of GOOD. Many of the difficulties and diſtreſſes, which befal the human Species, conduce to ſave it from Sloth, and to rouſe it up to action; to action, which is in fact the very life of the Univerſe.

——— *Pater ipſe colendi*
Haud facilem eſſe viam voluit, primuſque per artem
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi paſſus ſua regna veterno *.

* *Virg. Georg.* I.

IF there were no dangers, then could there be no Fortitude; if no Temptations, then no Temperance; if no adverſe Accidents, nor Loſs of what we love, then no ſubmiſſive Reſignation, no pious Acquieſcence. Ch. X.

Οὐκ ἂν γενοῖτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ κ᾽ κακά·
Ἀλλ᾽ ἔϛι τις σύγκρασις, ὥϛ᾽ ἔχειν καλῶς.

Things GOOD *and* ILL *can ne'er exiſt apart;*
But ſuch the MIXTURE, *that they* WELL *accord* (*c*).

AGAIN,

(*c*) The fine Diſtich here tranſlated is from *Euripides*, quoted by *Plutarch de Iſid. et Oſirid.* p. 369. *Edit. Xyland.*

As to the *Speculations* here offered, and the *Solutions* ſuggeſted, we may well apply to them that juſt reflection of the *Stagirite*, tho' uſed by him on a different occaſion.

Ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν κ᾽ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον· τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι

Ch. X. AGAIN, the Jaws of the Lion, the Poiſon of the Rattle Snake, the Sword of the Conqueror, and every Inſtrument of deſtruction, may be ſaid incidentally to prepare the way for Generation; and that not only by making room for new Comers, but by furniſhing freſh Materials towards their reſpective Production. For tho' the Theatre of the World ſo far reſembles other Theatres, that it is perpetually filled with Succeſſions of new Spectators; yet has it this in peculiar, that the Spectators, which ſucceed here, are made out of thoſe that went before. Every particular *Birth, or natural production*, appears an act, if not of *hoſtility*, at leaſt of *Separation*; a *Seceſſion* from the general Maſs; a kind of

---

προηκέναι περὶ ἑκάστων αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστι.—*Perhaps 'tis difficult to prove any thing clearly upon Subjects ſuch as theſe, without having often conſidered and examined them. And yet to have thrown out doubts concerning them, is a thing, not altogether without it's uſe. Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 40. *Edit. Sylb.*

revolt

revolt from the *greater* Bulk in favour of a *ſmaller*; which ſmaller would detach itſelf, and, were it able, be independent. Ch. X.

IN a word as FRIENDSHIP, by *cementing Multitude*, produces UNION; ſo STRIFE, by *diſſolving Union*, produces MULTITUDE; and 'tis by MULTITUDE *that the World becomes diverſified and repleniſhed.*

AND hence we may perceive the meaning of what *Heraclitus* ſays in *Plutarch*, where he calls "WAR, *the Father and* "*King and Lord of all things*; *and aſſerts*, "*that when* HOMER *prayed*

"*That Strife be baniſhed both from Gods and Men,*

"*he was not aware that he was curſing* "*the Generation of all things*; *as in fact* "*they deduce their riſe out of Conteſt and* "*Antipathy.*" The ſame Philoſopher

Ch. X. adds immediately, " *that* THE SUN *could* " *not paſs his appointed bounds; that other-* " *wiſe, if he could,*

Tongues he would find to patronize the Cauſe:

meaning by this *mythological* way of talking, that the Sun could not deſert his Courſe, becauſe ſo much depended on it; or otherwiſe, if he could, that being himſelf *one of the primary Authors of Generation* upon this Earth, and well knowing how much Strife co-operated in the ſame work, he would ſurely look out for an advocate (were ſuch any where exiſting) to defend the cauſe of STRIFE againſt the Calumnies of *Homer* (*d*).

FROM

(*d*) Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίκρυς πόλεμον ὀνομάζει πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ κύριον πάντων· καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὅμηρον, εὐχόμενον,

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν, ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι,

λανθάνειν φησὶ τῇ πάντων γενέσει καταρώμενον, ἐκ μάχης

FROM all theſe Speculations one thing at leaſt appears (whatever elſe may be doubtful) Ch. X.

μάχης καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τὴν γένεσιν ἐχόντων· ἥλιον δὲ μὴ ὑπερβήσεσθαι τὰς προσήκοντας ὥρας· εἰ δὲ μή,

Γλώτλας μιν δίκης ἐπικύρας ἐξευρήσειν.

Plutarch. de Iſid. et Oſir. p. 370. *Edit. Xyland. Fol.*

Dr. *Squire*, the late Biſhop of St. *David's*, has given a fair Edition of this Tract in the original, to which he has ſubjoined an *Engliſh* Tranſlation; but (according to a Practice too frequent with the beſt Critics) he has, in the Paſſage above quoted, attempted to mend, where no Emendation was wanting.

Chalcidius plainly alludes to the ſame Sentiment of *Heraclitus* in the following Extract from his Commentary on *Plato's Timæus.—Proptereaque Numenius laudat Heraclium* (lege *Heraclitum*) *reprehendentem Homerum, qui optavetit interitum et vaſtitatem malis vitæ, quòd non intelligeret mundum ſibi deleri placere: ſi quidem Sylva, quæ malorum fons eſt, exterminaretur. Chal.* p. 396. *Edit. Meurſ.* 1617.

In the *Greek* Quotation, *Homer* is ſuppoſed to wiſh inadvertently againſt the *Generation* of all things; in the Latin, he wiſhes in the ſame inadvertent manner againſt the exiſtence of *Sylva*, that is, of *Matter*. The difference is eaſily reconciled, if we ſuppoſe Matter to be the *Baſis of Generation*, and to be *eſſentially*

Ch. X. doubtful) that *Relations* of *Hoſtility*, as well as *Friendſhip*, have their uſe in the Univerſe. Both alſo equally ariſe from *Want* on one ſide, and from *the Power of removing it* on the other (*e*). The difference is, that in *friendly* Relations the *Help* is communicated either *with pleaſure*, as when the Mother ſuckles her Child; or at leaſt *without pain*, as when we ſhew a traveller his way. In hoſtile Relations, the *Help*, without regard to the *Communicator*, is either taken by force, as when the Wolf devours the Lamb; or obtained by ſtratagem, as when the Spider inſnares the Fly.

---

requiſite to the exiſtence of things *Generable* and *Periſhable*, out of which this lower and viſible World is wholly compoſed.

(*e*) How far the WANT OF GOOD leads to *Arts* and *Action*, may be ſeen in *Vol. I. Treatiſe the firſt*, p. 24; and in the Notes ſubjoined, p. 272, 3, 4, 5. We here perceive it to extend not only to the whole *animal* World, but even to the *Vegetable*. More will be found on this Subject in the Treatiſe upon *Motion*, a part of the preſent Work.

AND

AND thus by the reciprocal *Relations* of *Want* and *Help* (both of which under a variety of Forms exiſt in every *individual*) is there a kind of general Concatenation extended throughout the Univerſe; while each Being communicates what Help it can afford, and obtains in it's turn, that Help which it requires. Ch. X.

To all theſe *Relations* muſt be added that chief, tho' mentioned laſt, *that* of the whole Univerſe, and every Being in it, to the *Firſt*, *Supreme*, and *Intelligent* CAUSE, thro' which *Relation* THEY are called HIS OFFSPRING, and HE THEIR FATHER. Here indeed the *Relations* are not blended as before; they are all purely referable to *Want* on one ſide, and all purely ariſe from *ſpontaneous Help* on the other; the correſpondence exiſting, as far as *Perfect* has reſpect to *Imperfect*, *Independent* to *Dependent*, the *Object deſired*

Ch. X. *ſired* to the Beings which *deſire* (*f*), *the Maker* to his *Works*, the *Parent* to his *Children* (*g*).

AND now to conclude with a Remark, which regards *Relation in general.* "As "to every Continuous Being the Genus "of QUALITY *gives Diſtinctions*, which "help to mitigate it's Sameneſs, and ren- "der it as it were *diſcrete*; ſo to Beings "*diſcrete*, however remote, the Genus "of Relation gives a Connection, which "ſerves to mitigate their Diverſity, and "to render them as it were *continuous.*

(*f*) Πῶς δὲ ϰ᾽ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν ὁ Θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ— *How is* GOD *called an Object deſirable to all Beings, if there be no* RELATION *between the Object of Deſire, and the Being which deſires? Simplic. in Prædic.* p. 43. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551. See before, Note p. 225.

(*g*) St. *Paul* has given his Sanction to that Verſe of *Aratus*—Τοῦ γὰρ ϰ᾽ γένος ἐσμέν—*For we are his Offſpring. Arat. Phæn.* v. 5. *Acts* xvii. 28.

"Thus

" Thus is the World maintained as well Ch. X.
" in it's UNION, as in it's VARIETY,
" while *both Species of Quantity run thro'*
" *the whole, and thro' every Part.*"

AND ſo much for the ARRANGEMENT or GENUS OF RELATION, it's nature, it's properties, it's utility, and extent (*h*).

(*h*) Before we quit this Arrangement, we ſhall ſubjoin the following Note.

The old Logicians held that *Things Intelligible*, and *Intellection* were *Relatives*; ſo alſo *Things Senſible*, and *Senſation*. But then they ſtarted an objection—If *Relatives co-exiſt*, and always *reciprocate in their exiſtence*, what would become of *Euclid's Theorems*, ſuppoſing there were no *Geometricians?* What would become of *Senſible Objects*, ſuppoſing there were no *Beings ſenſitive?*

One Solution of this Objection is derived from the *Percipient*—THE FIRST ORIGINAL AND SUPREME PERCIPIENT IS EVERY WHERE, AND ALWAYS IN THE FULL ENERGY OF UNIVERSAL PERCEPTION.

Another Solution is from the *Objects perceived*, be they ſenſible or intelligible. Every ſuch Object has a *double* nature; an *abſolute* nature, and a *relative* one. The Sound A is an Octave to the Sound B. B ceaſes, and A continues. A is no longer *an Octave*, but ſtill it is *a Sound:* and even tho' we ſhould call it no

Ch. X.

no Sound, if there were to be no Hearers; it would ſtill be an *Undulation* of Air, capable of producing Sound, if there were an Ear capable of perceiving it, that is, *an Organ adequate to the Senſation.*

The Inſtance given on this occaſion by the Philoſophers *Porphyry* and *Simplicius*, is curious, becauſe it is taken from that difficult Syſtem of Muſic, *the Enharmonic.* The following are the words of *Simplicius* —Κᾶν γὰρ διὰ ῥαθυμίαν ἀποβάλωμεν ποτὲ τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν, ὐδὲν ἧττον μένει τὰ ὄντα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπιστητά· κ᾽ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ πρότερον μὲν κατηκούομεν διέσεως, νῦν δὲ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τέτυ τῦ διαστήματ☉ ἐσμέν. —*For if ever thro' any Sloth or Indolence we reject Knowlege, thoſe things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheleſs. 'Tis thus that in Muſic we uſed in former days to hear the* QUARTER-TONE, *but now we are unable to diſtinguiſh this interval. Simplic. in Præd.* p. 48. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

Porphyry, having told us that tho' there were no Geometry, conſidered as a *Science*, there would ſtill be Objects Geometrical, ſubjoins—ἐπεὶ κ᾽ ἐν τῇ μουσικῇ τὸ μὲν πάλαι τῦ διεσιαίυ διαστήματ☉ ἤκουον οἱ μουσικοὶ, ὕστερον δὲ ἀμεληθείσης τῆς ἐναρμονίυ μελῳδίας, καθ᾽ ἣν τὸ διεσιαῖον διάστημα ἐμελῳδεῖτο, ὐκέτι τῦ τοιέτυ αἴσθησις ἔσαι (*lege* ἐστὶ) διαστήματ☉· κ᾽ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῦτο διάστημα, εἰ κ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν.—*For thus too in Muſic, Muſicians uſed* FORMERLY *to hear* (and diſtinguiſh) *the Interval of the* QUARTER-TONE: *but in latter days,* THE ENHARMONIC MELODY *having been neglected, by which this Interval uſed to be modulated, there is no longer now any Senſation of ſuch an Interval: and yet 'tis evident that this ſenſible Interval has an Exiſtence in nature, altho'*

tho' for the preſent the Senſation of it be loſt. *Porphyr. in Prædic.* p. 40. *Ed. Paris.* 1543. Ch. X.

Porphyry flouriſhed in the third Century; *Simplicius* in the ſixth.

We may remark by the way from the above Quotations, how faſt *the Arts* of Elegance were ſinking even in the *more early* of thoſe two Periods.

As for the ſtate of Philoſophy in the *latter* Period, we may form a Judgment of it by what we learn from *Simplicius* in the ſame Treatiſe, with regard to the *Stoics*. Having in his Commentary on the Predicaments of *Action* and *Paſſion* given many Quotations from the *Stoic* Logic, he concludes the Chapter with the following words—Πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξεργασία παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς· ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπεν—*There is much elaborate Diſcuſſion of theſe matters among the* STOICS, *of whom both the* DOCTRINE *and* MOST OF THE WRITINGS *are* IN OUR TIMES *loſt, and at an end.* *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 84. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

Mahomet ſoon followed, whoſe Succeſſor *Omar* burnt the *Alexandrine* Library; nor did the ſucceeding *Caliphs* emerge from Barbarity, till the Race of the *Abbaſſidæ*, near two Centuries after.

The Barbarity of *Weſtern Europe* continued much longer, and did not begin to leſſen, till the *fifteenth* Century, that preceding the age of *Leo the tenth.*

CHAP.

IX.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning ACTION *and* PASSION—*Action, it's five Species—thoſe of Paſſion reciprocate—Mind Divine, Human—latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Paſſivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Reaction, where they exiſt, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence and what—requiſite both in Action and in Paſſion—Power, tho' like Non-Entity, yet widely different—Double in the reaſoning Faculty—Power, not firſt in exiſtence, but Energy, which never has ceaſed, or will ceaſe, or can ceaſe.*

Ch.XI. IN treating of *Relatives* we have conſidered principally thoſe, which poſſeſs the *Relative* Character in a degree *above* every other. But there are things, which,

which, as they poſſeſs it blended with Characters *more* eminent, have been formed for that reaſon into *ſeparate* ARRANGEMENTS. Such for example is *the Relation* between a Being, and *the Place, which it occupies*; *that* between a Being, and *the Time, while it exiſts*; the firſt of which Relations gives an anſwer to the Queſtion, WHERE; the latter, to the Queſtion, WHEN. Ch. XI.

THERE are alſo Relations of *Poſition*; Relations of *Habit*; and beſides theſe there are Relations of ACTION and PASSION, all of which are diſtinguiſhed by peculiar Attributes of their own, and have therefore merited diſtinct Examinations from the ancient Writers upon Logic.

THUS, if we conſider the two laſt, I mean ACTION and PASSION, we ſhall find them diffuſed thro' every part of the Univerſe; and that, either united in *one* Subject,

Ch. XI. Subject, or elſe ſeparate, and in *different* Subjects.

By *Horace* they are united:

Qui ſtudet optatam curſu contingere metam,
Multa TULIT, FECIT*que puer*—— (*a*)

So are they by *Livy*, in that manly Speech of *Caius Mucius*—*Et* FACERE *et* PATI *fortia, Romanum eſt* (*b*).

So are they by *Shakeſpeare*:

Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to SUFFER
The Stings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune.
Or—*by* OPPOSING *end them* (*c*).

So are they by *Milton*:

(*a*) *Hor. Art. Poet.* v. 412.
(*b*) *Liv.* ii. 12.
(*c*) *Hamlet.*

Fal'n

Fal'n Cherub, to be weak is miſerable, Ch. XI.
DOING, *or* SUFFERING—— (*d*)

IN *Virgil* we ſee them ſeparated, and PASSION given to *Man*, ACTION to the *Deity*:

O! PASSI *graviora, dabit* DEUS *his quoque finem* (*e*).

As therefore ACTION and PASSION are of the moſt extenſive influence; as they partake in ſome degree the nature of *Qualities* or *Attributes*, by being *intimately* and *eſſentially* connected with Subſtance; while the Relatives, *When*, *Where*, and *Poſition*, ſeem rather connected *accidentally*: we ſhall give ACTION and PASSION their juſt Precedence, and make them the Subject of the preſent Chapter.

(*d*) *Par. Loſt.* i. 157.

(*e*) *Æn.* i. 203.

Ch. XI. THE SPECIES OF ACTION are as many, as are *the different Modes of acting* in the *different Species of Agents.*

THE FIRST SORT OF ACTION is that of *mere* BODY ALONE, conſidered either as void of Senſation *wholly*, like Fire, when it burns; or at leaſt *as void of Senſation*, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and univerſal Power, the Power of *Attraction*, which all Body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to poſſeſs *in proportion to it's Quantity*; that *active* Power, (if it may for the preſent be ſo called) the Effects of which modern Philoſophy has ſcrutinized with ſo much penetration. Such too are thoſe Energies peculiar to *different* Bodies, and ariſing out of them from their *different Natures*; as when we ſay the Heavens emit Light; the Trees produce Leaves; the Fields give us Corn, &c:

Cælum

Cælum niteſcere, arbores frondeſcere,
Segetes largiri fruges, &c. *(f)*

Such too are thoſe more ſecret Operations of Bodies, whether *magnetic* or *electric*; to which may be added the Virtues and Efficacies of *Bodies Medicinal.* All theſe Energies in a comprehenſive ſenſe may be called the *Action* of Body, conſidered merely as *Body* (*g*).

A Se-

(f) Cicer. Tuſc. Diſp. l. 28.

(g) This is that Genus of Energies, which, as *Jamblichus* deſcribes it, *indicates no Action belonging to Soul, or to Animal Nature, or to Reaſonings, or to Life, but which* (on the contrary) *exhibits the particular Energy of* BODIES, CONSIDERED AS BODIES *purely inanimate; and that as well with reſpect to all the Peculiarities which appear to ſurround Body, as to all thoſe various inherent powers of Bodies, not only as they are ſolid and capable of reſiſting, but as they contain within them a multitude of Powers that are efficacious and active.* —Γίνω ἐνεργειῶν, ὅπερ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ λόγων καὶ ζωῆς ἀκίνητ ἐπιδείκνυσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ἢ σώματά ἐσιν ἄψυχα, φανερὰν καθίστησι τὴν σωματοειδῆ ἐνέργειαν

Ch. XI. A SECOND SORT OF ACTION is that which is the result of *Senſation*, *Inſtinct*, and *natural Appetite*, and which therefore, being complicated, muſt neceſſarily be confined to Bodies of a higher Genus, to Bodies *Senſitive*, that is, to ANIMALS.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus PETIT, &c. (*h*)

No where are *theſe Actions* expreſt with more elegance and conciſeneſs, than by our own *Epic Poet*, in his *Paradiſe Loſt*:

——— *Air, Water, Earth,*
By Fowl, Fiſh, Beaſt, was FLOWN, *was* SWAM, *was* WALK'D (*i*).

ἐνέργειαν κατὰ πάσας μὲν τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰς φαινομένας ἰδιότητας, κατὰ πάσας δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ ἡ μόνον στρεπτά ἐστι καὶ ἀντίτυπα, ἀλλ' ἡ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει πολλὰς δραστηρίους δυνάμεις. *Simpl. in Prædic.* p. 81. *Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

(*h*) *Hor. Sat.* ii. 1.

(*i*) *Par. Loſt*, vii. 502. Καὶ ὅλον ὅσα ποτέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα εἴδη τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα καὶ

ἐν

THERE is A THIRD SPECIES OF ACTION more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from Senſation, Inſtinct, and natural Appetite, but from *Reaſon* alſo, *ſuperadded* to theſe. This is a Mode of Action *peculiar to Man*, becauſe of all the Animals we ſee around us, *Man* alone poſſeſſes the *Reaſoning Faculty*. Ch. XI.

WIDELY diverſified is the Share aſſumed by the *ſubordinate* Faculties of the *Human* Soul, in Actions of *this* Character. Sometimes they ſubmit to *Reaſon*, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed

---

ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορά ἐϛιν. εἶδη κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν, περὶ ὧν ἐν ταῖς περὶ ζώων ἱϛορίαις διαριθμεῖϑαι εἰώϑαμεν.—'Tis evident that as are the Species of Irrational Animals in Number and in Quality, ſo many and ſuch are the different Species in Acting agreeably to this [animal] *mode of Energy*; *which ſeveral Species of Acting have been uſually enumerated in the Hiſtories of Animals.* *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 81, *ut ſuprà.*

Ch. XI.

of themſelves. And hence it is, that *Actions, produced* from Cauſes ſo peculiarly complicated, derive to themſelves the Colours of GOOD and EVIL, and are denominated, in diſtinction to every other deed of Man, ACTIONS MORAL.

WHEN VIRTUE and PLEASURE addreſſed the young HERCULES, VIRTUE ſuppoſed him to have a *Reaſon*, that could controul his *Appetites*; PLEASURE ſuppoſed him to have *Appetites*, that would bear down his *Reaſon*. Had he obeyed the laſt, he had been *vicious*; as he obeyed the firſt, he was *virtuous*. There was a Conflict in either caſe between his better part, and his worſe; and in that Conflict *both Species* of Faculties were preſumed, his *Rational Faculties*, and his *Irrational* (*k*).

THERE

(*k*) See *Xenoph. Mem.* l. ii. c. i. S. 21.

The above Species of *Action* is thus deſcribed by *Simplicius*—Τρίτον δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν γένος, τὸ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν

THERE is A FOURTH SORT OF ACTION, where the INTELLECT, operating *without* Paſſions or Affections, ſtays not *within itſelf*, but *paſſes out* (as it were) to ſome *external* Operation. 'Tis thus that NATURE, conſidered as an *Efficient Cauſe*, may be called *the Energy of God*, ſeen in the various Productions that repleniſh and adorn the World. 'Tis thus Ch. XI.

σειν ἀπηρίθμηται, ὅπερ τῦ λόγυ τὰς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ σύνθετα ποιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει, προαιρέσεων καὶ βάλευ δόξαν τε καὶ σκέψιν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις παρεχόμενον. *Simpl. ut ſupra. The Genus, comprehended under the Idea of* ACTING MORALLY, *is the third of this Order; that Genus, which preſides over the Energies of Reaſon with reſpect to the concrete Objects of Senſe* (that is, which preſides in the affairs of common life), *and which furniſhes upon occaſion Deliberate Choice, Volition, Opinion, Inquiry, and other Energies of the ſame character. Simp. in Præd.* p. 80. *B. Edit. Baſ.* 1551.

We have in this place tranſlated πράττειν *to act morally*, the better to diſtinguiſh it from ποιεῖν, a word of meaning more extenſive, ſignifying ſimply *to do*, or *to make*.

Ch. XI. that ART, considered as an *Efficient Cause*, may be called the *Energy of Man*, which imitates in it's Operations the plastic Power of *Nature* (*l*).

THE LAST AND MOST EXCELLENT SORT OF ACTION is seen in *Contemplation*; in *the pure Energy* of SIMPLE INTELLECT, keeping *within* itself, and *making itself it's own Object*. This is *the highest Action* of which we are susceptible; and by it *we imitate* THE SUPREME BEING, as far as is consistent with our subordinate Nature. 'Tis to this that our great *Poet* alludes, when speaking of his Employment, during a state of Blindness, he says—

(*l*) Τότε δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ θεῖον—πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, μιμουμέναις τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ παραλειπόμενον ὑπ' αὐταῖς (*lege* αὐτῆς) ἀναπληρούσαις. *Simplic. ut suprà. Of this Species of Acting* THE DIVINITY *has a large share—a large share also falls to* ARTS, *that imitate Nature, and supply what she has omitted.*

Then

Then FEED ON THOUGHTS, *which voluntary move* Ch. XI.
Harmonious Numbers——(*m*)

THE

(*m*) *Par. Loſt.* iii. 37.

This higheſt Mode of Action (if it may be ſo called) is thus deſcribed by *Simplicius* in the ſame Comment, p. 80:

Τὸ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ ἀμερίστων οὐσιῶν ἐπισκοπούμενον ἁπλαῖς νοήσεσιν—*That which, with ſimple intellections, inquires concerning Subſtances intelligible and indiviſible*—that is, Subſtances which, having no Parts, cannot, like *Body*, be *infinitely divided*.

Archytas has enumerated theſe Species of *Energy* or *Action*, but in a different manner, beginning with the laſt of them firſt, and ſo proceeding inverſely, till he come to the firſt that is mentioned here, and this he *omits*. His words are worthy of peruſal—Τὰς δὲ Ἐνεργείας διαφοραὶ τρεῖς· τὸ μὲν γάρ τί ἐστιν αὐτᾶς ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν, οἷον ἀστρονομεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὑγιάζειν, τεκταίνειν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πράσσειν, οἷον στρατηγεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι· γίγνεται δὲ ἃ μὲν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις. Γενικώτατα δὲ αὐτά. *Archyt. apud Simpl. in Præd.* p. 80. *There are three Diſtinctions of* ACTION *or* ENERGY: *One Sort of it conſiſts in* CONTEMPLATING, *as when we ſtudy the Stars*; *another in* MAKING, *as when we heal*

Ch. XI. THE *Species of* PASSION may be underſtood by their reciprocating for the moſt part with thoſe of ACTION.

THUS tho' the DIVINE MIND, by being *pure* and *intellectual Energy*, can have *nothing paſſive* in it's tranſcendent

---

heal a Diſeaſe, or exerciſe the Art of a Carpenter; another [not in making but] *in* ACTING, *as when we lead an Army, or adminiſter a Commonwealth. There is too a fourth Energy,* WHERE THERE IS NO USE OF REASONING, *as in Animals irrational. Theſe are the Forms of Action the moſt general and comprehenſive.*

Simplicius tells us, that *Archytas* has omitted the other Species (that which we have mentioned firſt, and which reſpects *Bodies inanimate*) becauſe he did not conſider it *as* a Species *purely active*, nor as ariſing from any *internal* and *ſenſitive* Principle of Motion. And yet perhaps, in an introductory Treatiſe, it can hardly be conſidered as introduced improperly, tho' it muſt be allowed at the ſame time to want this Requiſite.

We obſerve by the way that this diſtinction of Actions is called by Logicians *Actio tranſiens*, and *Actio immanens*, which correſponds in Grammar to Verbs *Tranſitive* on one ſide, and Verbs *Neuter* and *Middle* on the other. See *Hermes*, l. i. c. 9.

theory,

theory (*n*); yet THE MIND OF MAN, which has *intenſions* and *remiſſions*, is, for that reaſon, *neceſſarily* PASSIVE in two important manners, either as *Truth*, real or apparent, demands it's *Aſſent*; or as *Falſhood*, real or apparent, demands it's *Diſſent*. Ch. XI.

IT is in conſequence of *this Paſſivity* of the *Human* Mind, which I chuſe to call Paſſivity *Intellectual*, that it becomes *ſuſceptible of Diſcipline and Inſtitution*, and thus finds itſelf adorned (according as it is cultivated) with the various tribe both of Arts and Sciences (*o*).

As the *Reaſon of Man* is acted upon by the appearances of *Truth* and *Falſhood*, ſo are the *Appetites* of Man (and not only of Man, but of Brutes alſo) acted upon by the approach of *Pleaſure*

(*n*) See Chapter on *Qualities*, p. 161.

(*o*) *Vid. Arrian. Epict.* l. iii. c. 3.

and

CH. XI. and *Pain* (*p*). This therefore may be called SENSUAL PASSIVITY, in oppoſition to the *rational* above deſcribed. 'Tis to this *Davus* alludes in *Horace*,

——— *etenim fateor, me dixerit ille*
DUCI VENTRE *levem*: NASUM NIDORE SUPINOR,
Imbecillus, iners, &c. (*q*)

The moulding this Paſſivity of the *human* Mind into as much of the fair and honeſt, as it is capable of receiving, when it is applied to Nations, is called *Politics*; when to Families, *Oeconomics*; when to Individuals, *Ethics* (*r*); and is in general

(*p*) Δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν. —*We ought to ſuppoſe, that both* GOOD APPARENT *and* PLEASURE *ſupply the place of Good* (real); *for Pleaſure is Good apparent. Ariſt. de Animal. Motu.* p. 154. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*q*) *Hor. Sat.* ii. 7. 37.

(*r*) *Nicephorus Blemmides* adopts this Diviſion from the *Peripatetic* School—Τὸ δὲ Πρακτικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς

the Foundation of *Moral* Principles and Conduct. Ch. XI.

THE PASSIVITY PECULIAR TO BRUTES may be ſeen in the various purpoſes, to which we direct their ſeveral Powers;

εἰς ἠθικὸν, οἰκονομικὸν, καὶ πολιτικόν· καὶ ἠθικὸς μέν ἐστι φιλόσοφος, ὁ τὰ ἑαυτῷ ἤθη καὶ ἄλλα ῥυθμίζειν δυνάμενος· οἰκονομικὸς δὲ, ὁ καὶ οἶκον ὅλον ἐκπαιδεύειν καλῶς ἐπισάμενος· ὁ δέ γε πόλιν ἢ καὶ πόλεις διέξαγων καὶ διακυβερνῶν ἀρίστως, πολιτικός—*The* PRACTICAL *Part of Philoſophy is divided into* MORAL, OECONOMICAL, *and* POLITICAL. *It is the* MORAL *Philoſopher, who is able to adjuſt his own manners, and thoſe of any other individual: the* OECONOMICAL, *who knows how to inſtruct well a whole Family; and he, who in the beſt manner conducts and governs a City, or Cities, this Philoſopher is the* POLITICAL *one. Blem. Epitom. Logic.* p. 37.

As we have been ſpeaking juſt before of *Paſſivity*, it is proper to remark that the ſame Writer, from the ſame Philoſophy, takes notice of two Species of it, a better Species and a worſe; *Paſſivity Corruptive*, and *Paſſivity Completive*; *Corruptive*, as when any Being is conſumed by Fire; *Completive*, as when a Being either learns, or is acted upon, either by it's Intellect, or it's Senſes.—Τῷ πάσχειν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐστι φθαρτικὸν, ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι· τὸ δὲ τελειωτικὸν, ὡς τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ γινώσκειν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι. *Nic. Blem. Ep. Log.* 158.

ſome

Ch.XI. ſome to plow our lands, others to carry us; a third Species to hunt for us, &c. (*s*)

THE PASSIVITY OF INSENSITIVE BODIES, whether vegetable or not, is equally conſpicuous in the various Ends, to which we apply them. The Earth we plow; over the Sea we ſail; out of the Foreſt we build our Ships, &c. This inſenſitive *Paſſivity*, tho' it ſubmit to the *Action* of *other Bodies* upon it, yet always follows the *peculiar* Nature of the Being, to which it belongs; ſo that the *Effects* often *differ*, where the *Active* Power is *the ſame*.

Limus ut hic DURESCIT, *et hæc ut cera* LIQUESCIT,
UNO EODEMQUE *igni*—— (*t*)

(*s*) See *Vol. I. Treatiſe I.* p. 40, 41. See alſo as to the *Paſſivity* of Bodies *inanimate*, p. 39, 40, *of the ſame Treatiſe.*

(*t*) *Virg. Ecl.* viii. 80.

LASTLY,

LASTLY, all *Bodies*, that act by ATTRACTION, are themſelves RECIPROCALLY ACTED UPON, as modern Philoſophers have clearly demonſtrated. Ch. XI.

As to ACTION and PASSION *in general*, it may be obſerved, that the great and diverſified Mixture of them, which runs thro' the World, and is conſpicuous in every part of it, has a neceſſary reference (as all other Mixtures have) *to Principles more ſimple*, out of which it is compounded. PURE ACTIVITY we may ſuppoſe MIND; and PURE PASSIVITY, MATTER. As *Mind* is capable of acting whatever is poſſible, ſo is *Matter* of having, whatever is poſſible, acted upon it. The *former* is the *Source* of all Forms, Diſtinctions, and Beauty; the *latter* is the *Receptacle*. In THE SUPREME MIND there is *nothing paſſive*; in THE LOWEST MATTER, there is *nothing active*;

Ch. XI. *tive* (*u*); while all *between* is a Mixture of both, where in different parts the different Principles are *prevalent*, and from this prevalence give the Being it's proper Character.

If we call *Man* a *Compoſite* of Soul and Body, as a *rational* Being, he has a Motion *of his own*; as a *ſenſitive* Being, he has a Motion in common with *Brutes*; as a Being merely *corporeal*, a Motion in common with *all Bodies* whatever. A Dog has only the *ſecond* and *third* of theſe Motions, and a Stone only *the laſt*. Thus is the Stone *leaſt* active, the Man *moſt* ſo, and the Brute *between both*.

(*u*) See Chapter vi, p. 109, 110.

Thus *Archytas* in *Simplicius*—Τὰ καθαρὰ γένη τῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχικωτάτοις—τῦ μὲν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τῦ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῇ Ὕλῃ—*The pure and ſimple Genera of acting, and being acted upon, exiſt in the primary and moſt original of Beings*; ACTING, *in* GOD; *the being acted upon, in* MATTER. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 84. *B. Edit. Baſil.* 1551.

THE Modes are different, under which Beings *act upon one another.* Ch XI.

SOME (as the whole tribe of *corporeal* Maſſes) only *act*, becauſe they are *acted upon*, and that too by ſomething *external*, and perfectly diſtinct from themſelves. 'Tis thus the Nail acts upon the Timber, becauſe the Hammer acts upon the Nail; and were not the Hammer to drive, the Nail would never penetrate.

Now ſuch Motion as *this* is but a Species of *Paſſivity*, becauſe tho' the Beings, which poſſeſs it, have an *original* Power to *receive* Motion, they by no means poſſeſs an *original* Power to *impart* it. And hence it follows, that if ſomething did not exiſt *more intrinſically active* than themſelves, they would *never act*, and there would be *no Motion at all.*

ACTION of this kind (if it deſerve the name) is the ACTION of BEINGS,

Ch. XI. which, tho' MOVEABLE, are not *intrinsically* MOTIVE, that is, *Cauſes of Motion*.

ANOTHER Mode of ACTION may be found in the following inſtances.—A Lamb acts upon *the Senſes* of a Wolf—that Senſation acts upon his *Appetites*—that Appetite acts upon his *Corporeal Organs*—by *the Action of theſe* Organs he runs, he ſeizes, and he devours the Lamb.

A CHILD is ſeen by its Mother likely to fall from a precipice.—The *Senſation* acts upon her *parental Affections*—theſe Affections act upon her *Corporeal Organs*.—By *the Action of theſe Organs* ſhe runs, ſhe ſeizes, and ſhe ſaves her Child.

THE Inſtances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with *deliberation* and *thought*. The Splendor of the *Roman* Empire acted upon the *Imagination* of *Cæſar*—that *Imagination* acted upon his *Deſire of ſovereign Power*—that Deſire acted upon the *Faculties of his Mind and Body*.

—By

—By the *Energy of theſe Faculties* he paſſed the *Rubicon*, conquered *Pompey*, enſlaved *Rome*, and obtained the wiſhed-for Empire. Ch. XI.

AGAIN—The Domination of *Cæſar* acted upon the *Imagination* of *Brutus*—that *Imagination* acted upon his *Love for the Republic*—that Love for the Republic acted upon *his corporeal Organs*.—*His hand* in conſequence plunged a Dagger into *Cæſar*, and, for a time, the Republic, which he loved, was reſtored.

IN all theſe inſtances the *Corporeal* Organs act, like the *Corporeal* Maſſes before mentioned, becauſe they are *firſt acted upon*. But then they are not acted upon, as thoſe are, by *other external* Bodies, but by *internal* Appetites, Affections, and Deſires, *all* which, as well as the *Organs*, are PARTS *of one and the ſame* BEING. Such Being therefore is not, like Beings of the firſt Order, in a manner *paſſive* and *only moveable*; but, as it poſſeſſes *within itſelf* the power of *imparting* Motion, as

well as of *receiving* it, the ACTION is that of a BEING, not only MOVEABLE, but *intrinſically* MOTIVE.

WE may go farther, if we pleaſe, and ſuggeſt a *third* Mode of ACTION, the *Action* of the FIRST MOVER; THAT BEING, which, tho' *Motive*, is itſelf perfectly IMMOVEABLE.

IN a ſeries of Agents, where each of them *imparts* Motion, which it has *previouſly received*, were *ſuch* Agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no Motion could ever *begin*, were there not *ſomething* at their head *totally different* from them all; ſomething *purely impaſſive*; ſomething, which can *move*, without *being moved*; in other words, which *can impart Motion* to every thing elſe, and remain *itſelf* IMMOVEABLE.

'TIS to this character that *Boethius* alludes, in his truly ſublime addreſs to the Author of the Univerſe:

—*Qui*

Qui tempus ab ævo Ch. XI.
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das
CUNCTA MOVERI *(y).*

CONSIDERING *Action* therefore and *the being acted upon* with a view to *Motion* and the *being moved*, we may say that the *Peripatetic* Syſtem (for 'tis hence we derive theſe Speculations) contemplated all Beings in *three* views; either as MOVEABLE, but not MOTIVE; or as both MOVEABLE and MOTIVE; or laſtly as MOTIVE alone, but NOT MOVEABLE *(z)*.

(y) Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, ἀ. κινούμενον— *The* DESIRABLE, *and the* INTELLIGIBLE MOVE, WITHOUT BEING MOVED. *Ariſt. Metaph.* p. 202. *Edit. Sylb.* See below, p. 429, in the note.

The *Latin* Quotation is from the *Conſolation* of *Boethius*, and is a part of thoſe Hexameters, which for harmony of Numbers, and ſublimity of Sentiment are perhaps not inferior to any in the *Latin* Language.

O! qui perpetuâ mundum &c.

(z) This Doctrine is expreſſed by the *Stagirite*, but in an inverted order. Τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον, ἀ κινούμενον, κινεῖ· ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον, κινεῖ· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τῶν κινούντων, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κινεῖν ἀκίνητον. *De Animal. Motu*, p. 154. *Edit. Sylb.*

CH. XI. MORE is ſaid upon this Subject in the ſubſequent Theory concerning Motion (*a*).

WE ſhall only add, that, in the above Modes of Acting, when *Bodies* act upon *Bodies*, the Action for the greater part is *reciprocal*. While the Oar impels the Wave, the Wave reſiſts the Oar; while the Axe hews the Timber, the Timber blunts the Axe; while the Earth attracts the Moon, the Moon attracts the Earth. And hence the Theory of ACTION and RE-ACTION, ſo accurately ſcrutinized in modern Philoſophy.

IF we contemplate the World, as well the vegetable as the animal, we ſhall

(*a*) Concerning that MOTION, which *does not ariſe from the Colliſion of one Body with another Body, but* where *the Power which moves*, and *the Organs, which are moved*, appear to be *both of them vitally* UNITED *in* ONE *and the ſame Subject*, ſee below, p. 408 to p. 425. Concerning the neceſſity of *ſomething, different from Body, to put Body in Motion*, ſee below, p. 437. Concerning CAUSATIVE MOTION, ſee below, p. 440. Concerning IMMOBILITY, ſee below, p. 449, 450; and *Hermes*, p. 360 in the note.

perceive

perceive ACTION and PASSION diffuſed thro' every part. Ch. XI.

AND yet it muſt be obſerved both of *Action* and of *Paſſion*, (ſuch at leaſt as thoſe we ſee around us) that they are neither of them *perpetual* in any one particular inſtance. Corn *only* nouriſhes, and Hemlock *only* poiſons, when they meet a *proper* Body, on which to operate: the Muſician does not *always* perform, nor is the Ear *always* affected by Sounds: the Painter does not *always* paint, nor is the Eye *always* affected by Colours.

AND hence the riſe of that notable thing called POWER; that dormant Capacity, into which both *Action* and *Paſſion*, when they ceaſe, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their *Source* they *flow*.

THERE is nothing which appears ſo nearly to approach Non-entity, as this ſingular thing called POWER; yet is there nothing in fact ſo truly different from it.

Ch. XI. Of Non-entity there are no Attributes, no Affections; but every Power poſſeſſes a *ſpecific* and a *limited* character, which not only diſtinguiſhes it from *Non-entity*, but from every *other* Power.

Thus among the Active Powers, the Smith, *when aſleep*, has *ſtill* thoſe *Powers*, which make him a Smith; the Shipwright, *when aſleep*, has *ſtill* thoſe *Powers*, which make him a Shipwright. The *Powers* diſtinguiſh *both* from the *reſt* of mankind, who purely *from not having them* are neither Smiths nor Shipwrights.

The *ſame Powers* help to diſtinguiſh the *ſame Artiſts from one another:* for the *Powers*, though inviſible, are *incommutable*; nor can thoſe of the Shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or thoſe of the Smith enable him to conſtruct a Ship.

If we paſs from *active* to Paſſive Powers, we ſhall find *theſe* after the ſame manner to be *limited* in every

every Subject, and *different* in every Species. Timber has the *Capacity* of becoming a Ship, but not an Axe; Iron on the contrary of becoming an Axe, but not a Ship (z). And tho' *different Agents*, by operating on the *ſame Patient*, may produce *different Effects* (as the Shipwright makes Timber into a Ship, while the Carpenter forms it into a Houſe); yet ſtill muſt each Effect correſpond with the *paſſive Capacities*; or elſe, where theſe fail, there is nothing to be done. Ch. XI.

Were the caſe otherwiſe, were not the *Paſſive* Powers eſſentially requiſite as well as the *Active*, there would be no reaſon, why any thing might not be made out of any thing.

Far diſtant therefore from Non-entity are *Paſſive Powers*, however latent:

(z) See Chapter the fourth concerning *Matter*, p. 64, 65; alſo p. 148, 149.

Ch. XI. ſo far indeed, that where they differ eſſentially from one another, they often lead to Effects perfectly *contrary*, tho' the *Agent*, which operates, be individually the ſame:

Limus ut hic DURESCIT, *et hæc ut cera* LIQUESCIT,
Uno eodemque igni, &c (*a*).

'Tis from this Theory we perceive the reaſon of that ancient Axiom, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ſecundum modum recipientis*; than which nothing can be more true, when properly underſtood.

As to the *Active Powers*, there is an important diſtinction between thoſe called *Rational*, and the *Irrational*. The Subordinate are moſtly confined to the producing *One Contrary* out of *Two*. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; Ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But

(*a*) *Virg. ut ſup.* p. 270.

the

the *rational* Powers *imply both Contraries at once*, and give to their poſſeſſor the *Alternative* of producing either. The Muſician has *the Power* both of Melody and Diſſonance; the Phyſician *the Power* both of healing, and making ſick; the Magiſtrate *the Power* of deciding both juſtly and unjuſtly. Ch. XI.

THE reaſon of this is, that *Rational Power alone* is founded in SCIENCE, and 'tis always *one and the ſame Science, which recognizes Contraries*; that, which teaches us Harmony, teaches us Diſcord; that which informs us what is Health, informs us what is Diſeaſe; that which diſcerns Truth, diſcerns alſo Falſhood. Hence therefore it is, that as every *Science* may be called *double* in it's Powers of Knowlege; ſo all *Action founded on Science* may be called *double in it's Powers* of Acting (*b*). A noble Privilege this

(*b*) Καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἴσονται ἄλογοι, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου—ϗ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ

Ch. XI. to Man, if well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abuſed; ſince by this *He alone*, of all ſublunary Beings, is properly intitled either to *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*.

WITH reſpect to POWERS in general, there is this to be obſerved: ſo important are they to the conſtitution of many Beings, that often, tho' *latent*, they are

---

αἱ αὐταὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἑνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τῷ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν στέρησιν—*Of* POWERS *ſome will be found* IRRATIONAL, *others are attended with* REASON—*and as to thoſe which are attended with Reaſon*, THE SAME POWERS *will* EXTEND TO THINGS CONTRARY; *but as to the irrational*, ONE POWER *will extend* ONLY TO ONE CONTRARY; *what is hot for example will only conduce to heating; but the Art of Medicine will become the Cauſe both of Diſeaſe and of Health. The Cauſe is, that this Medicinal Science is Reaſon, and* THE SAME REASON DISCOVERS *both* THE THING, *and it's* PRIVATION. *Ariſt. Metaph.* p. 143. *Edit. Sylb.*

See alſo Vol. the firſt of theſe *Treatiſes*, p. 173, 298; to theſe add p. 150 of the preſent Treatiſe, eſpecially in the Note.

more

more regarded than the ſtrongeſt *apparent* Attributes. Thus 'tis from their *medicinal Powers only*, that we value the ſeveral Species of Drugs; and from their *generative Powers only* that we value the ſeveral Species of Seed, while little regard is paid to their ſenſible, that is their *apparent* Qualities, farther than as they help to indicate thoſe *inviſible* Powers. Ch. XI.

THE juſt Oppoſite to POWER is ENERGY, which, as it's etymology (*c*) ſhews, implies *the exiſting in Deed or Act*, as oppoſed to that exiſtence, which only implies *Poſſibility*.

AND here 'tis worth obſerving, *that Every thing exiſting in Power* is neceſſarily rouſed into *Energy* by ſomething, which itſelf *exiſted* PREVIOUSLY *in*

(*c*) Ἐν Ἔργῳ, IN ACT, IN DEED. See a ſketch of the difference between *Act* and *Power*, Vol. I. p. 13, 14.

Energy.

Ch. XI. *Energy (d)*. Events and Incidents never ſtand ſtill; ſome Agents or other are perpetually energizing, tho' all perhaps by turns have their reſpites and relaxations, as many of them at leaſt as are of the *ſubordinate* Tribe. It happens indeed in the World, as in a Ship upon a Voyage. Every hand at a proper ſeaſon has his hours of Reſt, and yet the Duty never ceaſes, the Buſineſs of the Ship is never at a ſtand; thoſe, that wake, rouſing thoſe, that ſleep, and

---

(d) 'Twas a Doctrine of the *Peripatetic* School, ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως ἐστι—THAT ENERGY *is* PRIOR TO POWER. *Ariſt. Metaph.* p. 150. 152. —ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῆ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικῆ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἐστίν. *That which exiſts in Energy is always formed out of that which exiſts in Power, by* SOMETHING WHICH EXISTS (already) IN ENERGY; *for example Man is formed by Man, the Muſical Artiſt by the Muſical Artiſt, there being always ſome* FIRST (or *prior*) BEING, *which gives the Motion. Now* THAT, WHICH GIVES THIS MOTION, IS ITSELF ALREADY IN ENERGY. *Ariſtot. Metaph.* p. 151. *Edit. Syll.*

being

being in their turn rouſed again themſelves. Ch. XI.

BUT another way to ſhew that ENERGY *is of neceſſity* PREVIOUS TO POWER, conſiſts in admitting the contrary Hypotheſis.

LET us ſuppoſe for example a Man placed in a part of Space, where there was, and ever had been, *eternal Silence*; or otherwiſe in a part, where there was, and ever had been, *eternal Darkneſs*: could ſuch a one ever *actually* either have heard or ſeen, however exquiſite his *Powers* both of hearing and ſeeing?—And why not?—Becauſe to the evocation of one of theſe Powers, there is a neceſſity of *actual* Sound; to that of the other, of *actual* Light; ſo that had not theſe *Energies exiſted previouſly*, his *Powers* muſt have remained dormant thro' the period of their exiſtence. Suppoſe therefore *all Energies* of

all

Ch. XI. *all* kinds to ſtop: how could they ever *revive?* Were they all once ſunk into one *univerſal* Sleep, where ſhould we find *a waking Cauſe, to rouſe them from their Slumbers* (*e*)?

AND what then are the inferences from this Speculation, that *Power neceſſarily ariſes from previous Energy?*—One is, that all thoſe Doctrines about Order

(*e*) 'Tis hence that *Ariſtotle*, ſpeaking according to the Principles of his Philoſophy, ſays of things *eternal, unalterable*, and *neceſſary*, that is, *things ever in Energy*—εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, ἀθὲν ἂν ἦν, *if* THESE WERE NOT, THERE COULD BE NOTHING. *Metaph.* 153, *ut ſuprà*. 'Tis a pertinent Queſtion, ſtated by the ſame Author, in another part of the ſame Tract—Πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μηθὲν ἔσαι ἐνεργείᾳ αἴτιον; ἡ γὰρ ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν—*How can things ever be ſet in motion, if there be no* CAUSE (previouſly) EXISTING IN ENERGY? *Mere Matter itſelf cannot move itſelf.*—*Ibid.* 201. And ſoon before in the ſame page—ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ ὐσία ἐνέργεια—*It may happen that the thing, which exiſts in* POWER ONLY, *may* NOT EXIST AT ALL: *there muſt therefore be* (in the Univerſe) *ſuch a Sort of* PRINCIPLE, AS THAT THE VERY ESSENCE OF IT SHOULD BE ENERGY.

ſpringing

ſpringing from Diſorder, Beauty from Confuſion; of Night and Chaos being the oldeſt of Beings; in general, of the Perfect and Actual ariſing from the Imperfect and Potential; however they may be true as to the *material* Cauſe of things, yet are they far from being true with reſpect to their *real and eſſential Origin*. There is nothing in fact more certain, than that the ACTUAL and PERFECT are *previous to their Contraries*; elſe there could never have been in the Univerſe *any thing Actual* or *Perfect*. Ch. XI.

ANOTHER inference is, that the *moſt minute* and contemptible *Energy*, now *actually* exiſting, neceſſarily proves the Exiſtence of an *eternal Energy*, to which, as to it's Cauſe, it is *ultimately* referable. And what can ſuch ETERNAL ENERGY be, but ſomething, *whoſe very* ESSENCE *is that* ENERGY *(f)*; ſomething, which

(f) See the Note preceding—The founder of the *Peripatetic* Sect, ſpeaking of the *Deity*, uſes the following

Ch. XI. knows no *remiſſions*, like ſubordinate *Energies*, no occaſional retirings into *Power* and dead Capacity, but is EVER THE SAME IMMUTABLE AND PERFECT? Without ſuch a *Principle* the Univerſe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what ſhall we call this Principle?

---

lowing Expreſſions—ἡ γὰρ Νῦ Ἐνέργεια, ζωή· Ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ Ἐνέργεια—*The Energy of Mind or Intellect, is Life: and* HE (the Supreme Being) *is that* ENERGY. *Metaph.* p. 203. See alſo *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpretat.* p. 198, *B.* &c. where the Arrangement of Beings is deeply and philoſophically diſcuſſed, and exhibited.—Ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιδείξαι βυλόμενος, κ. τ. λ.

'Tis agreeably to this reaſoning we are told—Τῷ χρόνῳ ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τῷ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πρώτως—*that one Energy in point of Time always precedes another, till we arrive at the Energy of that Being, which eternally gives Motion in the firſt inſtance. Metaph.* Θ. ϰ. p. 152. *Edit. Sylb.*

Which is as much as to affirm (in other words) that *there is a gradual aſcent of active efficient Principles, one above another, up to that* ONE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE, *which is* ORIGINAL *and* SUPREME.

Shall

Shall we call it BODY or MIND?—The beſt way to anſwer this, will be to ſearch *within* ourſelves, where we may diſcover, if we attend, a portion of *either* Being, together with the ſeveral Attributes appertaining to each. Ch. XI.

AND ſo much for the two ARRANGEMENTS or PREDICAMENTS of ACTION and PASSION.

CHAP. XII.

Concerning WHEN *and* WHERE—*Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how diſtinguiſhed from Time and Place, how connected with them—Deſcriptions of When and Where—their Utility and Importance in human Life—Various Terms, denoting theſe two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extenſive influence—plauſible Topics—concurring Cauſes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Cauſes—Supreme Intelligence.*

C. XII. WE have ſaid already, that *Time* and *Place* agree, as they both belong to *Quantity Continuous* (*a*). So

(*a*) See before, p. 183 to 187.

eſſential

eſſential is this character, that could either of them be ſeparated, as we ſeparate a piece of timber, there would then be Intervals *without* Time, and Diſtances *without* place. Thus far then they *agree*, while in this they *differ*, that a *million of different things may exiſt in one inſtant of Time*, but *never more than one thing at once can occupy one Place*. C. XII.

AND hence the Nature of *Place* may be called *diſtributive*, while that of *Time* may be called *accumulative*. Hence too as they *agree* in *ſome* reſpects, and *differ* in others, they are neceſſarily *not ſimple*, but *compound*. Ideas, both belonging to *one Genus*, and each diſtinguiſhed by *ſpecific* differences. Having a *Genus* and a *Difference*, they become capable of *Definition*, ſince 'tis on *theſe two requiſites* that all Definition is founded (*b*).

TIME

(*b*) *Omnis* DEFINITIO *conſtat* GENERE *et* DIFFERENTIA—*Fell*, 218. *Termini verò eſſentiales* (Definitionis

C. XII. TIME therefore is *Continuity, ſucceſſive in itſelf, and accumulative of it's proper ſubjects*; PLACE *is Continuity, co-exiſtent in itſelf, and diſtributive of it's proper ſubjects.*

WE have ſaid thus much about theſe two Beings, becauſe WHEN and WHERE, tho' diſtinct from both (*c*), are neceſſarily connected with them, and cannot well be underſtood without reference to this *Connection*.

MEN, human affairs, and univerſally all ſenſible and corporeal Beings, as none of them are infinite either in *Duration* or *Extent*, muſt have ſomething of courſe

---

tionis ſcil.) GENUS *et* DIFFERENTIA. *Sanderſon*, l. i. c. 17. See alſo *Walliſii Logic.* l. i. c. 23.— Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους καὶ τῶν συγατικῶν εἰσι διαφορῶν, τυτέϛι τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. *Amm. in* 5. *voces*, p. 67.

(*c*) How they are diſtinct, ſee below, particularly in Note (*f*), alſo p. 297.

to

to *limit* and *circumſcribe* them. Now PLACE circumſcribes their *Extent*, and TIME, their *Duration*; and hence the neceſſary connection of things corporeal with theſe two; and not only of things themſelves, but of all their Motions, of all their Accidents, in ſhort of all they are able to *do*, and of all they are able to *ſuffer*. C. XII.

FOR example, certain perſons are to meet for a certain purpoſe. They muſt be informed of the *Time* and *Place*, or their *Meeting* would not be practicable. Firſt then for the *Time*—

When ſhall we three meet again
In thunder, light'ning, and in rain (*d*) ?

The anſwer to this queſtion *connects* their *Meeting* with a *certain Time*; and *in the*

(*d*) *Shakeſ. Macbeth.*

C. XII. *Relation between theſe two,* we behold the riſe of the Predicament, WHEN.

WHEN *the battle's loſt and won,*
WHEN *the hurly burly's done* (*e*).

AGAIN——

Where's the Place?

(*e*) Οὐ μέντοι ἅτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτὸν τὸ Ποτὲ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον. *Nor is* WHEN *the ſame with* TIME; *but if any thing, it conſiſts in* THE RELATION WHICH IT BEARS TO TIME. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 87. *B. Ed. Baſ.* 1551. And again —ὅταν δέ τι πρᾶγμα, ἕτερον ὂν τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ ἐκ ὡς μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίγνεται, ἡ τῷ Ποτὲ, ἄλλη ὅσα παρὰ τὸ Ποσόν.—*But when any particular* THING, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM TIME, *and which is not aſſumed as any* PART OF TIME, *has a* RELATION TO *Time, and for this reaſon is* IN *Time, as for example the Sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at ſuch a particular Time: then there ariſes* A DIFFERENT PREDICAMENT, *that of* WHEN, *a* PREDICAMENT DIFFERENT *from that of* QUANTITY. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 88. *Ejuſd. Edit.*

The

The anſwer to this queſtion *connects* their *Meeting* with *a certain Place*; and *in the Relation between theſe two*, we ſee the riſe of the Predicament, WHERE. C. XII.

——— *upon the Heath,*
There we go to meet Macbeth (*f*).

LET us take another example. *Virgil*, we are informed, wrote his *Georgics* at *Naples*. By *Naples*, in this inſtance, is the *Place* of *Virgil* circumſcribed, which might elſe have been at *Rome*, at

(*f*) Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῦ χρόνυ ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρόνος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνυ τί· ἕτως ἄλλο μὲν ὁ Τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ Τόπον, ἢ τόπυ τί.— *For as in* TIME, *Time itſelf is one thing, and that, which is according to Time, or ſomething belonging to it, is another thing; ſo alſo is* PLACE *one thing, and that* WHICH IS ACCORDING TO PLACE, *or* SOMETHING BELONGING TO IT, *another Thing. Simpl. in Præd. ut ſup.*

UBI *non eſt Locus, ſed* ESSE IN LOCO. QUANDO *non eſt Tempus, ſed* ESSE IN TEMPORE. *Fell*, p. 104, 107.

C.XII. *Mantua*, &c. *The connection therefore of Virgil with this City* gives us an anſwer to the Queſtion, WHERE.

AGAIN, he wrote them, we are told, while *Cæſar Auguſtus* was on his *Oriental* Expedition. Here the *time of this Expedition* circumſcribes *the time of Writing*, which might elſe have been (for ought we know) during the Wars with *Brutus*, with *Antony*, &c. *This relative Connection* gives an anſwer to the Queſtion, WHEN.

——— *Dum Cæſar ad altum*
Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo:
Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope, ſtudiis florentem ignobilis otî (g).

(g) *Virg. Georg.* iv. *ſub fin.*

THESE

C. XII.

THESE elegant lines, which we ſo juſtly admire, are in fact nothing more than the *common date of an epiſtle*; as if the Author, having finiſhed his work, had ſubjoined *Naples, ſuch a Month, ſuch a Year:* ſo great, even in trivial matters, is the force of Numbers, and ſublime Ideas.

HENCE then we perceive the nature both of WHEN, and of WHERE. WHEN is not mere *Time*, nor is it *Beings* and *Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they ſtand related to Time.* Again, WHERE is not properly *Place*, nor is it *Beings* and *Events*; but it is *Beings and Events, as they ſtand related to Place.* If therefore *the When* only be given, and *not the Where*, then might the thing have happened either *here*, or at the *Antipodes:* and, by parity of reaſoning, if the *Where only* be given, and *not the When*, then might the Event have happened, either *yeſterday*,

C. XII. *yeſterday*, or *before the flood*. 'Tis then only comes *preciſion*, when we view *the two united* (*h*).

AND hence by the way the utility and praiſe of thoſe two ſubordinate accompliſhments (for Sciences I cannot call them) *Geography* and *Chronology*. By acquainting us with the relations, borne by illuſtrious perſons and great events to the different portions both of *Time* and of *Place*, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general Order and Concatenation of Events, and our own Connection with this Order, as Members of the ſame univerſe.

(*h*) Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ Πῦ καὶ τὸ Ποτὲ ἀδελφά πως ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, κοινὴν ἐπίσης παρέχοντα τὴν συντέλειαν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τοῖς κινουμένοις τὴν ἴσην χρείαν συμβαλλόμενα. *And thus it is that* WHEN *and* WHERE *are a ſort of Brothers one to another, affording equally a common Perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an Utility of equal Value to all things, that are in Motion. Simplic. in Prædi.* p. 87. *Ed. Baſil.* 1551.

IN

C. XII.

In general it may be obſerved, that whatever is *an anſwer* to the Queſtion, WHERE, belongs to the *Genus* or *Predicament* of WHERE; and whatever is *an anſwer* to the Queſtion, WHEN, belongs in like manner to the *Predicament* of WHEN. *When* did ſuch a thing happen? —*Now*; *this inſtant*; *to-day*; *yeſterday*; *a century ago*; *in ſuch a year of our Lord*; *ſuch a year of the Hegira*; *ſuch a year of Rome*; *ſuch an Olympiad*, &c. To theſe may be added ſuch terms in the *paſt*, as *Lately*, *Formerly*, *Long ago*, &c. and ſuch alſo in the *future*, as *Immediately*, *Soon*, *Hereafter* (*i*), &c. Again, WHERE did ſuch a thing happen?—*Here*; *There*; *in England*; *in Europe*; *in China*; *in the Moon*; *in the Sun*, &c. To theſe may be

(*i*) See many of theſe Terms elegantly and accurately explained in *Ariſtotle's Phyſics*, l. iv. c. 13. The Terms alluded to are νῦν, ποτέ, ἤδη, ἄρτι, πάλαι, ἐξαίφνης, κ. τ. λ.

added

C. XII. added ſuch Terms as *Near*, *Far off*, *Above*, *Below*, &c.

ALL theſe Terms, by *thus anſwering theſe Queſtions*, ſerve to indicate the *Relation* of ſome *Being*, or *Event*, either to *Time*, or to *Place*; and, tho' ſome of them do it with greater preciſion, and ſome with leſs, yet did they not all do it *in ſome degree*, they could not belong to theſe *two Predicaments*.

WE cannot aſſert the ſame of ſuch terms, as *an Inch*, *a Foot*, or *a Cubit*; *a Day*, *a Month*, or *a Year*. The reaſon is, *they indicate no Relation of Time*, or *Place* to *particular* things, but only *meaſure out definite Portions* in theſe two *infinite* Natures.

WITH regard to the *human* Body, not only the Whole fills its proper Place, but ſo too does every Limb. Hence, as it's *particular Place* is a meaſure to each *Limb*,

Limb, ſo is this *Limb* in it's turn made a meaſure to that *Place*, in order to define *a like portion* of it, *exiſting elſewhere* (*k*). And hence the origin of ſuch Meaſures, as *an Inch*, *a Foot*, *a Cubit*, and the like, which are all of them deduced from *certain Limbs* in the *Human* Body. C. XII.

BUT tho' *the Limbs of Man* were tolerably adequate to meaſure *Place*, yet were *his Motions* by no means adequate to the menſuration of *Time*, derived (as they appear) from ſuch a number of Appetites; from ſuch a variety of Fancies,

(*k*) This is indeed a common Property to all Menſuration, that the *Meaſurer*, and the thing *meaſured*, ſhould *reciprocate*, ſo that while the Gallon meaſures the Wine, the Wine ſhould meaſure the Gallon; while the Ell meaſures the ſilk, the ſilk ſhould meaſure the Ell.

See before, the Quotation given in the Note, p. 22. Ξέστης is there rendered a *Quart*, not as if this laſt repreſented that *Greek* meaſure, but as it was a meaſure, familiar to an *Engliſh* Reader.

and

C. XII. and contradictory Opinions. Here therefore were mankind obliged *to quit themſelves*, and to recur to Motions *more orderly* than *their own*; to the *real* Motion of the Moon, to the *apparent* Motions of the Sun, in order to obtain ſuch *orderly* Meaſures, as thoſe of *Days*, and *Months*, and *Years*.

AND thus from the nature and origin of theſe *Terms*, we may perceive how they are diſtinguiſhed from the Predicaments of WHERE and WHEN.

THERE is (if I may uſe the Expreſſion) an *enlarged When*, ſuch as *To-day*, *during this Month*, *this Year*, *this Century*; and a *preciſe When*, *the indiviſible inſtant*, in which the event happened. So alſo is there *an enlarged Where*, as *in London*, *in England*, *in Europe*, &c. and a *preciſe Where*, that is to ſay the *exact Place*, which each individual fills (*l*).

(*l*) See *Hermes*, p. 118, Note (*g*).

Now

Now as every man exiſts in ſuch a *preciſe Where*, and during ſuch a *preciſe When*, ſo is it with reference to theſe two Relations *of his own*, that he recognizes *the When* and *the Where of all other Beings*. WHEN *lived Charles the Great? Almoſt three hundred Years before the firſt Cruſade.* Tho' this Anſwer tell us the diſtance between *Charles* and *that Expedition*, yet are we ſtill uninformed as to *the Time, When* he lived, unleſs we have ſomething given us, *to connect him with ourſelves. And* WHEN, *we demand, happened the firſt Cruſade?—About ſeven hundred Years ago.* Here we have the *temporal* Relation between *ourſelves*, and that *Event*; ſo that having previouſly learnt *the like* relation between that *Event* and *Charles the Great*, we of courſe recognize *the Time*, WHEN *that Prince exiſted*; that is to ſay, *the temporal Relation between our own exiſtence, and his.* The ſame too happens in aſcertaining *the Place*, WHERE. C. XII

C. XII. AND hence it follows, that ſuch *Meaſures* of Time and Place, as *a Year, a Century, a Foot, a Furlong*, tho' they belong not *of themſelves* to the *preſent Predicaments or Arrangements*, may yet be made a Part of them, by being properly *aſſociated*. Such they become, when we ſay *a Furlong hence, a Century ſince, a Foot below, a Year after*. The reaſon is, they are brought, by ſuch *aſſociation*, to define *Relative Exiſtence*, in doing which the very *Eſſence* of theſe *Predicaments* conſiſts.

AND now a word, as to the force of *theſe two Predicaments*; their influence in the World; and more particularly in *human* affairs.

CÆSAR, when he was aſſaſſinated, fell at the feet of *Pompey's* Statue. The celebrated *Hampden* received his death's wound upon that *Field, where** he had

* *Clarendon's Hiſtory, Book* VII.

firſt

firſt executed the Ordinance for levying troops to ſerve the Parliament. From a royal Banqueting-houſe, built by himſelf in proſperity, was an unfortunate Prince led to an unjuſt Execution. In each of theſe inſtances the PLACE, WHERE, is a plauſible Topic; a Topic equally ſuited either to raiſe compaſſion, or, if we would ſophiſticate more harſhly *, to inſinuate Judgments, divine Vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which in fact demonſtrate nothing. C. XII.

'TWAS by an unfortunate fall ſo near the concluſion of the race, that the ſwift footed *Salius* loſt the prize to young *Euryalus* (*m*). 'Twas by being attacked *when* aſleep, and over-powered with liquor, that the gigantic *Polypheme* fell a ſacrifice to *Ulyſſes* (*n*). 'Twas by living in an age, *when* a capricious audience ruled,

* St. *Luke*, xiii. 4.

(*m*) *Æneid.* v. 286, &c.

(*n*) *Odyſſ.* ix. *ſub fin.*

C. XII. that the elegant *Menander* ſo often yielded to *Philemon*, his inferior by the confeſſion of all ſucceeding ages *(o)*. *The Race is not to the Swift, nor the Battle to the Strong, nor yet Favour to men of Skill; but* TIME *and* CHANCE *happeneth to them all (p)*.

THE ſame concurring Cauſes, which acted in theſe caſes like adverſaries, can become in others the moſt powerful allies. Δός μοι πῦ ςῶ, *Give me* WHERE *to ſtand*, was a well known ſaying of the famous *Archimedes*. He wanted but a *Place*, WHERE to fix his Machine, and he thought himſelf able to move even the World *(q)*. *Shakeſpeare* tells us,

---

(o) Vid. Quinctil. l. x. c. 1.—*A. Gell.* l. xvii. c. 4. who ſays of him, *ambitu, gratiâque, et factionibus ſæpenumerò vincebatur.*

(p) Eccleſiaſtes, xi. 11.

(q) See the Life of *Archimedes* in *Rivaltus's* Edition of his Works, *Paris*, 1615. *Fol.*

There

There IS A TIDE *in the affairs of men,* C. XII.
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in ſhallows—— (*r*)

When *Horace* ſent a Meſſenger with ſome of his Works to *Auguſtus*, his charge was to deliver them, if *Auguſtus* was in health; and not only ſo, but in good humour; and not only ſo, but in a humour to call for them:

Si validus, ſi lætus erit, ſi denique poſcet (*s*).

Such a Streſs did this polite author lay on the *propriety of* THE WHEN. *Virgil* mentions finely the

—— MOLLISSIMA *fandi*
TEMPORA (*t*).

(*r*) *Julius Cæſar*, Act iv. Sc. 5.
(*s*) *Hor. Epiſt.* l. ii. Ep. 13.
(*t*) *Æneid.* iv. 293.

C. XII. He makes too his *Fury* ſuſpend her Powers of Miſchief, till ſhe could catch a LUCKY MOMENT to make her influence more extenſive:

At ſæva e ſpeculis TEMPUS *Dea* NACTA *nocendi,*
Tartaream intendit vocem, &c (*u*).

AND hence we may collect a juſt idea of the Term, OPPORTUNITY. It is not merely *Time, concurring with Events,* for *Time* attends them *all,* be they proſperous or adverſe; but it is TIME, CONCURRING FAVOURABLY; 'tis TIME, CO-OPERATING *as an auxiliary Cauſe* (*x*).

TIME

(*u*) *Æneid.* vii. 511.

(*x*) According to the *Stagirite,* GOOD paſſes thro' all the *Predicaments,* and, as it ſtops at each, aſſumes a *different* Denomination. In *Subſtance,* it is MIND and DEITY; in *Quality,* 'tis that which is *Juſt*; in *Quantity,* that which is *Exact,* and *according to Meaſure*;

TIME (it is ſaid) *and* CHANCE *happeneth to all.*—And what is this CHANCE? —Is it the *Chance* mentioned by *Milton*, as reſiding at the Court of Chaos (*y*)? Or is it the ſame, which *ſome* Philoſophers ſuppoſe to have framed the World, and to have maintained in it ever ſince no inconſiderable Sway?—If *ſuch Chance* be the ſtrict oppoſite to a *rational Principle*, 'tis hard to conceive, how it ſhould have ſupplied it's place, and without the leaſt ingenuity have produced a work ſo ingenious. 'Tis hard alſo to conceive, how *without* a Reaſon *that* ſhould *exiſt*, which C. XII.

ſure; and in the Predicament WHEN, it is OPPORTUNITY, ἐν δὲ τῷ Πότε, ὁ Καιρός· that is to ſay, GOOD or FAVOURABLE, *acceding to the Time* WHEN, and *characteriſing* it, gives it by *ſuch acceſſion* the Name of OPPORTUNITY. *Ariſtot. Ethic. Eudem.* p. 86. *Edit. Sylb. Locum autem Actionis, Opportunitatem Temporis eſſe dicunt*; TEMPUS *autem* ACTIONIS OPPORTUNUM *Græcè* Εὐκαιρία, *Latinè appellatur* OCCASIO. *Cic. de Offic.* i. 40.

(*y*) *Parad. Loſt*, Book ii. 965.

C. XII. it requires *ſo much Reaſon* (even in part only) *to comprehend* (z). There is however *another* ſort of CHANCE, which, under the name of FORTUNE, we find deſcribed as follows—*a Cauſe not manifeſt to human reaſoning* (a); not *a Cauſe devoid of Reaſon*, but a *Cauſe, which human Reaſon wants the means to inveſtigate.*

WE may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human Freedom, (and enough is there

(z) *Hanc igitur in Stellis conſtantiam, hanc tantam tam variis curſibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum,* NON POSSUM INTELLIGERE SINE MENTE, RATIONE, CONSILIO. *Cic. de Nat. Deor* ii. 21.—*Dubitant de Mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, caſune ipſe ſit effectus aut neceſſitate aliquâ, an ratione ac mente divinâ: et* ARCHIMEDEM *arbitrantur* PLUS VALUISSE IN IMITANDIS *Sphæræ converſionibus, quam* NATURAM IN EFFICIENDIS. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. 34.

(a) —δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ἡ Τυχὴ, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ.—*Ariſt. Phyſ.* ii. 4. p. 33. *Edit. Sylb.* Inſtead of διανοίᾳ, they uſed afterwards the Term λογισμῷ.

left

left both for *Merit* and *Demerit)* it is not ſo uncontrouled, as in the leaſt to affect the Univerſe. It is not in our power to interrupt the courſe of Nature; nor can we, like the Giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreverſible Order of things, to which we neceſſarily ſubmit; an indiſſoluble Concatenation of ſucceſſive Cauſes with their Effects, by which both the Being and the Well-being of this Whole are maintained. C. XII.

THIS divine *Order* or *Concatenation* has *different* denominations: referred to the *Supreme Being* as to it's author, we call it FATE; referred to his Foreſight for the Good of all, we call it PROVIDENCE (*b*).

(*b*) Three Terms are here employed, CHANCE, FATE, and PROVIDENCE; the *two firſt* of which have been often improperly aſſerted, *the laſt* has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the *Atheiſtic Syſtem.*

C. XII. 'Tis *this* which mingles itſelf with all our Actions and Deſigns; which *co-operates* with the Pilot; the Huſbandman, and the Merchant; nor with theſe alone, but with all of every degree, from the meaneſt Peaſant, up to the mightieſt Monarch. If it co-operate *favourably*, they ſucceed; if otherwiſe, they fail. And hence the *ſuppoſed efficacy* of *Time* and *Place*, ſo often of ſuch importance *in this co-operation*. 'Tis hence, *the Race is not to the ſwift, nor the Battle to the ſtrong*, &c.

A PILOT ſails, with intention to reach a certain port. All, that the ſkill of a good Navigator can ſuggeſt, is done;

The Author of theſe Notes has endeavoured to give ſuch Meanings to the Terms CHANCE and FATE, as may render them ſubſervient to the Cauſe of PROVIDENCE, and by making them *wholly dependent on* THE SUPREME INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE, to make them weaken the Syſtem of *Atheiſm*, rather than contribute to it's Support.

yet

yet he fails at a *Time*, when hurricanes ariſe, and, inſtead of gaining the deſtined port, is daſhed upon the rocks. A Farmer with proper induſtry manures and ſows his fields; yet the Seaſons deſtroy his harveſt, and (according to his own Phraſe) *the Times fight againſt him.* A Merchant travels for the ſake of gain to a diſtant country, and *there* contracts a peſtilential diſeaſe, which carries him off.

THESE Incidents, thus connected with *Time* and *Place*, are referred in common language to *Chance*, as to their *Cauſe*; and ſo indeed they may, as far as CHANCE *implies a* CAUSE, *which human reaſoning was not able either to foreſee or obviate.* But if we go farther, and ſuppoſe it a *Cauſe, where there is in fact no Reaſon at all*; in ſuch caſe we do nothing leſs than *deify* CHANCE, committing the affairs of the World to *the blindeſt* of Guides, inſtead of that ONE, ALL-GOOD, ALL-POWERFUL, DIVINE

C. XII. VINE INTELLIGENCE, *which in the ſame undivided inſtant both ſees, and hears all things (c).*

AND ſo much for the two GENERA or ARRANGEMENTS of WHEN and WHERE.

(c) See *Epicharmus*, quoted in the Note, p. 115.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Concerning POSITION *or* SITUATION—*What it is, and how deduced—how it exiſts in Beings inanimate—in Vegetables—in Man—animal Progreſſion—Works of Art—Attitudes—illuſtrations of Attitude—from Poets—from Actors—from Orators—It's Efficacy, whence—Poſition, among the Elements of Democritus—it's Influence and Importance in the natural World—in the intellectual.*

THE *Arrangement* or *Predicament* of POSITION or SITUATION has a near affinity with that of *Place*. They are both of the *relative* order, and are both converſant, when taken *ſtrictly*, about *corporeal* Subſtances only. They differ however, in as much as the *ſimple Poſſeſſion* of Space conſtitutes PLACE; the C.XIII.

C. XIII. the *manner (a)* of *poſſeſſing it*, POSITION, or SITUATION.

Now

(a) *Differt* SITUS *ab* UBI *in hoc, quod* UBI *eſt* LOCATIO TOTIUS, SITUS *eſt* ORDINATIO PARTIUM IN LOCO. UBI *eſt ſimpliciter* ESSE IN LOCO; SITUS, *ſecundum* PARTIUM ORDINATIONEM. *Fell*, p. 104.

Ad SITUM *omnem requiritur* TRIPLEX HABITUDO, *quæ conjuncta conſtituit Situm; Habitudo Partium alicujus Totius inter ſe; Partium alicujus Totius ad ipſum Totum; Partium et Totius ad Locum. Sanderſon*, p. 49, l. i. c. 14.

Prædicamentum SITUS (Κεῖσθαι) *reſpicit Poſitionem rei, tum reſpectu partium ſuarum inter ſe, tum reſpectu Loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis*, l. i. c. 13.

— ὅτε ἓν τὸ κείμενον σῶμα, ὅτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ κεῖται, τῇ διανοίᾳ περιλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχουσάν πως θέσιν ἐν τῷ γένει τῶ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ὅσα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ἢ ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις· ἡ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκὴ τῶν ἐνιδρυμένων καὶ τῶν τὴν ἕδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη καὶ πρωτίστη ἐστὶ τῶ κεῖσθαι ὑπογραφή—*We are not to underſtand the Genus of* LYING *or* POSITION, *by taking into our Diſcuſſion either the Body lying, or the Place, in which it lies, but ſingly and ſolely by taking into our account the peculiar Mode of* SITE *in the Genus of lying, as it runs thro' all thoſe ranks of Beings, which are formed by nature to be ſupported ſome of them by others, or to be ſeated ſome*

Now the *manner*, in which a Body poſſeſſes Space, has reſpect to certain *Relations*, which exiſt, ſome *within*, and ſome *without* it; Relations, which ariſe from it's *Parts*, it's *Whole*, it's *immediate Place*, and *the Place ſurrounding it*. C.XIII

We ſhall explain what we aſſert (which perhaps may appear obſcure) by beginning from Bodies *the moſt ſimple*, and paſſing from theſe to others, more *complex* and diverſified.

The ſimpleſt and moſt perfectly ſimilar of all Bodies is the Sphere (*b*). If there-

---

ſome of them upon others; for 'tis THIS CONNECTION BETWEEN THINGS, THAT ARE SEATED, *and* THINGS THAT AFFORD THE SEAT, *which makes the primary and the ſtricteſt Deſcription of* LYING *or* POSITION. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 85. *Ed. Baſil.* 1551.

(*b*) The Sphere, and other ſolid Figures, ſoon after mentioned in this Chapter, are for the greater part well known. He however, who wiſhes for ocular inſpection,

C.XIII. therefore we take a Sphere, and place it upon the ground, the Part *fartheſt from the Earth's centre* we call it's *Top*; that *the neareſt*, it's *Bottom*; and all lying between we call it's *Middle*. Theſe Diſtinctions in the *Sphere* regard *external Objects only*, becauſe the Sphere being *every where ſimilar* contributes nothing to them *itſelf*. If we roll it therefore along, the Diſtinctions are not loſt; only, while the Motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference *to local Diſtinctions, exiſting without*.

And hence it follows, that the Sphere, tho' it have *Place*, yet according to theſe reaſonings has in ſtrictneſs no *Poſition*, becauſe it has *no peculiar Parts* deducible

---

ſpection, may find them all (the Sphere alone excepted) among the Diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth Books of *Euclid*, to which Books we refer him, as they are eaſy to be had, under various Editions.

from

from it's own Figure, which Parts can be called *Top* or *Bottom*, as *contradiſtinguiſhed* one to another. C.XIII.

WHAT is true of the Sphere, may be aſſerted *almoſt* as truly of the five *Platonic* Bodies, the *equilateral Pyramid*, *the Cube*, *the Octoedron*, &c. and that, becauſe they are not only *regular*, but becauſe their ſeveral *Faces* are *every way ſimilar*.

WHAT is true of *theſe* Bodies, is true alſo of their *Oppoſites*, the Bodies I mean, which are not only *diſſimilar*, but *univerſally irregular*. Fragments of Rock, and Hillocks of Sand, have neither *Top* nor *Bottom*, but what is merely *caſual*; and therefore, tho' of neceſſity they exiſt in *Place* by being *Bodies*, yet, as they have no *internal* local Diſtinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of courſe follows *they cannot properly have Poſition*.

BUT

C. XIII. BUT if we paſs to thoſe Bodies, which are neither *irregular*, like the broken Rock, becauſe they have *Order* and *Proportion*; nor yet *every way ſimilar*, like the Sphere, becauſe they have *Extenſions that are unequal* (ſuch for example as the *Cylinder*, or the *Parallelipipedon*); here we ſhall find the very Bodies, from *their own* Attributes, to concur with the World around, both in *acquiring* to themſelves POSITION, as well as in *diverſifying* it.

THE Cylinder for example extends *farther* one way than another, and therefore poſſeſſes *within* itſelf three ſuch parts, as *two Extremes*, and *one Mean*. If we ſo place it therefore, that one of theſe Extremes (no matter which) ſhall be *moſt remote from the Earth's Centre*, and the other *moſt near*; in ſuch caſe, by this manner of blending *external* and *internal* Relations, *the Cylinder* is ſaid TO STAND. If we remove in part the *higher* Extreme *from*

from it's Perpendicular, and thus *differently* blend Relations, the Cylinder is ſaid TO INCLINE. And if we purſue this *Inclination*, till the two Extremes of Top and Bottom become *horizontal*, then is it ſaid TO LIE. The *Motion*, which leads from *Standing* to *Lying*, we call FALLING; that from *Lying* to *Standing*, we call RISING. Every one of theſe Affections may well happen to the *Cylinder*, becauſe it's peculiar *Figure*, taken with it's peculiar *Place*, co-operates to the production of the POSITIONS here deſcribed. CXIII.

'TIS not ſo with thoſe Bodies already mentioned, where theſe *internal Characters* are not diſtinguiſhed. The *Sphere* and the *Cube neither* FALL *nor* RISE, becauſe *they neither* STAND *nor* LIE more at one time than another.

BUT ſuppoſe we go farther; ſuppoſe to *one* Extreme of this Cylinder we add

C.XIII. *a new Part*, that is a *Capital*; to *the other* Extreme *another Part*, that is a *Baſe*: the *two Extremes* of the Cylinder would no longer in ſuch caſe remain *indiſcriminate*, but the Characters of *Top* and *Bottom* would become diſtinguiſhed and aſcertained, *even in the Figure itſelf*, without looking to things *external*.

THE conſequences of theſe new Characters are *new Modes of* POSITION. A *Pillar* (for ſuch we muſt now ſuppoſe it) is not only capable, like the *ſimple* Cylinder, of *Standing* and of *Lying*, but in as much as two of it's Parts, that is to ſay it's Extremes, are *eſſentially* diſtinguiſhed, if it reſt on it's *Baſe*, it STANDS UPRIGHT; if on it's *Capital*, it STANDS INVERTED.

LET us carry our ſuppoſitions farther, and by a Metamorphoſis, like one of *Ovid's*, transform this *Pillar* into *a Tree*. Let the *Capital* ſprout into Branches, the *Shaft*

Shaft become a Trunk, and the *Baſe* ſtrike into Roots. Here then in a *vegetable* Subject we behold the ſame Diſtinctions; a *Top*, a *Bottom*, and a *Middle* of it's own, leading as before to the *ſame Diverſities* of *Poſition*. C. XIII.

If we ſtill purſue the Metamorphoſis, and transform *the Tree* into a *Man*, making it's Branches into a *Head*, it's Trunk into a *Body*, and it's Roots into *Feet*, we ſhall diſcover alſo in an *animal* Subject the ſame *Diſtinctions* as before; and the Subject will in conſequence be capable of Lying, as well as of Standing; of *Standing* upright, as well as inverted.

But this is not all. *Man* is not only an *extended* ſubſtance, like the Column, or the Tree, but over and above, *as an Animal*, he is by nature *locomotive*. Now the *Part* of him in progreſſion, which *leads* the way, we denominate his *Fore-part* or *Front*; the *Oppoſite*, his *Hinder-*

C.XIII. *part* or *Rear*; and the two Parts upon each Side, *his Right* and his *Left*.

AND thus has *Man*, in conſequence of his animal Frame, over and above the former Diſtinctions of *Top* and *Bottom* (both of them common to the *other* Subjects already deſcribed) *four additional Diſtinctions peculiar to him as an Animal*, the Diſtinctions of *Front* and *Rear*, of *Right* and *Left*, which four are *wholly unknown* both to the Column, and to the Tree.

WHILE he is under the POSITION OF STANDING, theſe four *Diſtinctions* have little force, but when he happens TO LIE, then is their Efficacy ſeen, and *each* of them leads to a *new*, and *different Poſition*. If his *Front*, while he is *lying*, be *neareſt* to the Earth, then is he ſaid to *lie* PRONE; if his *hinder-part* or *Rear*, then to *lie* SUPINE; if *neither* of theſe, then 'tis either on his *Right*, or on his *Left*; which

which *Positions* are unknown either to the Pillar, or the Tree. C.XIII.

THUS, beſides the *Standing* POSITIONS of UPRIGHT and INVERTED, has MAN, in conſequence of his Frame, FOUR OTHER POSITIONS, which appertain to him, *as he lies*; ſo that his Frame taken together, as *one perfect Whole*, is ſuſceptible of SIX DIFFERENT AND SPECIFIC POSITIONS, which have *reference* to the SIX DIFFERENT and SPECIFIC EXTENSIONS OF HIS BODY (*c*).

FABLES tell us, that the triangular Iſland *Sicily* was thrown upon the Giant *Typhoeus*. Under one Promontory lay

(*c*) See theſe different *Extenſions*, which *Ariſtotle* calls *Diſtances*, διαςάσεις, fully diſcuſſed in his Treatiſe *de Animalium ingreſſu*, p. 129. *Edit. Sylb.* In his Hiſtory of Animals, we read—ἔχει δ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, καὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὰ ὀπίσθια, καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ ἀριςερά. *Hiſt. Animal.* p. 17. *Edit. Sylb.*

CXIII. his *Right* Arm; under another, his *Left*; under a third, his *Legs*; under mount *Ætna*, his *Head*; under the whole iſland, his *Body*, having his *Breaſt upwards*, his *Back downwards*. Theſe *Poſitions refer* to the ſeveral *Extenſions* above deſcribed.

Vaſta giganteis ingeſta eſt inſula membris
Trinacris, et magnis ſubjectum molibus urget
Æthereas auſum ſperare Typhoëa ſedes.
Nititur ille quidem, pugnatque reſurgere ſæpè;
DEXTRA *ſed Auſonio manus eſt ſubjecta Peloro;*
LÆVA, *Pachyne, tibi: Lilybæo* CRURA *premuntur;*
Degravat Ætna CAPUT: *ſub quâ* RESUPINUS *arenas*
Ejectat, flammamque fero vomit ore Typhoeus (*d*).

(*d*) *Ovid. Metam.* v. 346.

BUT

C.XIII.

But not to anticipate with regard to Poets, of whom we ſhall ſay more hereafter.—In a *Cube* there are *ſix* Faces, capable of denoting as many *Poſitions*; and yet there is this important Difference between the *Cube* and the *Man*: the Faces of the *Cube* being all of them *Similar*, it's *Poſitions*, being only *nominal*, can only *refer* to *things without*, and *every* Face can alike concur to the forming of the *ſame Poſition*. But the Parts *analogous* to theſe in *Man* being all of them *diſſimilar*, his *Poſitions*, being *real*, are by no means thus *commutable*; but if the *Head* be *uppermoſt*, *then*, and *then only*, is he, *by Poſition*, *Upright*; if his *Back* be uppermoſt, then, and *then only*, is he, *by Poſition*, *Prone*; nor can he poſſibly be called either *Prone* or *Upright*, were *any other Part* to exiſt in *the ſame Place*, excepting the two here mentioned.

C.XIII. FROM what has been alleged, we ſee the true Origin of POSITION or SITUATION. "*It ariſes from the Relation,* "*which the Diſtinctions of* PARTS WITHIN "*bear to the Diſtinctions of* PLACE "WITHOUT; *and it varies of courſe,* "*as this Relation is found to vary.*" The *fewer* of theſe *internal* Diſtinctions any Being poſſeſſes, the *leſs* always the number of it's *poſſible Poſitions.* As it poſſeſſes *more*, it's *Poſitions increaſe* with them.

As to the *Progreſſion of Animals, peculiar to them as Animals*, that Progreſſion, (I mean) by which they move *not* as mere *Bodies*, but as Bodies poſſeſſed of *Inſtinct* and *Senſation*; it is to be obſerved, that this Progreſſion is formed by the help of Joints and Muſcles, and that theſe, during their operation, form *within the Animal Body* a variety of *Angles* and *Flexures.* Now hence

hence ariſes *a freſh multitude of characteriſtic Poſitions.* There is one *Poſition*, under which a Bird *flies*; *another*, under which a Horſe *gallops*; *a third*, under which a Man *walks*, &c. C.XIII.

THESE latter *Poſitions* differ from thoſe already deſcribed, becauſe they depend not on a ſimple Relation of the *whole Body* to *things without*, but on a diverſified *Relation* of it's different *Parts, one to another.* The Painter well knows the force of theſe *Poſitions*, ſince 'tis by theſe he ſuperinduces *Motion* upon *immoveable* Canvas; ſo that from the *Poſition*, which we *ſee*, we *infer* the *Progreſſion*, which we *ſee not* (*e*).

AND this naturally leads us to conſider the POWER OF POSITION or SITUATION in Works of ART. Among the common Utenſils of life, ſuch as Chairs,

(*e*) See *Vol. I. Treatiſe* 2. chap. ii. p. 61.

Beds,

C.XIII. Beds, Tables, &c. there is a *Poſition* which is *proper*, and another which is *abſurd*; a *Poſition*, by which they *attain their End*, and another, which *renders them uſeleſs*. Some derive their very *Eſſence* (if I may uſe the Phraſe) from their *Situation*; for example, the *Lintel*, from being *over* the Door; the *Threſhold*, from being *under it (f)*. We may paſs from theſe to Productions more elegant.

'Tis the Knowlege of theſe various Positions peculiar to *Animal* Bodies, and to the *human above the reſt* (commonly known by the name of Attitudes)

(*f*) Τὰ δὲ θέσει [λέγεται,] οἷον ὑδὸς ἢ ὑπέρθυρον· ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κεῖσθαι πως διαφέρει—*Other Subſtances are* denominated from their Position, *as the* Threshold, *and the* Lintel; *for theſe differ by the peculiar manner of their being* situated.—And ſoon after—Οὐδὸς γάρ ἐστιν, ὅτι ὕπως κεῖται· ἢ τὸ εἶναι, τὸ ὕπως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει—*For it is a* Threshold, *becauſe it is ſo* situated; *and it's* Existence *indicates* it's being situated after this manner. *Metaph.* H. c. 6. p. 135. *Edit. Sylb.*

the

which conſtitutes ſo eminent a part in the character of a perfect *Painter*. To the *Statuary*, if poſſible, it is a more important Science ſtill, becauſe he has no helps, like the Painter, from Colour, Light, and Shade. C.XIII.

INSTANCES in ſupport of this aſſertion (if it need ſupporting by inſtances) may be alleged innumerable both from Pictures and from Statues.

PAINTING gives us the ATTITUDES of St. *Paul*, and the Sorcerer *Elymas*, in the Cartoon of *Raphael*—of *Apollo*, and *the dancing Hours*, in the *Aurora* of *Guido*—of the *ſleeping Chriſt*, his *Mother*, and St. *John*, in the *Silence* of *Caracci*—of many and diverſified *Holy Families*, in the works of *Carlo Maratti*, &c.

FROM ATTITUDES in *Painting* we paſs to thoſe in *Sculpture*; to that of the *Medicean Venus*, the *Farneſian Hercules*, the

C.XIII. the *Niobe*, the *Laocoon*, the *Wreſtlers*, the *dying Gladiator*, &c.

'Tis eaſy, when we are deſcribing theſe Beauties, to be diffuſe in our expreſſions, and to exclaim, as we deſcribe, *how charming*, *how exquiſite*, &c. But the obſervation is juſt, as well as obvious—

Segniùs inritant animos demiſſa per aurem,
Quàm quæ ſunt oculis commiſſa fidelibus (*g*).

He, therefore, who would comprehend Attitude in Works ſuch as theſe, muſt either viſit the Originals, or elſe contemplate them (as he may eaſily do) in Models, Drawings, and Books of Sculpture and Painting (*h*).

We

(*g*) *Hor. Art. Poet.* 180.

(*h*) Thoſe, who dwell in the neighbourhood where theſe Notes were written, may find excellent examples of Attitude at *Wilton Houſe (Lord Pembroke's)* among the Statues and Baſſo-Relievos there preſerved; in particular the *Cupid bending his Bow*

the

C.XIII.

We ſhall find leſs difficulty in the works of *Poets*, becauſe *theſe* addreſs us in *Words*, and convey to us their Ideas not thro' our language but their own. 'Tis thus *Virgil* gives us an ATTITUDE OF SITTING IN DESPERATION :

—— SEDET, *æternumque* SEDEBIT
Infelix Theſeus—— (*i*)

SHAKESPEARE, of SITTING IN DESPONDENCE :

She SATE, *like Patience on a monument*,
SMILING AT GRIEF—— (*k*)

MILTON, OF CONJUGAL AFFECTION :

---

the *Faun*, who, as he ſtands, *turns* his Body, and *looks backward*; *the Figures in the Marriage-Vaſe*; *the Amazon fighting*, the Baſſo-Relievos of *Meleager*, of *Niobe*, of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*, &c.

(*i*) *Æn.* vi. 517.

(*k*) *Shakeſpeare's Twelfth Night*, Act. ii. Sc. 6.

MILTON,

CXIII. ——— *He, on his ſide*
LEANING HALF RAISED, *with looks of cordial Love*
HUNG OVER HER, *enamour'd*— (*m*)

OVID makes *Theſcelus*, as he elevated a javelin, to be miraculouſly petrified *in the* VERY ATTITUDE OF AIMING:

—— *Utque manu jaculum fatale parabat*
Mittere, in HOC *hæſit ſignum de marmore* GESTU (*n*).

MORE formidable is *a ſimilar* ATTITUDE at *Milton's* Lazar-houſe:

— OVER *them triumphant* DEATH *his dart*
SHOOK—*but delay'd to ſtrike*— (*o*).

(*m*) *Par. Loſt.* v. 11.
(*n*) *Ovid. Metam.* v. 182.
(*o*) *Par. Loſt*, xi. 491.

THERE

THERE are ATTITUDES leſs tremendous, that mark *Reverence* and *Humiliation*. C. XIII.

THUS *Shakeſpeare*,

Theſe CROUCHINGS, *and theſe* LOWLY COURTESIES
Might fire the blood of ordinary men (*p*).

THE LYING, or BEING EXTENDED ON SOME SURFACE, is an ATTITUDE in *moſt* inſtances ſo connected with *Death*, that DEATH is often denoted by *that* Attitude *alone*.

THUS *Neſtor* in *Homer*, ſpeaking of the *Greek* Commanders, ſlain before *Troy*—

— ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτα κατέκταθεν ὅσσοι ἄριστοι,
Ἔνθα μὲν Αἴας ΚΕΙΤΑΙ ἀρήϊος, ἔνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεύς,
Ἔνθα δὲ Πάτροκλος, θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος,
Ἔνθα δ' ἐμὸς φίλος υἱός—— (*q*)

(*p*) *Shakeſpeare's Jul. Cæſar*, Act iii. Sc. 1.
(*q*) *Hom. Odyſ.* r. 108.

There

C.XIII. *There fell the braveſt of the Grecian Chiefs;*
There LIES *great Ajax; there Achilles*
LIES;
There too Patroclus, knowing as a God;
There my own much-lov'd Son— *.

THUS SHAKESPEARE,

O! mighty Cæſar, doſt thou LIE *ſo* LOW?
Are all thy triumphs, glories, conqueſts, ſpoils,
Shrunk to this little meaſure— (r)?

SLEEP, whom the Poets deify, appears under a SIMILAR POSITION:

— CUBAT *ipſe Deus, membris languore ſolutis* (s).

'TWAS perhaps from this *Reſemblance* in POSITION, joined to that other, *the*

* See alſo *Hom. Il.* Σ. v. 20, and Mr. *Clarke's* Note, where he quotes *Quinctilian.*

(r) *Shakeſ. Jul. Cæſ.* Act iii. Sc. 3.

(s) *Ovid. Metam.* xi. 612.

Ceſſation

Ceſſation of the Senſitive Powers, that SLEEP and DEATH were by the Poets called BROTHERS *(t)*, and that the former *(u)* upon many occaſions ſerved to repreſent the latter. C. XIII.

IF we paſs from *Poets* to *Actors* (by *Actors*, I mean thoſe of *Dramatic* Com-

(*t*) See *Hermes*, l. i. c. 4. p. 52.

(*u*) When *Sleep* repreſents Death, it is commonly marked with ſome ſtrong Epithet: by *Homer* it is called a *brazen Sleep*; by *Virgil*, an *iron Sleep*; by *Horace*, ſimply *a long Sleep*; which Idea the Poet *Moſchus* heightens, by calling it not only a *long Sleep*, but a *Sleep, without an end*; *a ſleep, out of which we cannot be awak'd.*

Εὕδομες ἐν μάλα μακρὸν, ἀτέρμονα, νήγρετον ὕπνον.

See *Hom. Iliad.* Λ. 241. *Virg. Æn.* x. 745. *Horat. Od.* l. iii. 11. v. 36. *Moſch. Idyll.* iii. 105.

Even in Proſe-writers, when we read of perſons being *dead*, we ſometimes read that *they are* FAL'N ASLEEP, or *that they* SLEPT *with their fathers*. *Corinthians* i. c. xv. v. 6. 2 *Chronicles* c. ix. v. 31.

It ſeems indeed to have been a cuſtom with all nations, in inſtances of this ſort, to mitigate the *Harſhneſs* of the *Thing* ſignified, by the *Mildneſs* of the *Terms that ſignify it*: a well known Figure, called in books of Rhetoric *Euphemiſmus*.

C.XIII. poſitions) we ſhall find that ATTITUDES and POSITIONS make at leaſt a moiety of their merit; ſo that tho' they are *to ſpeak* 'tis certain, as well as *to act*, yet 'tis from *acting*, not from *ſpeaking*, that they take their *denomination*.

NOR are JUST POSITIONS without their Uſe to that *real Actor* upon the Stage of life, I mean the *Orator*. *Demoſthenes*, in whom Rhetoric attained it's laſt Perfection, was at firſt ſo unſucceſsful, that he was in a ſtate of deſpair, 'till *Satyrus*, a celebrated Tragedian, ſhewed him the amazing force of *Action*, by the different *manners* of repeating certain Paſſages out of *Euripides* and *Sophocles* (*x*).

AND whence is it that POSITIONS derive this wonderous Efficacy?—'Tis in fact becauſe the *Body* is an *Organ* to the *Soul*; an inſtrument, *whoſe Geſtures cor-*

(*x*) *Plutarch. Demoſth.* p. 849. *Edit. Xyland.*

reſpond

reſpond to every Affection, and are diver- C. XIII.
ſified by *Nature herſelf*, as thoſe Affections are found to vary. *Words* move only thoſe, who underſtand the language; and even, where the Language is underſtood, acute Sentiments often eſcape the comprehenſion of unacute Hearers. But *Action*, ſpontaneouſly indicating the Motions of the *Soul*, is a Language which not only the vulgar, but even the ſtranger comprehends. Every one knows the external Geſtures and Signs, by which, without teaching, both himſelf and others indicate their ſeveral *Affections*; ſo that ſeeing *the ſame Signs* recur, he readily knows their *Meaning*, in as much as *Nature herſelf* ſupplies the Place of an Interpreter. But to paſs from theſe Speculations to others more general.

THE primary Elements of *Democritus* were *Atoms* and *a Void*. As for the *Variety* and the *Specific Differences*, which he found to exiſt in things, he deduced

C. XIII. them out of his *Atoms*, firſt by *Figure*, as A for example differs from N; next by *Order*, as AN for example differs from NA; and laſtly by POSITION, as Z for example differs from N, theſe Letters in *Figure* being in a manner the ſame (*y*).

THUS POSITION, according to this Philoſopher, ſtands *among the Principles of the Univerſe*.

A HIGH rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeſerved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate it's extenſive influence. For not to mention

(*y*) What others called σχῆμα, FIGURE, *Democritus* called Ῥυσμός; Τάξις, ORDER, he called Διαθήγη; and Θέσις, SITUATION, or POSITION, he called Τροπή. See *Ariſtot. Metaph.* p. 11. 134. *Edit. Sylb.* See alſo *Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt.* l. i. c. 2. where *Philoponus* in his Comment informs us, that theſe ſtrange words were λέξεις Ἀβδηριχαὶ, *Abderic Words*; Words uſed in *Abdera*, the city to which *Democritus* belonged.

the

the force of POSITION in the different parts of every *animal*; not to mention the admirable SITUATION even of *ſub-ordinate* Subjects; the grateful variety of Lands and Waters, of Mountains and Plains; what ſhall we ſay to the POSITION of the Heavens *above*, and of the Earth *beneath*; *of the Sun himſelf* in the centre, and the ſeveral Planets moving *round* him? If we carry our hypotheſis farther, and ſuppoſe (as has been well conjectured) that the Solar Syſtem itſelf has a proper *Poſition* reſpecting the *fixed* Stars; and that they, preſiding in other Syſtems, maintain a certain *Poſition* reſpecting the Syſtem of the Sun; we ſhall have reaſon ſo to eſteem the importance of this GENUS, that perhaps upon it's Permanence depends the Permanence of the World. C. XIII.

NOR need we be ſurpriſed, tho' it be properly an Attribute of things *corporeal*, if we diſcover the traces of it even in

C. XIII. Beings *incorporeal.* If the ſenſible World be an *Effect*, of which the *Cauſe* is *a ſovereign Mind*, all that we diſcover in *Effects* we may fairly look for in their *Cauſes*, ſince *here* it's *prior* Exiſtence (z) is in a manner *neceſſary*.

THUS *our own* Minds are not only the Place and *Region of our Ideas* (*a*), but with reſpect to theſe Ideas, ſuch is the influence of POSITION, that upon this in a manner depends our *whole Perception of Truth*. Let us for example *invert* the Terms of a ſimple Propoſition, and inſtead of ſaying, that *Every Man is an Animal*, ſay that *Every Animal is a Man*; and what becomes of the *Truth* which

(z) See *Hermes*, p. 381, &c.

(*a*) — Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν—*Well therefore do they conceive, who ſay that the* SOUL *is* THE REGION OF FORMS, *or* IDEAS. *Ariſt. de An.* iii. 4. p. 57. *Edit. Sylb.* See before, p. 98, in the Note, and p. 112, 113.

ſuch

ſuch Propoſition contained? Let us *de-range* in any Theorem the Propoſitions themſelves, confounding them in their order, blending them promiſcuouſly, putting the *firſt laſt*, and the *laſt firſt*; and what becomes of the *Truth* which ſuch *Theorem* was to *demonſtrate?* 'Tis loſt, till the Propoſitions recover their natural *ſituation*. C. XIII.

—— *tantum ſeries, junctúraque pollet* *.

DEMOCRITUS, whom we have juſt mentioned, in order to ſhew the importance of ARRANGEMENT in *natural* Subjects, and the amazing *Differences* that ariſe, where the Change is moſt *minute*, ingeniouſly remarks, that *out of the ſame Letters are formed Tragedy and Comedy* (*b*). We may affirm as confidently,

* *Hor.*

(*b*) — ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία γίνεται, καὶ κωμῳδία γραμμάτων. *De Gen. et Corrupt.* l. i. c. 2. p. 4. *Edit. Sylb.*

CHAP. XIII. that out of the *ſame* Terms are formed *Truth* and *Falſhood* (*c*).

THE Efficacy indeed of this INTELLECTUAL POSITION is ſo great, that thro' it not only the wiſe *know*, but the unwiſe become *informed*. 'Tis by the ſtrength of this alone that all *Teaching* is performed; all *Learning* acquired; that the ſimple and uninſtructed are led from Truths *acknowleged* (*d*) to Truths *unknown*,

(*c*) SIMPLE TERMS are to be found in the ſeveral PREDICAMENTS or ARRANGEMENTS here treated, being THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC.

From different *Arrangements* of theſe *Terms* ariſe PROPOSITIONS; and from different *Arrangements* of *Propoſitions* ariſe SYLLOGISMS.

PROPOSITIONS are the Object of THE SECOND PART OF LOGIC; SYLLOGISMS, of THE THIRD.

There is no going *farther*, for the moſt enlarged Speculations are but Syllogiſms repeated. Such then, in a *Logical* and *Intellectual* View, is the FORCE and EXTENT of the PREDICAMENT of POSITION or SITUATION, here treated.

(*d*) There is an Order or Arrangement peculiar to Learners; and of courſe, *with reſpect to them*, *the Principle*

known, and thus aſcend by due degrees to the ſublimeſt parts of Science. What then ſhall we ſay to that STUPENDOUS POSITION, to that MARVELLOUS ARRANGEMENT, EXISTING WITHIN THE DIVINE MIND; where the *whole* of Being is *ever* preſent in *perfect Order*; and to which no ſingle Truth is ever latent or unrevealed (*e*)? C. XIII.

Principle or *Beginning* of Knowlege is different from what it is, according to *the order of Nature*. Hence the following obſervation.—Ἡ δὲ (Ἀρχὴ) ὅθεν ἂν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο· οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ῥᾷστ' ἂν μάθοι—*There is another Species of* BEGINNING, *and that is the Point, from which any thing may be done after the beſt manner; for example in the affair of Learning any thing, we are ſometimes not to begin from what is firſt, and which is the Principle or Beginning of the Thing itſelf, but we are to begin from that Point, whence any one may learn the moſt eaſily. Metaph.* l. iv. c. 1.

In the *Meno* of *Plato* there is a ſtriking example of an *Arrangement* of Truths, which lead an *uninſtructed* Youth to the Knowlege of a fine and important Theorem in Geometry. See the Dialogue of that name in *Plato*, and Mr. *Sydenham's* elegant and accurate Tranſlation, enriched with Diagrams.

(*e*) See before, p. 110, 161, 204, 5, 6, 266, 272, 287, 8.

C.XIII. If we would comprehend the Dignity of POSITION in this it's ARCHETYPAL FORM, let us view it at the ſame inſtant with ſomething, it's *perfect contrary*: let us compare it for example to the ſick Man's Dream, or to that Chaos of Ideas, which fills the Mind of one delirious. As we can find few *Situations* more *unfortunate*, than theſe *latter*; ſo we can conceive no one more reſpectable, or *divine*, than the *former*.

AND ſo much for the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of POSITION, which ariſes from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of WHERE, as this from the *Genus* or *Arrangement* of RELATION, both *Poſition* and *Where* being in their nature *Relatives*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Concerning HABIT, *or rather the* BEING HABITED—*It's Deſcription—it's principal Species deduced and illuſtrated—it's Privation—Concluſion of the ſecond or middle part of the Treatiſe.*

THE GENUS OF HABIT, or rather OF BEING HABITED, is of ſo little importance, when compared to the other *Predicaments*, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to *antient* authority *(a)*. C.XIV.

THO' it have reſpect both to *Habits*, which are *worn*, and to *Perſons* who *wear* them; yet is it not recognized ei-

(a) The Authority alluded to is that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*.

ther

C.XIV. ther in the one or the other, but is a RELATION, *which ariſes from the two taken together* (*b*).

Now as every ſuch *Habit*, as well as every ſuch *Wearer*, are both of them *Subſtances*, the Relation muſt neceſſarily be a *Relation*, *exiſting between Subſtances*. It cannot therefore be the *Relation* exiſting between *Mind* and it's *Habits* (ſuch as Virtue or Science) nor that between *Body* and it's *Habits* (ſuch as Agility or

---

(*b*) *Quæd non ita intelligendum eſt, ac ſi res ipſæ, quæ ſic habentur, ſint hujus Prædicamenti (puta Veſtitus ipſi,* &c.) *quæ ad alia Prædicamenta ſpectant, ſed* HABITIO *harum, ſeu* IPSUM HABERE, τὸ ἔχειν ταῦτα. *Walliſ. Logic.* l. i. c. 14.—Soon after he explains HABITIO, and informs us it means, *Veſtitum eſſe, Tunicatum eſſe, Togatum eſſe, Coronâ cingi, Calceo indui,* &c.

Sanderſon in his Logic explains the *Predicament* as follows—*Corpus habens eſt Subſtantia; Res habita ferè eſt Forma artificialis de quartâ Specie Qualitatis;* APPLICATIO HUJUS AD ILLUD *eſt* HABITUS *hujus Prædicamenti.* Lib. i. c. 14.

Health),

Health), for theſe Habits are not Sub- C.XIV.
ſtances, but *inherent Attributes* (*c*).

AGAIN, it cannot be the *Relation* exiſting between a *Man* and his *Poſſeſſions*; for, tho' theſe are both of them *Subſtances*, and tho' a Poſſeſſor may be ſaid to *have* an Eſtate, he cannot be ſaid to have it *upon* him; he does not wear it (*d*).

(*c*) *Simplicius*, when he gives the reaſon, why *Habit* and the *Body-Habited* cannot co-exiſt, as *Subſtance* and it's *Attributes* co-exiſt, ſays—συμφυῆ γὰρ ταῦτά ἐϛι, καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο—*For theſe Attributes are con-natural* [that is, grow with the Being] *and are the* BEING ITSELF. *Simplic. in Præd.* p. 93.

(*d*) Διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ κτήματα, ἢ ἀνδράποδα, ἢ φίλους, ἢ πάτερας, ἢ υἱεῖς κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἔχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι οὐκ ἐν περιθέσει ταῦτά ἐϛι, καίτοι κτήματα ὄντα.—*For which reaſon we are not ſaid, in the ſenſe of this Genus,* TO HAVE *Poſſeſſions, or Slaves, or Friends, or Fathers, or Children; for theſe none of them are ſaid to exiſt in their being* THROWN ROUND US, *or* SUPERINDUCED, *altho' they are all* [in ſome ſenſe or other] *our Poſſeſſions. Simplic. ut ſuprá.*

THE

C. XIV. THE being Habited therefore is in it's *ſtricteſt* Senſe ſomething *leſs* than the *firſt* Relation, that between a Subſtance, and it's Attributes; ſomething *more*, than the *ſecond* Relation, that (I mean) between a Poſſeſſor, and his Poſſeſſions (*e*).

'TIS to be hoped that theſe Reaſonings on a ſubject ſo trite, will be pardoned for their Brevity. They are to ſhew, not

(*e*) — ἢ ἐοίκε μέσον πως εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν, τῦ κεκτῆσθαι, ἢ τῦ καθ' ἕξιν διακεῖσθαι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἕξις, ὡς ἡ λευκότης. χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν κτημάτων, ἃ ἂ περικείμεθα· ἢ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστι ἢ ἔξωθεν, χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξεων, αἱ συμβεβήκασιν ἡμῖν, συμφυεῖς ὖσαι, ἢ ἐπίκτητοι—THE HAVING ANY THING ON *appears to be a ſort of Medium between* POSSESSING, *and the being* HABITUALLY DISPOSED. *As far as it is had, after the ſame manner as Whiteneſs is had,* [or any inherent Attribute,] *it is diſtinguiſhed from Poſſeſſions* WITHOUT, *with which we are not ſaid to be inveloped or cloathed. As far as it is corporeal, and* FROM WITHOUT, *it is diſtinguiſhed from* [inherent Attributes or] *Habits, which belong to us, as things* CON-NATURAL, *and not as things adventitious. Simplic. ut ſuprà.*

what

what the Relation *is*, but what it is *not*. C. XIV.

IF it be demanded—*And what then is it?*—the Anſwer muſt be, *It is a* RELATION *exiſting after a peculiar manner; when an* ARTIFICIAL SUBSTANCE *is* SUPERINDUCED (*f*) *upon a* NATURAL ONE, *and becomes contiguous to it, tho' it be not united in vital Continuity.*

Such was THE VERY ARMOUR HE HAD ON,
When he th' ambitious Norway combated (*g*).

THE primary End of being habited ſeems to have been PROTECTION; and that, either by way of defence againſt the inclemencies of *Nature*, as in the caſe of common Apparel; or by way of defence,

(*f*) See the preceding Notes in this Chapter, particularly the ſecond.

(*g*) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. 1.

againſt

C.XIV. againſt *Inſults*, as in the caſe of Helmets, Breaſt-plates, Coats of Mail, &c.

FARTHER than this, as Habits were various both in their materials and ſhapes; and, as among the number of thoſe who wore them, ſome were ſuperior to the reſt by their *Dignity and Office*: hence it was found expedient, that many of theſe *ſuperior Ranks* ſhould be marked by THE DISTINCTIONS OF PECULIAR HABITS; ſo that this eſtabliſhed *another End* of being Habited, over and above *Protection*, an *End*, which gave Robes to Peers, Uniforms to Admirals, &c.

FARTHER ſtill, ſome Regard, when either of the ſexes *habited* themſelves, was had to DECENCY; ſome to BEAUTY and ADVENTITIOUS ORNAMENT; of which laſt we may be more ſenſible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the *Grecian* Statues, or thoſe in the capital

pital Pictures of the great *Italian* Maſters, and compare theſe truly graceful and ſimple Forms to the taſteleſs and ever mutable ones of ourſelves, and our neighbours (*h*). C.XIV.

As there are many ſorts of Habit, which have reſpect to this laſt End, I

(*h*) The ſame Simplicity, which contributes to the Decoration of our *Perſons*, contributes alſo to the Decoration *of Nature*.

The following Anecdote, communicated to me by the late Lord *Lyttelton*, appears to be worth preſerving. When Sir *John Vanbrugh* had finiſhed *Blenheim-houſe*, the then Ducheſs of *Marlborough* aſked him for the Plan of a *Garden*. Sir *John* told her, he could give no Plan himſelf, and he feared ſhe might apply to others, as incapable as he was, naming certain Gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. *But*, continued he, *if your Grace would have a Garden truly elegant, you muſt apply for a* PLAN *to* THE BEST PAINTERS OF LANDSCAPE.

So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a Taſte, which, taking it's riſe not many years after from *Kent*, has been ſince completed by *Brown*, and no where with greater beauty and magnificence, than on the very Spot, of which we are now writing, I mean *Blenheim*.

C.XIV. mean to *Beauty* or *adventitious Ornament*; ſo when a man is found to cultivate this End to an *exceſs*, it conſtitutes the character, which we call a *Fop* (*i*). Nay, even the *Conveniences* of Dreſs, when *too minutely* ſtudied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. 'Twas hence that *Turnus* upbraided the *Trojans* for wearing a Covering over their hands, and for tying their Caps on with Strings, that is to ſay in *modern* language, *for uſing Gloves and Chinſtays.*

Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ (*k*).

(*i*) *Horace*, in the firſt ſatire of his firſt book, calls the wild and extravagant *Nævius*, by the name of VAPPA; which *Baxter* ingeniouſly explains, *quod inſano ſumptu ſtolidas ſequeretur delicias. Nos hujuſcemodi homunciones* FOPPS *dicimus; an et hoc a* VAPPA, *quærant alii.*

VAPPA meant originally the Juice of the Grape in a ſtate of *perfect inſipidity*, when 'twas neither *Wine*, nor *Vinegar*. VAPPA *propriè dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum eſt. Vet. Scholiaſt. in Horat. Satir.* l. i. S. 2. v. 13.

(*k*) *Æn.* ix. 616.

WE have already mentioned the Uſe of *Habit* as to *Diſtinction*. In almoſt all Countries ſomething of this hath taken place, to diſtinguiſh the *Noble* from the *Ignoble*; the *Scholar* from the *Mechanic*; to mark the *Sacerdotal*, the *Military*, the *Juridical*, &c. 'Tis to the *Fallibility*, which ſometimes attends this method of diſtinguiſhing, that we owe thoſe proverbial Sayings, THE CLOAK *makes not the Philoſopher*; THE COWL *makes not the Monk* (*l*). C.XIV.

'Tis in a Senſe *leſs ſtrict* and preciſe, that we take the word HABIT, when we ſay of the Plains, they are *cloathed* with Graſs; of the Mountains, they are *cloathed* with Wood; and more remotely ſtill, when we apply the Notion of *Habit* to the MIND——*Having on the*

(*l*) *Pallium non facit Philoſophum—Cucullus non facit Monachum.*

C.XIV. BREAST-PLATE *of Righteouſneſs—taking the* SHIELD *of Faith* (*m*), &c.

IN the Language of Poetry there is ſometimes much elegance derived from this Arrangement; as for example, when *the Morn*, at day-break, is ſaid to be clad with RUSSET MANTLE; or when *the Moon*, in diffuſing her pallid light, is ſaid *to throw o'er the duſk* HER SILVER MANTLE (*n*); or when the *Pſalmiſt* ſays, on a greater ſubject, *Thou* DECKEST *thyſelf with* LIGHT, *as it were with a* GARMENT (*o*).

THO' from all theſe inſtances we may perceive the force of this *Genus*, yet another ſtill remains, I mean the force of it's PRIVATION. *Nakedneſs* is found to heighten *other* circumſtances of Diſtreſs:

(*m*) *Epheſians*, ch. vi. v. 14, 16.

(*n*) *Hamlet*, Act i. Sc. 1.—*Par. Loſt*, iv. 608.

(*o*) *Pſalm* civ. v. 2.

NUDUS

NUDUS *in ignotâ, Palinure, jacebis arenâ* (*o*). C.XIV.

THO' the Senſe be *metaphorical*, yet *Shakeſpeare* avails himſelf of the *ſame Privation* in the pathetic Speech, which he gives to *Wolſey*:

——— *O! Cromwell, Cromwell!*
Had I but ſerv'd my God with half the zeal
I ſerv'd my King, he would not in mine age
Have left me NAKED *to my enemies* (*p*).

THE ſame Privation has it's effect alſo in a way more *Comic*, and contemptuous. 'Tis thus *Ariſtophanes* talks about *Philoſophers*:

Τὲς ὠχριῶντας, τὲς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις (*r*).

(*p*) *Æn.* v. 871.

(*q*) *Shakeſ.* Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 6.

(*r*) Ἀριστοφ. Νεφ. 103.

C.XIV. *You mean thoſe pallid, thoſe* BAREFOOTED *fellows.*

'Tis thus the Author of the *Dunciad* deſcribes *Friars*——

——— *Linſey-woolſey brothers,*
Grave mummers, SLEEVELESS *ſome, and* SHIRTLESS *others (s).*

In ſome inſtances, *ſuch partial Privations of Habit* become an indication of Reverence. Thus *Moſes*, when on *holy* ground, was ordered to ſtand *barefooted (t)*; and among *Europeans* 'tis a mark of Reſpect, to appear *bareheaded.*

And ſo much for the Genus or Predicament of Habit, which we divide into Species from it's different Ends

(s) *Dunciad.* iii. 113.
(t) Exod. iii. 5.

of

of PROTECTION, DISTINCTION, DECENCY, and ORNAMENT, to all of which is alike oppoſed their Contrary, PRIVATION. So much alſo for the TEN UNIVERSAL ARRANGEMENTS, GENERA, or PREDICAMENTS, with the diſcuſſion of which we conclude the *Second*, or *middle Part* of this Treatiſe. C.XIV.

CHAP. XV.

Concerning the APPENDAGES *to the Univerſal Genera or Arrangements; that is to ſay concerning* OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER *or* AT ONCE, *and* MOTION, *uſually called Poſt-Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all theſe* (*Motion excepted*) *deduced, and illuſtrated—Preparation for the Theory of* MOTION.

C. XV. HAVING now gone thro' each of the PREDICAMENTS or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, and conſidered it's Character, and diſtinguiſhing Attributes, there remains nothing farther to complete the Theory, but *an Explication of certain Terms*, which have occaſionally occurred; and which, from their ſubſequent place, and ſubſequent Contemplation, have been called by the

the Latin Logicians POST-PREDICAMENTS (*a*), and form the *third*, or *laſt* Part of this Treatiſe. C. XV.

THUS for example, things have been ſometimes mentioned in the former part of this Work, as *oppoſed* to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to conſider the Doctrine of OPPOSITES (*b*).

AT other times things have been treated as being ſome PRIOR, ſome SUBSEQUENT, and others exiſting TOGETHER or AT ONCE (*c*); and hence it becomes expedient to examine theſe ſeveral Terms, and to inveſtigate the *different* meanings, of which each of them is ſuſceptible.

(*a*) See before, p. 35, 36.

(*b*) See before ch. vii. and ch. viii. p. 173. See alſo *Ariſt. Præd.* περὶ τῶν ANTIKEIMENΩN, p. 47. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*c*) See before, p. 181, 182, 221. See *Ariſt. Prædic.* περὶ τοῦ AMA. p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

LASTLY,

C. XV. LASTLY, MOTION in it's various Species is ſo widely *diffuſed* thro' ſome of the moſt important *Genera* already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a ſpeculation, where the profeſſed *End* is *to ſcrutinize Univerſals.*

IT appears therefore that there ſtill remain, as Subjects of our Inquiry, OPPOSITES, PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT, CO-EXISTENT or AT ONCE, and laſt of all MOTION.

Now in the firſt place, as to OPPOSITES, the Reader muſt be reminded, that, having already ſpoken of them in a former Treatiſe (*d*), we omit them here, and refer to that.

THE

(*d*) See *Hermes*, l. ii. c. 2, Note (*i*) p. 250, in which Note are enumerated RELATIVES, τὰ πρός τι; CONTRARIES, τὰ ἐναντία; CONTRADICTORIES, τὰ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν. There is one Species omitted,

THE Doctrine (*e*) of PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT follows: and theſe perhaps may appear to be ſufficiently diſcuſſed, if we enumerate, and explain the following *Modes*. C. XV.

THE MOST OBVIOUS MODE of PRIORITY is the TEMPORAL (*f*), according

---

omitted, τὰ καθ' ἕξιν καὶ στέρησιν, *things oppoſed in the way of* HABIT *and* PRIVATION; ſuch as *Sight* and *Blindneſs*.

This Privation differs from that mentioned already in the third Chapter of this Treatiſe, becauſe the Privation there is the *road to natural Productions*; *the* Privation here admits no *Progreſs*, nor any *Return* to the original *Habit*, at leaſt in a *natural* way. See *Ammon.* p. 146, and of this Work, p. 56, 57, &c.

(*e*) See *Ariſt. Præd.* Περὶ τοῦ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ. p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*f*) This Mode *Ariſtotle* calls PRIOR κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ACCORDING TO TIME; the *Priority*, depending on *the Quantity of Time being larger* with reſpect to the Subject, which is called *elder*, or *more antient*—

τῷ

C. XV. ing to which we ſay, that the *Trojan* Wars were *prior* to the *Punic*, and the Battle of *Marathon* to that of *Blenheim*.

A SECOND MODE of PRIORITY is, when a thing is *prior* to ſome other, becauſe IT DOES NOT RECIPROCATE IN THE CONSEQUENCE OF EXISTENCE (*g*).

τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι, καὶ παλαιότερον καὶ πρεσβύτερον λέγεται. *Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

Ammonius, in commenting this Paſſage, obſerves an elegance in the *Greek* tongue, peculiar to itſelf—Παλαιότερον, he tells us, is applied *indiſcriminately* to Beings *animal* and *inanimate*; Πρεσβύτερον is applied *only* to the *animal* Genus. *Simplicius* on the ſame occaſion makes the ſame Obſervation, *in Præd.* p. 106.

The laſt Author has alſo the following remark concerning the different Modes of *Temporal* Priority—Τὰ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον πρότερα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γινομένων τὰ πορρώτερον ὄντα τῆς Νῦν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ ἐγγύτερον. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 106. *B. Things* PRIOR IN TIME *among the* PAST *are thoſe the* FARTHEST *from the* PRESENT NOW; *among the* FUTURE, *are thoſe the* NEAREST *to it. Simpl. in Loc.*

(*g*) The Words in *Ariſtotle* are—τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν. *Prædic.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.*

He

A FEW examples will illuſtrate the apparent difficulty of this character. The number *One* according to this doctrine is *prior* to the number *Two*, becauſe if there exiſt *Two*, 'tis a *neceſſary conſequence* that there ſhould be *One*; but if there exiſt *One*, it does not *reciprocate*, that there ſhould be *Two*. Thus every *Genus* is *prior* to any one of it's various *Species*, becauſe if there be *ſuch a Species* as Man, or Lion, there is neceſſarily *ſuch a Genus* as Animal; but if there be *ſuch a Genus* as Animal, there is not neceſſarily *ſuch a Species* as Man, or Lion. C. XV.

THIS *Mode* of *Priority*, which we call PRIORITY ESSENTIAL, will be found of great importance in all *logical* Diſquiſitions, and may therefore perhaps merit ſome farther attention.

He alleges the ſame Inſtance from *Numbers*, which is given here.

ACCORD-

C. XV. ACCORDING to this, *that thing* of any two or many things is PRIOR, which, *by being taken away, annihilates* the reſt; or *which, if the reſt* ARE, *muſt neceſſarily* BE (*h*).

FOR example—If there were *no Theorems* of Science, to guide the *Operations* of Art, there could be no Art; but if there were *no Operations* of Art, there might ſtill be *Theorems of Science*. Therefore is *Science* PRIOR *to Art*. Again, if there were *no ſuch Things* as *Syllogized Truths*, there could be no ſuch *Sciences* as Optics or Aſtronomy. But, *tho' neither of theſe*, there might notwithſtand-

(*h*) What is here ſaid, is explained in what immediately follows. *Simplicius* ſays, agreeably to the explanation here given, καλεῖν δὲ ἐνώθασιν οἱ νεώτεροι τὸ τοῦτον πρότερον, συνεπιφερόμενον μὲν, μὴ συνεπιφέρον δὲ, καὶ συναναιρῶν μὲν, μὴ συναναιρούμενον δὲ.—*The latter Logicians are accuſtomed to call this Mode of Priority, that which is* CO-INFER'D, *but does* NOT CO-INFER; *that which* CO-ANNIHILATES, *but is not* CO-ANNIHILATED. *Simpl. in Præd.* p. 106.

ing

ing be ſuch things, as *Truths Syllogized.* Therefore is *Logic* PRIOR *to theſe,* and, by parity of reaſoning, *to every other particular Science.* Again, if there were *no ſuch Principles as Self-evident Truths,* there could be no ſuch things as *Truths Syllogized.* But, *tho' no Truths Syllogized,* there might ſtill be *Truths ſelf-evident.* Therefore the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which treats of theſe *primary* and *original Truths,* being PRIOR to *Logic,* is PRIOR alſo to the tribe of *Scientes,* as are theſe to the tribe of *Arts;* ſo that of courſe the whole ſtructure of *Logic,* of *Sciences,* and of *Arts,* may be ſaid to reſt upon *this* FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as upon that only firm and ſolid Baſe, againſt which the Powers of Ignorance and Sophiſtry can never totally prevail. C. XV.

THERE is a THIRD MODE of PRIORITY, ſeen in ORDER and ARRANGEMENT. Thus in the *demonſtrative* Sciences, *Definitions* and *Poſtulates* are PRIOR to *Theorems*

C. XV.

rems and *Problems*; in Grammar, *Syllables* are PRIOR to *Words*, and *Letters* to *Syllables*. 'Tis thus in a well compoſed Oration, the *Proëme* is PRIOR to the *State* and *Argument*; and theſe laſt, to the *Peroration* (*i*).

A FOURTH MODE of PRIORITY is that of HONOUR and AFFECTION, when we prefer Objects, that we revere or love, to others that leſs merit, or at leaſt that we eſteem leſs to merit our Regard and Attention (*k*).

Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεὺς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκειται, Τίμα·—ἔπειθ' Ἥρωας ἀγαυούς·

(*i*) Τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις, κ. τ. λ. *Ariſt. Præd.* p. 53. *Edit. Sylb.* This is not tranſlated, being expreſſed in the Text.

(*k*) Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον πρότερον τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώθασι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένας ὑπ' αὐτῶν, πρεσβυτέρας παρ' αὐτοῖς φάσκειν εἶναι—*Ariſt. Præd. Ibid.*—not tranſlated for the reaſon before given.

Τὰς

Τὺς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων C. XV.
Τὺς τε γονεῖς τίμα, τὺς τ' ἀγχίς' ἐκγεγαῶτας (l),
κ. τ. λ.

The Gods immortal, as by Law divine
They ſtand arrang'd, FIRST *honour:* NEXT *revere*
Th' illuſtrious Heroes, and terreſtrial Race
Of Genii, paying each the legal Rites:
Honour thy Parents NEXT, *and thoſe of kin*
The neareſt, &c.

HIEROCLES, in his comment on theſe verſes, commonly called for their excellence the *Golden* Verſes of *Pythagoras*, has largely expatiated on this divine *Precedence* and *Subordination*.

THUS *Horace*, with reſpect to that *Priority* of Beings, founded on the Religion of his Country—

(l) *Pythag. aurea carmina.*

C. XV.

Quid PRIUS *dicam ſolitis Parentis*
Laudibus—— &c.
PROXIMOS *illi tamen occupavit*
Pallas honores (*m*).

He adopts PRIORITY, derived from *the ſame* principle, when he ſpeaks of the favourite topics, which his Genius led him to cultivate:

Quid PRIUS *illuſtrem ſatiris, muſâque pedeſtri* (*n*) ?

THE *Stagirite*, who records theſe *various Modes* of PRIORITY, obſerves on this *fourth* Mode (and apparently with reaſon) that it was in a manner the moſt *alien* and *foreign* of them all (*o*).

(*m*) *Horat. Od.* l. i. 12.

(*n*) *Horat. Sat.* l. ii. 6. v. 17.

(*o*) His Words are—ἔτι δὲ δὴ καὶ χείδον ἀλλοτριώτατον τῶν τρόπων ἐστὶν—*Ariſt Grad. Ibid.* p. 54.

HE mentions alſo a FIFTH MODE, C. XV.
but he introduces it with a ſort of doubt. *It ſhould ſeem* (*p*), ſays he, beſides the Modes here mentioned, there was *another Mode of* PRIORITY *even in things reciprocating*; altho', ſo far as they *reciprocate*, they may be ſaid to *co-exiſt*.

THE fact is, if either of them in any ſenſe can be called CAUSE to the *other*, it may for that reaſon be called PRIOR, if not in *Time*, at leaſt in *Efficacy* and *Power*.

FOR example, the *actual Exiſtence of a Man* reciprocates with the *Propoſition*, which affirms him *actually to exiſt*. For if the Man *actually* exiſt, then is the Propoſition *true*; and *reciprocally*, if the

(*p*) Δόξειε δ' ἂν κ) παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἕτερ@ εἶναι τῇ προτέρᾳ τρόπ@· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων ΤΟ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ, κ. τ. λ. *Ibid.* p. 54.

C. XV. Propoſition be *true*, then does the Man *actually exiſt*. And yet, tho' theſe things in this manner *reciprocate*, is not *the Propoſition* Cauſe to the Man's Exiſtence, but *the Man's Exiſtence* to that of the Propoſition; ſince according as the Man *either is* or *is not*, in like manner we call the Propoſition either *true* or *falſe* (q).

THIS laſt Mode of *Priority* we call CAUSAL PRIORITY, or the BEING PRIOR BY CAUSALITY.

WE muſt not however quit this Speculation, without obſerving that *Cauſe* and *Effect* do *not* always thus *reciprocate*, but that for the greater part *the Cauſe is naturally* PRIOR. For example: Hunger and Thirſt are the *natural Cauſes* of Eating and Drinking; and thus, by being their *Cauſes*, are *naturally prior* to

(q) The Words of *Ariſtotle* are—τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται.—*Ibid.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

them

them. Crimes too are *the natural Cauſe*, why Puniſhments are inflicted; and therefore Crimes, by parity of reaſon, are *prior* to Puniſhments. The Sentiment, tho' obvious, is well expreſſed by *Pætus Thraſea*. *Nam Culpa quàm Pœna* TEMPORE PRIOR EST; *emendari, quàm peccare, poſterius eſt (r)*. C. XV.

NOR are *Crimes only prior* to *Puniſhment*, but ſo is *Judicial Proceſs*; ſince to puniſh *firſt*, and *then* to hear, is what Sir *Edward Coke* chuſes to call (in a language ſomewhat ſtrong) *the damnable and damned Proceedings of the Judge of Hell (s)*:

Caſtigatque, auditque dolos—— (t).

AND thus it appears there are FIVE PRINCIPAL MODES OF PRIORITY; that

(r) *Tacit. Annal.* xv. 20.

(s) *Coke's Inſtitutes*, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

(t) *Æneid.* vi. 567.

C. XV. is to ſay, the TEMPORAL, the ESSENTIAL, that of ORDER, that of PRECEDENCE, and that of CAUSALITY; which five being known, THE MODES OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT (it's natural *oppoſite*) are eaſily known alſo (*u*).

WE are now to examine *the Modes of* CO-EXISTENCE, or *that of being* AT ONCE and TOGETHER (*x*); and *theſe Modes* have evidently great connection with the preceding.

THE moſt SIMPLE MODE among theſe, as well as among *the Modes of Priority*, is the TEMPORAL, perceived in things or events, which exiſt *during the ſame time* (*y*).

(*u*) —δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τὸ πρῶτον, τοσαυταχῶς ἂν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λέγοιτο. *Simplic. ut ſuprà*, p. 106. *B.*

(*x*) *Ariſtot. Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*y*) —ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ—*Prædic.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

UNA

UNA *Euruſque Notuſque ruunt*—— (*z*) C. XV.

—ΟΜΟΥ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς Ἀχαιούς (*a*).

War and the Plague AT ONCE *deſtroy the Greeks.*

Perſons, in this manner co-exiſting, are called CONTEMPORARIES: ſuch as *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*; *Virgil* and *Horace*; *Shakeſpeare* and *Johnſon.*

A SECOND MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE is founded in NATURE and ESSENCE; where two things neceſſarily reciprocate in conſequence of their exiſting, while neither of them at the ſame time is the *Cauſe* of exiſtence to the other (*b*).

'TIS

(*z*) *Æn.* i. 89.

(*a*) *Iliad.* A. v. 61.

(*b*) Thus expreſſed by *Ariſtotle*—Φύσει δὲ ΑΜΑ, ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θατέρου θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι. *Præd.* p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

C. XV. 'Tis in this ſenſe that *Double* and *Half* are TOGETHER or AT ONCE, for they *reciprocate*; if there be Double, there muſt be Half; and if Half, there muſt be Double. They are alſo *neither* of them *the Cauſe*, why the other exiſts. Double is no more the Cauſe of Half, than Half is of Double. This laſt condition is requiſite, becauſe if either of the Two were *eſſentially* and truly *a Cauſe* to the other, it would paſs, by virtue of it's *Cauſality*, from Co-exiſtence to *Priority* (*c*).

There is a third Mode of Co-existence, ſeen in *different* Species of the *ſame* Genus, when, upon dividing

---

By referring to the Chapter on *Relatives*, it is eaſy to perceive, whence this Speculation ariſes; for in that Chapter the ſame Example is alleged as here, by way of illuſtration of the ſame Doctrine. See before, p. 221.

(*c*) See before, p. 371, 2.

the

the Genus, we view them *arranged together, contra-diſtinguiſhed* one to another (*d*). C. XV.

'Tis thus the Genus, Triangle, being divided into equilateral, equicrural, and ſcalene, *no one of theſe Species* appears to be by nature *prior*, but all of them TO EXIST AT ONCE in a ſtate of *Contradiſtinction*. The ſame may be ſaid of the *three animal Species*, the aerial, aquatic, and terreſtrial, when we divide, after the ſame manner, *the Genus* Animal (*e*).

AND thus are the *Modes* of CO-EXISTENCE or TOGETHER either the TEM-

(*d*) Thus expreſſed by *Ariſtotle*—ἢ τὰ ἐκ τῦ αὐτῦ γένους ἀντιδιηρημένα ἀλλήλοις ΑΜΑ τῇ φύσει λέγεται—*Ibid.* 55.

(*e*) —ἀντιδιηρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν· οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ ἢ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ—*Ibid.* 55.

PORAL,

C. XV. PORAL, the ESSENTIAL, or the SPECIFIC.

AND here, ſhould any one object to theſe Diſtinctions, as either too *trivial* or too *ſcholaſtic* for the purpoſes of a *polite* writer; we anſwer, that we no more wiſh an author to mention them, when not profeſſedly his ſubject, than we would have him diſſert, without a cauſe, upon nouns, pronouns, and the principles of Grammar. All we hope from theſe elementary Doctrines, is to ſee them in their *Effects*; to ſee them in the accuracy of the compoſition, both as to reaſoning and language. 'Tis thus a grazier, when he turns his oxen into ſome rich and fertile paſture, never wiſhes to inſpect what food they have devoured, but to ſee a fair and ample Bulk, the effect of food well digeſted. Beſides, when *Sophiſts* aſſail us, and either exhibit *one thing for another*, or *two things for one and the ſame*; to what ſurer wea-

pon

pon can we recur for defence, than to that of *preciſe* and *well-eſtabliſhed Diſtinction* (*f*)? C. XV

THERE remains to be treated the Theory of MOTION; in which, without attempting to impeach or contradict any modern Speculations, we ſhall inquire, what was the opinion of the Ancients concerning it; in what manner they attempted to catch it's *fugitive* nature; and how they divided it by it's *Effects* into it's *ſubordinate Species*.

(*f*) *Learning* and *Science*, or rather learned and ſcientific *Terms*, when introduced *out of Seaſon*, become what we call PEDANTRY. The *Subject* may have merit, the *Terms* be preciſe, and yet, notwithſtanding, the *Speaker* be a PEDANT, if he talk *without regard either to Place, or Time.*

The following ſtory may perhaps illuſtrate this Aſſertion. "A learned Doctor at *Paris* was once purſ"chaſing a pair of ſtockings, but unfortunately could "find none, that were either ſtrong enough, or thick "enough. *Give me*, ſays he to the Hoſier, *ſtockings* "*of Matter* CONTINUOUS, *not of Matter* DISCRETE." *Menagiana*, tome ii. p. 64.

BUT

C. XV. But this is a Theory demanding a *ſeparate* Chapter, where thoſe, who queſtion the doctrines, may perhaps amuſe their curioſity, while they peruſe an attempt to exhibit the ſentiments of Antiquity upon ſo ſingular a ſubject; a ſubject, in it's *exiſtence* ſo obvious, in it's *real character* ſo abſtruſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Concerning MOTION PHYSICAL—*It's various Species deduced and illuſtrated—blend themſelves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Oppoſition, Reſt—Motion Phyſical—an Object of all the Senſes—Common Objects of Senſation, how many—Motion, a thing not ſimple, but complicated with many other Things—it's Definition or Deſcription taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Ariſtotle, and why.*

ALL MOTION is either PHYSICAL, or NOT PHYSICAL. As by MOTION PHYSICAL I mean that, which is obvious to the *Senſes*, ſo by MOTION NOT PHYSICAL, I mean that, which, by being the object of no ſenſe, (as for example the C. XVI.

C.XVI. the Succeſſion of our Thoughts and Volitions) is the Subject of *after* contemplation, and knowable *not to the Senſitive*, but to the *rational* Faculty.

THIS therefore will be the Plan of our following Inquiry.

IN the preſent Chapter we ſhall conſider MOTION MERELY PHYSICAL, both in it's ſeveral *diſtinct* Species, and in it's *general* or *common* Character.

IN the next Chapter we ſhall inquire whether there be OTHER MOTION BESIDES; and if ſuch may be found, we ſhall then examine, how far it is *diſtinguiſhed* from the *Phyſical*, and how far it is *connected*.

FIRST therefore for the firſt (*a*).

(*a*) In the Order of *Nature* the *Genus* precedes it's ſeveral Species; but in the order of *Human* Perception the ſeveral *Species* precede their Genus, which laſt is the order adopted here. See *Hermes*, p. 9.

As

As the moſt obvious of all *Motions* is the *Motion of Body*, ſo the moſt obvious *Motion* of Body is that, by which it *changes from Place to Place* (*b*), itſelf remaining, or at leaſt ſuppoſed to remain, both in one Place and the other, preciſely *the ſame*. 'Tis thus a Bowl moves over a Plane; a Bird thro' the Air; a Planet round the Sun. This Motion is properly MOTION LOCAL; or, if we chuſe a ſingle Name, we may call it PASSAGE or TRANSITION. It's peculiar character, as oppoſed to any other Motion, is *to affect no Attribute of Body*, but merely *that of Local Site*. C.XV

Cæruleo per ſumma levis volat æquora curru,
Subſidunt undæ, tumidumque ſub axe tonanti

(*b*) Called therefore in *Greek* ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, and ſometimes by a ſingle word, φορά. See *Ariſt. Prædic.* p. 55. *Edit. Sylb.* and *Ammon. in Loc.* p. 171. *B.*

Ster-

C.XVI. *Sternitur æquor aquis; fugiunt vaſto æthere nimbi* (*c*).

Here the Chariot flies, the Waves ſubſide, the Clouds diſperſe, all is in LOCAL MOTION.

THERE are *other Motions*, which affect the more *inherent* Attributes. Thus when a lump of Clay is moulded from a Cube into a Sphere, there is *Motion more than local*; for there is the acquiſition of *a new Figure*. The ſame happens, when a man from hot becomes cold, from ruddy becomes pale. MOTION OF THIS SPECIES has reſpect to the Genus of *Quality*, and (if I may be permitted to coin a word) may be called ALIATION (*d*).

If thou be'ſt He! but O! how fal'n, how CHANG'D
From Him, who in the happy realms of light,

(*c*) *Æn.* v. 819.

(*d*) Ἀλλοίωσις, in barbarous Latin, *Alteratio*. *Vid. Ariſt. ut ſuprà.*

Cloath'd

Cloath'd with tranſcendent brightneſs, didſt outſhine
Myriads, tho' bright—— (*e*). C.XVI.

Here we behold *Qualities that are changed*, a Scene of ALIATION.

ANOTHER SPECIES OF MOTION is ſeen in *Addition* and *Detraction*; as when we either add, or take away a Gnomon from a Square. Here is no *Aliation*, or Change of *Quality*, (for the Figure, as a Square, remains the ſame in either caſe) but the Effect of *ſuch Motion* is a *Change only in the Quantity*, as the Square becomes either *ſmaller* or *larger*. When *Quantity is enlarged*, we call the *Motion* AUGMENTATION; when 'tis *leſſened*, we call it DIMINUTION (*f*).

Behold a wonder: They, but now who ſeem'd
In BIGNESS *to ſurpaſs Earth's Giant Sons*,

(*e*) *Par. Loſt*, i. 84. See p. 174.

(*f*) *Augmentation*, Αὔξησις—*Diminution*, Μείωσις. *Vid. Ariſt. ut ſup.*

C. XVI.

Now LESS *than ſmalleſt Dwarfs, in narrow room*
Throng numberleſs—— (g)

Here we behold DIMINUTION.

PARVA *metu primo; mox ſeſe* ATTOLLIT IN AURAS,
Ingrediturque ſolo, et caput inter nubila condit (h).

Here we behold AUGMENTATION.

ALL theſe *Motions* have this *in common*, that they are *Changes or Roads* from one *Attribute* to another (i), while the *Subſtance* remains *the ſame*, both in Eſſence and in Name. Thus the Planet *Jupiter*, which was a year ago in ſuch

(g) *Par. Loſt*, i. 777.

(h) *Æn.* iv. 176. See chap. ix. where the Species of *Quantity* are enumerated.

(i) Οὐ κατηγορίαι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὁδὸς εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας—*They* (that is, theſe ſeveral Species of Motion) *are not Predicaments, but a* ROAD *to the Predicaments. Ammon. in Præd.* 171.

a part

a part of the heavens, and is at preſent in another, tho' his *Attributes of Place* are changed, is yet both in *Eſſence* and in *Name* ſtill *the ſame* Planet. By parity of Reaſon, 'tis *the ſame individual* Man, who, by change in *Quantity*, from fleſhy becomes emaciated (*k*). C. XVI.

But

(*k*) Speaking of theſe Species of Motion, *Ammonius* ſays—κινεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ Ποσὸν, ἢ κατὰ Ποιὸν, ἢ κατὰ Τόπον, φυλάττοντα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰδῶδες Εἶδος—*That things are moved and changed either in* QUANTITY, *or in* QUALITY, *or in* PLACE, *ſtill preſerving* [during theſe Motions] *their* ORIGINAL ESSENTIAL FORM. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 172.

Here we find the Phraſe Εἶδος εἰδῶδες, commonly called *Subſtantial Form*, but which we chuſe (as thinking it more accurate) to tranſlate *Eſſential*. To explain—Let us for example call *Sphericality* (if we may employ ſuch a word) the *Eſſential Form* to a Bowl. Every one will admit that the Bowl may undergo *many* Changes; may become White from Black, Hot from Cold; and (by a more eaſy Change than theſe) it may roll from one Place to another; and yet notwithſtanding it may *ſtill continue* to be a *Bowl*. But when it's *Sphericality*, that is to ſay it's Εἶδος εἰδῶδες, it's *eſſential Form* departs, when (ſuppoſing it's *Matter* to be Clay) it is moulded *from*

CXVI. BUT there are *other Motions*, which in their *Effects* go *farther*. Thus when the *Subſtance* of a Man becomes not only pallid and emaciated, but it's *living* Principle is detached from that which it enlivens, Putrefaction and Diſſolution of the Body enſue, and 'tis no longer a Change *within the Subſtance*, but the *very Subſtance is loſt* both in Eſſence and in Name (*l*). SUCH MOTION is called CORRUPTION, DISSOLUTION, or DYING. On the contrary, when the Seed of any Species, whether Animal or Vegetable, by Evolution, Accretion, or other latent Proceſs of Nature, produces a certain *Being, which had no exiſtence before*; 'tis a *Change*, like the former, that goes not merely to *Attributes*, but by a more efficacious Operation to the very *Subſtance*

---

a *Sphere into a Cube*, from that inſtant *the Bowl is no more*. it has no longer an exiſtence either in *Eſſence*, or in *Name*. See before, p. 90.

(*l*) See the Note immediately preceding.

itſelf.

itſelf. SUCH MOTION is called GENERATION or BIRTH. C.XVI.

THE following difference ſubſiſts between theſe two latter Species and the former; the *former* are no more than *Roads to different Modes* of Being; *the latter* lead to *Being itſelf*, and to it's oppoſite *Non-being* (*m*).

HOWEVER ſeparate and diſtinct theſe Species of *Motion* may be found, *yet being all of the ſame Genus, they naturally blend themſelves together.*

(*m*) Hence GENERATION is called—Ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τῦ ᾗ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ᾗ ὄν, τυτέστιν ἀπὸ τῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν—THE ROAD *from* NON-BEING *to* BEING; that is, from BEING IN POWER *to* BEING IN ACT—CORRUPTION or DISSOLUTION, on the contrary, is called Ὁδὸς ἀπὸ τῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν—THE ROAD *from* BEING *to* NON-BEING. *Ammon. in Præd.* p. 172.

The Particle ᾗ prefixed in the Quotations to μὴ ὄντος, and τὸ ὄν, is to diſtinguiſh the *Non being* and *Being* here mentioned from Being and Non-being *abſolute*. Πῇ means *in a manner, as it were, after a ſort*. See below, 397, 398.

C. XVI. THUS tho' *Local Motion* may poſſibly exiſt *without the reſt*, yet 'tis *impoſſible for the reſt* to exiſt without *Local Motion*. *Generation* is the Aſſemblage of parts; *Corruption*, the Separation; ſo that here *Local Motion* is evident in either caſe. 'Tis the ſame in *Aliation*; the ſame in *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. When Fear renders a perſon pale, ſuch *Change* could not be, did not his Blood retreat *locally* from the ſurface *to within*: and as for *Augmentation* and it's *Oppoſite*, they are no more than the bringing *to*, and the carrying *off*; both which in their very Idea imply *Local Motion*.

THE other Species of *Motion* are *incidentally* blended alſo. He that *increaſes* in bulk, commonly increaſes with *ruddineſs*; and he that *leſſens* in bulk, commonly leſſens with *Paleneſs*. There are both in the *Qualities* and the *Quantities* of the particles to be aſſembled, many Changes

Changes neceſſarily previous to *Generation* or *Birth*; and many others, as neceſſarily previous to *Corruption* or *Death* (*n*). C.XVI.

AND thus have we eſtabliſhed SIX SPECIES OF MOTION, which we denominate PHYSICAL, becauſe they reſpect *Phyſical Subjects*. *They are to be found in four of the* UNIVERSAL GENERA, or ARRANGEMENTS; one in the Genus, *Where*, TRANSITION; one in *Quality*, ALIATION; two in *Quantity*, AUGMENTATION and DIMINUTION; two in *Subſtance*, GENERATION and CORRUPTION.

(*n*) See *Ariſtot. Phyſ.* l. viii. c. 8.—where he ſhews at large that *Local Motion* is neceſſarily the *primary* Motion, as *running thro' the reſt*, and eſſential to them all; and where he likewiſe explains in what manner the *other* Species of Motion neceſſarily *blend themſelves* with each other. The Chapter is too long to be here tranſcribed. In his Tract *de Animâ*, l. i. c. 3. having ſpoken of the ſeveral Species of Motion, he adds, that MOTION infers PLACE—πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ—*For that* ALL THE MOTIONS *here enumerated are in* PLACE.

C.XVI. In all theſe *Motions* there is OPPOSITION or CONTRARIETY (*o*). Where two Species are coupled in one Genus, the two Species themſelves are, in ſuch caſe, *Contraries*; as *Generation* and *Corruption*, *Augmentation* and *Diminution*. Where the Species ſtands *ſingle*, as *Local Motion*, or *Aliation*, the Contrarieties are more *numerous*, and therefore perhaps not mentioned. In *Local Motion* we behold Backward and Forward, Rectilinear and Curvilinear, Centripetal and Centrifugal, &c. In *Aliation*, or *Change of Quality*, we behold Blackening and Whitening; Straightening and Bending; Strengthening and Weakening; with many others, to which names are wanting. Laſtly, all MOTION whatever is contrary to REST (*p*).

(*o*) See the Chapter preceding, p. 361.

(*p*) Ἐςὶ δὲ ἁπλῶς τῇ μὲν κινήσει ἠρεμία ἐναντίον— *In ſtrictneſs the* CONTRARY *to* MOTION *is* REST. *Ariſt. Prædic.* c. xi. p. 56. *Edit. Sylb.*

AND

AND now perhaps it may not be amiſs to inquire, WHAT PHYSICAL MOTION IS. Some Philoſophers have found a ſhort method here, by telling us, 'tis a *ſimple Idea*, and therefore *cannot be defined*. Others, with more reaſon, have called it *hard* to be defined (*q*), a circumſtance not unuſual with other Subjects *equally obvious*, there being nothing more different both in accuracy and truth, than that Apprehenſion, which is adequate to the purpoſes of the Vulgar, and that, which ought to ſatisfy the inveſtigation of a Philoſopher. C.XVI

IN the firſt place, if we conſider MOTION as an Object of *Senſation*, we ſhall

---

The other Modes of *Contrariety* are explained in the ſubſequent part of the Chapter here quoted, which in ſome Editions is the fourteenth.

(*q*) —χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν αὐτὴν (*ſcil.* κίνησιν) τί ἐστιν· *'Tis hard to comprehend what it is*—So ſays the *Stagirite*, and gives his Reaſons, which we poſtpone for the preſent, that we may not anticipate. *Phyſ.* l. iii. c. 2. p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

diſcover

C.XVI. diſcover it to be the Object not of *one* Senſe, but of *all*. In a ring of Bells we *hear* it; in a ſucceſſion of Savours we *taſte* it; of Odours, we *ſmell* it; and that we *feel* or *ſee* it, there needs no example. Thus is it diſtinguiſhed from thoſe Objects, that are *peculiar to one Senſe alone*; as from Colours, which we *only ſee*, or from Sounds, which we *only hear*. *Simple* therefore as it is, it is not only an Object of Senſation, but ſtands *diſtinguiſhed*, as a COMMON OBJECT, from other objects that are PECULIAR.

AND are there then (it may be demanded) no *other* Objects of the *ſame* Character?—'Tis anſwered, there are; as Bulk and Figure, *common* Objects to the Sight and Feeling; Reſt and Number, *common* Objects, like Motion, to *every* Senſe (*r*).

(*r*) Κοιναὶ δὲ, κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἴδια (*ſcil.* αἰσθήσεως). *The common Objects of Senſation are* MOTION,

C. XVI.

AND how (it is aſked again) is *Motion* diſtinguiſhed from theſe?—We reply, from Reſt, by *Contrariety*; from Number, by *Continuity*; from Bulk and Figure, as the Parts of Motion are *never permanent, never co-exiſt.* What Speculations does this Idea, *Simple* as it is called, open, even while we conſider it no farther than as an Object of *Senſation?*

BUT we muſt not ſtop *here*, even while we conſider it as *Phyſical.* As ſuch we ſhall find it connected with a *Body*, which moves; and as ſuch, neceſſarily performed *thro' Space*, and *in Time*; ſo that *theſe alſo*, and their *Attributes* of *Infinite* and *Continuous*, muſt be added

---

TION, REST, NUMBER, FIGURE, BULK; *for theſe are peculiar to no one Senſe. Ariſt. de Animâ*, l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. Theſe *common* Objects are well worthy of Attention in explaining the Doctrine of the Senſes and Senſation.

to

C.XVI. to it's Theory, as ſo many neceſſary Speculations.

We cannot therefore but obſerve, that if it be a *ſimple* Idea, 'tis ſtrangely *complicated* with a multitude of others (*s*);

(*s*) See the Beginning of the third Book of *Ariſtotle's Phyſics*, ch. i. where being about to treat of *Motion*, he ſhews with what other Subjects it is neceſſarily connected, ſuch as CONTINUOUS, INFINITE, PLACE, TIME, &c. and where accordingly, after he has given us the Opinions of his Predeceſſors in Philoſophy concerning theſe Subjects, he proceeds in due order to explain what he thinks himſelf. —His words are, as they here follow. Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν Συνεχῶν· τὸ δ' Ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ Συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις τὸ Συνεχὲς, συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τῦ Ἀπείρου, ὡς εἰς Ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν τὸ Συνεχὲς ὄν. Πρὸς δὲ τάτοις ἄνευ Τόπυ, ἢ Κενῦ, ἢ Χρόνυ ἀδύναλον κίνησιν εἶναι. MOTION *appears to be in the number of things* CONTINUOUS: *now* INFINITE *immediately ſhews itſelf in that which is* CONTINUOUS; *for which reaſon, when they define* CONTINUOUS, *they have often occaſion to employ withal the character of Infinite, in as much as* CONTINUITY *is that, which is* DIVISIBLE TO INFINITE. *Add to this, without* PLACE, *and* VACUUM, *and* TIME, *'tis impoſſible that* MOTION *ſhould have exiſtence. Phyſic.* l. iii. c. 1.

ſuch

ſuch as *Space*, *Time*, *Infinitude*, *Conti-* C.XVI.
nuity, together with *Body*, and it's *viſible Attributes* both of *Quantity* and of *Quality*. But to proceed in our Speculation.

THAT there are things exiſting *in act*, *in reality*, *in actuality* (call it as you pleaſe) we have the evidence both of our Senſes, and of our internal Conſciouſneſs; ſo that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there alſo are things which *actually* and *really* are *not*, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx for example *actually* is *not*; a Centaur *actually* is *not*; for theſe we may call Phantoms in the language of *Lucretius*,

Quæ neque ſunt uſquam, neque poſſunt eſſe profectò.

Laſtly, every *Subſtance* that actually *is*, by *actually* being *that* thing, *actually is not*

C.XVI. *not any other* (*t*). A piece of Braſs for example actually *is not* an Oak; an Acorn, *not* a Vine; a Grape-ſtone, *not* a Statue.

THERE is a difference however here; I mean a difference in the laſt mode of *actually not being*; for tho' the Braſs is no more a Statue, than it is an Oak, yet has it a *Capacity* to become the one, and *none* to become the other. The ſame may be ſaid of the Acorn, with reſpect to the Oak; of the Grape-ſtone, with reſpect to the Vine. Were it not for this *definite nature of Capacity*, which as much diſtinguiſhes the *inviſible* Powers,

(*t*) This LAST SPECIES of NON-ENTITY ſhould be carefully attended to, as *the Doctrine of Motion wholly depends upon it*, and as it is ſo *eſſentially* diſtinguiſhed both from the PHANTASTIC Non-entities (the Sphinx, the Centaur, &c.) immediately preceding, and from that *ſtrongeſt* of all Non-entities, the Non-entity of IMPOSSIBILITY, ſuch as that *the Diameter of the Square ſhould be commenſurable with it's Sides*, or that *the ſame Number ſhould be both Even and Odd*. See before, p. 389.

as *Actuality* diſtinguiſhes the *viſible* At- C.XVI.
tributes, there would be no reaſon why an Acorn ſhould not produce a Statue, as well as it produces an Oak; or why *any thing* (to ſpeak more generally) *ſhould not be able to produce any thing* (*u*).

WHAT then, if there were *no Capacity* exiſting in the Univerſe?—Could there be *Generations*, *Corruptions*, *Growths*, *Diminutions*, *Aliations*, or *Change of Place*?—Impoſſible—But if theſe are all the Species of *Phyſical Motion*, it follows, that WITHOUT CAPACITY *there can be no ſuch Motions*.

AND is MOTION then for this reaſon *pure* CAPACITY, and that *only*?—Let us examine.—A Man, being in *Salisbury*,

(*u*) This Diſtinction of τὸ Ἐντελεχείᾳ and τὸ Δυνάμει, *of that which is in* ACTUALITY, *and that which is in* POWER, is the Baſis of all the *Peripatetic* Reaſoning upon this Subject. See p. 277, &c. alſo p. 148, 149.

has

CXVI. has a *Capacity* of travelling to *London*. Is he therefore, for merely *poſſeſſing ſuch Capacity*, upon the road thither?—He is not.—*Motion* therefore, *tho' Capacity*, is not Capacity *alone*: there muſt be ſome degree of ACTUALITY, or elſe MOTION can never exiſt. Shall we then call it *pure* ACTUALITY?—*We cannot aſſert that*, when we have made *Capacity* one of it's requiſites. Beſides, how ſhould *Motion* be ſeen in *pure Actuality*; an Actuality, which *never exiſts*, till *Motion* is *at an end?* A Man ſurely can no more be called *moving towards London*, who is *actually* arrived there, than he who, poſſeſſing the *Capacity* of going thither, *forbears* to exert any of his *motive* powers.

IF *Motion* therefore be neither *Capacity alone*, nor *Actuality alone*, and yet *both* (as it appears) are *eſſential* to it; 'tis IN BOTH we muſt look after it,

AS DERIVING IT'S EXISTENCE FROM BOTH. C.XVI.

SUCH in fact it will appear; ſomething MORE *than dead Capacity*, ſomething LESS *than perfect Actuality*: CAPACITY ROUZED, *and ſtriving to quit it's latent Character:* not the CAPABLE *Braſs*, nor yet the ACTUAL *Statue*, but the CAPACITY IN ENERGY, that is to ſay, the Braſs in Fuſion, while *it is becoming* the Statue, and *is not yet become*. Thus too, when a Complexion is *actually Red*, we ſay not that it *reddens*; much leſs do we aſſert ſo, while it remains *perfectly Pale*; but as every *pale* Complexion implies a *Capacity to become red*, 'tis *in* THE ENERGY OF THIS CAPACITY exiſts the *Reddening*, that is the MOTION.

IN the account of MOTION here given we ſee the Doctrine of the *Peripatetics*. The more ancient Sects of *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, tho' they give *different*

CXVI. Deſcriptions, ſeem to have deduced them all from *the ſame* Principles. Thus becauſe, whenever any thing is *moved*, it is ſome way or other *diverſified* either in *Quantity*, or in *Quality*, or at leaſt in *Place*, for this reaſon they called MOTION, DIVERSITY. Again, becauſe, while oppoſite forces are *equal*, then is *Motion ſuſpended*, and revives not till *Inequality deſtroys the Equilibrium*; for this reaſon they called MOTION, INEQUALITY. Again, becauſe every thing, which is *moving*, *is not* in ſome certain Attributes, either what it *was*, or what it *will be*; for this reaſon they called MOTION, NON-ENTITY (*x*), not *Non-entity abſolute*, but with a peculiar *reference*.

ALL theſe Deſcriptions of MOTION naturally flow from *one* Source, and that

(*x*) — ἔλεγον δὲ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι Ἑτερότητα, καὶ Ἀνισότητα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. *Philop. in Phyſic.* p. 144. For *Non-Entity*, ſee before p. 397, 98.

is,

is, from it's *indefinite* (*y*) and *unaſcertainable* appearance. Now the reaſon why it *ſo* appears, is, as we have ſaid, becauſe we cannot place it either in *the ſimple* CAPACITY of things, or in *the ſimple* ACTUALITY. The Bow for example *moves not*, becauſe it *may* be bent; nor becauſe it *is* bent; but *the Motion lies between*; lies in an *imperfect* and *obſcure union* of the two *together*; is THE ACTUALITY (if I may ſo ſay) EVEN OF CAPACITY ITSELF (*z*); *imperfect* and *obſcure*, CXVI.

(*y*) — αἴτιον δὲ τὸ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι αὐτὰς, ὅτι ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις. *Phyſ.* p. 45. *Edit. Sylb.*—*The Cauſe of their placing* MOTION *among theſe things, is, that it appears to be ſomething* INDEFINITE.

(*z*) We have juſt before ſtiled it the ENERGY OF CAPACITY; here, the ACTUALITY OF CAPACITY. Theſe expreſſions are difficult, unleſs we attend to the manner, in which they are uſed. The original *Greek* expreſſes the Sentiment thus—ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν—THE ENERGY *of what exiſts* IN POWER, *conſidered as* SO *exiſting, is* MOTION. *Ariſt. Phyſic.* 43. *Edit. Sylb.*—And ſoon after, p. 45—τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνη-

CXVI. *obſcure,* becauſe ſuch is CAPACITY to which it belongs.

στιν αἴτιον ὅτι ὅτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων, ἄτε εἰς ἐνέργειάν ἐσι θεῖναι αὐτὴν ἁπλῶς· ὅτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι ποσὸν κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ποσόν· ἤτε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δὲ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατὸν ἧ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια κίνησις· ᾗ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι, ἢ εἰς δύναμιν, ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἁπλῶν· τούτων δ' ὑθὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον· λείπεται τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μέν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ' ἐνέργειαν, οἵαν εἴπομεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι. *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. iii. c. 2.—*The Reaſon why* MOTION *appears to be* INDEFINITE, *is, that there is no placing it ſimply either in the* CAPACITY *of things, or in their* ENERGY: *for neither is that neceſſarily moved, which is* CAPABLE OF BECOMING *a certain Quantity; nor that, which* IS *a certain Quantity in* ENERGY *and* ACT. *Indeed the* MOTION *itſelf appears to be a certain Sort of Energy, but then 'tis an* IMPERFECT *one; and the reaſon of this is, the* CAPACITY ITSELF *is* IMPERFECT, OF WHICH *it is the* ENERGY. *Hence therefore it becomes hard to comprehend it's Nature: for 'tis neceſſary to place it either in Privation, or in Capacity, or elſe in ſimple Energy, and yet no one of theſe appears to be poſſible. The Manner therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining,* which is, *that it ſhould be a peculiar Sort of Energy, and that, ſuch a one as we have deſcribed*; HARD TO DISCERN, AND YET POSSIBLE TO EXIST. P. 45, *ut ſuprà. Edit. Sylb*

AND

CXVI.

And ſo much for Motion Physical, it's different Species, and it's general Character. We are now to inquire concerning *Motion of another kind.*

CHAP. XVII.

Concerning MOTION NOT-PHYSICAL—*This means* METAPHYSICAL, *and why ſo called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Conſciouſneſs, Anticipation, Preconception—Appetite, Reſentment, Reaſon—Motion Phyſical and Metaphyſical how united—Diſcord and Harmony of the internal Principles—Powers vegetative, animal, rational—Immortality—*REST, *it's ſeveral Species—*MOTION, *to what perceptive Beings it appertains; to what, not—and whence the Difference.*

Chap. XVII.

OUR Contemplation hitherto may be called *Phyſical*, becauſe 'tis about *Phyſical Motions*, that the whole has been employed, and 'tis from *Phyſical* Obſervations, that the whole has been deduced. But he, who ſtops here, has but

but half finiſhed his Work, if it be true that *Corporeal* Maſſes only *move*, becauſe they *are moved* (*a*); and therefore cannot be conſidered as *the original Source of Motion*. Chap. XVII.

When a Boy carries about with him an Inſect in a Box, we call not this Motion the *Inſect's Motion* as an *Animal*, becauſe a Nut or a Pebble would have moved in like manner. (*b*) When the ſame Boy, piercing a Wing of this In-

(*a*) Τὸ κινῶν φυσικῶς, κινητόν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ, κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.—*That which* GIVES *Motion* PHYSICALLY, *is itſelf* MOVEABLE: *for every thing, which gives Motion in this manner, is moved alſo itſelf.*—And ſoon after—Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει· ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει—*This*, (namely the giving Motion) *it does by* CONTACT; *ſo that at the ſame time* (while it acts) *it is acted upon. Ariſtot. Phyſic.* l. iii. c. 1. p. 44, 45. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*b*) —ἐοίκε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι, οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος—*That ſeems to be* FORCED *or* COMPELLED, *of which the Principle or Moving Cauſe is* FROM WITHOUT, *while the Being compelled contributes nothing from itſelf. Ethic. Nic.* l. iii. c. 1. p. 37. *Edit. Sylb.*

Chap. XVII.

fect, makes it deſcribe *a circular Motion* round a Pin or Needle, even *this* cannot well be called the Inſect's Motion; for it's *Motion*, as an *Animal*, is not, like a Planet, round a Center. So far however *the Motion* differs from that in the Box, that by being a *mixt* Motion, the *centrifugal* Part is the *Animal's* own, the *centripetal* is *extraneous*. But if ever the Wing detach itſelf, and the fortunate Inſect flie off; at that inſtant the *Mixture of extraneous* is no more, and the *Motion* thence forward becomes properly and purely *animal*.

AND what is it, which gives *the Motion* this *proper* and *pure* character?—It is SPONTANEITY (*c*), that pure and *innate* Impulſe ariſing from the Animal *it-*

(*c*) Τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ— *That ſhould ſeem to be* SPONTANEOUS, *of which the Principle or Moving Cauſe is* IN THE BEING ITSELF. *Eth. Nic.* l. iii. c. 1. p. 38. *Edit. Sy.b.*

ſelf,

ſelfs by which *alone* it's Flight is then produced and conducted. Chap. XVII.

AND thus, while we paſs from Flying to *Innate and Spontaneous Impulſe*, that is to ſay in other words, from Flying to its *Cauſe*, we paſs alſo inſenſibly from *Motion Phyſical* to *Metaphyſical*; for METAPHYSICS are properly converſant about *primary and internal Cauſes*. We call not ſuch Impulſe *Metaphyſical*, as if it were μετὰ τὴν φυσικὴν κίνησιν, *ſomething ſubſequent to natural Motion*, that is, to Flying (for this would ſet Effect before Cauſe, a prepoſterous order indeed!); but we call it *Metaphyſical*, becauſe tho' truly prior in itſelf, it is *ſubſequent* in *Man's Contemplation*, whoſe Road of Science is naturally *upward*, that is, from Effect to Cauſe, from Senſible to Intelligible *(d)*.

(d) See *Hermes*, p. 9. See alſo the ſecond Edition of Vol. I. p. 365, and of the preſent Treatiſe, p. 344, Note *(d)*.

SPON-

Chap. XVII.

SPONTANEOUS *Impulſe* (*e*) is to the Inſect the Cauſe of Flying; ſo it is to the Dolphin, of Swimming; to the Man, of Walking. But *what* is *the Cauſe* of this Impulſe itſelf? And why do *Animals* poſſeſs it, more than Stocks or Stones?

To ſolve this queſtion, we muſt firſt remark, that every *Animal*, however exquiſite in it's frame, is nevertheleſs far from being perfect, being ſtill the Part of a greater and more perfect Whole (*f*), to

(*e*) Ὁρμή. *Diog. Laert.* vii. 85. *Una pars in* APPETITU *poſita eſt. Cic. de Offic.* i. 28.—APPETITIONES*que, quas illi* ὁρμὰς *vocant, obedientes efficere Rationi—De Offic.* ii. 5.—*Animalia, quæ habent ſuos* IMPETUS *et rerum* APPETITUS—*Ejuſd.* ii. 3.—NATURALEM *enim* APPETITIONEM, *quam vocant* ὁρμὴν, *itemque*, &c. *De Fin.* iv. 14.—*Seneca* uſes the words, SPONTANEOS MOTUS. *Epiſt.* cxxi.

(*f*) *Ipſe autem* HOMO—*nullo modo perfectus, ſed eſt quædam* PARTICULA PERFECTI. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii.

to which it is *connected* by many neceſſary *Wants*. Chap. XVII.

ONE of theſe for example is common to all Animals, that of Food or Aliment. Suppoſe then *this Want* were not to be gratified, what would be the conſequence?—The Animal would periſh. —And how has Providence obviated this danger?—It has given to every *Animal*, however baſe, however young, not only a *Conſciouſneſs of this Want*, but an *obſcure Senſation* of ſome diſtinction in things *without*; and a *Preconception* or *Anticipation* in favour of that Aliment which it is to *prefer*, from an *inward feeling of it's proper Conſtitution* (*g*). 'Tis

ii. 14. See of this Vol. p. 239, &c. and the end of the preſent Chapter.

. What is applied by *Cicero* in the above Paſſage to *Man*, may with equal propriety be applied to all other Animals, and needs no proving. 'Twas a fundamental Doctrine of the *Stoics*.

(*g*) — Πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι παντὶ ζώῳ τὴν αὑτῆς σύϛασιν, καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν—*The thing* PRIMARILY

Chap. XVII.

thus *without* either *Teaching* or *Experience*, but merely from an *innate Feeling of what is conducive to their proper Being*, that Infants are able to diſtinguiſh Milk from Vinegar; and Silkworms the Leaf of a Mulberry from that of a Laurel or an Aſh (*h*). Now the

---

RILY INTIMATE *to every Animal, is it's* OWN CONSTITUTION, *and a* CONSCIOUSNESS *of it. Diog. Laert.* vii. 85.

(*h*) —*Simul atque natum ſit animal—ipſum ſibi conciliari, et commendari ad ſe conſervandum et ſuum Statum, et ad ea, quæ conſervantia ſunt ejus Statûs, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iiſque rebus, quæ interitum videantur adferre. Cic. de Fin.* iii. 5.

Thus *Seneca*—OMNIBUS (*ſc.* Animalibus) CONSTITUTIONIS SUÆ SENSUS EST, *et indè Membrorum tam expedita tractatio. Epiſt.* cxxi.—Soon after—*Conſtitutionem ſuam* [Animal] *craſſè intelligit, ſummatim, et obſcurè*—and again—*ante omnia eſt Mei cura: hoc animalibus ineſt cunctis: nec inſeritur, ſed* INNASCITUR.—And ſoon after, ſpeaking of the terror, which ſome Animals feel in their earlieſt ſtate, when they firſt behold a Hawk, or a Cat, he adds—*apparet illis ineſſe Scientiam nocituri, non* EXPERIMENTO COLLECTAM; *nam, antequam poſſint experiri, cavent.*

the Conſequence of this *Conſciouſneſs*, of theſe *Preconceptions* or *Anticipations*, is a *ſpon-* Chap. XVII.

Even the *ferocious* tribes of Animals, when their Powers become mature, are *ſhewn*, how to employ them, by an *innate*, *internal Inſtinct*.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, niſi INTUS *Monſtratum*——

As to INNATE IDEAS, there is certainly nothing ſo true, (and it requires no great Logic to prove) that, if by INNATE IDEAS be meant INNATE PROPOSITIONS, there never were, nor ever can be any ſuch things exiſting. But this no ways tends to ſubvert that *innate Diſtinction* of things into *Eligible* and *Ineligible*, according as they are ſuitable to every Nature, or not ſuitable; a Diſtinction, which every Being appears to recognize from it's very birth.

Hence the Author above quoted in the ſame Epiſtle —*tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoque modo effuſa, quid ſit infeſtum ipſis* PROTINUS *norunt, et mortifera devitant.*

And 'tis upon this reaſoning we may venture to affirm, that every *ſuch* Being in it's earlieſt moments *perceives itſelf to be an Animal, tho' it may not be philoſophically informed, what an Animal really is*— QUID SIT ANIMAL, *neſcit*; ANIMAL ESSE *ſe ſentit.* *Ibid.*

Whatever

Chap. XVII.

ſpontaneous Impulſe: for 'tis in theſe that ſuch Impulſe finds an *adequate efficient* Cauſe.

Whatever others in ancient, or even in modern days, may have thought concerning this Subject, *that Philoſopher* ſurely can be hardly ſuſpected *of favouring Innate Ideas*, who held THE HUMAN SOUL, or rather it's INTELLECTIVE PART, *from it's comprehending all things, to be for that very reaſon ſomething pure and unmixed*—ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι—and this, becauſe [in any compound] *that which is alien, by ſhewing itſelf along with other Objects, impedes and obſtructs*—παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ἀντιφράττει—*That therefore the* HUMAN INTELLECT *in it's Nature was nothing elſe than mere* CAPACITY, *or* THE BEING CAPABLE—ὥστε μηδὲ αὐτῷ εἶναι φύσιν τίνα μηδεμίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δύνατον—*That in conſequence it* WAS NOT *any ſingle one of the whole tribe of Beings, before it comprehended and underſtood it*—ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς Νοῦς—ἀδὲν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων, πρὶν νοεῖν—*That 'twas not therefore probable it ſhould be blended with the Body, for that then it would become veſted with ſome corporeal Quality, and be either hot or cold, and have ſome corporeal Organ, as the ſenſitive faculty has; whereas now it has none*—διὸ καὶ μεμίχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποῖός γὰρ ἄν τις γίγνοιτο, θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρὸς, κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δὲ ἀδέν ἐστι—He concludes at laſt his Reaſonings with telling us—*that the Intellect*,

Cauſe. But if we include all theſe under the common name of *Perception*, we

Chap. XVII.

Intellect, as he had ſaid before, was in CAPACITY, *after a certain manner, the ſeveral Objects intelligible; but was in* ACTUALITY *no one of them, until it firſt comprehended it—and that it was the ſame with the Mind or* HUMAN UNDERSTANDING [in it's original State] *as with a* RASA TABULA *or* WRITING TABLET, *in which nothing as yet had been* ACTUALLY *written*—διὸ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πως ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ Νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν μὴ νοῇ· ἔστι δ' οὕτως, ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ, ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ Νοῦ, *Ariſtot. de Animâ*, l. iii. iv.

As to the Simile of a RASA TABULA, or (to ſpeak in a language more modern and familiar) that of A SHEET OF FAIR WRITING PAPER, tho' it be ſufficiently evident of itſelf, it may be illuſtrated in the following manner.

The *Human Intellect* is *pure unmixed, untainted* CAPACITY, as *a Sheet of fair Writing Paper* is *pure unmixed, untainted* WHITENESS. The *pure unmixed* Character of this *intellectual Capacity* renders it *fit for every Object of Comprehenſion*, as the *pure unmixed* Character of the *Paper* makes it *adequate to every Species of Writing*. The Paper would not be adequate to this purpoſe, were it *previouſly* ſcrawled over with Syllables or Letters. As far only as it is *clear*, it is *capable*;

Chap. XVII.

we ſhall then find, that PERCEPTION is the *proper Cauſe of* SPONTANEOUS IMPULSE;

---

capable; and if we ſuppoſe it *perfectly* clear, then is it *perfectly* capable. *The ſame Sort of Reaſoning* is applicable to the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Such we take to be the Sentiments of this ancient Sage on this important Subject.

The Sentiments and Subject, being both of them curious, will ('tis hoped) be an Apology for this Digreſſion.

By it we think it appears, that it was a received Opinion among the Ancients, that *Inſtincts* both in Man and Beaſt were *original*, and *founded in Nature*. That *Ariſtotle* held the ſame, appears not only from his Hiſtory of Animals, but from the following remarkable Paſſage in his *Politics*, relative to Man. There ſpeaking of the *Social* State, or State of Society, he ſays—*φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν*—*that the* TENDENCY *to ſuch a Society was* BY NATURE *in all men*. *Pol.* p. 4. *Edit. Sylb.*

We think alſo it farther appears, that whatever *Ariſtotle* thought of *Inſtincts* reſiding in the *lower* faculties of Man, *Inſtincts* reſpecting the purpoſes of common *Life* and *Society*, yet, as to the SUPREME and INTELLECTIVE PART, *this* he held in it's original State to be WHOLLY PURE and UNMIXED, and only fitted, by that *Purity*, for *general* and *univerſal Comprehenſion*.

PULSE; that 'tis *ſo* the Animal *impels* itſelf, becauſe 'tis *ſo* that it *perceives*; it does not ſo *perceive*, becauſe it is ſo *impelled* (*i*). Chap. XVII.

THE Impulſe hitherto ſpoken of is of *earlieſt* date, commencing in a manner with the Animal itſelf; and, as it merely reſpects the Body and bodily Pleaſure, is diſtinguiſhed from other Impulſes by the name of APPETITE (*k*).

As Animals advance, the Scene of Perception enlarges, and the number of Spontaneous Impulſes increaſe of courſe with it. Yet while *Pleaſure corporeal* continues the *ſole* Object, and there appears no Danger either in *acquiring* or *pre-*

---

prehenſion. He ſeems (like the reſt) to have juſtly diſtinguiſhed between INNATE INSTINCTS, and INNATE PROPOSITIONS.

(*i*) — ὀρεγόμεθα ὅτι δοκεῖ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ, διότι ὀρεγόμεθα. *Ariſt. Metaph.* Λ. ζ. p. 203. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*k*) ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ.

Chap. XVII.

ſerving it, the Impulſe is ſtill an *Appetite*, varying only in it's name, as the Pleaſure, to which it is referred, varies in the Species.

YET, beſides theſe *Preconceptions*, the Sources of ſimple *Appetite*, there are alſo *Preconceptions* of *offering Violence*, and others of *reſiſting Danger*, and theſe naturally call forth *another* Power, I mean the Power of ANGER (*l*). Few Animals, when young, feel any ſuch *Preconceptions*; but the more ferocious and ſavage are ſure to find them at maturity; and the *iraſcible* Impulſes ſoon *ſpontaneouſly* attend, prompting the Lion to employ his Fangs; the Vultur his Talons; the Boar his Tuſk; and every other Animal of prey his proper and natural Preparations.

ALL theſe *Spontaneous Impulſes*, as well of *Anger* as of *Appetite*, are equally in-

(*l*) ΘΥΜΟΣ.

cluded

cluded under the common name of *Irrational* (*m*), being called by this name, becauſe they have nothing to do with *Reaſon*. Chap. XVII.

BUT when REASON becomes ſtrong enough to view it's proper Objects; that Sight, to which no Being here but *Man alone* is equal; when the Moral and the Intelligible riſe before his *mental* Eye, and he beholds the fair Forms of *Good* and of *Truth*; then too ariſe *Impulſes* of a far *more noble* kind, thoſe to Friendſhip, to Society, to Virtue, and to Science (*n*).

AND

(*m*) ΑΛΟΓΟΣ, as well as ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ and ΛΟΓΟΣ, are Terms too well known, to need more than to be mentioned.

(*n*) This Progreſſion from the lower to the ſuperior Faculties is well deſcribed by *Cicero*.

Prima eſt enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ ſunt ſecundum naturam: ſimul autem cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius (quam adpellant ἔννοιαν illi) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam; multo

Chap. XVII.

AND thus is Man not only a Microcoſm in the Structure of his Body, but in

---

multo eam pluris æſtimavit, quàm omnia illa, quæ primùm dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut ſtatueret in eo conlocatum ſummum illud hominis PER SE LAUDANDUM ET EXPETENDUM BONUM. *Cic. de Fin.* iii. 6.

Unicuique ætati ſua conſtitutio eſt: alia infanti, alia puero, alia ſeni: omnes enim conſtitutioni conciliantur, in quâ ſunt. Infans ſine dentibus eſt: huic conſtitutioni ſuæ conciliatur. Enati ſunt dentes: huic, &c. *Sen. Epiſt.* cxxi. The whole Epiſtle is worth peruſal, in particular what follows—*Ergò infans ei conſtitutioni ſuæ conciliatur, quæ* TUNC *infanti eſt, non quæ futura juveni eſt. Neque enim,* SI ALIQUID ILLI MAJUS IN QUO TRANSEAT, *reſtat; non* HOC *quoque, in quo naſcitur,* SECUNDUM NATURAM EST.

See alſo his elegant Application of this Doctrine to the different Stages of that well-known Vegetable, Corn, from it's firſt appearance above the ground, to it's State of maturity. *Nam et illa herba, quæ in Segetem,* &c. *Epiſt.* p. 603. *Edit. Varior.*

See alſo how elegantly *Cicero* applies the ſame Doctrine to the Vine, where to the *vegetative Powers* he firſt ſuppoſes *Senſe* ſuperadded; and then to Senſe, *Reaſon*; each Superaddition ſtill increaſing in value, tho' not robbing the former Powers of their due regard and attention—*Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuetur,*

ut

in the Syſtem too of his Impulſes, including all of them within him from the baſeſt Chap. XVII.

ut de Viti potiſſimùm loquar, eſt id, &c. *De Fin.* v. 14.

See Vol. the Firſt, Dialogue concerning Happineſs, part the ſecond, and the Notes, p. 302, &c.

The Number and Subordination of the *animating* Powers are well diſtinguiſhed in the following Extracts.

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσι πᾶσαι (καθάπερ εἴπομεν) τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη· δυνάμεις δὲ εἴπομεν θρεπτικὸν, αἰσθητικὸν, ὀρεκτικὸν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν· ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα μίαν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δὲ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὰ γὰρ ἡδέα ὄρεξις ἐστὶν αὕτη—*With regard to the Powers of the Soul that have been enumerated, to ſome Beings they appertain* ALL *of them; to others, only* SOME *of them; and to others, only* ONE *of them. The Powers we have mentioned, are the Nutritive, the Senſitive, the Power of Deſire, of local Motion, of Ratiocination. Now to Plants there appertains only the Nutritive Power; to other Beings both this, and the Senſitive: but if the Senſitive, then the Power of Deſire; for Appetite, and Reſentment, and Volition*

Chap. XVII.

baſeſt to the moſt ſublime (*o*). He includes them all, as being poſſeſſed of *all* Per-

---

Volition (the three great leading Powers) *are each of them a Species of Deſire, and all Animals have at leaſt one of the Senſes, I mean the Senſe of Touch. Now to the Being, which poſſeſſes Senſation, to this appertain alſo Pleaſure and Pain, and that which is Pleaſurable and Painful. But if theſe, then Appetite; for Appetite is the Deſire of that, which is Pleaſurable. Ariſt. de Anim.* l. ii. c. 3.

And ſoon after—Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τῆ θρεπτικῆ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστι· τῆ δὲ αἰσθητικῆ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Πάλιν δὲ, ἄνευ μὲν τῆ ἁπτικῆ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἄφη δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων οὔτε ὄψιν οὔτε ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε ὀσμῆς ὅλως αἴσθησιν· καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικὸν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα· οἷς δὲ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, —ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνον ζῶσι—*Without the Nutritive Power there is no Senſitive; but then the Nutritive is ſeparated from the Senſitive in Plants. Again, without Touch there can be none of the other Senſations, but there may be Touch without any of the reſt; for thus are there many Animals, which have neither Sight, nor Hearing, nor even a Senſation of Smells. Farther ſtill, of the Senſitive Beings ſome poſſeſs the Loco-motive Power, and others poſſeſs it not: the laſt Order*

Perception; and *Perception* we have now found to be the *Cauſe* of all *Spontaneous Impulſe*. Chap. XVII.

We

Order of Beings, and thoſe the feweſt in number, are thoſe, which poſſeſs the Powers of REASONING *and* DISCUSSION: *and among the mortal and periſhable Beings thoſe, who poſſeſs theſe Powers, poſſeſs* ALL *the remaining Species; but thoſe, who poſſeſs any one of theſe Powers in particular, do not all of them therefore poſſeſs the Reaſoning Power, but ſome of them want even the Power of Phanſy or Imagination; others of them conduct themſelves and live by that* [inferior Power] *alone. Ariſt. de Anim.* l. ii. c. 3. p. 28. *Edit. Sylb.* See before, p. 106, Note *(g)*.

It muſt be here obſerved, that PLANTS are ſaid TO LIVE (ζῆν) tho' not to be ANIMALS (ζῶα); *the Character of* ANIMAL being derived from the Power of SENSATION, of which Plants are ſuppoſed deſtitute; while that of LIFE appertains to them, becauſe they GROW, and PRODUCE *each of them* SEED *after their kind.*

Theſe different Powers, as they ſtand united in *one* ſubject, may be better comprehended, by marking their clear and diſtinct character, when they exiſt *apart*, in *different* Subjects.

(*o*) The preceding Speculations have reſpect to the *threefold Diviſion* of the SOUL, adopted by the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, by which they made it to be *Rational*, *Iraſcible*, and *Concupiſcible*, and called it's

Chap. XVII.

WE muſt remember however that 'tis not Perception *ſimply*, which cauſes ſuch *Impulſe*; but 'tis Perception of Want *within*, and of adequate Good *without*; and that as this Good is ſometimes an object of *Senſe*, ſometimes of *Intellect*, ſometimes a *miſtaken* Good, at other times a *real* one, (in as much as Senſation is fallible, and Reaſon may be deceived) ſo the whole amounts to this; *the Cauſe of Spontaneous Impulſe* is *the Perception of abſent Good, and that either ſenſible or intelligible, either real or apparent (p)*.

AFTER this manner we perceive one of the moſt important Unions; the *Union*

---

three Faculties Λόγος, Θυμὸς, and Ἐπιθυμία, REASON, ANGER, and CONCUPISCENCE or APPETITE. See *Diog. Laert.* iii. 90. *Plato's* Republic is founded on this Diviſion.

(p) See *Vol. the Firſt, Treatiſe on Happineſs*, and Notes on the ſame, pages 212, 246, 334, 356.

of

Chap. XVII.

of thoſe two capital Motions, the *Phyſical* and the *Metaphyſical*. THE SOUL *perceives* thoſe Goods, which it is conſcious that the Animal *wants*. Hence an *Impulſe to obtain them* by employing the Organs of the *Body*; and this, as far as *the Soul only* is concerned, we call Motion *Metaphyſical*. Hence the *bodily* Organs actually *are* employed, and this we call Motion *Phyſical*. *Perception leads* the way; *Spontaneous Impulſe follows*; and *the Body* ſupplies the place of an Inſtrument or Tool (*q*).

As

(*q*) —ἕτως μὲν ὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράτ̃ειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τῦ κινεῖσθαι ὄρέξεως ὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως—*And thus it is, that* ANIMALS *proceed to move themſelves and act, a* DESIRE *being the laſt and immediate Cauſe of their moving, and this Deſire being occaſioned either by* SENSATION, *or elſe by* IMAGINATION *and* INTELLECTION. *Ariſt. de Animal. Motu.* c. vii. p. 155. *Edit. Sylb.*

Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία·

Chap. XVII.

As every *animal Motion* has a view to Good, ſo, if it miſs that Good, *the Motion ceaſes*, and the Animal is left diſcontented: if it obtain it, the Animal is happy, but then too *the Motion ceaſes*; for the End is obtained, to which the Motion tended. And thus is all *animal* Motion in it's Nature *finite*, as it has a Beginning and an End; as it begins from the *Want* of *Good*, and ends in it's *Acquiſition*. Hence too as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to Motion *circular*, where we run a complete round,

---

φαντασία· αὐτὴ δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἢ διὰ νοήσεως, ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.—*The* CORPOREAL FEELINGS *prepare in a proper manner the* ORGANIC PARTS *of the Body*; DESIRE *prepares thoſe Feelings*; *that Deſire is prepared by ſome* FANCY *or* APPEARANCE; *and this laſt ariſes either thro'* INTELLECTION *or* SENSATION. *Ejuſd.* l. c. 8. p. 157. *Edit. Sylb.*

If it be aſked why nothing has been ſaid concerning *Averſion* and *Evil*, as well as concerning *Volition* and *Good*; the Anſwer is, that *to fly Evil* is *to ſeek Good*; and *to eſcape Evil* is *to obtain Good*; ſo that in the preſent inquiry they are both included.

by

by returning to the point whence we began. Chap. XVII.

'Tis no-unentertaining Speculation to attend to theſe *internal* Motions, as they ariſe from the different prevalence of their different *internal* Cauſes. Within the Soul of *Man* there are *Paſſions*, and a Principle of *Reaſon*: ſometimes the *internal* Motion ariſes from *many Paſſions at once*, and the Soul is like a Sea when agitated by contrary Winds.

——— *æſtuat ingens*
Imo in corde PUDOR, *mixtoque* INSANIA LUCTU (*r*).

Here the Motion is tempeſtuous, and *Reaſon* during the Storm appears to be overwhelmed. At other times ſhe interpoſes, but *without ſucceſs*; and in ſuch caſe the *Motion* is equally turbid and ir-

(*r*) *Æn.* x. 870.

regular.

Chap. XVII.

regular. Thus *Medea*, when ſhe is about to murder her children:

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά·
Θυμὸς δὲ κρείττων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων (*s*).

I know the miſchiefs, that I ſoon ſhall act,
But Paſſion over-rules my better thoughts.

There are times too, when *Reaſon* acts with greater ſucceſs, and when *the Motion* becomes of courſe more placid and ſerene. But whenever ſhe is ſo far able to eſtabliſh her authority, as to have *the Paſſions* obey her uniformly without murmuring or oppoſition, then follows that *orderly*, that *fair and equal Motion*, by which the *Stoics* repreſented even HAPPINESS itſelf, and elegantly called it *the Well-flowing of life* (*t*).

(*s*) *Arrian. Epict.* l. i. c. 28. p. 144. *Edit. Upton. Euripid. Med.* v. 1078, 9.

(*t*) Εὐροια βίου—See *Diog. Laert.* vii. 88.—*Hinc intellecta eſt illa beata vita, ſecundo defluens curſu. Senec. Epiſt.* 120. See alſo of this Treatiſe, p. 261, 262.

BESIDES,

Chap. XVII.

BESIDES the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely *moral*, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely *intellectual*. It is under *this Motion*, that the Man of Speculation *paſſes*, thro' the road of Syllogiſm, from the *ſimpleſt* Truths to the *moſt complicated* Theorems.

AND here it may be remarked, that as pure and original *Truth* is the Object of our *moſt excellent* VOLITION (it being all that we ſeek, conſidered as *Beings intelligent*), ſo is it as ſtrictly and properly the Object of our *moſt excellent* PERCEPTION; there being no perceptive Power, but our *Intellect alone*, that can reach it. 'Tis here then we behold the meaning of an antient and important Doctrine, that THE PRIMARY OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION AND OF VOLITION ARE THE SAME (*u*).

(*u*) Τὸ ΟΡΕΚΤΟΝ καὶ τὸ ΝΟΗΤΟΝ κινεῖ, ἀ κινέμενον· τέτων δὲ ΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΑ, ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ—*The* DESIRABLE

Chap. XVII.

'Tis hence alſo we may learn, that not only ALL GOOD IS TRUTH (as there can be none ſuch *without a reaſon*, from which it is ſo denominated), but alſo that ALL TRUTH IS GOOD, as it is the *ſole purſuit* of the contemplative, the *natural Object* of their Wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious (*x*).

HAVING

DESIRABLE *and the* INTELLIGIBLE *move, without being moved; and of theſe two Genera thoſe Objects, that are* HIGHEST *and* FIRST, *are* THE SAME. *Ariſt. Metaph.* Λ. ζ. p. 202. *Edit. Sylb.*

When a Theorem of *Archimedes* moves within us a *Deſire* to underſtand it; or when, being underſtood, it raiſes within us our neceſſary *Aſſent: we do not conceive the Theorem itſelf to be moved*, either by the Deſire, or by the Aſſent, as the Horſes are moved, that give Motion to the Waggon, or the Waggon moved, that gives motion to it's Load.

(*x*) Tho' we ſeldom hear of *Goods* in our common intercourſe with Mankind, but what have reference to the Body, or at beſt to the *lower* Affections; yet HAS THE HIGHEST FACULTY OF THE SOUL A PECULIAR GOOD, as much as the other faculties have, from

Chap. XVII.

HAVING ſaid thus much concerning *Perception*, and that higheſt Species of *animal Impulſe*, I mean *Volition*, it muſt not be forgot, that there are *other internal Motions* of a very different character, where both *Perception* and *Spontaneous Impulſe* are in a manner *unconcerned*.

WITHIN every Animal there is an INNATE and ACTIVE POWER, which ceaſes not it's work, when Senſe and Appetite are aſleep; which, *without any conſcious co-operation of the Animal itſelf*, carries it from an Embryo or Seed to the maturity of it's proper *Form*. Now ſo far this Power may be called a *Principle of Motion*. At *Maturity* it ſtops (for were

---

from the *intellectual Poſſeſſion* of which Good it ſeeks FELICITY and PEACE.

I loved her (ſays the wiſe Man, ſpeaking of Wiſdom; and what is *Wiſdom*, but the moſt exalted *Truth?*) *I loved her above Health and Beauty, and choſe to have her inſtead of Light: for the Light, that cometh from her, never goeth out.* *Wiſd.* vii. 10.

the

Chap. XVII.

the progreſs infinite, there could be no Maturity at all); and ſo far it may be called a *Principle of Ceſſation* or *Reſt* (*y*). From this point of Reſt it deſerts the Being gradually, and in conſequence of ſuch deſertion the Being gradually decays.

(*y*) Speaking of the difference between the Operation of the *Elements* and mere MATTER, and that of NATURE, and an *internal Principle*, the *Stagirite* obſerves—Τῶν δὲ φύσει συνεστώντων ὥρισται ἤδη καὶ λόγῳ μεγέθους καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἢ πυρὸς, καὶ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης—*As to things, which derive their Conſtitution from* NATURE, *there is a* BOUND *and Proportion in their Magnitude and Growth; and theſe proceed from their* SOUL, *not from the Element of Fire; and are cauſed rather by Reaſon, than by Matter.* *De An.* ii. 4. p. 30. *Edit. Sylb.*—And, not long before, deſcribing a *Phyſical* or *natural* Subſtance, he makes it to be ſomething ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῷ, *which poſſeſſes within itſelf a Principle of* MOTION *and of* REST. *De An.* ii. 1. p. 23. *Edit. Sylb.*

'Tis by *this* Principle that the Magnitude of the Thiſtle, the Oak, the Bee, the Elephant, and every other *natural* Production, whether animal or vegetable, is to a certain degree circumſcribed and *limited*; and when that *Limit* either *fails* or *exceeds* in a conſpicuous manner, the Being becomes a *Monſter*. See Vol. I. p. 295, Note xviii.

—*ſubeunt*

——— *ſubeunt morbi, triſtiſque ſenectus;*
Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mortis (*x*).

Chap. XVII.

As the *Local Motion* of Animals is derived from *Senſe*, and *ſpontaneous Impulſe*; ſo from the *Principle*, juſt deſcribed, are derived their *other* Motions: from it's ACTIVITY, their *Generation*, their *Augment tion*, and *Change to better*; from it's CESSATION, their *Change to worſe*, their *Diminution*, and laſtly *Death* *. 'Tis this is that *internal Principle*, which deſcends from Animals even to Vegetables; and which, as theſe laſt poſſeſs no other, is commonly called VEGETATIVE LIFE, tho' ſometimes it is denoted by the more obvious Name of NATURE (*a*).

(*x*) *Georg.* iii. 67, 68.

* See before, p. 384 to p. 389.

(*a*) See the Definition of NATURE in *Volume the Firſt*, among the Notes on the firſt Treatiſe, p. 257, and more fully in the addition to Note 31, p. 282.

Chap. XVII.

We muſt remember however, that while we ſpeak of *Motion* here, we mean the *inviſible* Cauſe, not the *viſible* Effects; for theſe are *purely phyſical*, and belong to another Speculation. After the ſame manner are we to ſpeak of thoſe other

---

The VEGETATIVE LIFE here mentioned is ſometimes called ψυχὴ φυτικὴ, ſometimes θρεπτικὴ, and at other times τὸ θρεπτικὸν, *the* NUTRITIVE PRINCIPLE; that Principle, which, paſſing thro' *Plants*, as well as *Animals*, never ceaſes to *nouriſh* and ſupport them, thro' the period of their exiſtence—ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ—καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἔνθα αἱ λοιπαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἠρεμοῦσι· τότε γὰρ μάλιστα αἱ πέψεις—THE VEGETATIVE SOUL *energizes at all times, and more during Sleep, when the* OTHER POWERS ARE AT REST; *and therefore 'tis then moſtly are performed the Digeſtions. Philop. in Ariſt. de An.* l. ii.—Τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον ὡς ἐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.—*The* NUTRITIVE *part of the Soul performs it's Work in* SLEEPING, *more than in Waking; for then, more than at any other time, are Animals nouriſhed and enlarged in bulk, as they have* NO NEED OF SENSATION FOR THESE PURPOSES. *Ariſtot. de Somn.* cap. I. *ſub fin.* See before, p. 104.

motive

motive Powers, the Powers of Magnetiſm and Electricity; the *viſible* Motions, which they produce, being of a Species *merely Phyſical*, but the *Cauſe* of theſe Motions lying itſelf *totally concealed*. Whether then we ſuppoſe it a Species of inferior *Life*, and ſay with *Thales*, that the Magnet and the Amber are *animated* (*b*); or whether we content ourſelves with calling it an *internal active* Quality (*occult* we muſt not call it, for that is now forbidden) we may ſafely pronounce it *a Quality*, which, tho' we

Chap. XVII.

(*b*) This Opinion of *Thales* concerning the Magnet's *having a Soul, becauſe it moved Iron* (ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ) may be found in *Ariſt. de An.* l. i. c. 2. p. 7.

Philoponus, in his Comment on this Paſſage, gives us from *Thales* the following Sentiment, which, tho' not immediately to our purpoſe, we have tranſcribed for it's importance—ἔλεγεν, ὡς ἡ Πρόνοια μέχρι τῶν ἐλαχίστων διήκει, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴν λανθάνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλαχιστον· —*He uſed to ſay that* PROVIDENCE *extends to the loweſt of all Beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is moſt minute.* See before, p. 130.

Chap. XVII.

are ſure of it's exiſtence, is not otherwiſe comprehenſible, than *by reference to it's Effects*; as we know *Homer*, who is out of Sight, by his *Iliad*, which lies before us.

THERE is yet *another motive Principle*, far greater *in local extent* than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every Atom of this our Earth has it's proper tendency, but by which even Planets, Satellites, and Comets, deſcribe their Orbits.

ASTRONOMERS will inform us as to the force of MOTION *here*, and how much on it's due Order depends this immenſe Univerſe.

THE beſt of ancient Philoſophers, when they ſaw ſo many *inferior Motions* not to be performed *without Counſel or Deſign*, could not think of imputing ſuch *ſuperior* ones to the efficacy of blind *Chance*;

Chance; and therefore, whatever they might conceive of the *immediate* Cauſe (call it *Gravitation* or *Attraction*, or by any other name) they juſtly ſuppoſed *the primary Cauſe* to be A PRINCIPLE OF INTELLECTION: Chap. XVII.

——— *totam infuſa per artus*
MENS *agitat molem*——— (*c*).

THEY indeed ſo far conſidered MIND *to be the Source* OF ALL MOTION, that 'twas thro' its *Motive* Powers, that they diſtinguiſhed it from *Body*; which laſt was no more than a *paſſive* Subject, poſſeſſing nothing *motive within itſelf*, but deriving all it's Motions from *ſomething elſe*.

'TWAS hence too that they inferred THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.—They reaſoned thus.—"*Vital Motion may*

(*c*) *Æn.* vi. 727.

Chap. XVII.

"*forſake the Body, becauſe to the Body 'tis* "*not an Eſſential; and in ſuch caſe the* "*Body is ſaid to die. But Vital Motion* "*cannot forſake the Soul, becauſe to the* "*Soul 'tis an Eſſential, and 'tis not poſ-* "*ſible that any thing ſhould be forſaken by* "*itſelf (d).*" But this by way of digreſſion.

(d) —*Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque* IPSUM *agitatur* ALICUNDE, *quando finem habet motûs,* VIVENDI FINEM HABEAT *neceſſe eſt.* SOLUM *igitur,* QUOD SEIPSUM MOVET, *quia* NUNQUAM DESERITUR A SE, NUNQUAM *ne moveri quidem deſinit. Quinetiam,* &c. *Cic. Tuſcul. Diſp.* i. 23.

The whole Paſſage, which is rather too long to tranſcribe, is the Tranſlation of an Argument, taken from *Plato's Phædrus.*—Τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινοῦν, καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, κ. τ. λ. *Plat. Edit. Fitini.* p. 1221. *B.*

See *Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis,* c. 13.

Cicero has uſed the ſame Argument in his Tract *de Senectute.*—*Cumque* SEMPER AGITETUR ANIMUS, *nec principium motûs habeat, quia* SE IPSE MOVEAT, NE FINEM QUIDEM *habiturum eſſe* MOTUS, *quia* NUNQUAM SE IPSE SIT RELICTURUS—C. 21.

Quintilian has brought the Argument into the Form of a Syllogiſm.—*Quicquid ex ſeipſo movetur, immortale eſt: Anima autem ex ſeipſâ movetur: immortalis igitur eſt Anima. Inſt. Orat.* V. 14.

As

Chap. XVII.

As to the *riſe* and *duration* of MOTION, the founder of the *Peripatetic* Sect thus ſtates the Queſtion. "*Was* "MOTION (ſays he) *ever generated without exiſting before; and is it ever again* "*ſo deſtroyed, that there is nothing moved;* "*or was it neither generated, nor is de-* "*ſtroyed, but ever was, and will be;* "*ſomething appertaining to Beings, which* "*is immortal and unceaſing; a kind of* "*Life, as it were, to all things that exiſt* "*by the power of Nature* (*e*)"?

THOSE, who meditate an anſwer to theſe Queries, will remember that MOTION *is co-eval with the Univerſe*, ſince we learn that, in its *firſt* and *earlieſt* æra, *the Spirit of God* MOVED *upon the face of the waters**. They will remember too that MOTION is as old as TIME, and their

(*e*) Πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, ἢ ἔστι πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν ὥστε, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν· ἢ ἦν τε ἐγένετο, καὶ φθείρεται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις ἅπασι τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν; *Ariſt. Phyſ.* l. viii. c. 1. p. 144. *Edit. Sylb.*

* *Geneſis* chap. 1.

Chap. XVII.

Coexiſtence ſo neceſſary, it is not poſſible to ſuppoſe *the one*, without ſuppoſing *the other*.

AND thus, having before conſidered PHYSICAL MOTION, have we now conſidered what may be called METAPHYSICAL, or (if I may uſe the expreſſion) CAUSATIVE MOTION; including under this name every ANIMATING POWER, whether *rational* or *irrational*, which, though different from *Body*, *acts upon Body*, cauſing it to live, to grow, and move itſelf and other *Bodies*. Theſe *animating Powers* are only known from their *Effects*, as the Painter's *Art* is known from his *Pictures*. And hence, as 'tis the Effect, which leads us to recogniſe the Cauſe, hence *theſe animating Powers*, tho' *prior in exiſtence* to *Phyſical Effects*, are *neceſſarily ſubſequent in human Contemplation*, and are thence, and thence only called METAPHYSICAL *(f)*.

(f) See 409, 451, 483. As to the character and ſubordination of the ſeveral *Animating Powers*, ſee before p. 421, 422. and ſo on to p. 438. as well in the Text, as in the Notes. See alſo Chapter the Sixth.

Chap. XVII.

AND now, having done with MOTION, we muſt take ſome notice of REST.

THE moſt obvious Species of REST is that oppoſed to the moſt obvious Species of MOTION; ſuch for example as the *Ceſſation of Gales*, after they have been freſh and blowing:

Ingrato celeres obruit OTIO
Ventos——— (*g*).

—the *Ceſſation of Billows*, after they have been loud and tempeſtuous—

SILENCE, *ye troubled Waves, and thou Deep*, PEACE (*h*).

BUT

(*g*) *Horat. Od.* l. i. 16.

(*h*) *Par. Loſt*, vii. 216.

Both theſe Species of *Reſt* are denoted in *Engliſh* by the common name of CALM. The *Greeks*, with their uſual preciſion, have given a different Name to each: the firſt, that is the *Wind-Calm*, they call Νηνεμία, and define it Ἠρεμία ἐν πλήθει ἀέρος, TRAN-

Chap. XVII.

BUT 'tis expedient to be more particular.—The two inſtances of REST, that we have alleged, are of MOTION *purely* LOCAL. So is it, when the *flight* of an Arrow is *ſpent*; when a Bowl, that has been *running*, *ſtops*. But REST is alſo connected with the *other* Species of *Motion*. The *Ceſſation* of *Growth* is *Maturity*; of the *Vital Energies*, is *Death*.

So too with reſpect to the *higher* faculties of the Soul, *Senſe* and *Reaſon*.

TRANQUILLITY *in a quantity of* AIR; the ſecond, that is the *Sea-Calm*, they call Γαλήνη, and define it Ὁμαλότης θαλάττης, EVENESS *in the* SEA'S SURFACE. Theſe definitions are of *Archytas*, and may be found in *Ariſtotle's Metaph.* p. 136. *Edit. Sylb.*

PLATO has brought the two terms together, in thoſe harmonious Lines, delivered by *Agatho* in the *Banquet*—

Εἰρήνην μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ ΓΑΛΗΝΗΝ,
ΝΗΝΕΜΙΑΝ ἀνέμων, κοίτην ὕπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

See *Platon. Symp.* p. 1190, *Editi Fic.* See alſo the learned and ingenious Tranſlation of Mr. *Sydenham*, p. 118.

The

The Reſt of the ſenſitive Powers, after the labours of the day, is SLEEP:

Dulcis et alta QUIES, *placidæque ſimillima Morti* (*i*).

The *Reſt of the Paſſions*, after having been agitated, is COMPOSURE and EQUANIMITY; *the Reſt of the deliberative and reaſoning Powers*, after ſedulous Inveſtigation, is the *Diſcovery* of the thing ſought, or rather the ACQUIESCENCE IN TRUTH diſcovered, either real or apparent, either practical or ſpeculative.

AND hence, in the laſt mode of *Reſt*, or *Acquieſcence*, the riſe of our *Engliſh* Phraſe, *I am fixt*; and of the *Latin* Phraſe, *Stat*:

STAT *conferre manum*—— (*k*).

(*i*) *Æn.* vi. 522.—See before, *Hermes*, p. 52, and of this Volume, p. 336, 337.

(*k*) *Æn.* xii. 678.

The incomparable *Sanctius* in his *Minerva* gives the following excellent explanation of this Paſſage. *Quamdiu*

Chap. XVII.

Hence *Science* in *Greek* is called ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, every Theorem being as it were a *Reſting Place*, at which the man of Science *ſtops* (*l*).

LASTLY, there is a *Reſt* of all the moſt intereſting to mankind, I mean PEACE, that *happy Reſt*, which follows the Trepidations and Ravages of *War*.

AND now having done with REST, let us bring the whole to a concluſion.

---

diu enim deliberatur, *conſilium vacillat, et ſententia* fluctuat; *ubi certum de* ſtatutum eſt, *quod quis facere vult*, conſiſtit *conſilium, et* STATA SENTENTIA. *Sanct. Minerv.* l. iv. c. 4. p. 637. *Edit. Amſt.* 1733.

In *Perizonius's* Note upon this part of *Sanctius*, it appears that SEDET is uſed in the *ſame* ſignification, and for *the ſame reaſons*. See the Note following.

(*l*) —ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ, καὶ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΕΙ μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει—INTELLECTION *appears to reſemble a certain Reſting and* STANDING STILL, *rather than a Motion. De An.* l. i. c. 3. See *Hermes*, p. 368, where this Etymology is treated of more at large.

WE

CHAP. XVII.

WE have ſaid already, that the Cauſe of all *Animal Motion* is GOOD, either real or apparent. It is a farther Requiſite, that it ſhould be GOOD, *which is wanting*; GOOD *at a diſtance*: for were *it preſent*, the *Motion* would then be ſuperfluous. Thus we ſee the meaning of the Philoſophical Critic, *Scaliger*: MOTIONIS ENIM APPETENTIA CAUSA EST; APPETENTIÆ, PRIVATIO (*m*): *The Cauſe of* MOTION *is* APPETITION; *of Appetition, is* PRIVATION. 'Tis to this PRIVATION or WANT, that the Wiſdom of all Ages has imputed Induſtry, Perſeverance, and the Invention of Arts and Sciences.

THIS, in *Virgil*, is the—

— *duris urgens in rebus* EGESTAS (*n*).

(*m*) *Scalig. de Cauſis Ling. Lat.* c. 114.

(*n*) *Geor.* i. 146. See Vol. firſt, p. 257, p. 273, 4, 5.

To

Chap. XVII.

To this alludes *Epicharmus*, the Poet and Philoſopher:

——————— τῶν πόνων
Πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα γὰρ τ' ἀλαθ' οἱ θεοί (o).

——————— *The Gods*
Sell us all Goods at Labour's painful price.

To this alludes *the Scripture*, at Man's earlieſt period,—*In the ſweat of thy face ſhalt thou eat bread* (p).

BUT tho' *Want* be thus eſſential to ſet Man, and not only Man, but all animal Nature, in *Motion*, yet is WANT itſelf an IMPERFECTION; and *to be in want* is *to be imperfect*. And hence it follows, that true Greatneſs, or Superiority of Nature, conſiſts not in having *many* Wants, even tho' we can find means to get them

(o) *Xenoph. Mem.* l. ii. c. 1.

(p) *Gen.* iii. 19.

gratified;

gratified; but in having *as few as poſſible*, and thoſe within the compaſs of *our own* abilities. Chap. XVII.

'Tis to this Doctrine that *Virgil* nobly alludes, when he makes *Evander* with an heroic dignity receive *Eneas*, not at the gates of a proud Palace, but at the Door of an humble Cottage:

Ut ventum ad ſedes, hæc, inquit, limina victor
Alcides ſubiit; hæc illum regia cepit:
AUDE, *hoſpes*, CONTEMNERE OPES, *et te* QUOQUE DIGNUM
FINGE DEO; *rebuſque veni non aſper egenis* (q).

Conformable to the *ſame* way of thinking is what *Socrates* ſays to *Antipho* in *Xenophon*: "*You* SEEM (ſays he) *O Antipho, to be one of thoſe, who imagine*

(q) *Æn.* viii. 362.

"*Happi-*

Chap. XVII.

" *Happineſs to be Luxury and Expence.*
" *But I for my part eſteem* THE WANT-
" ING OF NOTHING, *to be* DIVINE; *and*
" THE WANTING OF AS LITTLE AS
" POSSIBLE, *to come* NEAREST TO THE
" DIVINITY; *and, as* THE DIVINITY IS
" MOST EXCELLENT, *ſo the being* NEAREST
" TO THE DIVINITY *is the being* NEAREST
" TO THE MOST EXCELLENT (*r*)".

ARISTOTLE ſeems to have followed his old Maſter (for ſuch was *Socrates*), with reſpect to this Sentiment. " *To*
" *that Being*, (ſays he) *which is* IN THE
" MOST EXCELLENT STATE, HAPPINESS
" *appears to appertain* WITHOUT ACTION
" AT ALL; *to the* BEING NEAREST *to*
" *the moſt perfect, thro' a* SMALL *and*

(*r*) Ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυτάτω τῆ Θεία· καὶ τὸ μὲν Θεῖον, κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τῆ Θεία, ἐγγυτάτω τῆ κρατίστῳ. *Xenoph. Mem.* l. i. c. 6. Sect. 10.

" SINGLE

Chap. XVII.

" SINGLE ACTION; *to thoſe* THE MOST " REMOTE, *thro'* ACTIONS MANY AND " VARIOUS (*s*)." He ſoon after ſubjoins the reaſon, why *the moſt excellent Being has no need of Action.* " *It has* (ſays he) " WITHIN ITSELF THE FINAL CAUSE," that is to ſay, *perfect Happineſs: but* ACTION ALWAYS EXISTS IN TWO, *when there is both* A FINAL CAUSE, *and* A POWER TO OBTAIN IT, each of them *ſeparate*, and detached from one another (*t*).

AND

(*s*) Ἔοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως· τῷ δὲ ἰσχύτατα, διὰ ὀλίγης καὶ μιᾶς· τοῖς δὲ πορρώτατα, διὰ πλειόνων. *Ariſt. de Cælo.* l. ii. c. 12. p. 54. *Edit. Sylb.*

(*t*) Τῷ δ' οὐκ ἄριστα ἔχοντι ἐδὲν δεῖ πράξεως, ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ἐστὶν ἀεὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ὅταν καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾖ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα. *Ibid.*

The following Remark may perhaps explain this Sentiment, if it ſhould appear obſcure.

When *a Being* finds it's *Good fully and wholly within itſelf*, then, *itſelf* and it's *Good* being ONE, it finds *no*

Chap. XVII.

AND hence perhaps we may be able to diſcern, why IMMOBILITY ſhould be a peculiar Attribute to the SUPREME and DIVINE NATURE, in contradiſtinction to ALL OTHER Beings, endued with Powers of PERCEPTION. To Him there

---

Cauſe of Motion, to *ſeek* that, which it poſſeſſes *already*. Such Being therefore, from it's very nature, is IMMOVEABLE.

But when *a Being* and it's *Good* are ſeparate, here, as they neceſſarily are TWO, the *diſtant Good*, by being perceived, becomes a FINAL CAUSE OF MOTION, and thus awakens *within* the *Being* a certain DESIRE, of which *Deſire* MOTION is the natural Conſequence. SUCH BEING therefore by its nature is MOVEABLE.

Ammonius, in the following Quotation, appears to have had this Doctrine and theſe Paſſages of *Ariſtotle* in his view.

Ὅσα γὰρ πλειόνων τινῶν δέεται, πλείονας κινήσεις κινεῖται· τὰ δὲ ὀλιγοδεᾶ, ὀλιγοκίνητα· ἀμέλει τὸ Θεῖον, ἀνενδεὲς ὂν, καὶ πάντη ἐστὶν ἀκίνητον—*All ſuch Beings, as are in want of many things, are moved in many Motions; thoſe, who have few Wants, have few Motions; but* THE DIVINITY, *being* WITHOUT WANTS, *is therefore* PERFECTLY IMMOVEABLE. *Ammon. in Præd.* 144. *B.* 145.

are

are *no Wants, nothing abſent which is Good,* being himſelf the very Eſſence of pure Perfection and Goodneſs *(u)*. Chap. XVII.

AND ſo much for that MOTION which, tho' *ſubſequent in contemplation to the Phyſical (x)*, and thence called METAPHYSICAL, is yet truly *prior* to it in the *real order* of Beings, becauſe it appertains to *the Firſt Philoſophy*. So much alſo for the Theory of MOTION.

(*u*) See before, p. 161, 162.

(*x*) See before, p. 409.

CHAP. XVIII.

Concluſion — Utilities deducible from the Theory of theſe Arrangements—Recapitulation.

Chap. XVIII.

AND thus having finiſhed the Doctrine of *theſe* PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, or, in other words, of CATEGORIES, PREDICAMENTS, COMPREHENSIVE or UNIVERSAL GENERA, (for we have called them indifferently by every one of theſe names) together with ſuch Speculations both *previous* and *ſubſequent* (*a*), as were either requiſite to explain the Subject, or elſe naturally aroſe out of it; we imagine *the Utilities* of this knowlege will be obvious to every one, who has ſtudied it with impar-

(*a*) See before, p. 35, 36, 360, 361, and below, p. 464.

tiality,

tiality, and has aimed to know, what it *really* is. Chap. XVIII.

In the firſt place, as we have uſually begun the conſideration of each Arrangement from Speculations reſpecting Body, and have thence made a Tranſition to others reſpecting Mind; we may hence mark *the Connection between theſe* two great Principles, which ſtand related to each other, as the Subject and its Efficient Cause, and in virtue of that Relation may be ſaid *to run thro' all things* (*b*).

Again, our Mind, by this *orderly* and *comprehenſive* Theory, becoming furniſhed, like a good Library, with proper Cells or Apartments, we know where to place our Ideas both of *Being* and it's *Attributes*, and where to look for them again, when we have occaſion to call

(*b*) See before, p. 34.

Chap. XVIII.

them forth. Without ſome ARRANGEMENT of this ſort, the Mind is ſo far from *increaſing* in Knowlege by the Acquiſition of *new* Ideas, that, while it increaſes the *Number* of theſe, it does but increaſe it's own *Perplexity*. It is no longer a Library well regulated, but a Library crowded and confuſed,

——— *ubi multa ſuperſunt,*
Et dominum fallunt ——— (c).

AGAIN, as theſe ARRANGEMENTS have a neceſſary Connection *with the whole of Exiſtence*; with all BEING or SUBSTANCE on one hand, with every poſſible ACCIDENT or ATTRIBUTE on the other: it follows of courſe that *ſo general* a Speculation muſt have naturally introduced many others; Speculations, not merely *Logical*, but extending to *Phyſics*, to *Ethics*, and even to *the Firſt*

(c) *Horat. Epiſt.* l. i. 6.

Philo-

Philoſophy (d). The Reader from theſe incidental Theorems (if the Author has ſucceeded in his endeavours to repreſent them) will have a taſte how *the Ancients* wrote, when they reaſoned upon theſe Subjects, and may gratify his curioſity (if he pleaſe) by comparing them with *the Moderns.* Chap. XVIII.

It was not from an oſtentatious wiſh to fill his page with Quotations, that the Author has made ſuch frequent and copious extracts from other Authors. He flatters himſelf, that by this he has not only given authority to the Sentiments, but relieved alſo a Subject, in itſelf rather ſevere. From the Writers alleged, both ancient and modern, the Reader will perceive, how important and reſpectable theſe Authorities are. He will perceive too, that, in the wide regions of *Being*, ſome Sages having cultivated one part,

(d) See before, p. 16.

Chap. XVIII.

and ſome another, the Labours of Ancients and Moderns have been often different, when not hoſtile; often various, when not contradictory; and that, among the valuable diſcoveries of *later* periods, there are many ſo far from claſhing with the *ancient* doctrines here advanced, that they coincide as amicably, as a CHILLINGWORTH and an ADDISON in the ſame Library; a RAPHAEL and a CLAUDE in the ſame Gallery.

IT is not without precedents, that he has adopted this manner of *Citation*. It was adopted by *Ariſtotle* long ago in his *Rhetoric* and his *Poetics*. *Ariſtotle* was followed by thoſe able Critics, *Demetrius*, *Quinctilian*, and *Longinus*. *Chryſippus*, the Philoſopher, ſo much approved the method, that in a ſingle Tract he inſerted nearly the whole of that celebrated Tragedy, the *Medea* of *Euripides*: ſo that a perſon, who was peruſing the Tract, being aſked what he was reading, replied

replied pleaſantly, *'Twas the Medea of Chryſippus* (*e*). *Cicero* has enriched his philoſophic Treatiſes with many choice morſels both from *Greek* and *Roman* Writers; and this he does, not only approving the practice himſelf, but juſtifying it by the practice of the Philoſophers then at *Athens*, among whom he names *Dionyſius* the *Stoic*, and *Philo the Academic* (*f*). *Seneca* and *Plutarch* both purſued the ſame plan, the latter more particularly in his *moral* Compoſitions. To theſe may be added, tho' of a baſer age, my own learned Countryman, *John* of *Saliſbury* (*g*), who, having peruſed and ſtudied

(*e*) *Diog. Laert.* l. vii. § 180.

(*f*) *Tuſc. Diſput.* l. ii. § 10.

(*g*) This extraordinary Man flouriſhed in the reign of *Henry the ſecond*, and was therefore of *Old Saliſbury*, not of *New Saliſbury*, which was not founded till the reign of *Henry the third*. *John* (of whom we write) having had the beſt Education of the time, and being not only a Genius, but intimate with the moſt eminent Men, in particular with Pope *Adrian* (who

Chap. XVIII.

ſtudied moſt of the *Latin* Claſſics, appears to have decorated every part of his Works with ſplendid fragments, extracted out of them. Two later Writers of Genius have done the ſame in the narrative of their Travels; *Sandys* at the beginning of the laſt Century, and *Addiſon* at the beginning of the preſent.

And ſo much by way of Apology for the Author himſelf. But he has a farther Wiſh in this exhibition of capital Writers; a Wiſh to perſuade his Readers, of what he has been long perſuaded himſelf, that every thing really *elegant*, or *ſublime* in compoſition, is ultimately referable to the Principles of a *ſound Logic*; that thoſe Principles, when Readers little think of them, have ſtill a *latent*

(who was himſelf an *Engliſhman*) became at length a Biſhop, and died in the year 1182. See *Fabricius* in his *Biblioth. Lat.* v. ii. p. 368, and in his *Biblioth. Med. et Infim. ætat.* See alſo *Cave's Hiſtor. Literar.* v. ii. p. 243.

force,

force, and may be traced, if ſought after, even in the politeſt of Writers *. Chap. XVIII.

By reaſoning of this kind he would eſtabliſh an important *Union*; the Union he means between Taste and Truth. 'Tis this is that ſplendid Union, which produced the *Claſſics* of pure *Antiquity*; which produced, in times leſs remote, the *Claſſics* of *modern* days; and which thoſe, who *now* write, ought to cultivate with attention, if they have a wiſh to ſurvive in the eſtimation of poſterity.

Taste is, in fact, but a Species of inferior *Truth*. 'Tis the *Truth of Elegance*, of *Decoration*, and of *Grace*; which, as *all Truth* is *ſimilar* and *congenial*, *coincides* as it were *ſpontaneouſly* with the more *ſevere* and *logical*; but which, whenever *deſtitute* of that more ſolid ſupport, reſembles ſome fair but languid

* See the numerous Quotations thro' every part of this Treatiſe.

Body;

Chap. XVIII.

Body; a Body, ſpecious in feature, but deficient as to nerve; a Body, where we ſeek in vain for that natural and juſt perfection, which ariſes from the pleaſing harmony of Strength and Beauty aſſociated.

RECOMMENDING an earneſt Attention to *this Union*, we reſume our Subject by obſerving, that 'tis in contemplating theſe *orderly*, theſe *comprehenſive* ARRANGEMENTS (*h*), we may ſee whence the *ſubordinate*

(*h*) There are few Theories ſo great, ſo comprehenſive, and ſo *various*, as the Theory of theſe PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The Ancients had many methods of repreſenting Works of ſuch a *diverſified* and *miſcellaneous* character.

Fruits of various kinds, promiſcuouſly blended, uſed to be preſented *in a Diſh*, as an offering to *Ceres*. THIS DISH, SO FILLED, they called LANX SATURA; and hence LANX SATURA, or rather *Satura*, or *Satira alone* (*Lanx* being underſtood) came to ſignify by metaphor a *miſcellaneous* writing; ſuch as were the Compoſitions of *Lucilius*, *Horace*, *Perſius*, *Juvenal*, and others.

A *Satire*

ordinate Sciences and Arts all ariſe: *Hiſtory*, natural and civil, out of SUBSTANCE; Chap. XVIII

A *Satire* in this ſenſe did not mean Sarcaſm, Calumny, or perſonal Abuſe; it meant no more than a Writing, where the *Subject* was *various* and *diverſified*, ſuch as *Juvenal* well deſcribes it, when he ſpeaks of his own works:

Quicquid agunt homines, noſtri eſt FARRAGO *libelli.*

Again, we all know that GROVES and FORESTS are *diverſified* with Trees; with Trees of various Figures, Magnitudes, and Species; and hence it was that *Statius* called his *miſcellany Collections* of Poems by the name of SILVÆ.

Now it was from theſe ideas that Mr. *Stuart*, with his uſual Taſte and Claſſical Elegance, has deſigned the Frontiſpiece, which adorns this Volume.

We there behold a Temple of the *Tuſcan* Order, dedicated to *Ceres*; to which Goddeſs a *Roman* of diſtinction, with proper attendants about him, is making an offering of the LANX SATURA, or *Diſh of promiſcuous Fruits*. Behind we ſee a GROVE, which, beſides *the propriety* of being an *uſual* place for *Temples*, has a fine effect in forming the back-ground of the Piece.

The LANX SATURA and the GROVE equally contribute to denote *the Miſcellaneous Character of theſe* PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

This Account of the *Lanx Satura* is taken from *Diomedes* the Grammarian, and may be found in the Preface

Chap. VIII.

STANCE; *Mathematics*, out of QUANTITY; *Optics*, out of QUALITY and QUANTITY; *Medicine*, out of *the ſame*; *Aſtronomy*, out of QUANTITY and MOTION; *Muſic* and *Mechanics*, out of the *ſame*; *Painting*, out of QUALITY and SITE; Ethics, out of RELATION; *Chronology*, out of WHEN; *Geography*, out of WHERE; *Electricity*, *Magnetiſm*, and *Attraction*, out of ACTION and PASSION; and ſo in other inſtances.

EVERY Art and every Science being thus referred to it's *proper Principle*, we ſhall be enabled with ſufficient accuracy *to adjuſt their comparative value* (*k*), by comparing the ſeveral Principles, from which they ſeverally flow. Thus ſhall we be ſaved from abſurdly *overprizing a ſingle Art*, or *a ſingle Science*, and from

---

Preface of *Dacier* to his Tranſlation of *Horace's* Satires, and in the ſame Preface, prefixed alſo to the *Satires* of the *Delphin Horace*.

(*k*) See before, p. 34, 35.

treat-

treating all the reſt with a ſort of inſolent contempt; advantages ſo little to be expected from any Knowlege *leſs extenſive*, that, on the contrary, the more deeply knowing Men may be in *a ſingle Subject alone*, the more likely are they to fall into ſuch narrow and illiberal Sentiments.

It is indeed no wonder in ſuch caſe, that miſtakes ſhould ariſe, ſince thoſe, who reaſon thus, be they as accurate as may be in *their own* particular Science, will be found to reaſon about *one* thing, which they know, and about *many*, of which they are ignorant; and how from Reaſoners ſuch as theſe, ſo inadequately prepared, can we expect either an exact, or an impartial Eſtimate?

And thus much at preſent for the Speculation concerning Predicaments, or Philosophical Arrangements; in the treating of which, we have conſidered *in the*

Chap. XVIII.

the Beginning (*l*) ſuch matters as were neceſſarily *previous*; in the *Middle* (*m*) we have conſidered the ARRANGEMENTS *themſelves*; and, *in the End* (*n*), various matters, naturally *ariſing out of them*, or which have *incidentally occurred* during the time of their being diſcuſſed.

AND thus *this* Part of *Logical Speculation* appears to be finiſhed.

(*l*) See Chapter the *firſt* and *ſecond*.

(*m*) See from Chapter the *third* to Chapter the *fourteenth* incluſive.

(*n*) See from Chapter the *fifteenth* to the *Concluſion*.

THE END.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAGE 2.——SO EAGER WAS CATO FOR KNOWLEGE, *&c.*] Thus *Cicero* deſcribes him—*quippe qui, ne reprehenſionem quidem volgi inanem reformidans, in ipſâ curiâ ſoleret legere ſæpè, dum Senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ Reipublicæ detrahens.*—*De Fin.* III. 2.——Where 'tis worth remarking, that CATO conſidered his Application to *Literature* as no way obſtructing his Duty to the *Commonwealth*. The *Studious* character and the *Political* in Him were *united*.

Ibid.——THE PATRIOT BRUTUS FOUND TIME NOT ONLY TO STUDY, BUT TO COMPOSE A TREATISE UPON VIRTUE.] Thus the ſame *Cicero*—*Placere enim tibi* (Bruto ſcil.) *admodum ſenſi, et ex eo libro quem ad me accuratiſſimè ſcripſiſti, et ex multis ſermonibus tuis, Virtutem ad beatè vivendum ſe ipſâ eſſe contentam. Tuſcul. Diſput.* v. 1. And again,——*provocatus gratiſſimo mihi libro, quem de* VIRTUTE *ſcripſiſti.* De Fin. l. 3.

One or two ſhort fragments of this Treatiſe of *Brutus* are preſerved in *Seneca, De Conſolat. ad Helv.* C. ix.

AS to PERICLES, EPAMINONDAS, and the other great names mentioned in the ſame page with CATO and BRUTUS, ſee the note immediately following.

P. 5.——FOR THE SPLENDOR OF THEIR ACTIVE CHARACTER] The following authorities may ſerve to confirm the truth of this aſſertion.

In PLUTARCH's life of PERICLES we read as follows —Ὁ δὲ πλεῖϛα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος, καὶ μάλιϛα περιθεὶς ὄϊκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέϛερον, ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τῇ ἤθει, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομένιος, ὃν οἱ τότ' ἄνθρωποι ΝΟΥΝ προσηγόρευον. *But he, who was moſt converſant with* PERICLES, *and moſt contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high ſpirit for governing the popular Aſſemblies more weighty and authoritative; in a word, who exalted his ideas, and raiſed at the ſame time the dignity of his behaviour: the perſon, who did this, was* ANAXAGORAS, *the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age uſed to call* ΝΟΥΣ *or* MIND. *Plut. in Vit. Periclis*, p. 154. B. *Edit. Xyland.*

PLUTARCH ſoon after gives good reaſons for this appellation of ANAXAGORAS, viz. his great abilities, and his being the firſt who made MIND or INTELLECT (in oppoſition to CHANCE) a Principle in the Formation and Government of the Univerſe.

The Words of ANAXAGORAS on this ſubject, though well known, are well worth citing——Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα ΝΟΥΣ ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. *All things were* BLENDED TOGETHER: *then came* MIND (or an Intelligent Principle) *and gave them* ARRANGEMENT. *Diog. Laert.* II. 6.

EPAM-

EPAMINONDAS, in his *political* capacity, was ſo great a man, that he raiſed his Country, the Commonwealth of THEBES, from a contemptible ſtate to take the lead in *Greece*; a dignity which *the Thebans* had never known before, and which fell, upon *his* loſs, never to riſe again. The ſame man was a pattern in private life of every thing virtuous and amiable; ſo that *Juſtin* well remarks—*fuit autem incertum, vir melior, an dux, eſſet.*

CORNELIUS NEPOS, having recorded the other parts of his Education, adds—*at* PHILOSOPHIÆ PRÆCEPTOREM *habuit* LYSIM, *Tarentinum*, PYTHAGOREUM; *cui quidem ſic fuit deditus, ut adoleſcens triſtem et ſeverum ſenem omnibus æqualibus ſuis in familiaritate antepoſuerit, neque prius cum a ſe diniſerit, quam doctrinis tanto antecelſit condiſcipulos, ut facile intelligi poſſet pari modo ſuperaturum omnes in cæteris artibus.* *Corn. Nep. in Vit. Epaminon.* c. 2. *Juſtin. Hiſ.* VI. 8. *Cicer. de Oratore* III. 34.

As for ALEXANDER the Great, we may form a judgment, what ſort of Education his Father PHILIP wiſhed him to have, from that curious Epiſtle which he wrote to ARISTOTLE, upon ALEXANDER's birth. It is in its character ſo ſimple and elegant, that we have given it intire, as preſerved by *Aulus Gellius*:

Φίλιππος Ἀριστοτέλει χαίρειν.

Ἴσθι μοι γεγονότα υἱόν· πολλὴν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχω, ἐχ ὕτων ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει τῦ παιδὸς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν σὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι· ἐλπίζω γὰρ αὐτὸν, ὑπὸ σῦ τραφέντα κὴ παιδευθέντα, ἄξιον ἔσεθαι κὴ ἡμῶν, κὴ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων διαδοχῆς.

PHILIP *to* ARISTOTLE *greeting.*

Know that I have a Son born. On this account I am greatly thankful to the Gods, not ſo much for the birth of the child, as for his being born DURING YOUR TIMES: *for I hope that by his being bred, and educated* UNDER YOU, *he will become worthy of us, and* WORTHY TO SUCCEED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AFFAIRS. *A. Gell.* IX. 3.

What in fact *this education* was, we may learn not only from ALEXANDER's Hiſtory, but from an obſervation of *Plutarch*, in anſwer to an objection, how *Alexander could venture to attack ſuch an immenſe power as the* PERSIAN *with ſuch contemptible forces of his own. Plutarch* ſays, that no forces could be greater or fairer than the ſeveral accompliſhments of ALEXANDER's Mind—and concludes, *that he marched againſt the Perſians with better ſupplies from his Preceptor* ARISTOTLE, *than from his Father* PHILIP.——πλείονας παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους τῆς καθηγητοῦ, ἢ παρὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφορμὰς ἔχων, διέβαινεν ἐπὶ Πέρσας. *Plut. de Alex. Fort.* p. 327. *Edit. Xyland.*

As for SCIPIO, the illuſtrious Conqueror of *Carthage*, we have this account of him and his Companion POLYBIUS (to whom we may add alſo PANÆTIUS) from VELLEIUS PATERCULUS——SCIPIO *tam elegans liberalium ſtudiorum, omniſque doctrinæ et auctor et admirator fuit, ut* POLYBIUM PANÆTIUMque, *præcellentes ingenio viros, domi militiæque ſecum habuerit. Neque enim quiſquam hoc Scipione elegantiùs intervalla negotiorum otio diſpunxit, ſemperque aut belli, aut pacis ſervivit artibus; ſemperque inter arma et ſtudia verſatus, aut* CORPUS PERICULIS, *aut* ANIMUM DISCIPLINIS *exercuit. Vell. Paterc. Hiſtor.* L. I. p. 19 *Edit. Lipſii.*

During

During the *campaigns* of SCIPIO, POLYBIUS attended him even in the time of Action or Engagement; as, for example, in that bold attempt, when SCIPIO, with POLYBIUS and thirty Soldiers only, undermined one of the Gates of *Carthage*. See *Ammian. Marcel.* L. XXIV. 2.

During more quiet intervals *Polybius* did not forget the duties of a Friend, or the dignity of a Philoſopher, but gave advice, and that ſuitable to the character which SCIPIO wiſhed to ſupport in the Commonwealth. Among other things he adviſed him (as PLUTARCH informs us) never to quit *the Forum, or place of public reſort, before he had made himſelf ſome Friend, who was intimately converſant in the conduct of his fellow-citizens*—— μὴ πρότερον ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ φίλον τινὰ ποιήσασθαι, σύνεγγυς ὄντα τῶν πράξεων τῶν πολιτῶν. *Plut. Sympoſiac.* L. III. p. 659. *Edit. Xyl.*

To theſe inſtances we may add the peculiar regard which CÆSAR had for the Philoſopher ARISTO, and POMPEY for the Philoſopher CRATIPPUS. *Ælian* well remarks on theſe two great *Romans*, that, *they did not, becauſe their power was great, deſpiſe thoſe who had the power of doing them the greateſt Services:* ὑ γὰρ, ἐπεὶ μέγα ἐδύναντο, ὑπερεφρόνουν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὀνῆσαι δυναμένων. *Ælian. Var. Hiſt.* VII. 21.

In the ſame author, L. III. C. 17. there is an expreſs diſſertation on this ſubject, worthy of peruſal, as being filled with examples both from the *Grecian* and *Roman* Hiſtory.

To theſe citations I ſhall add only one or two more.—*Et certè non tulit ullos hæc Civitas aut gloriâ clariores, aut auctoritate graviores, aut humanitate politiores, P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui ſecum eruditiſſimos homines ex Græciâ palam ſemper habuerunt.* Cic. *de Orat.* III. 37.

In the ſame work, *to prove the Union of the* PHILOSOPHICAL *character and the* POLITICAL, we have the following teſtimony, taken from the hiſtory of thoſe Sages, ſo much celebrated in antiquity, PITTACUS, BIAS, SOLON, &c. *Hi omnes, præter Mileſium* THALEM, CIVITATIBUS SUIS PRÆFUERUNT. *De Orator.* III. 34.

See alſo *Cicero*'s tract ſtiled *Orator*, Sect. 15. p. 137. *Edit. Oxon.* and the *Phædrus* of *Plato*, p. 1237, *Edit. Ficini*, in both which places the intimacy above-mentioned between PERICLES and ANAXAGORAS is recorded, and the importance alſo of this intimacy, as to the weight it gave PERICLES in the Commonwealth of *Athens*.

P. 55——TO THE BETTER CO-ARRANGEMENT OF, &c.] To the Quotations here given may be added the following one from VARRO.

PYTHAGORAS *Samius ait omnium rerum initia eſſe Bina: ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem; quare item duo, ſtatus et motus. Quod ſtat aut agitur, Corpus: ubi agitatur, Locus: dum agitatur, Tempus: quod eſt in agitatu, Actio. Quadripartitio magis ſic elucebit: Corpus eſt, ut curſor: Locus, ſtadium quâ currit: Tempus, hora quâ currit: Actio, curſio. Quare fit, ut omnia ferè ſint quadripartita, et ea æterna, quod neque unquam Tempus, quin fuerit Motus, (ejus enim*

inter-

intervallum Tempus ;) neque Motus, ubi non Locus et Corpus ; (quòd alterum eſt, quod movetur ; alterum, ubi ;) neque, ubi ſit agitatus, non Actio ibi. Igitur Initiorum quadrigæ, LOCUS *et* CORPUS, TEMPUS *et* ACTIO.

PYTHAGORAS *the Samian ſays that the Principles of all things are two and two, or double : as for example, Finite and Infinite, Good and Evil, Life and Death, Day and Night ; and by the ſame rule, Reſt and Motion.* [In theſe laſt] *that which reſts or is agitated, is* BODY ; *the Where it is agitated, is* PLACE ; *the Whilſt it is agitated, is* TIME ; *and in the agitation itſelf we view the* ACTION.

This fourfold Diviſion will better appear as follows. Call BODY, *the Perſon who runs ; call* PLACE, *the Courſe, over which he runs ; call* TIME, *the hour during which he runs ; and let the Race or Running, be called the* ACTION.

Now it happens, that almoſt all things are in this manner fourfold, and this fourfold Diviſion is as it were eternal. The reaſon is, there never was Time, but there muſt have been Motion, (of which Time indeed is but the Interval ;) *nor Motion, but where there muſt have been Place and Body ; (one of which is the thing moved ; the other, that where it is moved ;) nor Agitation, but where there muſt have been Action.*

And hence it follows, that PLACE *and* BODY, TIME *and* ACTION, *form, as it were, a joint Quaternion of Principles. Varr. de Ling. Lat.* L. 4. p. 7 *Edit. Amſtel.*

We have given this Paſſage at length, not only as it explains *Co-arrangement*, but as it exhibits to us *four* of thoſe Predicaments or Arrangements, which make Parts

of this Treatiſe, viz. SUBSTANCE, WHEN, WHERE, ACTION.

P. 85.—— OF PURE AND ORIGINAL BODY]—— Συνεχὶς μὲν ἂν ἐϛι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· σῶμα δὲ, τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν· μεγέθους δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἓν, γραμμὴ· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, ἐπίπεδον· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, σῶμα· καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔϛιν ἄλλο μέγεθος, διὰ τὸ τὰ τρία πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τρὶς πάντῃ.—CONTINUOUS *is that, which is diviſible into Parts infinitely diviſible*; BODY *is that, which is every way diviſible. Of Extenſions, that which is diviſible one way, is a* LINE; *that which is diviſible two ways, is a* SUPERFICIES; *that which is diviſible three ways is* BODY; *and beſides theſe, there is no other Extenſion, becauſe* THREE *are* ALL, *and* THRICE [*Diviſible*] *is* EVERY WAY [*Diviſible*]. *Ariſtot. de Cælo*, L. I. c. 1.

In Support of this laſt Idea (that the Term THREE implies ALL) *Ariſtotle* refers to the common practice of his own Language—τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ΑΜΦΩ λέγομεν, καὶ τὲς δύο ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΥΣ, ΠΑ ΤΑ δ' ὲ λέγομεν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν φαμὲν πρῶτον. *We call* (ſays he) TWO THINGS, *or* TWO PERSONS, BOTH; *but we do not call them* ALL: *it is with regard to* THREE, *that we firſt apply* THIS APPELLATION (viz. the Appellation of ALL.) *Ariſt. in loc.*

This is true likewiſe in *Latin*; and is true alſo in *Engliſh*. Even the vulgar with us would be ſurpriſed were they to hear any one ſay, *Give me* ALL TWO, inſtead of *Give me* BOTH.

For the Grammatical Idea of BOTH ſee *Hermes*, p. 226.

The

The *French*, by a ſtrange ſoleciſm, ſay TOUS DEUX, a fault which we ſhould not expect in an elegant language, corrected and refined by ſo many able writers.

P. 90.——CAN NEVER SUBSIST WITHOUT IT.] MATTER and ATTRIBUTE are eſſentially *diſtinct*, yet like Convex and Concave, they are by nature *inſeparable*.

We have already ſpoken as to the *Inſeparability of Attributes*: we now ſpeak as *to that of Matter*.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν ὕλην τινὰ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀλλὰ ταύτην ἐ χωριστὴν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐναντιώσεως—*We ſay there is a certain* MATTER *belonging to all Bodies, the Objects of Senſe; a Matter,* NOT SEPARABLE, *but ever exiſting with ſome Contrariety.*

Soon after—Ἀρχὴν μὲν ϗ πρώτην ὑποθεμένους εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις—*Firſt, and for a Principle, we lay down* MATTER, *which is* INSEPARABLE *from the Contraries, and is their* SUBJECT *or* SUBSTRATUM. *Ariſt. de Gen. et Corr.* Lib. 2. p. 34, 35. *Edit. Sylb.*

By *Contraries* in this place he means the ſeveral Attributes of *Matter*, ſuch as Hot and Cold, Black and White; Moiſt and Dry, *&c.* which are all of them Contrary one to the other, from ſome or other of which Matter is always INSEPARABLE.

P. 116.——ANIMATING FORMS, WHICH THOUGH THEMSELVES NOT BODY, ARE YET] —ὅσων γάρ ἐσιν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν· οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν. ὥστε ϗ

ἢ θύραθεν εἰσίναι ἀδύνατον——χείπεται δὲ τὸν ΝΟΥΝ ΜΟΝΟΝ θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ ΘΕΙΟΝ εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῆ τῆ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια—— *As many Faculties or Principles of the Soul as require bodily or corporeal Energy*, [that is, which require a Body or an Organ to enable them to act] *theſe, 'tis evident, cannot exiſt without a Body; as for example, the locomotive Faculty of walking cannot exiſt without Feet: ſo that for ſuch Faculties to paſs into the Body from without* [originally ſeparate and detached from it] *is a thing impoſſible.——It remains therefore that* MIND *or* INTELLECT ALONE *ſhould paſs into us* FROM WITHOUT [that is, be ſeparate and wholly detached] *and ſhould* ALONE *be ſomething* DIVINE; *becauſe with the Energy of this Faculty Bodily Energy has no communication*—that is, there is no want of *corporeal* Organs for *reaſoning* and *thinking*, as there is want of Eyes, for *Seeing*, or of Ears for *Hearing*. *Ariſt. de Animal. Gen.* L. II. c. 3. p. 208, 209, *Edit. Sylb.*

In another Place, ſpeaking of thoſe Parts of the Soul, which are inſeparable from Body, becauſe *they cannot energize* without it, he adds——*There is however no objection why ſome Parts ſhould not be ſeparable; and that, becauſe they are the Energies of no one Body whatever. Beſides* (he goes on and ſays) *it is not yet evident, whether the Soul may be not the Life and Energy of the Body, in the ſame manner as the Pilot is the Life and Energy of the Ship.*—Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔνιά γε οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. Ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον, εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πλοίου. *Ariſt. de Animâ*, II. c. 1.

In this laſt inſtance he gives a fine illuſtration of the *Supreme* and *divine Part* of the Soul, that is, the MIND or INTELLECT. It belongs (it ſeems) to the Body, as a Pi-

a Pilot does to the Ship; *within* which Ship, though the Pilot exiſt, and which ſaid ſhip though the Pilot *govern*, yet is the Pilot notwithſtanding *no part* of the Ship: he may leave it *without change* either in the Ship or in himſelf; and *may ſtill* (we know) *exiſt when the Ship is no more.*

P. 129. —— EA CURA QUIETOS SOLLICITAT?] 'Twas the advice of the EPICUREANS with regard to *themſelves, not to marry, not to have children, not to engage in public affairs*——οὐ γὰρ γαμητέον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ παιδοποιητέον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πολιτευτέον. *Arrian. Epict.* III. 7. p. 384. *Edit. Upt.* The *political* Life, according to them, was like that of *Siſiphus*, a Life of labour which knew no end.

Hoc eſt adverſo nixantem tundere monte
Saxum, quod tamen a ſummo jam vertice rurſum
Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora campi.
Lucret. III. 1013, *&c.*

Hence, with regard to *their Gods*, they provided them a ſimilar Felicity; a Felicity, like their own, detached from all attention. Thus HORACE, when an *Epicurean*——

——*Deos didici* SECURUM AGERE ÆVUM,
Nec, ſi quid miri faciat natura, DEOS *id*
TRISTES *ex alto cæli demittere tecto.*
Hor. Lib. I, Sat. V.

Thus EPICURUS himſelf—τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει—— *That which is* BLESSED *and* IMMORTAL (meaning the Divine Nature) HAS NEITHER ITSELF ANY BUSINESS, *nor does it find buſineſs for any other. Diog. Laert.* x. 139.

AUSO-

AUSONIUS has tranſlated the ſentiment in two Iambics, *Ep.* cxvi:

Quod eſt beatum, morte et æternùm carens,
Nec ſibi parit negotium, nec alteri.

See alſo LUCRETIUS I. 57. VI. 83, whom *Horace* ſeems to have copied in the verſes above quoted.

'Tis true *this* Idea deſtroyed that of a *Providence*; but to them, who derived the World from a *fortuitous* Concourſe of Atoms, ſuch a conſequence was of ſmall importance.

P. 131.—AND SCAPE THY NOTICE.]

To the Citations in the note p. 150, may be added the following fine ſentiment of THALES—Ἠρώτησέ τις αὐτὸν, εἰ λήθοι θεὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀδικῶν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοούμενος, ἔφη—*One aſked him, if a man might eſcape the knowlege of the Gods, when he was* COMMITTING *Injuſtice: No, ſays he, not even when he is* MEDITATING *it. Diog. Laert.* i, 36.

P. 138.—WHO IS IT, THAT COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE?]

This Reaſoning and that in *Hermes*, p. 362, abundantly ſhew the SUPREMACY of THE MIND among the Faculties of the *Human Soul*. 'Tis MIND that ſees the Difference not only between Black and White, Bitter and Sweet, but (which no ſenſe is equal to) the difference between Black and Bitter, White and Sweet, and the various tribes of *heterogeneous* Attributes. Nor does it ſhew this Supremacy in theſe Recognitions only, but

but likewiſe, when under *one and the ſame view* it recogniſes Objects of *Senſe* and of *Intellect* united, as in caſe of Syllogiſms made of *Propoſitions particular* and *univerſal*, ſuch as, (if I may be permitted to ſpeak after ſo ſcholaſtic a manner) ſuch as the Syllogiſms *Darii* and *Ferio* in the Firſt *Figure*.

To this may be added, that this *joint Recognition* of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by THE SAME FACULTY, and in THE SAME UNDIVIDED INSTANT, ſeems to prove in the ſtrongeſt manner that ſuch FACULTY, (by this Faculty I mean the MIND or INTELLECT) muſt be INCORPOREAL; for *Body*, being *infinitely diviſible*, is by no means ſuſceptible of ſuch a *ſimple* and *perfect Unity*, as *this Recognition* muſt *neceſſarily* be.

P. 192.—THE MOUNTAIN, WHICH BY ITS RELATION TO THE MOLEHILL WAS GREAT, BY &c.]

This may be true with regard to Mountains, and Molehills, and the other *more indefinite* parts of Nature; but with regard to the *more definite* parts, ſuch as Vegetables, and Animals, here the *Quantities* are not left thus vague, but are, if not aſcertained *preciſely*, at leaſt aſcertained *in ſome degree*.

Thus ARISTOTLE—Ἔτι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρας τῦ μεγέθους· διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστῶν αὐξήσεως. Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶχεν αὔξησιν ἀεὶ, καὶ τῶν ζώων ὅσα ἔχει ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ηὐξάνετ' ἂν εἰς ἄπειρον. *All Animals have a certain Bound or Limit to their Bulk; for which reaſon the Bones have a certain Bound or Limit to their growth.—Were the Bones indeed to grow for ever, then of courſe, as many Animals as have Bone, or ſomething analogous to it, would*

continue

continue to grow as long as they lived. Arist. de Anim. Gener. ii. 6. p. 227. *Edit. Sylb.*

What follows from Simplicius is to the same purpose; only where he mentions FORM, we must understand that *efficient animating* Principle, described in the sixth chapter of this work.

Ἕκαστον εἶδος συνυπάγει, μετὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἰδιότητος, καὶ ποσόν τι μέτρον σύμμετρον τῇ ἰδιότητι· ἐ γὰρ ἔχημα μόνον ἐπιφέρει μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος, ὃ μετὰ διαστάσεως εἰς τὴν ὕλην παραγίγνεται. Πλάτος μὲν ἔχει καὶ τοῦτο ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον πῶς τῆς ἐνύλου φύσεως. Ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸν ὅρον παραλλάξῃ, ἢ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τέρας νομίζεται. *Every* FORM *introduces, along with its own original Peculiarity, a certain measure of Quantity, bearing proportion to that Peculiarity; for it brings with itself not a* FIGURE *only, but a* MAGNITUDE *also, which passes into the Matter, by giving it extent. Now even here this Magnitude has a sort of latitude, from the indefinite nature of the material Principle* [with which it is united.] *But yet, notwithstanding if it change the Bound or Limit, either as to greater or to less, in a remarkable degree, the Being* [by such deviation] *is esteemed a Monster. Simplic. in Præd.* p. 37. A. *Edit. Basil.*

SIMPLICIUS gives examples of this Deviation in the case of *Giants* and of *Dwarfs*.

P. 244.——SPECTATORS—MADE OUT OF THOSE THAT WENT BEFORE.] The *Subject Matter* is *the same* in many *succeeding* Beings; as the *River* is *the same*, which, as it flows along, reflects many different Objects. 'Tis in this sense we are to understand the following Asser-

Aſſertion, and not with the leaſt view to *equivocal* Production:

Οὐκοῦν διὰ τὸ τὴν τῇδε φθορὰν ἄλλου εἶναι γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν τῇδε γένεσιν ἄλλου εἶναι φθοράν, ἄπαυστον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν. *Wherefore, from the Diſſolution of one thing being the Generation of another, and the Generation of one thing being the Diſſolution of another, it neceſſarily follows that the Change muſt be perpetual and never ceaſe.* *Ariſt. de Gen. et Corr.* L. I. c. 3. p. 10. *Edit. Sylb.*

The Change here alluded to is the common courſe of Nature in the Production of Beings, which, were it not for the Proceſs *above-mentioned*, would either ſoon be at a ſtand, or would require a perpetual Miracle for the ſupply of *new* Materials.

P. 278.——THE THEORY OF ACTION AND REACTION.]

Of this Doctrine we have the following account.—Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὲν λύεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις, ὅτι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ πάσχοντος· οἷον τὸ τέμνον ἀμβλύνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ τεμνομένου, καὶ τὸ θερμαῖνον ψύχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμαινομένου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ κινοῦν (ἔξω τοῦ Πρώτου) ἀντικινεῖταί τινα κίνησιν· οἷον ὠθοῦν ἀντωθεῖταί πως, καὶ ἀντιθλίβεται τὸ θλίβον. *The Cauſe why Motions are ſtopt, is, that* THE ACTING POWER IS ALSO ACTED UPON BY THAT, UPON WHICH IT ACTS; *for example the cutting Power is blunted by that which is cut; and the warming Power is cooled by that which is warmed; and in general the moving Principle (excepting the* SUPREME *and* FIRST*) is reciprocally moved itſelf under ſome motion or other; the impelling Power,*

Power, for inſtance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compreſſing Power, after a manner re-compreſt. Ariſtot. de Animal. Gener. L. 4. p. 280. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 281. —— DOUBLE IN ITS POWERS, *&c.*] Ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, ἑαυτό τε χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον· καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπυλον γινώσκομεν, κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών· τὸ δὲ καμπυλον, οὔθ' ἑαυτῦ οὔτε τῦ εὐθέος.—*One of the two Parts in the Contrariety is ſufficient to judge both itſelf and its oppoſite. 'Tis thus that by the Strait we come to know both the ſtrait and the crooked, for the ſtrait Rule of the Artiſt is a judge of both. But the crooked on the other ſide is no judge either of itſelf, or of the Strait. Ariſt. de An.* i, 5.

P. 283. —EXISTED PREVIOUSLY IN ENERGIE.] Ὅσα φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνῃ, ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος γίγνεται ἐκ τῦ δυνάμει τοιύτυ.——*Whatever things are made either by Nature or by Art, are made* OUT *of ſomething, having a capacity to become the thing produced, and that* THROUGH *the operation of ſomething, which already exiſts in Energy. De Animal. Gener.* p. 204. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 297.—AS THEY STAND RELATED TO PLACE] The Force of this *Arrangement* or *Predicament* WHERE, is finely contraſted with the *Predicament* of QUANTITY, in that *Laconic Apophthegm* of AGIS. *The Lacedæmonians* (ſaid he) *do not aſk* HOW MANY *the Enemies are, but* WHERE *they are:* Οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν τὸς Λακεδαιμονίυς ἐρωτᾶν ΠΟΣΟΙ εἰσὶν οἱ πολέμιοι, ἀλλὰ ΠΟΥ εἰσιν. *Plut. Lacon. Apophth.* p. 215. D. *Edit. Xyland.*

P. 332.——THE DYING GLADIATOR, *&c.*] To theſe *Attitudes* may be added that, given by LYSIPPUS to the

the Statue of ALEXANDER the Great. That Prince had a certain Extenſion of Neck, which made him gently recline it upon his left Shoulder. When his Figure was caſt in braſs by *Lyſippus*, the Artiſt ingeniouſly contrived to convert this *natural defect* into an Attitude of Magnificence. His Head, being reclined, was made, with a ſort of inſolent look, to contemplate the *Heavens*, as if things *below* were *already* at his command. And hence the meaning of that celebrated Epigram, in which this Work of Braſs is ſuppoſed to addreſs *Jupiter* in the following words;

Αὐδάσοντι δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος, εἰς Διὰ λεύσσων,
Γᾶν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι· Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὄλυμπον ἔχε.

The Braſs looks up to Jove, and ſeems to cry,
This Earth is MINE; *do* THOU *poſſeſs the Sky.*

Plutarch. de Vitâ et For. Alex. p. 335. *Edit. Xyland.* See alſo *Brodæi Epigram. Gr.* L. IV. p. 454. *Edit. Franc.* 1600, where the Lines here cited are introduced by two others.

P. 337.—FROM POETS TO ACTORS, &c.] See *Cic. de Orat.* iii. 56, 57, 58, 59. *Edit. Pearce*, where 'tis worth remarking, (c. 59.) ſo much ſtreſs is laid on the management of the *Countenance*, and of the *Eyes* in particular, that we are informed the old men of that age did not greatly praiſe even ROSCIUS himſelf, when he appeared *in his Maſk—quo meliùs noſtri illi ſenes, qui* PERSONATUM *ne* ROSCIUM *quidem magnopere laudabant*; ANIMI *eſt enim omnis* ACTIO; *et imago animi* VULTUS *eſt, indices oculi:*

P. 355.—MOUNTAINS CLOATHED WITH WOOD.] Thus CICERO—*Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus*, &c. *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 64. p. 253. *Edit. Davis.*—And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the *Earth*, as *vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus*, &c. ii. 39. p. 198.—Yet all this we must remember is but *metaphorical*.

P. 366.——IS SCIENCE PRIOR TO ART?] *Nihil est enim, quod ad* ARTEM *redigi possit, nisi ille* PRIUS, *qui illa tenet, quorum Artem instituere vult, habeat illam* SCIENTIAM, *ut ex iis rebus, quarum Ars* NONDUM *sit, Artem efficere possit. Cic. de Orat.* i. 41. *Edit. Pearce*, &c. p. 63. *Edit. Oxon.*

This Citation well proves a part of what is here asserted, viz. the *necessary Priority* of *some Science* to *every Art*.

P. 389.——AND TO IT'S OPPOSITE NON-BEING.] These MOTIONS under the name of *Changes* (μεταβολαὶ) are well explained, as follows.

Ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἡ ἡ μεταβολὴ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τόπον, φορά. ὅταν δὲ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ τὸ ποιὸν, ἀλλοίωσις· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ, ἅ ἐστερον πάθος ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ, φθορά.—*When therefore the Change of the contrary Attribute is according to the* QUANTITY, *'tis* AUGMENTATION *or* DIMINUTION; *when according to the* PLACE, *'tis* LOCAL MOTION; *when according to any Affection, or* QUALITY, *'tis* ALIATION. *When* NOTHING REMAINS, *of which the new production can be*

at

at all considered as an Affection, or an Attribute, 'tis then GENERATION; *and the contrary,* DISSOLUTION. *Arist. de Gen. et Corr.* L. I. c. 4. p. 14. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 409. ——BUT WE CALL IT METAPHYSICAL.]

Philoponus, in a very few words well explains the term, METAPHYSICAL. Speaking of the *First* and *Supreme Cause* of all things, he adds——περὶ μὲν ἂν ἐκείνου εἰπεῖν, τῆς πρώτης ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας· θεολογικὴ γὰρ οἰκείου, καὶ τῆ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ πραγματείᾳ· μᾶλλον δὲ ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ, πρὸς ἡμᾶς γὰρ ὕστερα τὰ τῇ φύσει πρότερα——*To speak concerning this Principle, is the business of the* FIRST PHILOSOPHY, *for it is a Subject belonging to Theology, and to that Speculation, which is* METAPHYSICAL, that is to say, SUBSEQUENT TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, *or rather indeed 'tis a Subject* PRIOR TO MATTERS PHYSICAL, *in as much as these things with regard* TO US *are* SUBSEQUENT, *which are* BY NATURE PRIOR. *Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p.* 12. *Edit. Ald. Venet.* 1527.

415.——THE COMMON NAME OF PERCEPTION.]

This word, PERCEPTION, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes *Intellection* but *Sensation* also, and that *of the lowest* degree. What is here called Perception, is by *Aristotle* called KNOWLEDGE. ——Γνώσεώς τινος πάντα (scil. ζῶα) μετέχουσι, τὰ μὲν πλείονος, τὰ δ' ἐλάττονος, τὰ δὲ πάμπαν μικρᾶς, αἰσθησιν μόνην ἔχοντα· ἡ δ' αἴσθησις, γνῶσίς τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιον καὶ ἄτιμον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοπῶσι πρὸς φρόνησιν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν αἰψύχων γένος· Ἡρὺς μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν,

νησιν, ὥσπερ δοκεῖν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως μόνον· πρὸς δὲ ἀναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. Ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξῃ τὸ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ μὴ κεῖσθαι τεθνεὼς καὶ μὴ ὄν.

All Animals ſhare a degree of KNOWLEDGE; *ſome of them, a greater; others of them, a leſs; and ſome of them, an exceedingly ſmall degree; for they have all of them* SENSATION, *and* SENSATION IS A SORT OF KNOWLEDGE. *But the Value and the No-value of Senſation is widely different, when we compare it with* RATIONAL COMPREHENSION *on the one ſide, and with the race of* BEINGS INANIMATE *on the other. With regard to* RATIONAL COMPREHENSION, *the mere partaking of* TASTE *and* TOUCH *alone, appears to be as nothing; but with regard to pure* INSENSIBILITY *it is ſomething moſt excellent. For* [when compared to Beings Inſenſible] *it may ſurely appear a bleſſed Event, to be poſſeſt of* THIS *Knowledge, and not* [reſembling them] *to lie as dead and a Non-entity. Ariſtot. de Animal. Gener.* Lib. I. ſub. fin. p. 197. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 426.——ENDS IN IT'S ACQUISITION.]

Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος· ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. *All Animals both move, and are moved for the ſake of ſomething; ſo that this ſomething,* that is to ſay, THE FINAL CAUSE, *is the* BOUND *or* LIMIT *of all their Motion. Ariſt. de Animal. Mot.* C. 6. p. 153. *Edit. Sylb.*

P. 463.—CONCERNING PREDICAMENTS OR PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.] Many learned and ingenious Obſervations on this Subject, as well as on ſeveral other parts of antient Philoſophy (*the Peripatetic*

tetic in particular) have been given to the World in a Tract lately publiſhed, ſtyled, ON THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE, IN TWO VOLUMES, 8vo.

There may be found too in the ſecond Volume many judicious and curious remarks on *Style*, *Compoſition*, *Language*, particularly *the Engliſh*; obſervations of the laſt conſequence to thoſe, who wiſh either to write or to judge with accuracy and elegance.

The Author of theſe Arrangements might have availed himſelf of many Citations from this Work, highly tending to illuſtrate and to confirm his Opinions, but unfortunately for him, the greater part of his own Treatiſe was printed off, before the ſecond Volume of this Work appeared.

INDEX.

ABASSIDÆ, — — — 253
Abderic Words, uſed by *Democritus*, 340
Action and *Paſſion* univerſally diffuſed, 255. exiſt either in the ſame Subject, or in different ones, 256, 257. firſt ſpecies of Action, that of mere Body perfectly inſenſitive, 258. ſecond, that of Body ſenſitive, 260. third, that of Body ſenſitive, with Reaſon ſuperadded, 261. fourth, that of Reaſon or Intellect devoid of Paſſions, and operating on Subjects external, as in the caſe of Nature and Art, 261. fifth ſort, that of pure Intellect, keeping within itſelf, 264. Action pure, belongs only to the Supreme Mind; Paſſion pure, to the primary Matter, 271. Action, three Modes of, 273. the firſt Mode, ibid. the ſecond, 274. the third, —— —— 276
Action, in public Life often aided by Speculation, 2, 3, 4, 466, 467, &c.
Action and *Reaction*, — — 44, 278, 479
Active and *Paſſive*, run through the Univerſe, 96, 109, 137, 271, 272
Activity, pure, where it exiſts, 110, 171, 272
Actors, on the Stage, and in Life, 2, 337, 338, 481
Actual and *Perfect*, neceſſarily previous to their Contraries, or elſe nothing could have been Actual and Perfect, 281, 480. Actual and Capable, — 401

INDEX.

Actuality, 397, 398. Actuality of Capacity, where it exists, — — — — 401, 403
ADDISON, — — — 458
ADRIAN, Pope, — — 457
Agent, same Agent leads to different Effects, when acting upon different Patients, — 280
AGIS, — — — 480
ALEXANDER, the Great, 2, 6. his statue by *Lysippus*, — — — 481
ALEXANDER APRHRODISIENSIS, — 97
ALEXANDRINE LIBRARY, by whom burnt, 253
ALIATION, 384. See MOTION.
All, its use and application in Language, 472
Alteratio, means in barbarous Latin Ἀλλοίωσις, 384
AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, — 469
AMMONIUS, illustrates, where Analysis is to end, and Practice to begin, 12. quoted, 15, 16, 22, 32, 36. explains the utility of these Arrangements, 17. his account of Matter and Body, 85. his Text corrected and supplied from a Greek Manuscript, 163. quoted 213, 288, 292, 363, 364, 383, 386, 387, 389, 459. his account of Definition, — — 292
Ἀμφὼ, & Ἀμφότεροι, — 472
Analogy, a use of it, — — 34
Analogy and *Abstraction*, their use, 76, 77, 92, 162
ANAXAGORAS, — — 2, 466
Anger, — — — 418
Angles and Flexures of the Body, — 328
Animals, all have an inward feeling of their Constitution, and proper Nature, — — 411
Animating Powers, their Order and Subordination, 420, 421
Anteprædicamenta, — — — 36
Anticipation, what, — — 411
Antients, — — — 455

INDEX.

ANTIPHO, —— —— —— 447

Appendages to the Arrangements, what, and how many, 360

Appetite, —— —— 262, 417

APULEIUS, —— —— —— 45

ARATUS, —— —— —— 250

ARCHIMEDES, —— 306, 319, 430

ARISTO, —— —— —— 469

ARCHYTAS, wrote a Comment on the Categorics, or Predicaments, 7. his Name for them, 31. puts Quality next after Subſtance, and why, 143. held an Active and a Paſſive Principle, 111. enumerates the Species of Action, 265. refers to God, for pure Activity, 272. to Matter, for pure Paſſivity, ibid. Definitions of his, —— —— 441, 442

ARISTOPHANES, —— —— 357

ARISTOTLE, Preceptor to Alexander, 2, 467. his Rhetoric, quoted, 9. his Organon, explained by Ammonius, 12, 13. thought Infinite and Individuals to be unknowable, 21. quoted, 25. his account and Enumeration of the Predicaments, or univerſal Arrangements, 32. by whom eſteemed, and how long, 39. quoted, 41, 42, 44. his Treatiſe περὶ κόσμου, 45. quoted, 33, 48, 49, 51. holds the neceſſity of Matter or a Subſtratum for all natural Productions, 52, 53, 54. quoted, 56. thinks Form may ſupply the place of Privation, and why, 59, 60, 61. his Idea of Matter, 66, 67, 70. he and *Plato* borrowed from the *Pythagoreans*, 72, 76. uſed the methods of Analogy and Abſtraction, to prove the firſt Matter, 78, 79. quoted, 91, 93, 97, 98, 105. faculties of the Soul, how diſtributed, 101. quoted, 113, 117. a diſciple both of *Socrates* and *Plato*, 119. held there could be no *innate* Ideas, and why, 120. quoted, 123, 132, 133, 134, 138, 143, 150, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 161, 171,

171, 173, 174, 175, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 199, 215, 218, 219, 220, 221, 228, 234, 240, 243, 277, 282, 284, 286, 288, 299, 309, 310, 325, 330, 340, 342, 343, 345, 361, 363, 364, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 383, 384, 385, 391, 392, 393, 394, 396, 403, 404, 407, 408, 414, 415, 416, 417, 421, 422, 425, 429, 434, 435, 439, 442, 444, 448. follows *Socrates* in ſentiment, ibid. 449. abounds in *Quotations* where, 456. his explanation of the Terms, BOTH and ALL, 472. ſuppoſes Matter inſeparable from its Artributes, 473. his diſtinction between the animal faculties, which *want* a corporeal organ, and thoſe which *want none*, 474. compares the Soul to a Pilot, ibid. his Idea, after what manner the magnitudes of beings were limited, 477. his notion of Generation and Diſſolution, 478. makes *one Faculty* equal to the diſcernment of *two Contrarieties*, 281, 480. makes *Energy* prior to *Power*, 480. enumerates the ſix Species of Motion, 482. his extenſive uſe of the Term Γνῶσις, *Knowlege*, 483. ſuppoſes a *Bound* to Human Actions in *the Final Cauſe*, —— 449

Arithmetic, finds its ſubject in *Quantity*, — 195

ARRANGEMENTS, the neceſſity of them, 14, 22. their extenſive utility, 17, 452, 460. a method of Arrangement propoſed, 24. rejected, and why, 26. another method propoſed, 26 to 33. adopted, and why, 33. why called PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS, ib. different names given them by the Antients, 31, 32. how the Greek Logicians divided and formed their Speculations upon this Subject, 35, 36, 464. were followed by the Latins, who added names of their own coining, 36. Force of Arrangement in the intellectual World, 201, 342, 343, 344, 345. in the viſible world, 340, 341. Arrangements or Categories lead us from the Contemplation of Body to that of Mind,

458. teach us how to place our Ideas in proper Order, ib. are connected with, and introduce Speculations of every Species and Character, 444, 445. shew the Coincidence of many Theories antient and modern, 456. indicate the Union between Taste and Truth, 459. trace and teach the source of subordinate Arts and Sciences, 460, 461, enable us to adjust their comparative Value, 34, 35, 462. to the doing of this no particular Science is equal, and why, 35, 463

ARRIAN. See *Epictetus*.

Arrogance, a Cause of it, — 34, 35, 462, 463

Arts, how limited each particular one, 34. Art, what it is, what it is not, 102, 160. a difference between *Art* and *Nature*, 165. often ends in giving Figure, 168. *Arts* arise from *Want*, 445. Arts of Painting Music, Grammar, beholden to *Contraries*, 46, 47. Arts of *Progression*, and of *Completion*, 7, 8

Atheism, supposed organs to precede their Use, 122

Atoms and a Void, —— —— 44, 339

Attitudes, their importance to the Painter and Statuary, 331. instances from Pictures and Statues, 331. Attitudes from Poets of sitting in Despair, 333. of sitting in Dependence, ib. of conjugal Affection, ib. of *Thescelus*, aiming a Javelin, 334. of Death, doing the same, ib. of Humiliation, 335. of lying extended, 335, 336. of Sleep and Death, 336, 337. of *Alexander*, by *Lysippus*, 480, 481

Attraction, —— —— 258, 437

ATTRIBUTE and SUBSTANCE, general and particular, 25. *Attribute*, divided into its respective Sorts or Species, 31. this Division, the Basis of the whole Work, 33

AUGMENTATION and DIMINUTION, 385, 386. See *Motion*.

AXIOMS, —— —— 476

Axiom antient, 280

INDEX.

B.

Barbarity, when it was the Eaſtern World, when it was the Weſtern World emerged from it, — 253
BAXTER, Commentator on HORACE, — 354
Beings, why moveable, all but One, — 450
BESSARIO, Cardinal, — 238
Βίαιον, ſee *Forced*, — — 407
BLEMMIDES, — 57, 268, 269
BLENHEIM HOUSE, and GARDENS, — 353
Body, what makes it, 85. triply extended, ibid. conſidered, as *the ſecondary* Matter, ibid. *Mathematical*, and *Phyſical*, how diſtinguiſhed, — 87
Bodies, the perfectly ſimilar, tho' they have *Place*, have no *Situation* or *Poſition*, and why, 318, 329. the ſame holds, as to Bodies perfectly diſſimilar, and why, 319. Body human, the Soul's Organ, Tool or Inſtrument, 274, 275, 425, 426. all Body, Paſſive, 437
BOETHIUS, — 16, 17, 21, 26, 276
BOIVINUS, — — 239
Both, its uſe in Language, — 472
BROWNE, a Genius, — — 353
BRUTUS, — — — 2, 275
Bulk, ſometimes leſs aſcertained, ſometimes more, and why, 477. See *Magnitude*.

C.

CÆSAR, — — 304, 469
Calm, in the Winds, Νηνεμία, defined, 441. *Calm*, in the Sea, Γαλήνη, defined, — — 442
CAPACITY or POWER, 278, particular Capacities, various but limited, 279. far diſtant from Non-entity, ibid. *Capacity univerſal*, and *Privation univerſal*, the Characters of the FIRST or PRIMARY MATTER, 71. Character of Capacity, 278. Capacity *double* in the human Mind, and why, 149, 150. mediate, and immediate,

mediate, 152, 153. Capacity, two ſorts of, 160, 161. Incapacity, 151. Capacity, its Actuality, where exiſting, 403. definite, though inviſible, 398, 399. See p. 65, 66, and the Word, MATTER.
CASAUBON, —— —— 3
CATEGORIES, —— —— 32, 33, 452
CATO, —— —— —— 2, 465
Cauſe, ſee Index to the firſt Volume.
Cauſes, 39, 93. *inviſible* Cauſes, ſeen thro' *viſible* Effects, 108. *final* Cauſes denied by *Lucretius*, 124, 125. maintained by *Ariſtotle*, *Galen*, *Cicero*, 127
Cauſative Motion, ſee *Metaphyſical*.
CERES, a Sacrifice to her, deſcribed, — 461
CHALCIDIUS, —— 74, 77, 80, 107, 247
Chance, 122, 123, 128, proves an intelligent Principle, 128. different accounts of it, 209 to 313. no Cauſe of the World, and why, — — 436, 437
Change, ſee *Mutation*.
Chaos, ſee *Diſorder* and *Night*.
CHARLEMAGNE, —— —— 303
CHARLES THE FIRST, —— —— 305
CHRONICLES, —— —— 337
CHRYSIPPUS, —— —— 456
CICERO, 2, 108, 109, 119, 153, 208, 239, 259, 309, 310, 415, 412, 419, 420, 438, 457, 465, 470, 481, 482
Citation, ſee *Quotation*.
Co-arrangement, 55, Account of it from *Varro*, 470
Co-exiſtence, or TOGETHER, its *Modes*, or Species, 374 to 377, the *Temporal* Mode, 374, the *Eſſential*, 375, the *Specific*, 376, coincides with *Relation*, 376
COOKE, his Inſtitutes, —— —— 373
Colour, a *Quality*, 170, why inferior, in its effects, to Figure, —— —— —— 171
Completion, a *Capacity*, 148, *Completion* and *Progreſſion*, 7, 8
Conſciouſneſs,

Conscientiosi, —— —— —— 413
Continuous, Infinite, Place, Time, —— 396
CONTRARIES, essential to *Mutation* or *Change*, 42, this a general Opinion of all Philosophers, 43. *Contraries*, their extensive Influence and Operation, 45, 6, 7. adopted by all Philosophers, 47. the necessity of a *third Being*, that they may pass into each other, 50, 51. *Contraries* in Virtue and Vice, and even in Vices themselves, —— —— 173, 174
Contrariety, belongs to Quality, but not universally, 173
Corinthians, 337. See *Scripture*.
Cube. See *Sphere*.
CYRUS, his Speech, when dying, —— 108, 118

D.

DACIER, —— —— 461, 462
Death, —— 104, 388, 433, 443
Definition, its requisites, what, —— 291
DEMETRIUS, —— —— 456
DEMOCRITUS, his Principles, 44, 339. whence he deduced the variety, and specific differences in Nature, 333, 340. ingenious remark of, —— 343
DEMOSTHENES, —— —— 338
Desire, moves the *Body*; *Perception*, the *Desire*, 425
Desirable and *Intelligible*, how they move, and act upon other things, —— —— 279
DE WITT, —— —— —— 4
Digestion, —— —— 104, 434
DIOGENES, (not the Cynic,) 51, 72
DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 72, 410, 412, 424, 428, 457
DIOMEDES, the Grammarian, —— 461
DIONYSIUS, the Stoic, —— 457
Disorder and *Chaos*, not prior to *Order*, — 287
Dispositions, *Tendencies*, or *Progressive Qualities*, 154
Distinction, accurate and exact, its uses, — 378

Divine

Divine Principle, what it neceſſarily implies, 127. has *nothing Paſſive*, —— —— 266

E.

EARTH, her Relations and Duties, 232, 233, why called, MOST JUST, *ibid.*
ECCLESIASTES, 306. See *Scripture.*
ECCLESIASTICUS, —— —— 56
Εἶδος ἰδεῶδες, explained, —— 90, 166, 387, 388
EIDOTHEA, Daughter of PROTEUS, — 82, 83
Ἐκούσιον, defined, —— —— 408
Electric Powers, —— —— 89, 259
Elements of Beings compoſite, what, 62, 92, 93, how diſtinguiſhed from *Cauſes*, — 92, 93
EMPEDOCLES, 122, 123, 139, his ſublime Verſes on GOD, —— —— —— 162
Ends and *Means*, 121, 235. fine Speculation upon them from PLETHO, —— —— 235
ENEAS, —— 90, 135, 147, 447
ENERGY, what, 283. oppoſite to *Power*, but *previous*, 283. eſſential to the courſe of Events in the Univerſe, 284. farther proof of its being *previous to Power*, 285. inference from this Doctrine, 286. of what Being, Energy is the Eſſence, 287. Energy and Capacity, —— —— 401, 404
Enharmonic Syſtem, account of it in the times of PORPHYRY and SIMPLICIUS, —— 252, 253
Ἐντελέχεια and Δύναμις, —— 148, 399
EPAMINONDAS, —— —— 2, 467
EPHESIANS, 356. See *Scripture.*
EPICHARMUS, —— 115, 314, 446
EPICTETUS, 3, 130, 155, 225, 232, 234, 239, 267, 428
EPICURUS, his Idea of human and divine Felicity, 475

INDEX.

Εμπύημα, its Etymology, [illegible]

Epigram on the ſtatue of Alexander, 481

Equal, Similar, Same, [illegible] 195, [illegible] 5

Eternal and *Divine*, how attained by Beings *poſſible* and *corruptible*, [illegible] [illegible]

ETHICS, 33, 149, 155, 156, 157, 160, 173, 225, 226; 228, 261, 262, 268, 280, 282 419, 427, [illegible]. See the words, *Metaphyſics*, and *Phyſics*, from which two together with *Ethics*, the Illuſtrations in this Treatiſe are in great part derived.

Etymology, uſe made of it by the old *Greek* Philoſophers, [illegible]

EVANDER, [illegible]

EUCLID, [illegible] 218, 318

Evil, Natural, and *Moral*, 242. Suggeſtions and Conjectures upon the Subject, 242 to 248.

Euphemiſmus, Origin and Uſe of this rhetorical Figure, [illegible] 287

EURIPIDES, [illegible] 243, 328, 428, 456

EUSTATHIUS, [illegible] 81

EUSTRATIUS, [illegible] 56

EXODUS, 358, ſee *Scripture*.

Experiments, [illegible] 169, 195, 412

Extenſion, Figure, Organization, the original FORMS of *Body natural*. [illegible] 88

F.

FABRICIUS, [illegible] 7, 45, 458

Faculties in Man, rational and irrational, [illegible] 202

Families, their origin, [illegible] 233

Fate, Chance, applied to the purpoſe of *Providence*, and a *Deity*, [illegible] 311, 312

Feelings innate, [illegible] 412

FELL, [illegible] 92, 291, 295, 316

Figure. See *Extenſion*.

Figure, its *philosophical Idea*, as finely explained by SIMPLICIUS, 166. its importance, in consequence, 167. mathematical, 168. imaginary, or phantastic, 170. *Figure* and *Number*, their importance, 195

Final Causes, their importance, 127. favoured by ARISTOTLE, 240, 449, 450. the end of human Actions, 426, 445

First Philosophy, 33. Chap. 6. p. 139, 161, 162. truly so called, 367, 451, 455. See additional Note Vol. I. p. 361, &c.

Fopp, what makes one, and why so called — 354

Forced, how it differs from *spontaneous*, — 407

FORM, *lifeless*, its character, 54, 57, 58, 84, 91. its most simple Species, 85. *Forms essential* (vulgarly called *substantial*) their importance, 90, 164, 167, 387. FORMS *animating*, and *efficient*, 95. how they characterize, 96. *Soul* (in this sense) a *Form*, 97. *Form* used in this sense by OVID, 100, 101. *animating Form*, its various Efficacies and Operations, 104. *Forms*, *Intellect* the Region of, 112. *Forms*, some *inseparable* from Body, 90. others, *no way connected*, 116. *Characteristic Form*, 141, 90, 164, 387: its efficacy in *Quantity*, as well as *Quality*, 166, 432

Fortune, 128, 310. defined, ibid.

G.

Γαλήνη, see *Calm*.

GALE's *Opuscula*, —— —— 72, 82

GENERA, universal, — —— 32, 33, 35

Generation and *Dissolution*, 388. how they differ from other *Motions*, —— —— 388

Generation of things, how maintained, 244, 389. that, and Dissolution alternately prepare the way for each other, — — 244, 478, 479

GENESIS, 43, 446, see *Scripture*.

Genius, what, —— —— 159, 203

INDEX.

Gentleman, his Education, what it appears to want, to render it complete, — 196
Genus and *Species*, formed within us *spontaneously*, and originally, 18. *Genera*, fewer than Species; Species, than Individuals, — — 19
Geometry, finds its Subject in QUANTITY, — 195
GEORGE GEMISTUS. see PLETHO.
GOD, the Supreme Agent, 112. knows no Proficiency, being ever perfect, 161. Pure Mind, 162. Father of all, 249. univerſal Object of Deſire to all things, 250. *pure Energy of ſimple Intellect*, 264, 271. admits nothing *Paſſive*, 266. his *Eſſence*, *Energy*, 287. ever the ſame, immutable, perfect, 288. immoveable, 277, 448, 450. Fate and Chance, ſubſervient to his divine Attributes, 311, 312, 313. *univerſal Arrangement* of all Being within the DIVINE MIND, 345
Good, all *Good*, *Truth*, 430. Good *Intellectual*, its ſuperior value, 430, 431. Good *abſent* leads to *Want*; *Want* to *Induſtry*, *Arts*, &c. 445. Good, paſſes thro' the Predicaments, and aſſumes, as it paſſes, different denominations, 308. Good *real* or *apparent* moves all Deſires, 424, 425. its Effect, whether obtained, or not, analagons to Motion Circular, — 426
Gravitation, *Attraction*, — — 437
GREEKS, modern, ſhort account of their Controverſy about PLATO and ARISTOTLE, — 238
GROTIUS, — — — 4

H.

HABIT, or BEING HABITED, what *it is not*, what *it is*, 348, 349, 350. its Ends, *Protection*, 351. *Diſtinction*, 352. *Decency*, ibid. *Ornament*, ibid. *Beauty and Elegance* of Dreſs or Habit, where to be found, 352. where it *never* exiſted, 353. *Exceſs* in attention to it, what

character it conſtitutes, 354. *the Trojans* abuſed on its account, ibid. *metaphorical* Uſes of the Word, 355. 356. Force of its *Privation*, in the way both of Compaſſion and Contempt, 356, 357, 358. *Privation* of it ſometimes indicates *Reverence*, —— 358
Habits, intellectual and moral, —— 157
Habitude, reciprocal, —— —— 215
HAMDEN, —— —— 304
Hand, the Organ of Organs, why, 113. its Fingers, their power and efficacy, —— —— 99
Happineſs, an Account of it by the *Stoics*, 428
Harmony, in *Muſic*, 46. in the *World*, ibid. 225. between the *viſible* World, and the *inviſible*, 99. of *Strength* and *Beauty* in a perfect Body, —— 460
HELVIDIUS PRISCUS, —— —— 3
HEN. STEPH. POESIS PHILOSOPHICA, —— 162
HERACLIDES PONTICUS, —— —— 81
HERACLITUS, —— 47, 245, 247
HERBERT, Lord —— —— 4
HERCULES, —— —— —— 262
HERMES, quoted 19, 76, 98, 132, 138, 140, 173, 183, 198, 202, 266, 278, 337, 342, 362, 382, 409, 443, 444.
HIEROCLES, —— —— —— 369
HOMER, 20, 80, 130, 145, 174, 210, 222, 217. joined with *Shakeſpeare*, 227. quoted, 245, 305, 335, 337, 373
HORACE, 80, 130, 149, 154, 155, 160, 182, 187, 227, 256, 260, 268, 307, 332, 337, 343, 354, 369, 370, 413, 441, 454, 460

I.

IAMBLICHUS, —— —— 16, 266, 259
Idea, that of *Motion*, not a *ſimple* one, but *complicated* with many others, —— —— 397

Ideas innate, none, —— 413 to 417
Immobility, —— 277, 448, 449, 450
Immortal and Divine, —— 115, 116
Immortality, —— 117, 118, 119, 437
Impulse ſpontaneous, 408, 423. how cauſed, 424. Impulſe of *Appetite*, 417. of *Anger*, 418. of *Reaſon*, 419
Individuals, infinite, 19, 20, 21. how made *Objects* of Science, 22, 193, 194. what BOETHIUS and ARISTOTLE thought of them, —— 21
Infinite, how made an *Object* of Science, 21, 22, 193, 194. connected with *Motion*, how, —— 395
Innate Feeling, —— —— 412
Inſtincts, 149. exiſt, though not *innate Ideas*, 413
Intellect, human, a *Raſa Tabula*, why, —— 120, 415
Intellect and Science, a capital diſtinction between the Faculties of each, 153. tranſcendent objects of Intellect, peculiar to its ſelf, —— —— 114
Intelligence, pure, —— —— 116
JOHN OF SALISBURY, account of him, 457
Joints and Muſcles, —— —— 328
JULIUS CÆSAR, —— —— 274, 304
JUVENAL, —— —— 460

K.

Knowlege, partial, an effect, or conſequence of, 85, 463

L.

Lanx ſatura, ſee *Satura*.
LEO the Xth, —— —— 253
Life, ſocial and civil, —— —— 144, 234
Life, to Live (ζῆν) what it is, and how far it extends, 423

Like and *Unlike*, the *Property* of QUALITY, 175. explained, — — 178, 215
Line, *Superficies*, *Solid*, — — 85
Lintel and *Threshold*, derive their Name and even their Essence from *Position*, — 330
LIVY, — — — — 256
LOGIC, natural, what, 9. whether an *Organ* to Philosophy, or a *Part* of it, 22. something *Progressive*, that is, to carry us on, — — — 8
LONGINUS, — — — — 456
LUCILIUS, — — — 460
LUCRETIUS, — 90, 123, 124, 125, 397, 475
ST. LUKE, — — — 303
LYTTELTON, late Lord, an anecdote from him, 353
LYSIPPUS, his Statute of ALEXANDER, 480

M.

MACBETH, excellence of that *Tragedy* in a view to its *Moral*, — — — 228
MACROBIUS, — — — 438
Magnitude, limited *by Nature* in every Species, and where there is *an unusual Defect* or *Excess*, the Being becomes a *Monster*, 477, 478. see *Bulk*.
MAHOMET and OMAR, — — 253
Man, Offspring of GOD, 250. social, 144. rational, 261. possest of Appetite, and Reason, and the Agent of *moral* Actions, 262. a *Compound*, and how, 272. whence intitled to Praise and Dispraise, 282. the *specific Positions* of his Body have reference to it's *specific Extensions*, 325. the number of these last, six, and why, 325, 327. Man has *Instincts*, but *no innate Ideas*, 413. a Microcosm, and why, 420, 421. *Man*

 has

has more Faculties, than Brutes; *Brutes*, more than Vegetables, —— 272, 424, 422
MANUSCRIPT GREEK, Corrections from, 163. quoted in a large extract, —— —— 235
Many and *One*, —— —— 47, 205
MARCUS ANTONINUS, —— —— 3, 226
Mathematical Body, how it differs from *Natural*, and how it distinguishes in consequence *the Mathematician* from *the Naturalist*, —— 87
MATTER, preparation to prove it's existence, 50, 51, &c. its character, as opposed to FORM, 63, 168. seen in *Privation* and *Capacity*, 65. Matter, *Secondary* or Immediate, and *Primary* or Remote, 67. necessity of such a Being's Existence, 71. two methods of comprehending it, 76, 77. inseparable from its Attributes, 473. purely passive, 110, 111, 112, 271. *Dissimilarly similar* to the Deity, 11. essential to Generation, 248. See *Matter* in the Index to *Hermes*; and *Form* in the Index to Volume the first.
MAXIMUS TYRIUS, —— —— 102, 115
Means, lead not to *Ends*; but Ends to *Means*, 121
Measures, both measure and are measured, 22, 311. Measures of *Place*, deduced from the *human Body*, 300, 301. of *Time*, from the *Heavens*, —— 301
MEDEA, —— —— —— 456
Medicine and *Cookery*, how those Arts resemble each other, —— —— —— 165
MENAGE, a Story from him, —— 379
MENANDER and PHILEMON, —— 306
Metaphysical, meaning of the Word, 409, 451, 483
Metaphysics, chap. 6. p. 137, 152, 161, 162, 201, 203 to 206, 237, 238, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 263, 264, 266, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 281, 283, 284,

284, &c. to 288, 309, 310, 311, 312, 341, 342, 343, 345, 366, 367, 409, to the end of the chapter, p. 451, see the Words, *Ethics*, *Physics*, and *Motion*.

MILTON, his character, a mixed one, of an active and a speculative kind, 4. quoted, 5, 133, 136, 177, 181, 182, 256, 260, 264, 309, 333, 334, 385, 386, 441.

Mind, the Form of Forms, 113, 114. Region of Forms, 342, 238. described by *Epicharmus*, 115. Mind, something divine, 117. separable, ib. how its Perception differs from that of Sense, 117. *Human*, in its original state, *a Rasa Tabula*, 120, 415. Mind, it's amazing powers of Comprehension, 137. how, in an intellectual way, it partakes of Quantity, 201. presides over natural Operations, 237. Mind *divine*, ever in *Energy*, 266. Mind *human*, has intensions and remissions, 267. compared to a Library, 454. to a Pilot, —— —— 475

Miscellanies, their character how represented in the Frontispiece, —— —— 460, 461

Modern Philosophers, 44, 248, 271, 278, 436, 456

Monster, see *Magnitude*.

Moral Actions, 262. as seen in Nations, in Families, in Individuals, 268. Moral Praise and Dispraise, 282. Virtue, 419. Happiness, —— 428.

MORE, Sir Thomas, —— —— —— 4

MOSCHUS, —— —— —— 337

MOSES, —— —— —— 358

MOTION, PHYSICAL, or NOT-PHYSICAL, 381. *Physical* divided into six sorts or species, from 383 to 391, also 482. the first Species, *Motion local*, 383. the second, *Alation*, 384, the third and fourth, *Augmentation* and *Diminution*, 385. the fifth and sixth, *Generation* and *Dissolution*, 388, 389. the several Species *blend* themselves together, 389. Local Motion

tion, essential to *all* the rest, 390. in what Arrangements they are to be found, 391. Contrariety, 392. REST, ibid. *Physical* Motion runs thro' the Objects of *every* Sense, 394. *no simple Idea*, but *complicated* with many others, 394. 395. 396. preparation for it, Definition, 397 to 400. defined according to the *Peripatetics*, 401. 403. *Pythagorean* and *Platonic* Definitions agree with that of the *Peripatetics*, 402. *Aristotle's* Definition, tho' hard to comprehend, yet possible, 404. *primary* Cause of Motion, an intelligent Principle, 437. its rise and duration, 439.

MOTION, METAPHYSICAL, what, 407. 408. 409, how *united* with Physical, 425, 434, 435, 440

Motions, Internal, of the Soul, when tempestuous, when fair and orderly, —— —— 428

Motion of Beings, *not motive, but moveable*, 273. of Beings *both motive and moveable*, 274. 275. of that Being which is *motive, but not moveable*, 276. these *three* Species described by *Aristotle*, — 177

Multitude, —— —— 183, 245

Music, the antient Modes, 60, 61, 252, 253

Mutation, it's Essentials, what, and how many, 41, 49

N.

Nature, an internal active Power, a Principle of Motion and of Rest, 431, 432, 433. an *invisible* Cause, known from *visible* Effects, 434. 435. operates during Sleep, 434. prescribes a Bound or Limit to Growth and Magnitude, in every natural Production, 431. like Art, beholden to Contraries, 46, 47. Nature, what it is, what it is not, 103. Nature or Art, which of the two, prevalent in *Homer*, and in *Shakespeare*, 227, 228. *Nature does nothing in vain*, a favourite

ingenite Axiom of *Ariſtotle*, 240. *Nature*, the Energy of God; *Art*, of *Man*, —— —— 263
Natural Body, what —— —— 88
Navigation, ſee *Calm*.
Night and *Chaos*, not the firſt of things, and why, 287
Non-entity, reſembles Relatives, 223. but widely different, ibid. reſembles Capacity or Power, 278. but widely different, ibid. and 279, 280, 389. has various characters, —— 389, 397, 398, 402
Now, or *Inſtant*, —— —— 183, 184
Number, and *Figure*, their importance in conſtituting the Sciences of *Arithmetic* and *Geometry*, 155

O.

Objects, *ſenſible* and *intelligible*, how they differ, 18. Objects, *common to more Senſes than one*, what and how many, 394. of *Perception* and *Volition* meet and *coincide*, —— —— —— 429
OCELLUS LUCANUS, — — 72, 75
OMAR and MAHOMET, —— 253
Opportunity, what, 308. elegant accounts of it from *Ariſtotle* and *Cicero*, —— —— ibid.
Oppoſites, —— —— —— 362
Order, Divine, 311. Order, it's force, 367, 368, 482. order of the Parts in this Treatiſe, 36, 37, 452
Organ, Logic, an Organ, 22, 27. Hand, an Organ, 113. Body, an Organ, —— 275, 425
Organization, ſee *Extenſion*.
Ogham, —— —— —— 410
OVID, 86. his peculiar Uſe of the Word, FORM, 160, 161. quoted, —— 326, 334, 336

INDEX.

P.

Painter, induces *Motion* upon *immoveable* canvas, 329. how far Chance interferes in his Works, 328
Παλαιότερον and Πρεσβύτερον, how distinguished in their Signification, 364
PANÆTIUS, 468
Passions, different effects from them, as their Motions are tempestuous, or orderly, 427, 428
Passivity pure, where it exists, 116. insensitive, 270. of the Human Mind, how to be moulded, 261. corruptive and completive, 269
PAUL, SAINT, 250, 356
Πῆ, it's signification, 389
Peace, to what Genus it belongs 444
Pedantry, what, 379
Perception, the Cause of *spontaneous* Impulse, 423. it's extensive Influence, 413. *coincides* with Volition, 429. different in degree and excellence, 415, 483
PERICLES, 2, 466
PERIPATETICS, 22, 70. their erroneous System of Astronomy, ibid. their doctrine about *corporeal* Attributes, 90, 91. about Chance, 128. about Transmigration, 191. about Capacity, 152. about the Necessity of the *previous Existence* of some *Energy*, 284, 286, 480
PERIZONIUS, 444
PERSIUS, 460
PHILIP of Macedon, his Epistle to *Aristotle*, 467
PHILO, 457
PHILOPONUS, JOHN, 57. explains Privation by the Musical Modes, 60, 61. his Account of *Matter* and *Form*, 63. explains *Democritus*, 340. and Motion, 402. quoted, 434, 435. explains the Term, *Metaphysical*, 483
Philosophy, why so called, 1. its End, ibid. defended, 3, 4, 5. Philosophy First, see *First*.

Physics, 33. Chap. 3d. 4th. 5th. p. 136, 153, 164, 173, 199, 200, 231, &c. 248, 258, 260, 270, 271, 273, 278, 322, 323, 328, 329, 339, 340, 341, 381, 383 to 391, 393, 395, 401, 431, 432, 433, 434. See the words, *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*.

Place, defined, 292. its Use in Life and human Affairs, 292. its connection with human affairs generates WHERE, 295. Place and Time, QUANTITIES, 183, 187, 291. are capable of being defined, why, 291. defined, 292.

Plants, or Vegetables, *live*, but are not Animals, 423

PLATO, his Idea of *Matter*, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80. quoted, 106, 129. his Account of the liberal Sciences, 197, 198. quoted, 247, 345, 401, 423, 438, 442

Platonic Bodies, —— —— 319

PLETHO, 235. quoted from a MS. ibid.

PLOTINUS, —— —— 148, 205

PLUTARCH, 243, 245. a Correction by one of his Editors disapproved, 247. *Plutarch* quoted, 338, 457

Poets, why indebted to the Arrangement of *Quality*, 176. why to that of *Relation*, 227. why to that of *Position*, —— —— 333

POMPEY esteemed *Cratippus*, and why, 469

POLYBIUS, —— —— 2, 468, 469

POPE, —— —— —— 358

PORPHYRY, —— —— 19, 252

POSITION, differs from *Place*, how, 315, 316. deduced in its various characters, 317 to 325, also 328, appertains to Bodies, neither perfectly similar, nor perfectly dissimilar, 320. Modes of *Position*, first in the *Parallelepipedon* and *Cylinder*, 320, 321. then in the Column or *Pillar*, 321, 322. then in a *Tree*, 322, 323. then in a *Man*, 323, 324, 325. Modes of *Position* increase in number, and why, from 320 to 325. *Positions* described, standing, inclining

clining, lying, falling, rising, 320, 321. other *Positions*, 323, &c. *Positions* relative to animal Progression, 328, 329. Force of those *Positions* in Painting, 329. in other Works of Art, 329, 330. (See *Attitude.*) *Position* gives a Name, and (as it were) an Essence to some works of Art, 330. Its Use to Actors, and Orators, 337, 338. Reason of its amazing Effects, 339. of its Efficacy and Importance in *Nature*, and the visible World, 341. transition to its Force in *Mind*, Intellect, and Beings Incorporeal, 341, 342. in teaching, or communicating Science, 344, 345. its *Archetypal Form*, where to be found, 346.

POST-PREDICAMENTS, 36. their Number, 361

Power, or *Capacity*, 278. particular Powers, *various* in character, but *limited*, 279. differ by this from one another, 280. Powers Active, an important difference in, ibid. *Rational* Powers differ from *irrational*, by being *double*, and by implying both Contraries *at once*, 281. whence this character arises, 281. Source of Praise and Dispraise, 282. Powers tho' *latent*, often valued above *apparent* Attributes, 282, 283. Power necessarily *subsequent* to Energy, 286, &c.

PRÆ-PREDICAMENTS, 36

PREDICAMENTS, 31. Number of them different, according to different Philosophers, 32. pass into one another, 191.

Principles are *contrary*, 48. this, the Sentiment of all Philosophers, ibid. are three, and why, 53. Principles, *Form*, *Privation*, and a *Subject*, 56, 57. of these, some agree, others never agree, 55. all three Principles reduced to two, *Privation* being included in *Form*, 60, 61. Principle Active, and Principle Passive, what, 271. Principles *efficient*, their Ascent upwards to the *First Efficient*, 288. Vegetative Principle, 433. Principle of Gravitation, 436. two great Principles of the Universe, what, 453

INDEX

PRIOR and SUBSEQUENT, their Modes, or Species, 363 to 374. the *temporal* Mode, 363. the *essential*, 364. that *of Order*, 367. that *of Honour*, 368. that *of Causality*, —— —— 372
PRIOR, the Poet, —— —— —— 126
Privation, its character, 57, 58, 336, 337, 363, 445
Progression in Arts, 7. in Morals, —— 154
Property of Substance, 134. of Quality, 175. of Quantity, 191. Properties of all three, 191
Propositions, what, 10, 12, 36. *no innate*, 413
PROTEUS, his History according to *Virgil* and *Homer*; according to *Horace* and *Ovid*, 79, 80. allegorized by *Eustathius*, and *Heraclides Ponticus*, and, in latter times, by *Lord Verulam*, —— 81, 82, 83
PROVIDENCE, nothing hid from, 130, 131, 476. consults for the Good of all, 131. extends to the *lowest* of Beings, —— —— 435
PSALM, —— —— 130, 207, 356
PYTHAGORAS, supposed Author of the PREDICAMENTS, 7. quoted, —— 470, 471
PYTHAGOREANS, —— 55, 101, 401, 423

Q.

QUALITIES corporeal, *inseparable* from Body, 86. sensible, 88. Quality comes *next* to Substance, according to the *Pythagoreans*, 143. Qualities *corporeal*, and *incorporeal*, 145, 146. of *Capacity* and *Incapacity*, 150. of *Habit*, 157. *natural* and *acquired*, 147. *penetrating*, and *superficial*, 164. *Figures*, Quality, 168, 169. *Colours*, Quality, 170. Qualities how distinguished from incidental Affections, 171. Persons of *Quality*, 172, 173. peculiar *Property of Quality*, 175. *Quality* and *Quantity* often introduced together, 21, 207.
Quality occult, —— 435
QUANTITY, *Continuous* or *Discrete*; *Magnitude* or *Multitudes*,

titude, 181, 182, 183. Specific Distinctions between the two species, 183, 184, 185. Distinctions of either species resolved ultimately into *Identity* and *Diversity*, 190. *the Property of all Quantity*, what, 191. Quantity passes into *Relation*, 191. passes thro' all the other Arrangements, 200. sublime Idea of its efficacy according to *Plotinus* and *Iamblichus*, 303, 4. compared to the Predicament, WHERE, —, 488
QUINCTILIAN, —— 32, 207, 306, 438, 456
Quotations, Apology for their number, 455. justified by examples, —— —— 456, 457

R.

RALEIGH, Sir WALTER, —— —— 4
Rasa Tabula, the *Human* Mind or Intellect so called, and why, —— —— 120, 415
Rational, and *Irrational*, Faculties, —— 418, 419
Reason, 262, 419. its object, ibid. sometimes overwhelmed by the Passions, sometimes obeyed by them, 427, 428
RELATIVES, other Arrangements or Predicaments pass into them, 191. commutable in their character, 192, 3. why expressed by a *plural*, 212. their force and efficacy, 214. true and genuine Relatives, what, 215, 217. their *Properties* are, to *reciprocate*, 218. to be understood both of them *at once*, and with *equal* precision, 219. both of them to *co-exist*, and *cease* at the same instant, 221. other Predicaments connected with *Relation*, 191, 192, 213, 216, 217. *Relation* appears trivial, yet in fact is of the last importance, 224, 225. the Basis of *Moral* Duties, 225, 226, &c. supplies *Connection*, where *Continuity* fails, 230. *Relations* traced thro' the Universe, 230. those of the Sun to the World, 232. of the Earth to Vegetables, 232, 233. of Animals, Families, Civil Polities,

Politics, to each other, 234. of Vegetables 235. *Relations* amicable, 236. hoſtile, 239, 240. hoſtile *Relation* gave riſe to the Phœnomenon of *Evil*, 241, &c. *chief* and *ſupreme* Relation; that of *the whole* to *God*, 249, 250. Utility of this *Arrangement*, 250. Things intelligible, and *Intellection*; things ſenſible, and *Senſation*; how theſe become *Relatives*, 251.

REST, the natural Oppoſite, or Contrary to *Motion*, 392. its ſeveral Species from page 441, to 444. Ceſſation of *Local* Motion, 442. of *Growth*, ibid. of the *Vital Energies*, ibid. of *bodily Labour*, 443. of *Study*, Inveſtigation, and Deliberation, 443. of *War*, 444

ROSCIUS, more admired, when he acted *without* a Maſk, —— —— 481

S.

SANCTIUS, —— —— —— 443

SANDERSON, — 36, 220, 221, 292, 316, 348

SANDYS, —— —— —— 458

SAPPHO, —— —— 151

SATURA, or SATIRA, when applied to Writings, did not mean at firſt either *Sarcaſm* or Calumny, 460

SATYRUS, the Actor, —— —— 338

SCALIGER, —— —— —— 445

Science, is of Contraries, 281. Sciences and Arts, their Subordination, and common dependance on *the Firſt Philoſophy*, 366, 367. Science prior to Art, 482. its Etymology in Greek, 444. no Science of *particulars*, 20, 21. Sciences and Arts, traced up to, and deduced from, the ſeveral *Arrangements* or *Categories*, by examples taken from each of them, 461, 462

INDEX.

Scripture, 43, 56, 114, 130, 207, 250, 305, 306, 337, 356, 358, 438, 446
SENECA, —— 410, 412, 413, 420, 437
Sensation, not taught, but *perfect* from the beginning, 153.
a Species of *Knowlege*, —— 483
Sense, Common, what, —— —— 202
Sensible Objects, differ from Relatives, how, 220.
sensible Objects, Common to *many* or *all* of the Senses, what, and how many, —— 394
SHAFTESBURY, Lord, quoted, —— 103
SHAKESPEARE, 69, 147, 170, 174, 227, 228, 256, 293
SIBYL, Cumean, — — — 135
SICILY, — — — — 325
SIDNEY, ALGERNON, — — 4
Silva, a Wood or Grove, meant a *miscellany Treatise*, why, — — — — — 461
SIMPLICIUS, his account of the Predicaments, 32. wrote a valuable Tract upon the Subject, 7. quoted, 50, 59, 112, 143, 148, 166, 205, 213, 214, 215, 223, 224, 250. his account of the *Eubarmonic* System, and of the *Stoic* Writings, in the age when he lived, 232. quoted, 253, 261, 262, 264, 265, 272, 294, 295, 298, 317, 349, 350, 364. 374,
SITUATION. see POSITION.
Sleep and *Death*, Brothers, 337, 443. Sleep, what 443
Social Sympathy, 144. State, 416.
SOCRATES, — — 119, 197, 447, 448
SOPHOCLES, — — — — 338
Soul, its three great Principles, 106. itself *not visible*, but known from its *Operations*, 108. *immortal*, 118
Space, of Place and Time, connected with Motion, how, — — — — 395

Sphere,

Sphere, has no Position, or Situation, tho' it occupy Place, —— —— 318, 327
Spontaneous, how it differs from Forced, 408. what it is, and what constitutes it, 410, 411, 412, &c.
Stat and *Sedet*, peculiar uses of them, 443, 444
STATIUS, —— —— 461
STOICS, 22, 72. 411. account of the State of their Writings in the time of *Simplicius*, — 253
Strife, its utility, —— —— 245, 246
STUART, —— —— —— 461
Sublunary, meaning of the Word, —— 70
SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE, 25, 454. general and particular, 25. at the head of the Predicaments, 31. Substance natural, how *continued*, or carried on, 38. Substance, its *Properties*, considered logically, 132. has no Contraries *within* itself, 133. but susceptible of them *all*, —— 134
Substantial Form, what, — 90, 164, 167, 387
SUIDAS, —— —— —— 129
Sun, his Relations, and Duties, 232. a Cause of Generation, 246. presides over his proper System, 341
SUPREME BEING, 102, 110, 139, 161, 249, 264, 287, 288, 311, 313, 345, 450
Συστοιχία, 55, vide Co-arrangement.
SYDENHAM, his elegant translation of Plato, 345, 442
Syllogisms, — — 10, 11, 12, 13, 429
Sylva, Matter, 74, 247. *Sylvæ*, Miscellanies, 461
Systems of Nature, four: one, which admitted *no God*, 128. a second, which supposed Gods, that gave themselves *no trouble*, 129. a third, which only employed them on *difficult occasions*, 130. a fourth,

which ſupplied *Divine Providence never to ceaſe* for a moment, —— —— 130

T.

TACITUS, —— —— —— 373
Taſte, what it is, 459, 460. its natural Union, 459
TEMPLE, Sir W. —— —— 4
Terms, ſimple, their importance, 12, 13. what they repreſent, 14, 15. their character, 17. ſuch among them as denote *When*, and *Where*, 299, 300. ſuch as denote them not, yet denote *Time* and *Place*, 300
TERENCE, —— —— 144, 209
THALES, his Idea concerning the Magnet, 435. fine Sentiment about Providence, ibid. and p, 476
THEMISTIUS, 59. his Idea of Matter, 66, 71, 138
THEOGNIS, —— —— 57
THRASEA PÆTUS, —— —— 3, 373
TIBULLUS, —— —— 209
TIMÆUS, —— —— 75, 79, 89, 147
Time, *Place*, both of them *Quantities*, 183, 290. *Time*, how diſtinguiſhed from other Quantities *continuous*, 186, 7. Diſtinction, a peculiar one belonging to *Time* and *Place*, 187, 8. *Time* infinitely diviſible *in Power*, but *not in Act*, 188. having a Genus, and a Difference, may be defined, 291, 292. its Uſe in Life, and human affairs, 293 its connection with human affairs generates WHEN, 292, 297
Tous deux, —— —— 473
Tragedy and *Comedy* made out of the ſame Letters, 343
Tranſition, ſee Motion.
Truth, all Truth, Good, 430. its union with Taſte, in fine Writing, 459. all Truth, ſimilar and congenial,

nial, 1, 459. conſequence of this, in the forming of characters, 1. in the elegance of Compoſition, 459

TYPHOEUS, the Giant, his *Poſitions* finely enumerated by *Ovid*, when he deſcribes how the Iſland *Sicily* was thrown upon him, — 325, 326

V.

VANBRUGH, Sir John, his elegant reply, and his predicting the fine taſte of gardening, now at its height in *Great Britain*, —— 353

Vappa, ſee Fopp.

VARRO, 470. his account of four Predicaments, ibid.

Vegetative Life, deſcribed, 434, ſee Nature.

VELLEIUS PATERCULUS, —— 468

VENUS wedded to VULCAN: the Fable explained, 7. her Motion, as a Goddeſs, 201. her Appearance, 210

Utility of theſe *Arrangements* or *Predicaments*, 17, 33, 34, 453, 454, 458, 460, 462

Verbs tranſitive, and Neuter, where to be found among the Predicaments, —— —— 266

VERULAM, Lord, —— —— 82

VIRGIL, 90, 106, 109, 110, 129, 135, 147, 177, 181, 182, 200, 210, 233, 234, 241, 242, 257, 270, 280, 295, 296, 297, 305, 307, 308, 333, 337, 357, 373, 375, 383, 386, 427, 433, 437, 443, 445, 447.

VIRTUE, PLEASURE, and HERCULES, 262. moral Virtue, —— —— 160

Unifying comprehenſion, *the Property of Mind*, 137, 138, 476

Union, —— —— 47, 245, 251

Volition and Perception, their objects *coincide*, where, 429
VOLUME THE FIRST, 128, 140, 169, 201, 230, 234, 248, 270, 282, 283, 329, 409, 424, 432, 433, 445
Υποκείμενον and Ὕλη, how they differ, —— 71
UPTON, —— —— —— 3, 130

W.

WALLIS, — — 292, 316, 348
Wants, their Efficacy, 230, 231, 248, 249. Source of Connection, 411. founded on Perception, 424. the Source of *animal* Motion, 426. lead to Arts, and Induſtry, 445. to have few Wants, is *great*; to have none, *Divine*, — 447, 448
WHEN, connected with *Time*, 292. its nature and character, 297. co-incides with WHERE, 297. an *enlarged When*, and a *preciſe* one, both of them relative to each individual, 302. uſe of the *preciſe* When, in computation of *diſtant* Time, 303
WHERE, connected with *Place*, 292. its nature and character, 297. co-incides with WHEN, 297. *Where* and *When* called by *Simplicius* Brothers, 298. an *enlarged Where*, and a *preciſe* one, both of them relative to each Individual, 302. uſe of the *preciſe* Where, in computing *diſtant* Places, 303, compared with Quantity, —— 480
WILTON-HOUSE, its valuable Marbles, — 332
Wiſdom, Book of, — — — 430
Words, *Things*, *Ideas*, all reſpect ſimple Terms, and how, — — — 15, 16
World, one City or Commonwealth, 230, 231. a Theatre, 244. made by Reaſon, and Deſign, 309, 310